Possibility (two perspectives)

[Treedbear]

That four is actually what it landed on doesn’t alter the possibility of what it could have landed on.
...

It was a possibility and it no longer is.

It is still true today that it was a possibility yesterday. The truth hasn't changed.

How are you going to prove there was really a possibility of landing a 6 yesterday when you know it was a 4 the die showed. It's done. Alea jacta est. You can consider current possibilities because you are ignorant of the future.

You may even talk of what happened in the past in terms of possibilities when you actually ignore what happened.

Thus, it's possible the murderer stalked its victim for weeks before committing the crime. It is still a possibility today that the murderer stalked its victim for weeks simply because you happen to still ignore today that it was not the case. Epistemological possibility. There's nothing else to it which is not metaphysical.

What is the use of a metaphysical possibility?
EB

It could be used to say something like: "It's possible you could have made a different choice.", since the possibility still exists.

 

[fast]

That four is actually what it landed on doesn’t alter the possibility of what it could have landed on.
...

It was a possibility and it no longer is.

It is still true today that it was a possibility yesterday. The truth hasn't changed.

How are you going to prove there was really a possibility of landing a 6 yesterday when you know it was a 4 the die showed. It's done. Alea jacta est. You can consider current possibilities because you are ignorant of the future.

You may even talk of what happened in the past in terms of possibilities when you actually ignore what happened.

Thus, it's possible the murderer stalked its victim for weeks before committing the crime. It is still a possibility today that the murderer stalked its victim for weeks simply because you happen to still ignore today that it was not the case. Epistemological possibility. There's nothing else to it which is not metaphysical.

What is the use of a metaphysical possibility?
EB

It could be used to say something like: "It's possible you could have made a different choice.", since the possibility still exists.

Yes, but that too can be subtley twisted. How is it possible I could have made a different choice when the evidence is before us that I did not. It’s like there’s always a different interpretation hanging in the balance.

 

[Treedbear]

...
It could be used to say something like: "It's possible you could have made a different choice.", since the possibility still exists.

Yes, but that too can be subtley twisted. How is it possible I could have made a different choice when the evidence is before us that I did not. It’s like there’s always a different interpretation hanging in the balance.

I don't see that as the issue. The issue is that the possibility of making that choice (or the result from that roll of the dice) gets to ignore everything that caused that particular result in that particular instance. It's the presumption that even if everything was the same the result of the roll (or the choice) could have been different.

 

[Speakpigeon]

What is the use of a metaphysical possibility?
EB

It could be used to say something like: "It's possible you could have made a different choice.", since the possibility still exists.

Exactly the same as: "You could have made a different choice".

However, now it's clear with the past tense of "could have made" that the possibility no longer exists for that particular choice. It existed as long as the choice was still in the future because you couldn't know at the time what choice you would make eventually.

We don't think in terms of the possibilities of changing the past, because we know what the past is (or believe we know).

Your sentence "It's possible you could have made a different choice" is just sloppy English and effectively self-contradictory.

You could say "It's possible he made a different choice" if you mean that what we assume as to the choice he made may be false. And this would be in the present: there is now the possibility that, unbeknownst to us, he made a different choice from what we believe that he did.

Your sentence is self-contradictory because it means both that you know and don't know what choice was made.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

...
It could be used to say something like: "It's possible you could have made a different choice.", since the possibility still exists.

Yes, but that too can be subtley twisted. How is it possible I could have made a different choice when the evidence is before us that I did not. It’s like there’s always a different interpretation hanging in the balance.

I don't see that as the issue. The issue is that the possibility of making that choice (or the result from that roll of the dice) gets to ignore everything that caused that particular result in that particular instance. It's the presumption that even if everything was the same the result of the roll (or the choice) could have been different.

Could have been... There was a possibility of a different outcome. That possibility no longer exists.
EB

 

[fast]

Rolling a four isn’t the only possibility.
I can say that even after a roll has been made.

I’m trying to be careful not to fall into past tense usage after what actually occured is known.

 

[fromderinside]

Boole yah Bayes

 

[fromderinside]

OK, I give you the last 20 outcomes:

Show

3, 4, 5, 3, 2, 3, 1, 5, 4, 1, 1, 1, 5, 2, 3, 1, 4, 4, 5, 4.

EB

I couldn't find that sequence in my Chemical Rubber Publishing Company Book of mathematics and statistics tables. I call modding for fun and real estate.

It's late and I'm tired by not sleepy.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Rolling a four isn’t the only possibility.
I can say that even after a roll has been made.

