Qualia, consciousness and memory

[ruby sparks]

This thread is a split-off from the thread on 'Eliminating Qualia' and the following is an elaboration on what I said there before starting this one.

I'm going to sum up where I got to, personally, as a result of participating in that thread, and reading around the topic.

1. Qualia exist.
2. Qualia are basically, sensations. This is shorthand for 'conscious sensations'.
3. All of what we call consciousness, including self, belief, thoughts, reasoning, emotions, etc, consist, essentially, of sensations.
4. Sensations (aka qualia) and consequently all the above, probably arise out of brain processes, specifically, they probably arise out of non-conscious brain processes.
5. Consciousness is thus, 'one of the things brains can do' (in certain situations).
6. In other words, we are talking about mechanisms. Those are the appropriate models, and reduction is key.
7. Consciousness is a biological phenomenon and has evolved. It is therefore amenable to biological and evolutionary mechanism modelling.
8. There is probably causation from what we call the mental to the physical. This carries within it the implication that qualia are causal in some way.
9. We do not (yet) know how it happens, how consciousness arises, or how it interacts (if it does) with the brain, or functions in the brain it is part of.
10. Despite us not (yet) understanding what consciousness is or how it arises or functions, the study of it is amenable to science (ie applied philosophy) nonetheless.
11. Science is probably going to add more to our knowledge going forward than theoretical philosophy, though the latter will still play a useful role.


On the back of that list, for which each item could be prefaced by 'in my opinion', I'm going to suggest an amateur hypothesis which some of the various things said in the 'Eliminating Qualia' thread have prompted me to be curious about. I haven't looked into it (the evidence for or against the hypothesis) yet, though I hope to, and I don't mind being shot down in the meantime. The hypothesis is that qualia (in their complex combinations up to and including self-consciousness) reinforce memory.

I will offer a small illustration.

Pain (qualia) involves consciousness.

So, for example, according to the hypothesis, because you feel pain when you touch the flames, a stronger memory (or memory pathway) is laid down than if you didn't feel any pain. Similarly, because it hurt when the dog bit you, you will remember it and not put your finger in its mouth next time. In this sense, pain is effectively an alarm bell, and a lesson, and in that sense, a potential aid to survival. As such, once it first gradually emerged, we might expect it to be selected for.

Possibly ditto for pleasure.

I am guessing that a similar argument could be made for other 'basic qualia' such as sight, colour and taste, etc, and I am going to put my neck on the block and say that a case could hypothetically be built up from there to cover more complex arrangements of sensations, including thoughts, beliefs and self.

The key therefore, I'm suggesting, is memory.

I'm not also ruling out that 'reacting quicker' may be another outcome, in certain instances. Though I can already think of situations when non-conscious processes would be quicker, so I'm already sceptical. So on second thoughts I'm going to set that aside. 'Reacting (or predicting) better' (in certain situations, such as when forward planning or deliberating) might be more promising, and memory may come into play in that process/capacity.

I'm hoping that this is in principle a testable hypothesis and I am now (or soon) going to try to google something relevant (perhaps on pain and memory to start with). I'm well aware that my hypothesis might get shot down by the first neuroscientific paper I come across.

I should arguably have done that googling before starting the thread, but, sure, what the heck. I'm hoping it will be interesting, fun and rewarding, even if I'm wrong.

 

[ruby sparks]

Oh I should throw into the mix that I am running (provisionally) with the idea that something becomes conscious (acquires qualia) rather than non-conscious for a reason or reasons, and that these reasons may have something to do with the intensity, duration, contrast and pattern (or more specifically change in, or even more specifically the brain detecting changes in those), and possibly other characteristics, of the stimuli affecting the individual system/brain, be they external or internal stimuli.

 

[ruby sparks]

Abstracts from two studies which suggest/hypothesise that pain affects memory, specifically adversely affecting the laying down or access of memories, and/or that it "depletes scarce attentional resources, thereby interfering with concurrent cognitive tasks such as thinking, reasoning, and remembering".

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12044618

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9755349

If I were trying to advance my hypothesis, this isn't exactly supportive. On the other hand, the affects described are separate from the laying down of the pain memory itself, and it may be that this is partly what is 'using up resources'. And the cognitive drawbacks of experiencing pain would still render it undesirable in evolutionary terms. That said, these drawbacks might not be as important in survival terms as avoiding/detecting damage, which might be life-threatening or incapacitating.

One issue would be that pain (ie conscious experience) would not seem to be strictly necessary, that noiception would be sufficient, and that this may be how other living things with less complicated systems than ours function. But it does not seem that they have the 'forward planning' capacities that we do.

