RETRIBUTIVISM

[ruby sparks]

Why is it that you eschew our human moral sense and our intuitive apprehension of moral facts, but you do not eschew our human illness/health sense or our intuitive apprehension of facts about illness and health?

I'm not sure I do or ever did that, certainly not deliberately.

The analogy is essentially ok, imo. They are both, in the end, (human) senses. As with colour, as I agreed much earlier. Possibly they are also both judgements, attitudes and beliefs. There might even be other words for what they both are.

Let me recap from my end of the intertubes.

I am no longer making a strong claim that there are no moral facts. I even suggested a candidate quite a while ago. Now, it may be that there are either (i) very few specific moral facts (about specific acts, such as killing for fun) and/or (ii) quite a number of very general ones. In either or both cases, I felt that working out the rights and wrongs in any one particular instance might be as difficult (or not much easier) than it is already for someone who does not accept that there are moral facts, but I set that aside. It being difficult does not mean it is not possible, or worthwhile trying.

I had, in my head, more or less moved on from that issue to (a) start a thread on whether morality (facts included if they existed) was consequentialist in the way I mean it and (b) start two threads on responses to what are deemed moral wrongs (retribution and forgiveness respectively).

However, my accepting that there are or could be at least some moral facts was on the basis that they were basically not independent of human judgement, that they were 'merely' species-wide, a matter of consensus and that they were (human) senses, and so on. Which is what I said in my reply to AntiChris. And then you clarified. And thereafter that was what my particular point (if not yours) about the comparison with cancer was related to. I was no longer arguing (at least not strongly, or without some caveats) against the existence of moral facts, only their independence from humans. So we were at cross purposes.

And so now I am not sure what you mean by, "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes" because that would seem to be true of cancer......but not morality?

 

[aupmanyav]

"moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes"

Morality depends on one's society. I read about a tribe in a Pacefic island where the husband and wife should never be in friendship but always in conflict and were to live apart (in their own clan houses). However, sex was to be continued, and the woman would come after sunset. No morality outside society, that is to say, 'no intrinsic morality'.

 

[ruby sparks]

"moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes"

Morality depends on one's society. I read about a tribe in a Pacefic island where the husband and wife should never be in friendship but always in conflict and were to live apart (in their own clan houses). However, sex was to be continued, and the woman would come after sunset. No morality outside society, that is to say, 'no intrinsic morality'.

It's a very large topic and covers a lot of judgements about a lot of things. If you want my tuppenceworth, human morality is at least sometimes relative (to culture, historical period, zeitgeist, or the individual, for example) and sometimes non-relative to those things. At this point I don't think I'd pick one or the other for the whole topic. That allows for at least some things about human morality to be what we might call moral facts, even intrinsic ones (true for more or less all normal members of the species, barring defects or anomalies, such as psychopathology for example) but not independent to (from outside of) the species.

The more general the fact, the more of them there could be. The more specific, the fewer there could be.

I liked this article:

Moral Relativism
https://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/#H4

 

[The AntiChris]

And you do not have a good argument against moral facts.

What would you consider a "good" argument against moral facts?

It seems to me the claim that moral facts exist, independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes, is unfalsifiable.

...suppose someone claimed that there is a fact of the matter as to whether tomatoes are tasty. How could I go about challenging the claim?

This doesn't really help. The arguments you'd accept against fact-of-the matter tastiness would not persuade you against moral facts-of-the-matter.

To be honest I didn't expect you to be able to answer because it's not the kind of disagreement that's particularly amenable to argument. Both sides agree on the facts in play - it's the interpretation of those facts which is in dispute. Both sides finds the interpretation of the other side implausible.

I do not think any of this is unfalsifiable. Rather, attempts to falsify it have failed

Ok, but what, in your view, would falsify it. I really don't think there is anything.

For example, given, what many people would see as a genuine moral disagreement where neither side is (non-moral) right or wrong, you will always explain it away by suggesting, for instance, that the disagreement is really about non-moral facts/beliefs (and so not a genuine moral disagreement) or that the moral sensibilities of one person are malfunctioning.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

And so now I am not sure what you mean by, "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes" because that would seem to be true of cancer......but not morality?

I did not say that, but again, my comparison was not between moral facts and cancer facts. It was between moral facts and facts about health and illness. I could add color. For example, here is a fact about health/illness: Humans who have AIDS are ill. Here's a moral fact: Humans who electrocute other humans for fun behave immorally. Light with a 700nm wavelength is red.

Are they independent of our beliefs, feelings and other attitudes?
Sure. Imagine the world, 20000 years ago. No human has the concept of electrocuting other humans, or of AIDS, or wavelengths. Or imagine in a dystopian future, humanity is back to the stone age (but after HIV is defeated), and no one knows anything about those things. That would not make the statements above false, or those things non-facts. It's just that humans are not aware of those facts.