I’m trying to be careful not to fall into past tense usage after what actually occured is known.

I've already replied to that.

If the die is loaded, what you think is a possibility won't be an actual one, and after 10 or one thousand throws you will realise it by yourself and you will stop thinking it's a possibility, or indeed that there were any such possibility from the start.

Each time you throw a (fair) die, you will consider the possibilities anew. What are the actual possibilities will be rolled out in front of you as you keep throwing the die: 3, 5, 2, 2, 1, 1, 5, 3, 2, 4, 1, 4... No 6's? Maybe no 6's. It's possible. And it is it actually the case that no 6 will ever come out because the die is loaded, then having a 6 never was a possibility.

This is how things work because we actually can't know what would be the actual "potential results" of casting a die before casting it. Only the fact that you throw the die and look at the results will tell you what are the actual possibilities. Talk of possibilities is a measure of how ignorant we are. God is possible. You a Chinese spy to me is possible. Trump a genius is possible. It's just that he makes sure he looks like an idiot.

Anyway, I guess you want to believe in metaphysical things like possibilities and knowledge of the real world outside your mind. There's nothing I can do to convince you against your will. Yours is an ideological position. Letting go of metaphysical possibilities would necessitate that you reconsider the entirety of your ideology and you probably don't feel like doing that. But, I can guaranty you that you won't find any actual possibilities outside what is actually the case. In this case, your own mind.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

I don't see that as the issue. The issue is that the possibility of making that choice (or the result from that roll of the dice) gets to ignore everything that caused that particular result in that particular instance. It's the presumption that even if everything was the same the result of the roll (or the choice) could have been different.

Could have been... There was a possibility of a different outcome. That possibility no longer exists.
EB

I would agree with you. I was just making the point that in order for the possibility (as our friend fast would have it) to remain after the event occurs you would need to re-define the word, or else find another word as he suggested might be the case in OP. He seems to want something that idealizes the concept of a possibility so that even if in any particular case our imperfect assessment of it is off, an absolutely true value for the possibility exists as a sort of Platonic ideal. Now I'm putting words in his mouth. But it seems to me that's what it would require. A possibility needs to be re-defined very narrowly to the point that it obviates all the extraneous variables that might effect the actual outcome. In other words it must reject determinism. And as a matter of course in a deterministic world there would be no such thing as possibility. Everything is inevitable. That's why the word will always be an expression of our uncertainty. And it's a perfectly good and useful way of doing that. We shouldn't look for opportunities to corrupt that meaning.

 

[fast]

I don't see that as the issue. The issue is that the possibility of making that choice (or the result from that roll of the dice) gets to ignore everything that caused that particular result in that particular instance. It's the presumption that even if everything was the same the result of the roll (or the choice) could have been different.

Could have been... There was a possibility of a different outcome. That possibility no longer exists.
EB

I would agree with you. I was just making the point that in order for the possibility (as our friend fast would have it) to remain after the event occurs you would need to re-define the word, or else find another word as he suggested might be the case in OP. He seems to want something that idealizes the concept of a possibility so that even if in any particular case our imperfect assessment of it is off, an absolutely true value for the possibility exists as a sort of Platonic ideal. Now I'm putting words in his mouth. But it seems to me that's what it would require. A possibility needs to be re-defined very narrowly to the point that it obviates all the extraneous variables that might effect the actual outcome. In other words it must reject determinism. And as a matter of course in a deterministic world there would be no such thing as possibility. Everything is inevitable. That's why the word will always be an expression of our uncertainty. And it's a perfectly good and useful way of doing that. We shouldn't look for opportunities to corrupt that meaning.

It wouldn’t affect my perspective of determinism.

Determinism (to me) is a looking back view. For instance, if an event occurs (I’ll call it event Y), I may be interested in knowing if it was determined. The answer (for me) is finding out whether there was a cause or multiple reasons that explain how or why the event occured. If there was a cause, then the event was determined.

Keep in mind that I do not hold the view that a caused event is a necessary event. In fact, I hold the view that events are better off characterized as contingent events. All events that must happen will happen, but just because an event will happen, that doesn’t mean it must happen—and that’s because caused events are contingent events.

People often have a distorted view of determinism that I could characterize as forward looking—as if to have a fortune telling necessity embracing ora about it. Hard determinists take it to such an extreme that they conclude free will is an illusion and portray humanities events as marching to clock-work precision.

