RETRIBUTIVISM

[Angra Mainyu]

I am not making that argument?

You are not making that argument as an argument against illness facts (well, actually, you weren't making that argument at all though you were not arguing against it, either, but not the point; the point is that you do not count it against illness facts, but count the same argument for the moral case against moral facts, without offering a good reason).

Disagreement is commonplace. Your point about a supposed proportion eludes me.

Imagine I go to the supermarket, and I put the groceries in the cart, but then someone at the supermarket reckons it's very immoral to put bananas next to yoghurt, so he punches me in retribution! Well, that does not happen normally. In general, we do not go after each other all the time in retribution. And it's not out of fear. People actually do not reckon that it is immoral to put bananas next to yoghurt, things like that. My point is that there is agreement about nearly all behaviors, because in number, those behaviors vastly outnumber disagreement. They're all over the place, in every single small thing in our lives. We just do not realize how much agreement there is, because we take it for granted.

Separate hypothetical issue to whether disagreement is miniscule.

Indeed.

There is a difference between what humans ordinarily think, and facts, as has been demonstrated numerous times throughout history.

Again, as I explained in detail in the other thread, you would need a very good amount of specific evidence to raise reasonable doubts about ordinary facts of human experience, such as the existence of other minds, that humans can and sometimes feel pain, that they have the ability to move small objects around them, that there are bad people, etc., are all part of ordinary human experience. But generally, you do not do that. You do that in the specific case of morality, though you do not give a good reason to doubt it.

Forgiveness. It happens.

That is not at all an example. In fact, I was explaining to you why it is not, in the very part of my post to which you reply.

Again, that forgiveness happens is not at all an example of disagreement about the moral facts of the matter, let alone one in which they agree about the nonmoral facts relevant to the moral assessment, and they are not using an improper instrument.

That's just confusing. I was addressing the claim you had made.

No, you were saying that my claim was something other than what it was, and you were saying it was another claim I made elsewhere in the posts.

Yes but so what?

That the forgiveness itself is bad. The deserved retribution itself isn't, but what makes the act bad is (in the example; others are similar) some predicted consequences other than the deserved retribution.

Same for retribution?

No; while deserved retribution also can be good for some other goal, it is also good in an of itself. When people seek deserved retribution, normally they want it for its own sake, even if they might or might not (depending on the case) wanted for something else.

Same for retribution?

Yes, clearly.

It says more. It says retribution is a good thing.

Does it? Well, it depends on your definition. I'm not married to a word.

Says you.

Yes, and I also say that 30+5=35, that whales are not fish, and that the Moon is less massive than the Sun. I say many true things.

 

[ruby sparks]

That the forgiveness itself is bad.

Says you.

The deserved retribution itself isn't...

Says you.

while deserved retribution also can be good for some other goal, it is also good in an of itself.

Says you.

When people seek deserved retribution, normally they want it for its own sake, even if they might or might not (depending on the case) wanted for something else.

Some people apparently feel the same about forgiveness though, when they forgive. 'I forgave because it is right to forgive people, because we are all flawed'.

I might even question whether people do normally want retribution merely for its own sake.

Either way, the two are in principle on a par, valid options, even if one works better than the other more often (retribution).

It says more. It says retribution is a good thing.

Does it? Well, it depends on your definition.

It's your definition.

I say many true things.

I'm prepared to accept the fact that you seem very sure about that.

 

[Bomb#20]

I would not get into the discussion about whether it is moral or not. For me, the first concern will be the safety of my society. Any heinous crime, robbery (leaving aside petty thievery as someone said, a hungry thief taking some food items) must be strictly dealt with. India has a population of 1350 million people. If we are not strict the society will go to dogs. And don't spend public money for their upkeep in jail. Ask them to pay for it or shoot them if they can't.