On the other hand, there is a sense in which they do depend, namely the meaning of our words is given by usage, and we have the words we have (e.g., 'morally wrong', 'ill', 'permissible', etc., and synonims in other languages) because of the sort of minds we have. Smart aliens who evolved on another planet would very likely have different words, tracking different stuff. Due to similarities in evolution, I reckon they would likely have concepts that are closer to ours when it comes to illness/health than to moral wrongness, permissibility, etc., and the latter closer to ours than when it comes to color.

There is another, key sense in which they are independent of our beliefs, etc., namely that the truth of moral statements - like that of color statements, or statements about health and illness - is independent of the speaker. In other words, if you say the traffic light (a specific light, at a specific time and place, etc.) was green, and I say it was red, one of us makes a false statement, perhaps by mistake. The same for morality and for illness/health.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

This doesn't really help. The arguments you'd accept against fact-of-the matter tastiness would not persuade you against moral facts-of-the-matter.

Actually, they would convince me, if they were backed up by the same evidence, prominently linguistic evidence and evidence about human behavior in that context. That is why I gave it as an example.

To be honest I didn't expect you to be able to answer because it's not the kind of disagreement that's particularly amenable to argument. Both sides agree on the facts in play - it's the interpretation of those facts which is in dispute. Both sides finds the interpretation of the other side implausible.

No, it seems there is disagreement about some facts for sure.

Ok, but what, in your view, would falsify it. I really don't think there is anything.

I already explained that. If you could provide an argument like that for tomatoes, with similar linguistic evidence, etc., sure that would convince me.

Now, given that the linguistic evidence indicates something different, then it would not work, so I think I would not be convinced but because I have already looked at the evidence and it says otherwise, so you would have to provide evidence countering the linguistic evidence I've already seen to get the same result.

At any rate, there is one piece of evidence that would leave the matter just between 'no fact of the matter' and 'the fact is that nothing is morally good or bad, morally wrong, impermissible, permissible, obligatory, etc.', which would need further argument. What you would need to do is something akin to what you would need in the color case:

Imagine you can show me that there is an odd object (say, O1), such that, under ordinary light conditions, looks green to some people, and blue to others, and those are people who appear to have normal color vision. The evidence for normal color vision is that they seem to make correct color assessments in their lives, and there is no evidence of anything that might have interfered with the proper development of their color vision. Suppose further you try that on otherwise fit, healthy young people from different countries, and the difference remains. Given enough evidence like that, I would come to the assessment that there probably is no fact of the matter as to whether O1 is blue, though there is usually a fact of the matter as to the color of ordinary objects.

Similarly, if you can show me that human assessments on whether - say - same-sex sex is always immoral differ even when people are using their moral senses only and not an improper instrument (e.g., religious indoctrination, a metaphysical theory), even in absense of disagreement about other relevant matters (e.g., whether people who have same-sex sex intend to recruit children, etc.), and after reflection, I would be persuaded that there probably is no fact of the matter as to whether same-sex sex is always immoral.

That alone, however, would not be good grounds to think there isn't a fact of the matter in most ordinary cases - moreover, there is the problem that if the same pattern held for many ordinary cases, perhaps we would move from a 'no fact of the latter' situation to a 'the fact is that nothing is morally good or bad, morally wrong, impermissible, permissible, obligatory, etc.' situation (the difference with the tomato case is that in the latter case, people generally do not take themselves to be talking about a matter of fact, so linguistic evidence differs), though this would need more discussion.

In short, you could convince me (as above) that in some specific instances, there are no moral facts, but if you do that for many instances (how many to be assessed intuitively, as always), then maybe you would need a further argument to convince me that in general, there are no moral facts, rather than 'the fact is that nothing is morally good or bad, morally wrong, impermissible, permissible, obligatory, etc.'. Either way, I would be convinced that one moral error theory or the other holds - just which one requires further argument.

For example, given, what many people would see as a genuine moral disagreement where neither side is (non-moral) right or wrong, you will always explain it away by suggesting, for instance, that the disagreement is really about non-moral facts/beliefs (and so not a genuine moral disagreement) or that the moral sensibilities of one person are malfunctioning.

There is a third alternative: they are using an improper instrument. Instead of their moral sense, they are following the dictates of a religion/ideology/philosophy (RIP for short ) they were told about. This sort of wrong instrument might also damage the moral sense, so this alternative and the second one are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, apart from direct dictates, RIP can make contain false nonmoral claims on the basis of which false moral claims are made, so this alternative also overlaps with the first one (moral disagreement can have multiple causes).

(also, here 'disagreement' is a bit strong, as it A says X happened, B says X did not happen. It might be that B has never even thought about whether X happened. I will use 'disagreement' for short, but in the understanding that it includes cases like that, in which they have different beliefs, though they do not disagree in a strict sense; if necessary, we can change terminology).

