RETRIBUTIVISM

[ruby sparks]

Input fact A (to a normal brain) + input fact B + input facts C-Z = permissible output 1: punish.

Input fact A (to a normal but non-identical brain) + input fact B + input facts C-Z = permissible output 2: forgive.

Input fact A (to a normal but non-identical brain) + input fact B + input facts C-Z = permissible outputs 3 onwards: neither of the above, go make a sandwich or other response as selected.

The simplest explanation for the wide variety of possible answers, or permutations of them, is that morality is relative and depends on brains, which (crucially) differ, and does not independently exist outside of them. If nearly everyone agrees on some of them then that would merely show that nearly everyone agrees about those. A social species that has evolved over a very long time period would exhibit that feature, and all the features and patterns that can be observed, without recourse to independent, external moral facts, which are therefore, like Zeus and/or elves (neither of which can be proved not to exist) redundant to explanations,

 

[Angra Mainyu]

First, I did not compare cancer with morality. Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. I also did not compare the Sun and bananas.

Second, I never said or suggested anything about elves, or anything like that. When you start with the woo accusations, they are not related to my posts.

There's been some things about our conversations for quite a while, on various topics, that has reminded me of conversations I've had with religious people. The dogmatic certainty and conviction that something you personally think is actually true, and that other people you are talking to just don't see it yet. The more than slightly ropey 'revelation' (about there supposedly being only minuscule exceptions to moral judgements in general) that took place and is now the 'bedrock' of the 'true beliefs'. The not coming straight out with things. The tortured 'logic' and jumping through of endless hoops. The being vague and going around in quibbling circles instead. The reliance on (possibly hiding of weak or superfluous claims behind) everyday language, colloquialisms, analogies (about carefully selected aspects of things) folk psychology and intuitions. The lack of actual direct, objective evidence or demonstration. The repeated rejection, in turn, of scientific explanations and the results of experiments that you try to insist don't undermine the claims. The putting too much stock in merely not being falsified or conclusively shown to be wrong. The trying to limit the analyses and discussion of various issues to personally chosen, limited, 'safe' areas, and the consequent dependence on inadequate or incomplete analyses. The redundancy of the claims to explanations. The lack of parsimony. I could go on.

Claim: moral facts exist independently of and/or externally to the senses of the entities that believe them to.

I could say the same thing about gods. It's that type of claim.

That is all unwarranted and false.
There have been some things about my conversation with you that matches my conversations with nearly all endorsers of a religion/ideology/any political position on the internet: the demonization of the opponents, the constant attribution to the opponent of beliefs and intentions that the person does not have and that the accuser has no reason whatsoever to even suspect the person has, as well as accusations of actions the person has never engaged in, like "!The not coming straight out with things. " (all in your head), the " The more than slightly ropey 'revelation'" (look at how people actually debate), the " being vague and going around in quibbling circles instead" (not even close, I've been clarifying over and over and over, as a reply to persistent misrepresentations), the claim of denials of scientific explanations, and so on.

The most tragic part is that you actually believe what you say.

 

[The AntiChris]

All you're saying is that if the world were different you might be convinced.

No, I'm saying in which ways the world would have to be in order to convince me.

I think that's a 'yes'.

It really doesn't matter which convoluted justification you employ, my point is that the moral realist will always find a reason to reject, what many would see as, a genuine moral disagreement between normally-functioning humans.

First, it is not convoluted at all:

Are you proposing an opinion-independent fact-of-the-matter about convolution?

If you think that it [genuine moral disagreement] has much greater weight in showing that there is no fact of the matter, or that somehow it makes the issue unfalsifiable, I would ask that you make your argumentation clear.

Genuine moral disagreement wouldn't be fatal to attitude-independent moral facts-of-the-matter but it does present problems for the moral realist. I'll explain.

Assuming moral facts, independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes do exist, then moral disagreement between two normally-functioning humans would mean the following:

1. One, or both, disputants cannot reliably access/interpret moral facts.

2. If normally functioning human beings cannot be relied upon to access/interpret moral facts accurately then we (humans) have no way of knowing moral facts.

This doesn't show there are no moral facts-of-the-matter but, if they do exist, it renders them superfluous.

This is why a moral realist will go to great lengths to justify their denial of genuine moral disagreements.