I could be talking complete shite here.

 

[ruby sparks]

So before I add my next 'finding' (ie sumthin I found on t'internet') I have to preface it by saying that I fully appreciate that if it's anything at all, it can be no more than a very small part, or even just a clue to a part, of a very vast and currently unsolvable puzzle, sometimes philosophically called the 'hard problem'.

It's the protein molecule PKMzeta.

Apparently, it's involved in the creation of, storage of and more importantly, ongoing retention of, memories in our brain. It's apparently involved when our systems learn new things, and it's apparently involved in pain.

"...PKMzeta shows up at the gaps between neurons (synapses) and strengthens the connections between them. These bolstered synapses are the physical embodiment of our memories, and they are fragile things. It turns out that we need to continually recreate PKMzeta at synapses to keep our memories alive. If the protein disappears, so do our memories. Unlike the text of a book or the bytes of a hard disk, the information stored in our brain is constantly on the verge of being erased."

"Asiedu and Tillu knew that after a painful experience, neurons that carry pain signals develop stronger connections, especially those in a part of the spine called the dorsal horn. This is the same thing that happens in the brain when we learn something new, and the duo reasoned that PKMzeta might be involved in both processes."

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/n...ry-for-pain-stored-in-the-spine/#.Wv_I-1MvzOR

This, I believe, is a visual model of a PKMzeta molecule:

 

[ruby sparks]

Another interesting component might be cells called astrocytes, and a chemical called interleukin 1 beta (IL-1 beta), of which astrocytes are apparently a source.

"This could mean the animals need IL-1 beta from the astrocytes to remember scary times."
https://www.sciencenewsforstudents....ells-might-help-brains-remember-pain-and-fear

Astrocyte cells (in green):


Interleukin 1 beta (IL-1 beta) diagram:

 

[Speakpigeon]

You're really going for it, I have to say!

Me, I take a very different angle.

I see qualia as incidental in there.

Be careful now, I'm talking of qualia, not sensations. Sensations, like perceptions, have been fully accommodated as a scientific concept and as such I suspect you'll get good science on the connection between sensations and whatever our neurons can be observed as doing with their synapses and such.

Qualia are just qualia and nothing else, at least for now. You're going out on a limb and it's legitimate but I won't go there with you, sorry.

The point is, irrespective of what I think about qualia, I don't think you need them at all. For the science of our brain, all you need is to understand how all those tiny biological molecules and complex neuronal structures can code whatever properties the brain has and whatever processes it can run. Just doing that will be already very, very hard. Perhaps not even possible. But you don't need to include our qualia in this quantitative, analytical model. Qualia I suspect are not even involved in the reports subjects make about their inner mental states. Science should be able to explain that using the model of the p-zombie, i.e. assuming we're all p-zombies. Creatures utterly bereft of qualia.

Still, it's true there's still a problem with that view in that subjects specifically report qualia, and certainly myself to begin with. And yet, and this is the beauty of it, it's still true I don't expect science to need qualia at all to explain what people do and how they do it. Right, it's just baffling. I am baffled myself. But that's where we are.

Still, what I think you're going to end up doing inevitably is to turn this concept of the 100% qualitative qualia into a different one, one which is 100% quantitative.

And obviously, this will be exactly the same as assuming people are just p-zombies talking of qualia as if they had them.

So, I would say, you can achieve the same thing just talking of "sensations". You really don't need this talk of qualia. It's just one word too many in any scientific explanation of what we are.

Honest.

And I'm really, really baffled about the whole thing.
EB

 

[untermensche]

I experience "red".

"Red" is the complete experience.

No "qualia" to speak of.

But we never experience just one thing.

We experience a multitude of things at all times. A huge conglomeration of individual experiences.

No "qualias" to be found.

 

[ruby sparks]

I see qualia as incidental in there.

That is a valid perspective, imo. It may be right and it may be wrong. Lately, I've been discounting it, but that doesn't mean my new opinion is set in stone. But I've largely gone off epiphenomenalism, if that's related to what you mean.

Be careful now, I'm talking of qualia, not sensations. Sensations, like perceptions, have been fully accommodated as a scientific concept and as such I suspect you'll get good science on the connection between sensations and whatever our neurons can be observed as doing with their synapses and such.

I don't, at this point, see the difference between the two terms. If there are any differences, I'm not sure they're meaningful, since it seems to me that they both refer to the same thing. For example, pain is a sensation. It is also the archetypical quale. I suspect that 'quale' is a term used by philosophers and sensation is a term used by the general public, psychologists and maybe other sciences.