The truth condition in the JTB Theory of Knowledge does NOT say that our justified beliefs MUST be true—only that they ARE true. It is at least almost always the case we might (bare possibility) be mistaken, yet the logical possibility ALONE does not alter in any way what is ACTUALLY the case.

I insist that possibly being mistaken and actually not being mistaken is consistent.

 

[Treedbear]

..,.
I would agree with you. I was just making the point that in order for the possibility (as our friend fast would have it) to remain after the event occurs you would need to re-define the word, or else find another word as he suggested might be the case in OP. He seems to want something that idealizes the concept of a possibility so that even if in any particular case our imperfect assessment of it is off, an absolutely true value for the possibility exists as a sort of Platonic ideal. Now I'm putting words in his mouth. But it seems to me that's what it would require. A possibility needs to be re-defined very narrowly to the point that it obviates all the extraneous variables that might effect the actual outcome. In other words it must reject determinism. And as a matter of course in a deterministic world there would be no such thing as possibility. Everything is inevitable. That's why the word will always be an expression of our uncertainty. And it's a perfectly good and useful way of doing that. We shouldn't look for opportunities to corrupt that meaning.

It wouldn’t affect my perspective of determinism.

Determinism (to me) is a looking back view. For instance, if an event occurs (I’ll call it event Y), I may be interested in knowing if it was determined. The answer (for me) is finding out whether there was a cause or multiple reasons that explain how or why the event occured. If there was a cause, then the event was determined.

Keep in mind that I do not hold the view that a caused event is a necessary event. In fact, I hold the view that events are better off characterized as contingent events. All events that must happen will happen, but just because an event will happen, that doesn’t mean it must happen—and that’s because caused events are contingent events.

I don't understand what you mean by contingent. An event that has multiple simultaneous causes? Complex circumstances? That's not an argument against determinism.

People often have a distorted view of determinism that I could characterize as forward looking—as if to have a fortune telling necessity embracing ora about it. Hard determinists take it to such an extreme that they conclude free will is an illusion and portray humanities events as marching to clock-work precision.

Comparing it to clockwork is a gross understatement of the complexity of the physical world. But that's what fortune tellers as astrologers do. Free will is only free within certain boundaries. A person is free to be who they are and no more. Why would I want to be other than myself?

The truth condition in the JTB Theory of Knowledge does NOT say that our justified beliefs MUST be true—only that they ARE true.

It seems to me that's backwards. The truth condition in the JTB Theory of Knowledge does NOT say that our justified beliefs ARE true—but that they MUST BE true in order for a belief to be knowledge.

It is at least almost always the case we might (bare possibility) be mistaken, yet the logical possibility ALONE does not alter in any way what is ACTUALLY the case.

I insist that possibly being mistaken and actually not being mistaken is consistent.

I'm guessing you're saying that even though the clock's broken it still gives the correct time twice a day. That's hard to justify as knowledge of the time.

 

[fast]

I don't understand what you mean by contingent. An event that has multiple simultaneous causes? Complex circumstances? That's not an argument against determinism.

I’m not arguing against determinism. Determinism is simply the view that every event has a cause. When people say things that suggest events are necessary, I retort that they’re contingent. A contingent event would be one that doesn’t have to take place. I grabbed the gun and shot the possum eating the cats food. Had the gun jammed, the event wouldn’t have occured. Events do transpire or unfold in the way they do, but we can have an effect on how things transpire, so although things will happen as they do, never should we think that events therefore unfold as they must.

Comparing it to clockwork is a gross understatement of the complexity of the physical world. But that's what fortune tellers as astrologers do. Free will is only free within certain boundaries. A person is free to be who they are and no more. Why would I want to be other than myself?

No argument from me. I believe we have free will, I believe determinism is true, and I believe they are compatable. I would side with or align with the compatibilist/soft determinist. The nemesis to free will is compulsion (constrained to do as I please not or restrained from doing as I please).

It seems to me that's backwards. The truth condition in the JTB Theory of Knowledge does NOT say that our justified beliefs ARE true—but that they MUST BE true in order for a belief to be knowledge.

The conditions are necessary. But, be very careful. Consider the proposition, “the cat is on the mat.” If I have a justified true belief, that doesn’t mean that THAT (or any component therein) has to be true. If the necessary conditions are met, then I do have knowledge (barring Gettier-type counterexamples). Never think that the cat must be on the mat; in other words, don’t inadvertently think the cat getting on the mat was a necessary event.