 

[ruby sparks]

The most tragic part is that you actually believe what you say.

Have you ever considered becoming a Catholic priest? Serious question. If you said yes, you did at one time contemplate attending a seminary, I honestly would not be totally surprised.

On the other hand, no, you'd probably have to think wrongdoers sometimes deserve forgiveness.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The simplest explanation for the wide variety of possible answers, or permutations of them, is that morality is relative and depends on brains, which (crucially) differ, and does not independently exist outside of them.

That is not the simplest explanation. You would need to explain the massive failure of one of our faculties - i.e., the moral sense - to provide accurate information, as we would be massively mistaken about right and wrong, falsely believing that there is a fact of the matter and engaging in long debates about things about which there is no fact of the matter. You would have to explain why a sense that fails to track anything would evolve, how it would manage to work for monkeys given that they would not be able to predict with their own moral sense how the other monkeys will react, and so on. Do you have handy explanations for all of those things? Evidence in support of them?


There are simpler explanations if you look at the way debates go, like:

1. Disagreement about nonmoral facts, in a broad sense (i.e., different relevant information; one of the debaters may not have considered what the other debater has, rather than denying it).
2. Someone is using the wrong instrument, like RIP or something along those lines.
3. Their moral sense (i.e., the faculty by which humans normally make moral assessments) is malfunctioning.
4. A combination two or three of the above.
​

Note that this is a simple explanation, as the pattern would match we see in many, many other areas of discourse, like a debate on whether chimps and mosquitoes have a common ancestor. The realistic options are:

1. There is disagreement about what observations were made, and these observations are used to make the assessment as to whether they have a common ancestor (analogue: disagreement about nonmoral facts). Here, 'disagreement' is used broadly, to include instances in which some of the debaters simply has not considered what the other debater says.
2. Someone is using the wrong instrument, like RIP or something along those lines.
3. Their epistemic sense (i.e., the faculty by which humans normally make epistemic probabilistic assessments) is malfunctioning.
4. A combination two or three of the above.​

As I already pointed out, also in philosophy, long-lasting disagreements are pretty common. For example, disagreements between theists and nontheists, between substance dualists (i.e., souls and the like) and substance monists, and then property dualists and property monists. Also, disagreements in general about epistemology, philosophy of mind, you name it. Generally, though, we reckon there is a fact of the matter in those cases (not all philosophical disputes perhaps, but surely the ones I mentioned before and many others in those fields of philosophy). Why do these sort of disagreements persist? Well, it seems to me that it's something like the options given above.

In short, these sort of 1-4 things happen very often. And provide a better explanation. And they match what actually happens in moral debates, nearly always (it's 1.). Go ahead, see for yourself. Just take a look at moral debates as they actually happen (e.g., here in PD, or somewhere else). You will find that there is plenty of nonmoral disagreement to base the moral disagreement. You will see the demonization of the opponents, the accusations of having intent, beliefs, etc., that there is no good reason to believe the other person has (and which of course they deny, so plenty of disagreement), as well as demonization of the person they are debating with their opponents about. You will also see excuses from the other side. In other words, you will see vast nonmoral disagreement.

For example, take a look at how you attack me, with things like

Have you ever considered becoming a priest? Serious question. If you said yes, I honestly would not be surprised.

Or like the accusations in your previous post, e.g.,

There's been some things about our conversations for quite a while, on various topics, that has reminded me of conversations I've had with religious people. The dogmatic certainty and conviction that something you personally think is actually true, and that other people you are talking to just don't see it yet. The more than slightly ropey 'revelation' (about there supposedly being only minuscule exceptions to moral judgements in general) that took place and is now the 'bedrock' of the 'true beliefs'. The not coming straight out with things. The tortured 'logic' and jumping through of endless hoops. The being vague and going around in quibbling circles instead. The reliance on (possibly hiding of weak or superfluous claims behind) everyday language, colloquialisms, analogies (about carefully selected aspects of things) folk psychology and intuitions. The lack of actual direct, objective evidence or demonstration. The repeated rejection, in turn, of scientific explanations and the results of experiments that you try to insist don't undermine the claims. The putting too much stock in merely not being falsified or conclusively shown to be wrong. The trying to limit the analyses and discussion of various issues to personally chosen, limited, 'safe' areas, and the consequent dependence on inadequate or incomplete analyses. The redundancy of the claims to explanations. The lack of parsimony. I could go on.