That's a very bad idea. If you shoot people for robbery, what are you going to do to people for murder? If it's worse than shooting, murderers will simply shoot themselves to avoid being taken alive. So you've effectively made the penalty for robbery the same as the penalty for murder. A robber will want very much not to be caught, but there's a witness to his crime: the person he robbed. The simplest way for a robber to minimize the chance of being caught is to kill the robbery victim; but robbers don't usually do that because the punishment for murder is usually a lot worse than the punishment for robbery. If you shoot people for robbery you are incentivizing murder. Speaking on behalf of all of India's potential robbery victims, please don't do that.

 

[The AntiChris]

And you do not have a good argument against moral facts.

What would you consider a "good" argument against moral facts?

It seems to me the claim that moral facts exist, independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes, is unfalsifiable.

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't think he's saying that moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes. I think he's only saying that there are facts about human moral beliefs/attitudes/feelings (in other words facts about our sense of morality).

Maybe it would be more accurate (if a bit more of a mouthful) to call them "human moral-sense facts" or "human moral-attiudes facts".

In a way, I think it's obvious that there are. But they generally seem to be 'sometimes facts' not 'always facts'. The fact "it is morally wrong to kill another human for fun" might be an exception. I'm not sure. I think it's the best candidate so far.

One problem I have is the appeal to inherently 'good/right' things and 'bad/wrong' things. What does 'inherently' mean? At best it's surely only 'deemed to be' (by whatever percentage of humans doing the deeming).

That could allow for things like "most humans deem X to be bad/wrong (some or all of the time) either of itself or depending on other things". That could easily be a fact about human moral sense, and it could, conceivably, apply throughout human history and across cultures. Someone once said that in order not to be wrong, just be as vague as necessary.

In such cases, where it's most humans, the idea that the remaining (minority of) humans' sense is necessarily defective or mistaken is, I think, at least questionable. I think it's more likely to represent the tails of a bell-curve (normal) distribution of moral sense-data, that's all. Something such as 'variations in temperament' (which might be related to chemicals such as oxytocin for example, since that seems to affect levels of trusting and cooperation) might explain many differences, for example, especially when it comes to retributive urges.

 

[ruby sparks]

As for 'of itself', that's another tricky one, imo.

I think that's 'merely deemed' also.

Doesn't it just mean, 'for no other reason that I am aware of' rather than 'for no other reason'?

It activating the chemical reward parts of our brain would be a reason, or the equivalent, but not one we may be particularly aware of.

Interestingly, retribution appears to do that, apparently, via dopamine. Apparently, forgiveness does too, but the processes do not appear to be the same. If I had to guess, I'd guess that the rewards of the latter might have something to do with delaying gratification (the immediate gratification of what might be the more innate urge to retribute). Or it may gradually allow for raised, stable levels (of, say, dopamine) over time, as opposed to short bursts or swings to high and low levels.

But reward/gratification in both cases.

And saying that something is more 'right' merely because it shows up earlier in human development (as retributive urges seem to, being present in infants as early as 8 months old) would seem questionable. Forgiveness turning up later, because of cognitive development, and being an inhibitor to the earlier (more innate) urge of retribution would not make it any less.......'right'. It might even be considered a more mature, flexible, developed and cognitively sophisticated option.

And the first/innate one is probably the result of antecedent consequences anyway.

 

[The AntiChris]

I don't think he's saying that moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes.

I think you'll find he is (he's quite explicit in The Great Contradiction thread).

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't think he's saying that moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes.

I think you'll find he is (he's quite explicit in The Great Contradiction thread).

Then I hadn't understood that or had missed it.

He can clarify.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

And you do not have a good argument against moral facts.

What would you consider a "good" argument against moral facts?

It seems to me the claim that moral facts exist, independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes, is unfalsifiable.

Plenty of philosophers gave arguments. I just don't find them persuasive at all. But for example, suppose someone claimed that there is a fact of the matter as to whether tomatoes are tasty. How could I go about challenging the claim?