Let consider another example. I walked into a very clean glass door while not paying attention. I believe I did, and I have justification for my belief. It is NOT TRUE, however, that I had to walk into it. It wasn’t a necessary event. It was a contingent event. Had I been paying attention or the glass not been so clean or decided to not eat there that day, it likely would not have happened. It did ACTUALLY happen, so it’s TRUE that it happened. That is enough to satisfy the truth condition. The condition must be satisfied for the justified belief to be knowledge, but the event itself need not be a necessary event.

It is logically possible that I might be mistaken and only dreamed that I walked into the glass, but that doesn’t change anything. All that is necessary is that the condition IS TRUE.

See, when I say I know something, I might not be so certain that mistake is an impossibility. However, it’s only if I am mistaken that the conditions are not met and I do not know. If the conditions are met, then I know. I don’t have to know that I know in order for the conditions to have been met.

 

[steve_bank]

That four is actually what it landed on doesn’t alter the possibility of what it could have landed on.

Before the throw
1 is a possibility and actuality is unknown because it’s yet to be
Same for 2 to 6

After the throw
The truth regarding possibilities shouldn’t have changed. If it wasn’t possible for 4 to be what it would land on, it couldn’t have become the actual number it landed on. It seems to me that if 3 wasn’t possible (as well as 1, 2, 5, and 6), it would have been impossible for those options to have occurred.

Sounds like semantics, A possibility and an actuality are mutually exclusive.

For a six sided die the mathematical probability is 1/6. That means if you toss the die 60 times with reasonable randomness the result will be around 10 counts for each side 1-6. Try the experiment. Or a quarter. Flip the coin 100 times and record H T. It will be around 50%. As the coin is tossed the probability or possibility of H or T is always 50/50, but whether it ends up H or T is not predictable or knowable. When the coin comes to rest it is actual an H or T. Possibility versus actuality.

Once the die lands there is no probability or possibility. The result is an actual number.

Don't know any other way to explain it. maybe flipping a coin may help you. Give a quarter a good shake in cupped hands and toss it 100 times. I did there simple expeimnts 40 years ago when learninmg staistics.

Actuality requires possibility. For instance, a single die has no possibility (physical possibility, that is) of landing on a seven.
Landing on a four is certainly a possibility, no less or more than landing on anywhere from a one to a six. That fact is demonstrated by your illustration that a subsequent and independent roll shows a calculable possibility.

If it lands on a four yet am told that there is no possibility for a three landing, then that kind of negates why there was a 1 in six chance.

The wording is important, I agree.

Each number is possible. When the actual number is realized, there needs to be a tenseless expression to maintain the understanding that retains the possibilities recognized.

Of the six possibilities, it actually landed on a four. For someone to say that landing on a three isn’t possible (not wasn’t possible—keep past tense at bay) is what I object to.

It appears you just want to debar semantics. What puzzles me is if you are able to communicate in the real world without going down a semantic rabbit hole.

Exit stage right...

 

[Treedbear]

I don't understand what you mean by contingent. An event that has multiple simultaneous causes? Complex circumstances? That's not an argument against determinism.

I’m not arguing against determinism. Determinism is simply the view that every event has a cause. When people say things that suggest events are necessary, I retort that they’re contingent. A contingent event would be one that doesn’t have to take place. I grabbed the gun and shot the possum eating the cats food. Had the gun jammed, the event wouldn’t have occured. Events do transpire or unfold in the way they do, but we can have an effect on how things transpire, so although things will happen as they do, never should we think that events therefore unfold as they must.

But aren't all events contingent? That is, any cause can be considered a contingency. And those causes are the effects of prior causes. It's turtles all the way down, yes? Contingent doesn't normally mean uncaused. That would require some further explanation.

Comparing it to clockwork is a gross understatement of the complexity of the physical world. But that's what fortune tellers as astrologers do. Free will is only free within certain boundaries. A person is free to be who they are and no more. Why would I want to be other than myself?

No argument from me. I believe we have free will, I believe determinism is true, and I believe they are compatable. I would side with or align with the compatibilist/soft determinist. The nemesis to free will is compulsion (constrained to do as I please not or restrained from doing as I please).

Compatiblism/soft determinism is not determinism. And the nemesis of the argument for free will is the problem of defining what exactly it is one is talking about. Which usually comes down to the assertion that one could have chosen differently given exactly the same circumstances. Which, as I already suggested, is the reason you're seeking a way for unrealized possibilities to remain meaningful even after the event occurs. If the possibilities still exist in some metaphysical kind of way then an alternative choice would also still exists.

