Poll: Free will most people think they have

[Juma]

''Determines'' in the sense that the information state of the brain in any given instance, adaptive, maladaptive, glitches, connectivity failure, etc, that is expressed in conscious form, this not being open to modification through an act of will. The same rule applies to realizable veto, which is possible if there is sufficient time within the sequence of cognitive events to alter a decision in progress, ie, a train of thought interrupted by new information and vetoed...you change your mind. Or more to the point, your mind is changed by fresh input within the neuronal decision making process. All being related to states and conditions within a brain, which is information. Including a failure to connect here, a chemical imbalance there, particle position, ion flow and so on.

The will itself let's define physically as state A. If the prior state causes state A in accordance with some kind of determinable mechanics (such as Newtonian or QM pilot wave theory) then I agree that we do not have free will. The will would have to follow mechanical principles.

However, if the prior state does not determine state A, and state A determines itself, then that is equivalent to free will.

What does ”state A determines itself” even mean?

 

[ryan]

''Determines'' in the sense that the information state of the brain in any given instance, adaptive, maladaptive, glitches, connectivity failure, etc, that is expressed in conscious form, this not being open to modification through an act of will. The same rule applies to realizable veto, which is possible if there is sufficient time within the sequence of cognitive events to alter a decision in progress, ie, a train of thought interrupted by new information and vetoed...you change your mind. Or more to the point, your mind is changed by fresh input within the neuronal decision making process. All being related to states and conditions within a brain, which is information. Including a failure to connect here, a chemical imbalance there, particle position, ion flow and so on.

The will itself let's define physically as state A. If the prior state causes state A in accordance with some kind of determinable mechanics (such as Newtonian or QM pilot wave theory) then I agree that we do not have free will. The will would have to follow mechanical principles.

However, if the prior state does not determine state A, and state A determines itself, then that is equivalent to free will.

What does ”state A determines itself” even mean?

Think about it. You can figure it out.

 

[DBT]

''Determines'' in the sense that the information state of the brain in any given instance, adaptive, maladaptive, glitches, connectivity failure, etc, that is expressed in conscious form, this not being open to modification through an act of will. The same rule applies to realizable veto, which is possible if there is sufficient time within the sequence of cognitive events to alter a decision in progress, ie, a train of thought interrupted by new information and vetoed...you change your mind. Or more to the point, your mind is changed by fresh input within the neuronal decision making process. All being related to states and conditions within a brain, which is information. Including a failure to connect here, a chemical imbalance there, particle position, ion flow and so on.

The will itself let's define physically as state A. If the prior state causes state A in accordance with some kind of determinable mechanics (such as Newtonian or QM pilot wave theory) then I agree that we do not have free will. The will would have to follow mechanical principles.

However, if the prior state does not determine state A, and state A determines itself, then that is equivalent to free will.

You don't need hard determinism to eliminate the possibility of free will at work within the system. If there are random changes, quantum events, altering the decision making process, these are not subject to will or choice yet alter the normal course of decision making in unpredictable and probably undesirable ways. Decision making itself not being an example of free will, random glitches being worse.

 

[Juma]

What does ”state A determines itself” even mean?

Think about it. You can figure it out.

No. A state cannot ”determine itself”. It doesnt mean anything.

 

[ryan]

''Determines'' in the sense that the information state of the brain in any given instance, adaptive, maladaptive, glitches, connectivity failure, etc, that is expressed in conscious form, this not being open to modification through an act of will. The same rule applies to realizable veto, which is possible if there is sufficient time within the sequence of cognitive events to alter a decision in progress, ie, a train of thought interrupted by new information and vetoed...you change your mind. Or more to the point, your mind is changed by fresh input within the neuronal decision making process. All being related to states and conditions within a brain, which is information. Including a failure to connect here, a chemical imbalance there, particle position, ion flow and so on.

The will itself let's define physically as state A. If the prior state causes state A in accordance with some kind of determinable mechanics (such as Newtonian or QM pilot wave theory) then I agree that we do not have free will. The will would have to follow mechanical principles.

However, if the prior state does not determine state A, and state A determines itself, then that is equivalent to free will.

You don't need hard determinism to eliminate the possibility of free will at work within the system. If there are random changes, quantum events, altering the decision making process, these are not subject to will or choice yet alter the normal course of decision making in unpredictable and probably undesirable ways. Decision making itself not being an example of free will, random glitches being worse.