But note that this is similar to other cases in which (I think) you do not doubt that there is a fact of the matter. Take, for example, common descent. Surely, there is plenty of disagreement about whether, say, chimps and mosquitoes have a common ancestor. What can account for the disagreement? It's not that there is no fact of the matter. So, I would say the realistic options are:

1. There is disagreement about what observations were made, and these observations are used to make the assessment as to whether they have a common ancestor (analogue: disagreement about nonmoral facts).
2. Someone is using the wrong instrument, like RIP or something along those lines.
3. Their epistemic sense (i.e., the faculty by which humans normally make epistemic probabilistic assessments) is malfunctioning.
4. A combination two or three of the above.

Moreover, in philosophy, long-lasting disagreements are pretty common. For example, disagreements between theists and nontheists, between substance dualists (i.e., souls and the like) and substance monists, and then property dualists and property monists. Also, disagreements in general about epistemology, philosophy of mind, you name it. Generally, though, we reckon there is a fact of the matter in those cases (not all philosophical disputes perhaps, but surely the ones I mentioned before and many others in those fields of philosophy). Why do these sort of disagreements persist? Well, it seems to me that it's something like the options given above.

 

[The AntiChris]

The arguments you'd accept against fact-of-the matter tastiness would not persuade you against moral facts-of-the-matter.

Actually, they would convince me, if they were backed up by the same evidence, prominently linguistic evidence and evidence about human behavior in that context.

If the evidence was the same then the world would would be a different place. It's not. The evidence is what it is and all we're left with are differing interpretations.

Both sides agree on the facts in play - it's the interpretation of those facts which is in dispute. Both sides finds the interpretation of the other side implausible.

No, it seems there is disagreement about some facts for sure.

I'm not at all convinced.

Ok, but what, in your view, would falsify it. I really don't think there is anything.

I already explained that. If you could provide an argument like that for tomatoes, with similar linguistic evidence, etc., sure that would convince me.

I've explained this is an impossibility. All you're saying is that if the world were different you might be convinced.

For example, given, what many people would see as a genuine moral disagreement where neither side is (non-moral) right or wrong, you will always explain it away by suggesting, for instance, that the disagreement is really about non-moral facts/beliefs (and so not a genuine moral disagreement) or that the moral sensibilities of one person are malfunctioning.

There is a third alternative: they are using an improper instrument. Instead of their moral sense, they are following the dictates of a religion/ideology/philosophy (RIP for short ) they were told about. This sort of wrong instrument might also damage the moral sense, so this alternative and the second one are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, apart from direct dictates, RIP can make contain false nonmoral claims on the basis of which false moral claims are made, so this alternative also overlaps with the first one (moral disagreement can have multiple causes).

It really doesn't matter which convoluted justification you employ, my point is that the moral realist will always find a reason to reject, what many would see as, a genuine moral disagreement between normally-functioning humans.

Moreover, in philosophy, long-lasting disagreements are pretty common. For example, disagreements between theists and nontheists, between substance dualists (i.e., souls and the like) and substance monists, and then property dualists and property monists. Also, disagreements in general about epistemology, philosophy of mind, you name it. Generally, though, we reckon there is a fact of the matter in those cases (not all philosophical disputes perhaps, but surely the ones I mentioned before and many others in those fields of philosophy). Why do these sort of disagreements persist? Well, it seems to me that it's something like the options given above.

Just to make it clear, I haven't been making the argument that moral disagreement disproves moral facts-of-the-matter.

 

[ruby sparks]

And so now I am not sure what you mean by, "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes" because that would seem to be true of cancer......but not morality?

I did not say that...

You did seem to....

.... All that said, and for the sake of clarity, you say 'independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes'. Well, in a relevant sense, yes.

....but I may have misunderstood.

....but again, my comparison was not between moral facts and cancer facts. It was between moral facts and facts about health and illness. I could add color. For example, here is a fact about health/illness: Humans who have AIDS are ill. Here's a moral fact: Humans who electrocute other humans for fun behave immorally. Light with a 700nm wavelength is red.

I'm good with all that. It's just this 'independent' thing.

And while you may have been comparing one aspect or property of cancer to morality, which is fine as far as it goes, I wasn't limiting myself to that, or to 'comparable properties' and don't see why I should. It'd be a bit like comparing the sun to a banana because they're both yellow.

Are they independent of our beliefs, feelings and other attitudes? Sure.

Ok so you are saying it?

Imagine the world, 20000 years ago...

Imagine a world 50 million years ago.

Or imagine one 50 million years from now, with humans all gone.

I think we're at cross purposes here. A human moral fact needs a human to deem it to exist. And it's not independent to human brains (even when humans do exist), as in not from anywhere other than the sense of it that's in their brains. It's not external to humans, whether they exist or not. It sort of doesn't matter whether they do or not. The absence of humans in the past or future only serves to illustrate a point.

Human moral facts are only in human brains. There's no moral facts (and no morality) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

Imagine the world, 20000 years ago. No human has the concept of electrocuting other humans, or of AIDS, or wavelengths. Or imagine in a dystopian future, humanity is back to the stone age (but after HIV is defeated), and no one knows anything about those things. That would not make the statements above false, or those things non-facts. It's just that humans are not aware of those facts.