Well, first I would go with linguistic evidence. People generally would say things like 'there is no fact of the matter', and refrain from debating the point. That shows they do not understand themselves to be talking about something about which there is a fact of the matter. Given that, it is hard to see how there could be any fact of the matter. A similar argument would work in the moral case, if people generally talked like that. But they do not. The evidence goes in the other direction.

Now you might say some people would debate about the tomato. Well, that is rare, so at least, it would seem in the vast majority of cases, there is no fact of the matter given what people mean. But okay, let us consider the small proportion of people who would debate it. What fact of the matter might that be? It would seem to be it's whether tomatoes cause some gustatory pleasurable sensations in humans who taste them. It is clearly not about the taste of all animals. Yet, we see that humans make pretty different evaluations about tomatoes. Some say they're tasty, others that they're not. Those humans are not getting different inputs: they're all eating tomatoes of the same kind (you can ask them to eat parts of the same tomato as an experiment, but that is not needed). So, this isn't like two people who disagree about whether Joe acted immorally because their moral senses get different inputs (in the form of different beliefs about what Joe intended, expected, believed, etc.). Here, you have same input-> different outcome. Moreover, this happens often with people who appear healthy, and no matter how hard you try, you find no good reasons to think their gustatory taste has been compromised (as in by religion or ideology in the moral case; we know these things compromise human faculties even in non-moral cases). So, it appears humans do not give a same verdict on the taste of (the same) tomatoes, even given the right input (namely, tasting the tomatoes), and with no malfunctioning.

Now, if there were a fact of the matter, then how does the word 'tasty' got that single referent? Meaning is given by usage, and it seems humans have different tastes when it comes to tomatoes, even under normal functioning and same input...then again, this might provide evidence instead that the tomato debaters who say there is a fact of the matter are in a sense correct: the fact of the matter is that it is not the case tomatoes are tasty to all normally functioning humans. So, it's a question of whether this would result in 'no fact of the matter' or an error theory. But you could argue for both; there are linguistic arguments in either direction.

Anyway, that I think would be a pretty good argument against the claim that there is a fact of the matter as to whether tomatoes are tasty, or else that an error theory holds for the tomato debaters (otoh, there is a fact of the matter when it comes to some gustatory statements; whether there is depends on the specific case, counting both what the people making the assessments mean and whether there is universal (normal) human taste on the matter). If someone can make similar cases for ordinary moral assessments, that I think would be a pretty good argument, not against all moral facts, but about enough to establish a partial substantive and epistemic moral error theory, either due to error as to whether there is a fact of the matter, or that some things are wrong, etc.

So, if you or ruby sparks or someone else wants to make a case like that, I'm listening. If, on the other hand, you or someone else prefers to make a different case, I'm listening, though I'm not sure what else would work for 'no fact of the matter'. A different line of argumentation would hold that there are no moral properties, though there are moral facts, namely the fact that nothing is immoral, or morally right, etc. There are ways to make the case for that - I just reckon none of those succeed, either, but I'm willing to listen to arguments.

I do not think any of this is unfalsifiable. Rather, attempts to falsify it have failed - because, well, it's true...but I'm willing to listen to arguments (many years ago, I used to think the argument from apparent disagreement to miscommunication was much stronger than it is, but I was mistaken).

All that said, and for the sake of clarity, you say 'independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes'. Well, in a relevant sense, yes. In another, no. For example, consider illness facts. Do they exist independently of our beliefs, etc.? In a way, sure: if everyone came to believe - say, due to some religion/ideology - that people with cancer are not ill, they would be mistaken. However, whether cancer is an illness depends in an indirect sense on our faculties: the meaning and referent of the words (including 'illness') is given by usage, and the manner we choose to use words depends on our the different faculties, attitudes, etc., that we humans have (save for malfunctioning, etc.). So, it is in that sense in which you can find a dependency. Suffice it to say, this applies to illness/health or redness/greenness as much as it does to immorality/permissibility, etc.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In a way, I think it's obvious that there are. But they generally seem to be 'sometimes facts' not 'always facts'.