If something fully forms and causes my intentions/will, okay, maybe no free will. But if nothing fully forms and causes them, then why can't they be free (all being components of a stream of consciousness)?

 

[ryan]

What does ”state A determines itself” even mean?

Think about it. You can figure it out.

No. A state cannot ”determine itself”.

With nothing else determining it, why not it?

 

[DBT]

You don't need hard determinism to eliminate the possibility of free will at work within the system. If there are random changes, quantum events, altering the decision making process, these are not subject to will or choice yet alter the normal course of decision making in unpredictable and probably undesirable ways. Decision making itself not being an example of free will, random glitches being worse.

If something fully forms and causes my intentions/will, okay, maybe no free will. But if nothing fully forms and causes them, then why can't they be free (all being components of a stream of consciousness)?

Doesn't help. You experience thoughts and intentions, etc, because they are being formed by the underlying process, a process that you the conscious experience of thoughts and intentions, etc, have no access to, or control over.

 

[ryan]

You don't need hard determinism to eliminate the possibility of free will at work within the system. If there are random changes, quantum events, altering the decision making process, these are not subject to will or choice yet alter the normal course of decision making in unpredictable and probably undesirable ways. Decision making itself not being an example of free will, random glitches being worse.

If something fully forms and causes my intentions/will, okay, maybe no free will. But if nothing fully forms and causes them, then why can't they be free (all being components of a stream of consciousness)?

Doesn't help. You experience thoughts and intentions, etc, because they are being formed by the underlying process, a process that you the conscious experience of thoughts and intentions, etc, have no access to, or control over.

I said,"But if nothing fully forms and causes them", and then you respond with "they are being formed by the underlying process". You aren't addressing what I said.

I agree that my intensions are mostly formed and caused in the sense that I am presented with limited options instead of infinite, but if the deterministic mechanics have any gap at all (and we know they must) then the rest of the formation and cause is coming from somewhere else, possibly from itself as far as anyone knows.

 

[DBT]

Doesn't help. You experience thoughts and intentions, etc, because they are being formed by the underlying process, a process that you the conscious experience of thoughts and intentions, etc, have no access to, or control over.

I said,"But if nothing fully forms and causes them", and then you respond with "they are being formed by the underlying process". You aren't addressing what I said.

I was trying to point out that if you are having an experience, your experience is being formed. Your experience is fully formed. What a partly formed experience may be, or feel like, I have no idea. Maybe that should be explained.

I agree that my intensions are mostly formed and caused in the sense that I am presented with limited options instead of infinite, but if the deterministic mechanics have any gap at all (and we know they must) then the rest of the formation and cause is coming from somewhere else, possibly from itself as far as anyone knows.

What is a partly formed intention?

 

[fromderinside]

What one does is determined. Full Stop! What one thinks one does is an irresistible human inclination. An inclination I argue is necessary for one, a social animal, to sustain probability of one's existence, that is to be fit. Such puts will as a form of rationalization and presentation for already committed behavior, not put one in a controlling onset of behavior. Sorry if this has already been established. Just came upon this thread. Obviously I'm controlling the weal.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Is that all the argument you have?

Well, I suppose I could. It's just that I am free to do what I want.
EB

And how is that different from just doing what you want?

I'm also free not to do what I want, and I do that a lot too.

You should try it sometime.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

What one does is determined. Full Stop! What one thinks one does is an irresistible human inclination. An inclination I argue is necessary for one, a social animal, to sustain probability of one's existence, that is to be fit. Such puts will as a form of rationalization and presentation for already committed behavior, not put one in a controlling onset of behavior. Sorry if this has already been established. Just came upon this thread. Obviously I'm controlling the weal.

Complete nonsense.
EB

PS Please check your email.

 

[ruby sparks]

[It feels like] I'm also free not to do what I want, and [I feel like] I do that a lot too.

Suggested amendments in brackets.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It's not just that I 'feel' free to act (or not). In my experience, I can choose what to do next and I assume other people can also choose what to do next. I also think this is a perfectly rational view to have and one which is perfectly consistent with a scientific outlook. And I still have to see any argument that this view would be wrong somehow.
EB

 

[ryan]

I was trying to point out that if you are having an experience, your experience is being formed. Your experience is fully formed. What a partly formed experience may be, or feel like, I have no idea. Maybe that should be explained.