I would say that if, back then, something that is deemed to be a moral fact now (or is a moral fact now, because everyone deems it) wasn't then, that the better explanation is that it simply wasn't a fact at that time, that the fact literally did not exist. Because again, morality is not necessarily a good analogy to AIDS or wavelengths. Facts about those (and I'm not claiming AIDS is or isn't an illness, I'm talking about other facts about AIDS) exist independently of what humans think about them. And I'm saying moral facts don't, because moral facts are only things that humans think. This is not true of AIDS, cancer or wavelenghths. Colour, yes, that's not independent, like morality that's a brain sense.

On the other hand, there is a sense in which they do depend, namely the meaning of our words is given by usage, and we have the words we have (e.g., 'morally wrong', 'ill', 'permissible', etc., and synonims in other languages) because of the sort of minds we have. Smart aliens who evolved on another planet would very likely have different words, tracking different stuff. Due to similarities in evolution, I reckon they would likely have concepts that are closer to ours when it comes to illness/health than to moral wrongness, permissibility, etc., and the latter closer to ours than when it comes to color.

I might agree with you. To be honest, I'm focusing on the issue of independence.

There is another, key sense in which they are independent of our beliefs, etc., namely that the truth of moral statements - like that of color statements, or statements about health and illness - is independent of the speaker. In other words, if you say the traffic light (a specific light, at a specific time and place, etc.) was green, and I say it was red, one of us makes a false statement, perhaps by mistake. The same for morality and for illness/health.

That's only independent of the beliefs, feelings and attitude of an individual human (the speaker), or possibly some humans (speakers). Perhaps that's what you meant in what I bolded above. Ok.

Anyhows, I'm suggesting that human morality, being a human sense, is not independent of humans. I thought that when someone said, "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes", the 'our' implied humans generally.

What moral facts do depend on, it seems, is humans to deem them.

In one way, they are basically statistical, they are about enough agreement (about a deeming) between brains, to have a consensus about them.

 

[ruby sparks]

If the evidence was the same then the world would would be a different place. It's not. The evidence is what it is and all we're left with are differing interpretations.

I think I agree. Human moral judgements clearly often vary and are relative to various things. This is indisputable (and not even disputed here I think). There may sometimes be agreement to the point of universal (human) consensus, about some aspects of human morality however, at which point, we can call something there is a universal (human) consensus about, a human moral 'fact', and 'real' and 'true' in the sense that it is actually real and true and a fact that there is a universal (human) consensus about it.

Or, perhaps more importantly, I might even say that anything further than that, about the factualness or realness or truth of moral judgements and senses, is redundant to, superfluous to, and unnecessary for explanations. Which if it is the case, surely makes it permissible to simply leave it out. If someone wants to include it, as an interesting additional hypothetical assertion, in the absence of being able to show that it's actually, independently or externally true, go them. Can we do invisible elves carrying falling leaves down to the ground next?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

If the evidence was the same then the world would would be a different place. It's not. The evidence is what it is and all we're left with are differing interpretations.

But that is not the issue. You asked me what would convince me, and I gave you an answer. The evidence does not have to be exactly but relevantly the same, e.g., people generally saying that there is no fact of the matter instead of engaging in moral debate, evidence of persistent disagreement of the right kind (as explained), and so on.

Of course, as it happens, the evidence is not relevantly the same. But that does not mean at all that the claim is unfalsifiable. I gave you examples as to how to falsify it.

I've explained this is an impossibility. All you're saying is that if the world were different you might be convinced.

No, I'm saying in which ways the world would have to be in order to convince me. You were saying that it is unfalsifiable. That is not what it means for something to be unfalsifiable. I'm telling you, if such-and-such happens, then it is falsified. I already provided an example with color, if you do not like the tomato example.

It really doesn't matter which convoluted justification you employ, my point is that the moral realist will always find a reason to reject, what many would see as, a genuine moral disagreement between normally-functioning humans.

First, it is not convoluted at all:

a. Just take a look at moral debates as they actually happen (e.g., here in PD, or somewhere else). You will find that there is plenty of nonmoral disagreement to base the moral disagreement. You will see the demonization of the opponents, the accusations of having intent, beliefs, etc., that there is no good reason to believe the other person has (and which of course they deny, so plenty of disagreement), as well as demonization of the person they are debating with their opponents about. You will also see excuses from the other side. In other words, you will see vast nonmoral disagreement.

b. Take a look at disagreements about evolution. You have not addressed my point:

But note that this is similar to other cases in which (I think) you do not doubt that there is a fact of the matter. Take, for example, common descent. Surely, there is plenty of disagreement about whether, say, chimps and mosquitoes have a common ancestor. What can account for the disagreement? It's not that there is no fact of the matter. So, I would say the realistic options are:

1. There is disagreement about what observations were made, and these observations are used to make the assessment as to whether they have a common ancestor (analogue: disagreement about nonmoral facts).
2. Someone is using the wrong instrument, like RIP or something along those lines.
3. Their epistemic sense (i.e., the faculty by which humans normally make epistemic probabilistic assessments) is malfunctioning.
4. A combination two or three of the above.