Actually, the most obvious facts we encounter are neither of those, but the 'specific facts', like 'Ted Bundy was a bad person', or generally 'what such-and-such person did in such-and-such situation was immoral', etc. The reason is that we have an instrument for finding moral facts (i.e., our human moral sense) that gives verdicts in pretty specific situations, not in much general ones. In the general ones, what we can do is test the hypotheses by trying to find exceptions, but those exceptions are of course in specific cases.

One problem I have is the appeal to inherently 'good/right' things and 'bad/wrong' things.

That conflates two pairs of very different concepts: good and right, and bad and wrong.

At best it's surely only 'deemed to be' (by whatever percentage of humans doing the deeming).

Why?
Do you think it's surely only whether cancer is deemed to be an illness by whatever percentage of humans, etc.?
If not, what is the difference? Why do you single out morality?

 

[ruby sparks]

Do you think it's surely only whether cancer is deemed to be an illness by whatever percentage of humans, etc.?
If not, what is the difference? Why do you single out morality?

There are facts about cancer that are independent of human judgements about it. There do not appear to be any moral judgements that are independent facts in that way.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

There are facts about cancer that are independent of human (or any other) judgements about it.

Just as there facts about cancer that are independent of human judgments about it, there are facts about Ted Bundy that are independent of judgments about him. Do you agree, or disagree?

Now, I would say that one of those facts about (human) cancer that is independent of judgements about it, is that cancer is an illness. And one of the facts about Ted Bundy that is independent of judgements about him, is that he was a bad person. Now I guess you disagree. But why? Why do you accept that it is a fact about human cancer independent of any judgments about it that cancer is an illness, but it is not a fact about Ted Bundy that is independent of any judgments about him that he was a bad person. What is the difference?

Note that the fact that there are facts about how cancer develops, what causes it, etc., is beside the point. For that matter, there are facts about how Ted Bundy developed, what he intended to do and did, etc.

So, what is the difference here?

 

[ruby sparks]

There are facts about cancer that are independent of human (or any other) judgements about it.

Just as there facts about cancer that are independent of human judgments about it, there are facts about Ted Bundy that are independent of judgments about him. Do you agree, or disagree?

Now, I would say that one of those facts about (human) cancer that is independent of judgements about it, is that cancer is an illness. And one of the facts about Ted Bundy that is independent of judgements about him, is that he was a bad person. Now I guess you disagree. But why? Why do you accept that it is a fact about human cancer independent of any judgments about it that cancer is an illness, but it is not a fact about Ted Bundy that is independent of any judgments about him that he was a bad person. What is the difference?

Note that the fact that there are facts about how cancer develops, what causes it, etc., is beside the point. For that matter, there are facts about how Ted Bundy developed, what he intended to do and did, etc.

So, what is the difference here?

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether Ted Bundy was or wasn't a bad person, or even that he did bad things. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about cancer. They do not depend on human agreement about them. How difficult is that to understand?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether Ted Bundy was or wasn't a bad person, or even that he did bad things. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about cancer. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?

You are the one who is not understanding. I am talking about the fact that cancer is an illness vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person.

I might as well mirror your argument and say:

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether cancer is an illness. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about Ted Bundy. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?
​

Do you see the parallel?
I hope you realize why the distinction you are making does not work.

 

[ruby sparks]

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether Ted Bundy was or wasn't a bad person, or even that he did bad things. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about cancer. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?

You are the one who is not understanding. I am talking about the fact that cancer is an illness vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person.

I might as well mirror your argument and say:

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether cancer is an illness. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about Ted Bundy. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?
​

.

You did a switcheroo to 'whether cancer is an illness'. I noticed. You've tried it before. You tried to frame the question that way. Naughty.

Stick with 'the independent and fully objective facts about cancer', since that is what I said, and meant, and have obviously been referring to.

I think you will surely have to agree that there are independent facts about cancer that do not depend on agreement about them. Or do you believe cancer cells would not grow if there was no one there to observe them?