Claim: moral facts exist independently of and/or externally to the senses of the entities that believe them to.

I could say the same thing about gods. It's that type of claim.

Here, you make things up about me that are not remotely connected with the truth. Now, you believe those things of course, but the crucial point is the massive disagreement about facts like what I intend/intended to do, what I said, what I believe, etc. (which you all have wrong, as you should know, but even if you will not, you can at least tell that there is massive disagreement). Your derogatory beliefs about me by which you dismiss what I say as something really stupid (and actually unrelated to what I said) matches what happens in other debates, including moral debates.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Have you ever considered becoming a Catholic priest? Serious question. If you said yes, you did at one time contemplate attending a seminary, I honestly would not be totally surprised.

But you should be, as you had no reason to even suspect so, and the vast majority of people do not consider that. No, I did not.

On the other hand, no, you'd probably have to think wrongdoers sometimes deserve forgiveness.

Catholicism says that wrongdoers deserve forgiveness? Is it not a free gift, but deserved? And even when they have not made an act of contrition? Could you provide evidence that Catholicism holds this, please?

 

[ruby sparks]

Catholicism says that wrongdoers deserve forgiveness? Is it not a free gift, but deserved? And even when they have not made an act of contrition? Could you provide evidence that Catholicism holds this, please?

Maybe I was wrong. But if I was, the good news is that you could become a Catholic priest.

I think you should at least consider it. It might suit your personality in some keys ways. I think they do intuitions and folk-psychology a LOT. And you would have the option to continue making the types of claims about your beliefs that you already do. And just think of all the evidence that you could say doesn't undermine them.

 

[ruby sparks]

View attachment 26187

Not like me = bad: Infants prefer those who harm dissimilar others
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4374623/

In one scenario during this experiment, 75% of 9 month-old infants and 98% of 14 month-old infants preferred (from a choice of 2) the dog puppet that helped (by retrieving an accidentally dropped ball for it) a puppet that was 'like the infant' (in this case shared their food preferences).

By contrast, in another scenario, over 75% of 9 month-old infants and 98% of 14 month-old infants preferred (from the same choice of 2) the dog puppet that by contrast harmed (by running away with the accidentally dropped ball) a different puppet that was 'not like the infant' (did not share their food preferences).

Which suggests that from a very early age indeed, human moral judgements are coloured by whether the recipient or victim of an action is 'like me' or 'not like me'.

This seems to be yet another thing that human morality is relative to and in this case biased about.

After reading such things, we may not really be surprised, but we may still be a bit shocked and saddened, if it is in fact the case, because it looks possible that basic human moral judgements based on favouritism and discrimination may be almost innate.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Maybe I was wrong. But if I was, the good news is that you could become a Catholic priest.

Maybe you would do better, as you have a lot more in common with them.
As for me, I do not think I would be a good fit.

I think you should at least consider it. It might suit your personality in some keys ways. I think they do intuitions and folk-psychology a LOT.

You got that backwards. I use moral intuitions to debunk their claims, and some of them strongly protest the use of intuitions, going instead if not with the Bible or some Catholic docrtine, with a philosophical view that is unwarranted and false, like Thomism.

And you would have the option to continue making the types of claims about your beliefs that you already do. And just think of all the evidence that you could say doesn't undermine them.

You are the one not even looking at the evidence. Again, take a look at what you are doing here. You attribute to me beliefs and intentions I do not have, claims I have not made, etc., and then you dismiss what I said. It happens all the time in moral debates as well. Plenty of nonmoral disagreement. Even if you won't see what you have been doing here, take a look at what people do in other threads. When you are watching other humans fight instead of fighting yourself, it is easier to see how the vast majority of them make stuff up about their opponents (not deliberately, they actually believe it) and about the people they condemn in general, and regardless of whether you see that, at least you will see the extent of nonmoral disagreement (hopefully you will see that).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

View attachment 26187

Not like me = bad: Infants prefer those who harm dissimilar others
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4374623/

In one scenario during this experiment, 75% of 9 month-old infants and 98% of 14 month-old infants preferred (from a choice of 2) the dog puppet that helped (by retrieving an accidentally dropped ball for it) a puppet that was 'like the infant' (in this case shared their food preferences).