I might mirror your argument and say that realists about common ancestry will always find a reason to reject, what many would see as, a genuine ancestry disagreement between normally-functioning humans, and then say that the claim that there is a fact of the matter as to whether chimps and mosquitoes have a common ancestors is unfalsifiable, or alternatively, that the claim that there is a fact of the matter as to whether it is rational, on the basis of the available observations, to believe that chimpanzees and mosquitoes do not have a common ancestor, is unfalsifiable.


Second, the claim "the moral realist will always find a reason to reject, what many would see as, a genuine moral disagreement between normally-functioning humans." is false. I'm a moral realist, but I was not always so. I mean, I began as an implicit realist like everyone else (except maybe psychopaths), but many years ago, I found the argument from apparent disagreement to miscommunication persuasive. I had made a mistaken assessment about the type of disagreement there is (also, I made another mistake about how people used the words, but that's not the relevant issue here). Upon further observation, I realize I got that wrong. That's not remotely what you see in a case of unfalsifiable claims.

Just to make it clear, I haven't been making the argument that moral disagreement disproves moral facts-of-the-matter.

No, you just say that the claim is unfalsifiable, and advance the case of moral disagreement in a fuzzy way, without explaining why you push it.

I'm just using parallels to show that the argument from disagreement fails (at whatever goal you intend for it to have) in other cases in which disagreement seems to happen in a similar manner. If you think that it has much greater weight in showing that there is no fact of the matter, or that somehow it makes the issue unfalsifiable, I would ask that you make your argumentation clear.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You did seem to....

No, I did not seem to. You used quotation marks. I did not say that.

I'm good with all that. It's just this 'independent' thing.

But why? Why is the fact that humans with cancer are ill any more independent than the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person?

Ok so you are saying it?

Yes, now I'm saying that in a way they are. In what way? In the way I described in the post you replied to.

Imagine a world 50 million years ago.

That simply gets out of the scenario, and excludes it by decision. But that is not a way of countering my arguments.

Or imagine one 50 million years from now, with humans all gone.

Why do you think there will not be post-humans with morality?
But regardless, let's say not. Everyone dies in a nuclear war or whatever.

I think we're at cross purposes here. A human moral fact needs a human to deem it to exist.

No, that is not true. If all humans were to die, then it would remain the case that Ted Bundy was a bad person, as it would remain the case that humans who had cancer were ill, or that red traffic lights were red.

And it's not independent to human brains (even when humans do exist), as in from anywhere other than the sense of it that's in their brains. It's not external to humans, whether they exist or not. It sort of doesn't matter whether they do or not. The absence of humans in the past or future only serves to illustrate a point.

But it doesn't illustrate that. It fails. Suppose again all humans die. That does not affect the fact that human red traffic lights were red. Or that humans with cancer were ill. Or that Ted Bundy was a morally bad person. Why would you single out the third one for elimination?

Human moral facts are only in human brains. There's no moral facts (and no morality) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

Parallel 1: Human illness and health facts are only in human brains. There's no illness and health facts (and no illness or health) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

Parallel 2: Human color facts are only in human brains. There's no color facts (and no color) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

I take it - from what you've been saying - that you reject these parallels..at least with illness (I'm less sure what you think about the color parallel now). But why? What is the relevant difference?

On the other hand, if you agree with the parallels, please let me know.

I would say that if, back then, something that is deemed to be a moral fact now (or is a moral fact now, because everyone deems it) wasn't then, that the explanation is that it simply wasn't a fact at that time, that the fact literally did not exist. Because again, morality is not necessarily a good analogy to AIDS or wavelengths.

The analogy is not between morality and AIDS. The analogy is between moral facts and illness facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS is not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. And again, the analogy is not at all between wavelengths and morality. It is between color and morality, etc.

Facts about those (and I'm not claiming AIDS is or isn't an illness, I'm talking about other facts about AIDS) exist independently of what humans think about them.

But then you are not talking about what I am talking. I am talking about the fact that a human being with AIDS is ill vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a morally evil person.

And I'm saying moral facts don't, because moral facts are only things that humans think. If nobody thinks them, they don't exist. This is not true of AIDS, cancer or wavelenghths.

I don't agree that they do not exist if nobody thinks them (e.g., everyone dies, and it remains the case that Ted Bundy was a bad person).

Colour, yes, that's not independent, like morality that's a brain sense.

Do you believe that if all humans die, then all grass stops being green? If not, then why the fact that Ted Bundy was a morally evil person go away?

 

[ruby sparks]

No, I did not seem to. You used quotation marks. I did not say that.

So what? If you do think it and agree you did say it later, what's the point of quibbling? That was rhetorical. Please don't answer.