That is the difference between morality and cancer. Please stop trying to avoid it.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You did a switcheroo to 'illness'. I noticed. You've tried it before. You tried to frame the question that way.

The accusation is false.

Stick with 'certain facts about cancer', since that is what I said, and meant, and was referring to.

I was talking about the fact that cancer is an illness. Your accusation is false.

Let us look at the exchange:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765267&viewfull=1#post765267

At best it's surely only 'deemed to be' (by whatever percentage of humans doing the deeming).

Why?
Do you think it's surely only whether cancer is deemed to be an illness by whatever percentage of humans, etc.?
If not, what is the difference? Why do you single out morality?

See, my point was about whether cancer is an illness. That was my challenge to your anti-morality argument.

Here is your reply:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765271&viewfull=1#post765271

Do you think it's surely only whether cancer is deemed to be an illness by whatever percentage of humans, etc.?
If not, what is the difference? Why do you single out morality?

There are facts about cancer that are independent of human judgements about it. There do not appear to be any moral judgements that are independent facts in that way.

And that is your swtcheroo. Do you realize now that you did the switcheroo, and I noticed. Of course, I will not accuse you of doing the switcheroo deliberately. You just misunderstood my words, but you did the switching.


I took your switcheroo as an unfortunate fact, and thought of other ways of getting you to realize that you are making a mistake and your analogy fails. So, here is my reply:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765293&viewfull=1#post765293

Just as there facts about cancer that are independent of human judgments about it, there are facts about Ted Bundy that are independent of judgments about him. Do you agree, or disagree?

At that point, I show that your switcheroo from whether cancer is an illness to 'facts about cancer' can be mirrored by a 'facts about Ted Bundy'. And then I go on:

Now, I would say that one of those facts about (human) cancer that is independent of judgements about it, is that cancer is an illness. And one of the facts about Ted Bundy that is independent of judgements about him, is that he was a bad person.

See, I am making the parallel as explicit as I can. Even with your switcheroo, I try to find another way to get you to realize what is going on. And further

Now I guess you disagree. But why? Why do you accept that it is a fact about human cancer independent of any judgments about it that cancer is an illness, but it is not a fact about Ted Bundy that is independent of any judgments about him that he was a bad person. What is the difference?

Do you see what is going on? I am trying to explain why you have provided absolutely no good reason to challenge the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person but not that cancer is an illness, and further, that your arguments against morality would work against illness - yet, of course you realize that there is illness.

I even went on to say:

Note that the fact that there are facts about how cancer develops, what causes it, etc., is beside the point. For that matter, there are facts about how Ted Bundy developed, what he intended to do and did, etc.

How can I make that even more clear?

And yet, here is your reply:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765311&viewfull=1#post765311

There are facts about cancer that are independent of human (or any other) judgements about it.

Just as there facts about cancer that are independent of human judgments about it, there are facts about Ted Bundy that are independent of judgments about him. Do you agree, or disagree?

Now, I would say that one of those facts about (human) cancer that is independent of judgements about it, is that cancer is an illness. And one of the facts about Ted Bundy that is independent of judgements about him, is that he was a bad person. Now I guess you disagree. But why? Why do you accept that it is a fact about human cancer independent of any judgments about it that cancer is an illness, but it is not a fact about Ted Bundy that is independent of any judgments about him that he was a bad person. What is the difference?

Note that the fact that there are facts about how cancer develops, what causes it, etc., is beside the point. For that matter, there are facts about how Ted Bundy developed, what he intended to do and did, etc.

So, what is the difference here?

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether Ted Bundy was or wasn't a bad person, or even that he did bad things. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about cancer. They do not depend on human agreement about them. How difficult is that to understand?

At this point, you still do not get it. So, I make a parallel again:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765316&viewfull=1#post765316

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether Ted Bundy was or wasn't a bad person, or even that he did bad things. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about cancer. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?

You are the one who is not understanding. I am talking about the fact that cancer is an illness vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person.