The point is, irrespective of what I think about qualia, I don't think you need them at all. For the science of our brain, all you need is to understand how all those tiny biological molecules and complex neuronal structures can code whatever properties the brain has and whatever processes it can run. Just doing that will be already very, very hard. Perhaps not even possible. But you don't need to include our qualia in this quantitative, analytical model. Qualia I suspect are not even involved in the reports subjects make about their inner mental states. Science should be able to explain that using the model of the p-zombie, i.e. assuming we're all p-zombies. Creatures utterly bereft of qualia.

At this point, I'm taking the line that p-zombies are imaginary, merely a thought experiment, and that they probably cannot exist. Iow, I've sort of gone off p-zombies too.

As for whether qualia play a role or roles, I think they do, for reasons given in a few recent threads. It would be beyond me to pin it (or more likely them) down though. I hope to at least find some clues though.

Still, it's true there's still a problem with that view in that subjects specifically report qualia, and certainly myself to begin with. And yet, and this is the beauty of it, it's still true I don't expect science to need qualia at all to explain what people do and how they do it. Right, it's just baffling. I am baffled myself. But that's where we are.

Science may not need qualia to explain behaviour, but that doesn't mean it mightn't be leaving something important out. Can science actually, really explain such things without referring to sensations (qualia)? Physics and chemistry might (only might), but psychology? Cognitive Science? Biology? My feeling is that any explanation which does not involve them is likely to be incomplete in some way.

Now, you might say, 'well, what's with all the images of cells, molecules and proteins in that case?' To which I might say, looking for physical explanations does not mean eliminating or disregarding the weird mental phenomena they apparently produce. To an extent, I think Dennett and a few other philosophers are a bit guilty of doing this. Dennett, who is my most familair example, although Ned Block may be another, seems to try to do it via what he calls 'quining'. And I took away the general impression from that paper on 'real patterns' which sub posted that he is or was up to something similar with beliefs. If so, I'm not convinced. Setting qualia aside does not make them go away. Nor am I yet persuaded that the concept of either (qualia or beliefs) is so flawed as to render it useless, which is the other, not-quite-so-eliminative option.

To me, at this point, beliefs, for instance, are qualia (sensations, conscious sensations) at bottom.

Still, what I think you're going to end up doing inevitably is to turn this concept of the 100% qualitative qualia into a different one, one which is 100% quantitative.

No, I don't think so. Or, maybe there are ways of looking at them via both of those perspectives, or a hybrid of them, or some other way.

So, I would say, you can achieve the same thing just talking of "sensations". You really don't need this talk of qualia. It's just one word too many in any scientific explanation of what we are.

Your point is respectfully noted. However, I may continue to use them more or less interchangeably. I've always liked synonyms, for a variety of reasons. And if they aren't synonyms, and someone convinces me of that or that there isn't allowable overlap, well then I'll have learned a new distinction.

And coming, as I think you do, from a country which idiosyncratically decided to call potatoes 'apples of the ground' I'm hoping you of all people can appreciate that different words can relate to the same things and still be permitted.

 

[Speakpigeon]

That is a valid perspective, imo. It may be right and it may be wrong. Lately, I've been discounting it, but that doesn't mean my new opinion is set in stone. But I've largely gone off epiphenomenalism, if that's related to what you mean.

I never understood and still don't understand why people insist in talking of epiphenomenon.

epiphenomenon
1. (Philosophy) a secondary or additional phenomenon; by-product

What would it matter that something should be secondary? Would that change anything as to its actual existence? Why should we even care?

I see the use of this notion as an indication of mental confusion.

Be careful now, I'm talking of qualia, not sensations. Sensations, like perceptions, have been fully accommodated as a scientific concept and as such I suspect you'll get good science on the connection between sensations and whatever our neurons can be observed as doing with their synapses and such.

I don't, at this point, see the difference between the two terms. If there are any differences, I'm not sure they're meaningful, since it seems to me that they both refer to the same thing. For example, pain is a sensation. It is also the archetypical quale. I suspect that 'quale' is a term used by philosophers and sensation is a term used by the general public, psychologists and maybe other sciences.

The concept of quale do not assume the existence of anything else. The concept of sensation does. It has metaphysical import. It's a loaded term. You would need to prove the metaphysical claim that comes with the concept of sensation to make sure you know what you're talking about. When I use the term "qualia", I certainly know what I'm talking about. I definitely don't whenever I use the term "sensation".