But why? Why is the fact that humans with cancer are ill any more independent than the fact that Ted Bundy was a bad person?

I already agreed that illness was no more independent.

Imagine a world 50 million years ago.

That simply gets out of the scenario, and excludes it by decision. But that is not a way of countering my arguments.

I'm not obliged to limit myself to your selective aspects of the issue. I'm doing the issue, not just your selected aspects of it (which I agree with) because there's more to the issue. You have a habit of not responding to my replies on other aspects of the issue. I don't know why, since our agreement on yours is done and dusted and for the last time, I'm not countering those points.

I think we're at cross purposes here. A human moral fact needs a human to deem it to exist.

No, that is not true. If all humans were to die, then it would remain the case that Ted Bundy was a bad person, as it would remain the case that humans who had cancer were ill, or that red traffic lights were red.

It would only be the case that those things were once deemed to be the case, by humans.

Suppose again all humans die. That does not affect the fact that human red traffic lights were red. Or that humans with cancer were ill. Or that Ted Bundy was a morally bad person. Why would you single out the third one for elimination?

I don't, from those three. I put all those three together, as 'facts'.

Parallel 1: Human illness and health facts are only in human brains. There's no illness and health facts (and no illness or health) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

Parallel 2: Human color facts are only in human brains. There's no color facts (and no color) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

For the last time, I hope, I am good with that.

I take it - from what you've been saying - that you reject these parallels..at least with illness (I'm less sure what you think about the color parallel now). But why? What is the relevant difference?

Double whammy. Wrong and weird, given that I've gone blue in the face making it clear I have no problem with those particular comparisons.

On the other hand, if you agree with the parallels, please let me know.

Wtf? I agree, and had already done so.

The analogy is not between morality and AIDS. The analogy is between moral facts and illness facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS is not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. And again, the analogy is not at all between wavelengths and morality. It is between color and morality, etc.

I think you mean your selective arbitrary comparisons. Go you. The sun is like a banana. Both are yellow. I guess that's all we need to consider and we can put them on a par, according to your inadequate standards and incomplete criteria.

But then you are not talking about what I am talking. I am talking about the fact that a human being with AIDS is ill vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a morally evil person.

Given that I already agreed with you about that quite a while ago, why are you still banging on about it?

And I'm saying moral facts don't, because moral facts are only things that humans think. If nobody thinks them, they don't exist. This is not true of AIDS, cancer or wavelenghths.

I don't agree that they do not exist if nobody thinks them (e.g., everyone dies, and it remains the case that Ted Bundy was a bad person).

It only remains true that when there were humans, they deemed Ted bundy to be bad, that's all.

Colour, yes, that's not independent, like morality that's a brain sense.

Do you believe that if all humans die, then all grass stops being green? If not, then why the fact that Ted Bundy was a morally evil person go away?

Yes, the grass stops being green if there is no entity to deem it to be green. Similar for Ted Bundy being bad. And, in the final analysis, whether anyone was ever what is called ill.

Grass may still exist however. Cancer may still exist. There may still be wavelengths for electromagnetic radiation. Those would be facts that would be independent of what humans deem them.





And all of that is why moral facts are apparently not independent of humans, which is at this time the issue we are discussing.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

So what? If you do think it and agree you did say it later, what's the point of quibbling?

It's not quibbling. Rather, you said

And so now I am not sure what you mean by, "moral facts exist independently of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes" because that would seem to be true of cancer......but not morality?

In that context, you are asking for clarification of my words. I'm saying I did not say that, so I have no way of clarifying.

I'm not limiting myself to your selective framing of the issue. I already agreed that illness was no more independent.

I did not know you agreed with that. I thought you were sort-of agreeing about color ("sort of" because you were still not interpreting my comparision as it was meant to, so I was not/am not certain).

I'm not obliged to limit myself to your selective framings of the issue. I'm doing the issue, not your arbitrary selections. You have a habit of not responding to my replies on their own terms.

No, I do reply. I just point it out first that the reply misses the point where it does. Still, we are getting somewhere, given that you already agreed (if I am reading this right) that neither illness nor color is more 'independent' than morality (whatever you mean by 'independent', that's good progress I think).

It would only be the case that those things were deemed to be he case, by humans.

They were deemed so correctly. The point of using the color and illness/health analogies was to use examples in which you would (I would have expected) accept that there is a fact of the matter, that if humans die the facts remain, and so on. If you do not agree with that, either, I guess there might not be enough ground for further discussion. I will think of further examples.

I don't, from those three. I put all those three together.

Great, so the analogies worked in a way...just they had an opposite effect to what I was going for.
I mean, yes, I wanted you to put all those three together, so success!
But then, I wanted to do so as a 'partners in innocent' sort of thing, where moral facts get rescued by color facts and/or facts about health and illness. Instead, it seems you got a 'partners in crime' reading, so that color facts and facts about health and illness got taken down as well.