By contrast, in another scenario, over 75% of 9 month-old infants and 98% of 14 month-old infants preferred (from the same choice of 2) the dog puppet that by contrast harmed (by running away with the accidentally dropped ball) a different puppet that was 'not like the infant' (did not share their food preferences).

Which suggests that from a very early age indeed, human moral judgements are coloured by whether the recipient or victim of an action is 'like me' or 'not like me'.

This seems to be yet another thing that human morality is relative to and in this case biased about.

After reading such things, we may not really be surprised, but we may still be a bit shocked and saddened, if it is in fact the case, because it looks possible that basic human moral judgements based on favouritism and discrimination may be almost innate.

But you are getting a wrong conclusion.
First, that is about favoritism. Even if people prefer to be around those more 'like them', that does not mean they would disagree about the correct moral judgment.

Second, if human morality is pro-discrimination, favoring the in-group, that would not mean there is no fact of the matter, or even that it is relative in the relevant sense. It would mean people have obligations, say, not to harm their in-group members for fun or to steal from them, etc. (where the group is instinctively picked), but lesser or no obligations not to harm out-group members for the same reasons, and so on. You are confusing a group-centered, biased morality with no morality.

 

[ruby sparks]

But you are getting a wrong conclusion.

Me, and the researchers, I guess.

Your evidence-denialism, which has been a feature of your postings in a few threads, might fit in nicely at the seminary too. Although I strongly suggest that you at least study the texts when you get there, better than you do here, so that you know what they actually say.


I admire your stamina and work ethic. There appear to be no lengths you will go to or no limit to the number of hoops you will try to jump through to protect your redundant and undemonstrated claims.

First, that is about favoritism. Even if people prefer to be around those more 'like them', that does not mean they would disagree about the correct moral judgment.

Second, if human morality is pro-discrimination, favoring the in-group, that would not mean there is no fact of the matter, or even that it is relative in the relevant sense. It would mean people have obligations, say, not to harm their in-group members for fun or to steal from them, etc. (where the group is instinctively picked), but lesser or no obligations not to harm out-group members for the same reasons, and so on. You are confusing a group-centered, biased morality with no morality.

Although you may or may not have noticed, you and I have not been disagreeing much for quite some time now as to whether there are at least some of what might be called moral facts (albeit against an obvious backdrop of relative variation, for which reason I think your claims about moral facts are overstated). But I now in retrospect think it a bit unfortunate that you were quite happy to allow me, for quite a while, in various threads, to agree that there were moral 'facts' of a certain sort, albeit clearly stated by me from the moment I accepted it to be on a particular basis and not on the basis of them being external or independent to humans, without making it clear and obvious, when talking to me, that you disagree with me about that, even though you clearly did and do disagree.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Me, and the researchers, I guess.

I do not know about that. While humans often seem biased against strangers, the bias takes the form of false beliefs about what those strangers intend, believe, etc. I do not see researchers saying that those assessments would persist upon agreement about the nonmoral facts of the matter.

But if you think otherwise, why don't you quote them making statements that support your claims against my view?

Your evidence-denialism, which has been a feature of your postings in a few threads, might fit in nicely at the seminary too.

The fact that you believe I engage in evidence-denialism in spite of what you can read in my posts would be a good fit for the seminary (well, in terms of absurdity, but I do not know whether your judgment of my posts is clouded by RIP, or just because you are angry with me).

I admire your stamina and work ethic. There appear to be no lengths you will go to or no limit to the number of hoops you will try to jump through to protect your redundant and undemonstrated claims.

I don't need to 'demonstrate' claims that are part of ordinary human experience, like the claim that humans generally can move small objects in their vicinity, or that some traffic lights are red, or that humans with AIDS or cancer or the flu are ill, or that humans can and sometimes feel pain, and so on. The same goes for there being moral facts. If you intend to challenge that, the burden is on you.

Although you may or may not have noticed, you and I have not been disagreeing much for quite some time now as to whether there are at least some of what might be called moral facts (albeit against an obvious backdrop of relative variation, for which reason I think your claims about moral facts are overstated). But I now in retrospect think it a bit unfortunate that you were quite happy to allow me, for quite a while, in various threads, to agree that there were moral 'facts' of a certain sort, albeit clearly stated by me from the moment I accepted it to be on a particular basis and not on the basis of them being external or independent to humans, without making it clear and obvious, when talking to me, that you disagree with me about that, even though you clearly did and do disagree.