Quale
(Philosophy) philosophy an essential property or quality

Sensation
1. (Physiology) the power of perceiving through the senses
2. (Physiology) a physical condition or experience resulting from the stimulation of one of the sense organs: a sensation of warmth.
3. a general feeling or awareness: a sensation of fear.

Still, it's fine, sometimes we have to go out on a limb.

I'll be watching you from this other limb I'm perched on.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Well try this limb. Crick found that a certain set of capacities were necessary for the appearance of consciousness. What's more he based this on the notion that distinguishing other from subsistence was critical for the appearance of consciousness. So shape and motion became important determinants for the nervous system underlying consciousness.

Philosophers took another path and wound up with quale.

I'm pretty happy with the limb ruby sparks is on since it provides a way for getting at what those who are merely rational place among the ephemeral. When one connects 'red' with wavelength among many species and one can elicit consistent responses from observers of what they experience as 'red' I'm happy that experience is reduced to the physical relation between stimulus and response. or physical is being related to physical. The notion there must be a separate mental dimension becomes meaningless.

It's meaningful that what has not been thought available to measure is actually measurable. One might even call this an advance in knowledge.

Oh poof, there goes another basis for superstition and magic.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Well try this limb. Crick found that a certain set of capacities were necessary for the appearance of consciousness. What's more he based this on the notion that distinguishing other from subsistence was critical for the appearance of consciousness. So shape and motion became important determinants for the nervous system underlying consciousness.

Philosophers took another path and wound up with quale.

I'm pretty happy with the limb ruby sparks is on since it provides a way for getting at what those who are merely rational place among the ephemeral. When one connects 'red' with wavelength among many species and one can elicit consistent responses from observers of what they experience as 'red' I'm happy that experience is reduced to the physical relation between stimulus and response. or physical is being related to physical. The notion there must be a separate mental dimension becomes meaningless.

It's meaningful that what has not been thought available to measure is actually measurable. One might even call this an advance in knowledge.

Oh poof, there goes another basis for superstition and magic.

Your "arguments" are invariably crap. Reminds me of my banker arguing that nothing has value unless you can put a figure after the "$" sign.

Your arguments are usually formally flawed. I'm sure you logical sense is good but like for the banker, other drives take precedence over your logic and decide what you actually say.

And you watch yourself mouthing crap while the right amount of epinephrine goes into your bloodstream. Well done.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

... the right amount of epinephrine goes into your bloodstream. Well done.

You can't even make a statement without putting some etheric value to it.

And so goes the hand waving for something bigger than activity to explain the meaning of waving. Gott ist tot. Suck it up. Move on.

 

[Speakpigeon]

... the right amount of epinephrine goes into your bloodstream. Well done.

You can't even make a statement without putting some etheric value to it.

And so goes the hand waving for something bigger than activity to explain the meaning of waving. Gott ist tot. Suck it up. Move on.

No it's just you grabbing the little bit of humanity I put in my post to indulge you and ignoring the rest.

Still, if you do it, I'm sure it must be the convenient thing to do.

I'm not sure how you express the idea of "comfort zone" in the extremely limited hardcore lingo.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I'm not sure how you express the idea of "comfort zone" in the extremely limited hardcore lingo.
EB

Again grabbing just the real item in your justification for not saying anything I'll attempt to show how in some small way it could be used to approach a hard over empiricist approach to what is soft science questions.

One could establish a set of operations to set up something called a comfort zone in most any living thing's behavior, probably constrained by situation in which behavior is found. So a comfort zone for sleep behavior might be related to conditions of surviving while asleep determining whether or how an organism would terminate sleep in it's niche, another term needing definition and specification, given requirements to sleep for its systems, another term yada yada, in a particular environmental regime, still more terms needing ......

This process could go on to whatever extent deemed necessary to relate behavior to operations in the physical world.

It's not that one can't squeeze relevant meaning out of certain classes of behaviors its whether that squeezing is likely to result in any insight into the overall behavior of the organism, class of organisms, or any other system set that can be operationally defined as behaving.

If one starts constructing empirical models for the physical world one would expect what I wrote above to apply since it is much easier to treat simple behavior for matter and energy regimes in both closed and open systems than it is to treat behavior in complex systems.

Obviously one would like to think that something like man could have enough well defined and differentiated attributes so we could avoid problems of hierarchy. We don't but it would be nice so quale remains as something included in our concepting regime.

Sometimes it is more practical to draw lines so persons can 'understand' behavior at some quasi empirical level in the near term while we continue searching for underlying rules relating simple to complex.

I thought all this was self evident, but, here we are.