It seems to me that's backwards. The truth condition in the JTB Theory of Knowledge does NOT say that our justified beliefs ARE true—but that they MUST BE true in order for a belief to be knowledge.

The conditions are necessary. But, be very careful. Consider the proposition, “the cat is on the mat.” If I have a justified true belief, that doesn’t mean that THAT (or any component therein) has to be true. If the necessary conditions are met, then I do have knowledge (barring Gettier-type counterexamples). Never think that the cat must be on the mat; in other words, don’t inadvertently think the cat getting on the mat was a necessary event.

Let consider another example. I walked into a very clean glass door while not paying attention. I believe I did, and I have justification for my belief. It is NOT TRUE, however, that I had to walk into it. It wasn’t a necessary event. It was a contingent event. Had I been paying attention or the glass not been so clean or decided to not eat there that day, it likely would not have happened. It did ACTUALLY happen, so it’s TRUE that it happened. That is enough to satisfy the truth condition. The condition must be satisfied for the justified belief to be knowledge, but the event itself need not be a necessary event.

It is logically possible that I might be mistaken and only dreamed that I walked into the glass, but that doesn’t change anything. All that is necessary is that the condition IS TRUE.

See, when I say I know something, I might not be so certain that mistake is an impossibility. However, it’s only if I am mistaken that the conditions are not met and I do not know. If the conditions are met, then I know. I don’t have to know that I know in order for the conditions to have been met.

I'm not sure if you're defending the JTB or arguing around it. I myself certainly don't consider it sound. There are many examples of its deficiencies, including Gettier's. The main one being adequate justification for the belief. The conditions for JTB are not being met if the premises for justification are false. IOW seeing a mirage of an oasis in the desert is not JTB knowledge even though an oasis truly does exist. But the starting point is always that the knowledge is of something that is actually true. That one condition is a given.

 

[fast]

Propositions are true or false. Possibly true. Possibly false.
A true proposition couldn’t be true if it were not possible.

The cat is on the mat. Possibly true. Possibly false.
It couldn’t be true if it weren’t possible.

Possibility doesn’t truly dissipate.
Even if a proposition is true, it’s possibly false. In other words, if it wasn’t possibly false, then necessarily it was true, but the cat being on the mat wasn’t a necessary truth but a contingent truth.

 

[Treedbear]

Propositions are true or false. Possibly true. Possibly false.
A true proposition couldn’t be true if it were not possible.

The cat is on the mat. Possibly true. Possibly false.
It couldn’t be true if it weren’t possible.

Possibility doesn’t truly dissipate.

Then does it almost completely dissipate? Like if the possibility goes to essentially zero? Because if this is about Cartesian doubt possibilities become irrelevant.

Even if a proposition is true, it’s possibly false. In other words, if it wasn’t possibly false, then necessarily it was true, but the cat being on the mat wasn’t a necessary truth but a contingent truth.

When something is said to be contingent it is because it's contingent on something else. What is the cat being on the mat contingent on? Is this your theory or can you point me to some reference where this is explained more fully? All I have so far is that contingent gets around the issue of determinism.

 

[fast]

The kind of possibility that doesn’t change, go away, or dissipate is what I believe is called logical possibility.

It’s the case the cat is on the mat and it’s not the case the cat is on the mat is a contradiction, but the cat is ACTUALLY on the mat and the cat is POSSIBLY not on the mat is not a contradiction. Since it’s not a contradiction, the possibility survives.

 

[Treedbear]

The kind of possibility that doesn’t change, go away, or dissipate is what I believe is called logical possibility.

It’s the case the cat is on the mat and it’s not the case the cat is on the mat is a contradiction, but the cat is ACTUALLY on the mat and the cat is POSSIBLY not on the mat is not a contradiction. Since it’s not a contradiction, the possibility survives.

OK I give up. That's just weird. I think you should eat more haggis.

 

[fast]

The kind of possibility that doesn’t change, go away, or dissipate is what I believe is called logical possibility.

It’s the case the cat is on the mat and it’s not the case the cat is on the mat is a contradiction, but the cat is ACTUALLY on the mat and the cat is POSSIBLY not on the mat is not a contradiction. Since it’s not a contradiction, the possibility survives.

OK I give up. That's just weird. I think you should eat more haggis.

Well, it has an air weirdness about it, but with logical possibilities, weirdness abounds! Many downright physical impossibilities are nonetheless possible, logically.

The distinction seems divergent enough to warrant a descriptor so that people can appreciate the difference.