I agree that my intensions are mostly formed and caused in the sense that I am presented with limited options instead of infinite, but if the deterministic mechanics have any gap at all (and we know they must) then the rest of the formation and cause is coming from somewhere else, possibly from itself as far as anyone knows.

What is a partly formed intention?

I tried to explain in the post you responded to. Partly formed/determined free will is the neural processes that presents the options of A, B, C, ... etc. It constrains or limits the freedom of the will by giving it a finite set of options.

 

[fast]

I think there are two common ideas of free will.

When the tearful victim recounted her ordeal as a bank teller following the demands of the bank robber, she spoke of having to take her clothes off before handing over the cash during the heist. She says that she didn't have a choice and did not act of her own free will.

The learned ones amongst the group listening in evaluates the claim in her story about having no choice. They come to the conclusion that she was in fact mistaken on that account and decides that although she was presented with a horrifying choice between risking her life by not cooperating and possibly increasing her chances of survival by complying, she did in fact have a choice since she had volition, or an actual ability (despite possible consequences of not complying) to comply. Conclusion (among the evaluators: she had a choice).

The commoners in the crowd may espouse the view that she didn't have a choice, but again, the learned ones recognized that there was in fact a choice, hard of a choice as it was.

The leaned ones and the commoners, however, both agree that she did not act of her own free will. The basis of that conclusion is despite having the volition to have acted otherwise since her actions were in fact compelled. The learned ones in this case happen to hold that any compulsion (whether constrained to or restrained from) contrary to wants is an opposition to freedom of the will. Compatibilists agree with the commoners here. Despite an ability to do otherwise, she was not acting of her own free will.

The learned ones later discuss the issue with some other die hard free will enthusiasts. The enthusiasts say, "woe woe woe, none of us even have free will and that it's just an illusion. We don't really have choices. We live in a mechanistic universe and just as surely as the internal workings of a clock have a causal chain of events leading to a certain outcome, so too, (despite the complexities amidst the microscopic events within our thought processes) there is an unbroken gear-like link between the input and output.

In other words, although the telephone pole will fall to the east is a contingent truth if lightening strikes from the west, once the events are set in motion, despite the contingents truths, necessary events follow. Just as it is so without a human with a mind to make decisions, then so too must everything occur as they will. Imagine a world with no creatures with a brain. There would be nothing of consciousness to influence direction of events. What these enthusiasts are saying is that it remains the case with sentient beings as well, as the complexities alter the facts of physics not one bit.

The wise men listening in present a very dark assessment to both the learned ones and the enthusiasts. They say free will is not an illusion so long as volition is present. *notice the jump; it's not about compulsion but volition*. We do have free will, just as we have choices. That's not the dark part. The dark part is that they hold true that every event is a necessary event despite the contingent truths. That means, it's not true that you must but it's true that you will.

That parts gets complex, so let's use the God knows all example. God knows you will choose vanilla on august 1st. God cannot be mistaken. Now, does this mean you MUST choose vanilla? Some think so, but that's not true. It's only true if it's a necessary truth, but it's not a necessary truth. It's a contingent truth. The choice is not compelled, as you can choose otherwise. It's not that you must choose vanilla but rather that you will.

Anyway, this gets a little convoluted sometimes. The main thrust of my point is that in common everyday language, what we regard as free will is ambiguous. It's very common to use the term when compulsion is involved; in philosophical circles, especially precompatibilist times, the long standing debate regard volition as being more vital. See, the divide has been between the implications of determinism. If one, then not the other.

I'm beginning to recall the dangers of labels. There is the precompatibilist notion of free will that apparently will not suffer a swift death, and then there's the newer more ordinary notion that lives to never engage in the fight.

 

[DBT]

I was trying to point out that if you are having an experience, your experience is being formed. Your experience is fully formed. What a partly formed experience may be, or feel like, I have no idea. Maybe that should be explained.

I agree that my intensions are mostly formed and caused in the sense that I am presented with limited options instead of infinite, but if the deterministic mechanics have any gap at all (and we know they must) then the rest of the formation and cause is coming from somewhere else, possibly from itself as far as anyone knows.

What is a partly formed intention?

I tried to explain in the post you responded to. Partly formed/determined free will is the neural processes that presents the options of A, B, C, ... etc. It constrains or limits the freedom of the will by giving it a finite set of options.

Your explanation wasn't clear...at least not me. I still don't know what you mean.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I think there are two common ideas of free will. <snip>

Excellent post.

Thanks.
EB