I'll think of some other domain I might be able to use, but I need to think about it (there is a candidate in my exchange with The AntiChris, but I'm worried it might backfire as well; I'll think about it more).

For the last time, I hope, I am good with that.

Okay, I get it.
So, again, that backfired.

Double whammy. Wrong and weird, given that I've gone blue in the face making it clear I have no problem with those particular comparisons.

Okay, so I misunderstood. It is not so weird, though. Misunderstanding is the rule in these forums.

I think you mean your selective arbitrary comparisons. Go you. The sun is like a banana. Both are yellow. I guess that's all we need to consider.

No, I do not mean that at all. I regret you feel it's that way. There was a point to the comparisons (see above).

But then you are not talking about what I am talking. I am talking about the fact that a human being with AIDS is ill vs. the fact that Ted Bundy was a morally evil person.

Given that I already agreed with you about that quite a while ago, why are you still banging on about it?

Okay, I misunderstood, but see, you kept saying things like

Because again, morality is not necessarily a good analogy to AIDS or wavelengths.

Yes, you repeated that several times. But since I never used morality as an analogy to either AIDS or wavelengths, it made sense to keep clarifying what my analogies were about.

It only remains true that when there were humans, they deemed Ted bundy to be bad, that's all.

That is not true, just as if all humans die, it remains the case that Marie Curie was ill due to radiation poisoning...but I guess you do not agree with that, either, so maybe not enough common ground for a conversation here.

Yes, the grass stops being green if there is no entity to deem it to be green. What's difficult about that?

It's not difficult, and I disagree of course. But I thought it would be obvious to you as well that this was false. That was the point of these analogies. They failed because you bit the bullets instead of recoiling.

 

[ruby sparks]

There was a point to the comparisons (see above).

I didn't say there wasn't, but as regards comparing cancer or AIDS with morality, it was only a partial point, because it only related to certain aspects that could be positively compared.

Okay, I misunderstood, but see, you kept saying things like

Because again, morality is not necessarily a good analogy to AIDS or wavelengths.

Which it isn't necessarily, because they are apparently different in the very way we are supposed to be discussing, namely their independence from human brains.

For the latter (AIDS, cancer, grass or wavelengths) there are apparently facts that are independent of humans and for the former (morality) there apparently aren't. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that their was ever human morality when there weren't human brains, or even when there were but moral facts were not asserted? No. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever grass or electromagnetic radiation when there merely were no human brains? Yes. The latter two are therefore, by any reasonable standard, demonstrably independent of human brains and the former isn't that, and you are more or less left with nothing but an arguably controversial bald assertion about the supposed independence of morality, an assertion that has no evidence, can't be demonstrated, and that is also redundant to explanations.

Now, can we do invisible, leaf-carrying elves? Perhaps you think I need to falsify them, or provide evidence they don't exist?

Hey, if you were essentially doing woo-type stuff, you should have just said, a lot earlier.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I didn't say there wasn't, but as regards comparing cancer or AIDS with morality, it was only a partial point, because it only related to certain aspects that could be compared.

Actually, that was neither a partial nor a complete point from me. Rather, I never compared cancer or AIDS to with morality.
Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. And again, the analogy is not at all between wavelengths and morality. It is between color and morality, etc.

Which it isn't necessarily, because they are apparently different in the very way we are supposed to be discussing, namely independence.

I don't know what you mean by 'independence' here, but the point is that when you say things like "Because again, morality is not necessarily a good analogy to AIDS or wavelengths." in reply to my posts, you suggest (given what you also say) that I made that analogy. I did not. Rather, the analogy was between color facts and moral facts, and between redness and moral evilness/badness, and the other analogy I just explained again.

For the latter (AIDS, cancer or wavelengths) there are apparently facts that are independent of humans and for the former (morality) there apparently aren't, beyond a bald assertion that can't be demonstrated. Can it be demonstrated that their was ever human morality when there weren't humans? No. Can it be demonstrated that there was ever grass when there weren't humans? Yes. One is independent of humans and the other isn't.

What do you mean by "there was morality"? If you mean there were morally wrong behavior, etc., it seems clearly so. It's not as though morality sprang into existence with humans. There were other primates, like say Homo Erectus that also had morality - evidence of this is that chimps and other apes do as well.

But that is not the issue. Yes, there was grass before there were humans. And there was also green stuff before there were humans. And there were ill animals, plants, etc. The fact that the meaning of our words is given by usage and the fact that usage is informed by our faculties does not imply that the referents of our words did not exist before humans.
On the other hand, was there AIDS before humans? It seems not.

You disagree that grass stops being green if there is no entity there to deem it to be green? That's extremely controversial.

I do not think it is extremely controversial, or controversial at all, unless by that you mean a few people strongly disagree. Sure, you can find anything in philosophy. But it would be extremely weird for humans to believe that grass stops being green if there is no entity there to deem it green.