I might as well mirror your argument and say:

In the end, it is in fact strictly speaking debatable as to whether cancer is an illness. There is, in the end, just almost complete agreement among humans about it, that's all. That's not the same for the independent and fully objective facts about Ted Bundy. They do not depend on agreement. How difficult is that to understand?
​

Do you see the parallel?
I hope you realize why the distinction you are making does not work.

Frankly, I was sincerely hoping you would eventually realize that you were making a mistake. But I also thought maybe you wouldn't. What I did not see coming was an accusation. Look, I get that you did not do any of this deliberately. I just hope that you realize that I was talking about whether cancer is an illness. I get you did not understand that. I hope now you do, and you understand the nature of the challenge to your argument against morality. If you do not understand it, please let me know, and I will explain it again, in greater detail.

 

[ruby sparks]

Yes, I switched it, to show why cancer is not a good analogy to morality.

The first has independent facts that do not depend on agreement, the latter does not. That is a big and relevant difference between the two things.

Please stop trying to dodge that fact.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Yes, I switched it, to show why cancer is not a good analogy to morality.

The first has independent facts that do not depend on agreement, the latter does not. That is the big difference.

Please stop trying to dodge that fact.

Perhaps the most irritating thing is that you sincerely believe that you are right and I am trying to dodge something. Please, try to understand the careful explanation as to why you are mistaken.

There are plenty of facts about Ted Bundy that can be described in nonmoral terms, e.g., he "kidnapped, raped, and murdered numerous young women and girls during the 1970s and possibly earlier" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Bundy, where you can find plenty more of those facts). Similarly, there are plenty of facts about human cancer that can be described in non-illness terms. For example, you can describe how it develops, what causes it, how the cells mutate, what effects it has on the person as it progresses, etc., without using the word 'illness', or similar.

Upon contemplating those facts about Ted Bundy, I reckon that he is a bad person. I do that by means of my moral sense, which allows me to intuitively apprehend moral facts.

Upon contemplating those facts about human cancer, I reckon that it is an illness. I do that by means of my health/illness sense, which allows me to intuitively apprehend facts about that domain.

Do you see the analogy? Do you realize why I am not dodging anything, but providing an argument against your argument against morality? I hope you realize that.

 

[ruby sparks]

Do you see the analogy? Do you realize why I am not dodging anything, but providing an argument against your argument against morality? I hope you realize that.

I see the particular/limited analogy, with cancer. But if there is a big difference between morality and cancer as regards whether there are independent facts about one and not the other, it may mean that the two things can't be properly compared, even if there are merely some selected aspects (or properties) of the two that could be.

Also, after my brief exchange with AntiChris just above, it seemed to me that you clarified that you do in fact believe that "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes". And it was that I was particularly interested in during our exchanges since that, when comparing morality with cancer.

I'm objecting to you using cancer as a direct analogy to morality, because there is a fundamental difference between the two as regards independent facts.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Do you see the analogy? Do you realize why I am not dodging anything, but providing an argument against your argument against morality? I hope you realize that.

I see the analogy, with cancer. But if there is a big difference between morality and cancer as regards whether there are independent facts about one and not the other, it may mean that the two things can't be properly compared, even if there are merely some selected aspects (or properties) of the two that could be.

I'm objecting to you using cancer as an analogy to morality.

I see that you do not understand what I am doing. I am not using cancer as an analogy to morality. Not at all. Rather, I am using illness/health as an analogy to morality. In the analogy, cancer is the analogue not to morality or to moral badness, but to Ted Bundy.

We humans reckon intuitively that Ted Bundy is a bad person. We humans reckon intuitively that human cancer is an illness.

In the moral case, we have a moral sense that allows us to intuitively apprehend moral facts. In the health/illness case, we have a similar sense that allows us to intuitively apprehend facts about health and disease.

Why is it that you eschew our human moral sense and our intuitive apprehension of moral facts, but you do not eschew our human illness/health sense or our intuitive apprehension of facts about illness and health?