Purely for example, take a look at the following links:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinosaur_coloration
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/1/100127-dinosaur-feathers-colors-nature/

Those animals became extinct over 65 million years before there were any humans. People discuss what color they were, and while there is disagreement, that's about what the evidence tells us, not about whether they were some color in the first place. That goes without saying (i.e., it's entirely uncontroversial, leaving aside some philosophers of course, but then, nearly everything would be controversial in that context).

 

[ruby sparks]

Things such as AIDS, cancer, grass and wavelengths are apparently different from morality in the very way we are supposed to be discussing lately, namely independence from human brains.

For AIDS, cancer, grass or wavelengths, there are apparently facts that are independent of humans and for morality there apparently aren't. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever human morality when there weren't human brains, or even when there were but moral facts were not asserted? No. You are more or less left with nothing but an arguably controversial bald assertion about the supposed independence of morality, an assertion that has no evidence, can't be demonstrated, and that is also redundant to explanations.

But maybe you are right.

Now, can we do invisible, leaf-carrying elves? Perhaps you think I need to falsify them, or provide evidence they don't exist?

We can discuss them colloquially or in terms of intuitions if you like.

Hey, if you were essentially doing woo-type stuff, you should have just said, a lot earlier.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

For the latter (AIDS, cancer, grass or wavelengths) there are apparently facts that are independent of humans and for the former (morality) there apparently aren't. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that their was ever human morality when there weren't human brains, or even when there were but moral facts were not asserted? No.

What do you mean?
There are facts that are not depending on time or instantiation, and others that are.

For example,

F1: It is always immoral for a human being to kill another for fun.
F2: Ted Bundy was a morally evil person.

Now, F1 is a fact of the first kind. F2 is a fact of the second kind. F2 of course requires the past existence of Ted Bundy. But it is not affected by future events. F1 does not require anyone's existence. Why? It is not an assertion about a particular individual, or about a particular time, etc. Rather, it is a general assessment about all humans, which does not require existence of humans.

On the other hand, you can say there was no human morality before there were humans in the sense there were no humans with moral properties - morally good, morally bad, etc. - though there were H. Erectus with such properties.

At any rate, I do not see where you are going with this.

Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever grass or electromagnetic radiation when there merely were no human brains? Yes. The latter two are therefore, by any reasonable standard, demonstrably independent of human brains and the former isn't that, and you are more or less left with nothing but an arguably controversial bald assertion about the supposed independence of morality, an assertion that has no evidence, can't be demonstrated, and that is also redundant to explanations.

Well, if you restrict your scenario to human morality, I might as well restrict the cancer comparison to human brain cancer, which did not exist before there were human brains.

Alternatively, we can consider Tourette's syndrome. By your standard, it seems that Tourette's syndrome and human brain cancers are also 'dependent' (whatever that means). I'm still not seeing your point.

Now, can we do invisible, leaf-carrying elves? Perhaps you think I need to falsify them, or provide evidence they don't exist?

Hey, if you were essentially doing woo-type stuff, you should have just said, a lot earlier.

That is not remotely related to anything I said.

 

[ruby sparks]

That is not remotely related to anything I said.

It's pretty similar in some ways. You know, like cancer and morality. Like the sun and bananas.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That is not remotely related to anything I said.

It's pretty similar in some ways. You know, like cancer and morality. Like the sun and bananas.

First, I did not compare cancer with morality. Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. I also did not compare the Sun and bananas.

Second, I never said or suggested anything about elves, or anything like that. When you start with the woo accusations, they are not related to my posts.

 

[ruby sparks]

That is not remotely related to anything I said.

It's pretty similar in some ways. You know, like cancer and morality. Like the sun and bananas.

First, I did not compare cancer with morality. Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. I also did not compare the Sun and bananas.

Second, I never said or suggested anything about elves, or anything like that. When you start with the woo accusations, they are not related to my posts.

There's been some things about our conversations for quite a while, on various topics, that has reminded me of conversations I've had with religious people. The dogmatic certainty and conviction that something you personally think is actually true, and that other people you are talking to just don't see it yet. The more than slightly ropey 'revelation' (about there supposedly being only minuscule exceptions to moral judgements in general) that took place and is now the 'bedrock' of the 'true beliefs'. The not coming straight out with things. The tortured 'logic' and jumping through of endless hoops. The being vague and going around in quibbling circles instead. The reliance on (possibly hiding of weak or superfluous claims behind) everyday language, colloquialisms, analogies (about carefully selected aspects of things) folk psychology and intuitions. The lack of actual direct, objective evidence or demonstration. The repeated rejection, in turn, of scientific explanations and the results of experiments that you try to insist don't undermine the claims. The putting too much stock in merely not being falsified or conclusively shown to be wrong. The trying to limit the analyses and discussion of various issues to personally chosen, limited, 'safe' areas, and the consequent dependence on inadequate or incomplete analyses. The redundancy of the claims to explanations. The lack of parsimony. I could go on.

Claim: moral facts exist independently of and/or externally to the senses of the entities that believe them to.

I could say the same thing about gods. It's that type of claim.