Actually, when you talk about the 'independent to humans' stuff, you badly misconstrue my words, and attribute to me beliefs I do not have at all. Given the lack of clarity of your posts, I couldn't tell (I still can't) how much we disagree. Sometimes you say that you agree there are some moral facts. But then you go on to challenge them. It's rather weird. But to reiterate: I do not claim they are independent any more than claims about illness or color are. I tackled your arguments and showed that they failed, so I know your position is not correct, but how wrong it is is hard to tell because it's not precise enough for that.

For example, you claimed:

Yes, the grass stops being green if there is no entity to deem it to be green. Similar for Ted Bundy being bad. And, in the final analysis, whether anyone was ever what is called ill.

You tend to talk about this alleged "final analysis" that is never actually done, but clearly that is false. It's some sort of confusion. Dinosaurs had different colors, and scientists discover, discuss, etc., their color, even though no one was there to see it (their species-relative color vision saw something different, not what the scientists are talking about), and of course, people who had cancer were ill, and that is not the sort of fact that future events could retroactively change. This is just a mistaken theory that for some reason you hold.

Another error: you said:

Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever grass or electromagnetic radiation when there merely were no human brains? Yes. The latter two are therefore, by any reasonable standard, demonstrably independent of human brains and the former isn't that, and you are more or less left with nothing but an arguably controversial bald assertion about the supposed independence of morality, an assertion that has no evidence, can't be demonstrated, and that is also redundant to explanations.

Well, if you restrict your scenario to human morality, I might as well restrict the cancer comparison to human brain cancer, which did not exist before there were human brains. Alternatively, we can consider Tourette's syndrome. By your standard, it seems that Tourette's syndrome and human brain cancers are also 'dependent' (whatever that means), and if all humans were to die, then no human ever had Tourette's syndrome, which is patently false.

In short, your account of 'independence' is pretty obscure, but the parts that are clear enough to make an assessment are clearly wrong.

 

[ruby sparks]

I do not know about that. While humans often seem biased against strangers, the bias takes the form of false beliefs about what those strangers intend, believe, etc.

The experiment would seem to undermine that suggestion. What was believed about the 'like me' and 'not like me' puppets was not false. Interpreting scientific results correctly does not seem to be your strong suit. I wonder if that's why you feel you can try to reject them so often, especially when they don't agree with your own claims and beliefs. Try again with that one.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

I read the rest of your post carefully but I find a lot of it very questionable. In particular, the way you are comparing things like cancer or AIDS or Tourette's Syndrome, grass, wavelengths, etc, to morality is imo very confused for reasons previously given many times. And in particular your heavy reliance on 'ordinary human experience' (and things like intuitions, perceptions, everyday language, folk-psychology, analogies, colloquialisms, etc) is, I think a basic flaw that runs through many of your claims. Those considerations have much more in common with religion than anything else.

But I can cut through all that and just say I think you are wrong about moral judgements, and indeed moral 'facts', being independent of what humans deem them to be. We are now talking about the claim that morality is independent. The rest, as they say, is now merely commentary on that.

So, on that issue of supposed independence (I'm underlining it for you so that you understand, I hope, that we're not talking about moral 'facts' in the way I previously accepted):

Cancer, AIDS, grass, colour, and wavelengths are still not necessarily good analogies to morality regarding independence, for several reasons given. They may be, but possibly, like all analogies, only in some ways (see side note below also).

Human morality (ie the human sense of morality) did not, I would tend to assert (subject to being shown or convinced otherwise) exist before humans and would therefore cease to exist when humans cease to exist. This is not true of wavelengths, cancer or grass. It may be true of human cancer, yes, obviously, and historically the case, obviously. Duh.

Colour is slightly different, that, in the end, never really exists (except in the colloquial sense, such as 'lights are red' or 'dinosaurs were green') unless there is an entity to have the experience of it, given that colour is a sensory experience, and the experiencing entity doesn't have to be human. The idea that there is actually redness and greenness 'out there' is dubious and controversial. There are, it seems, only wavelengths of a certain type of radiation that are transmitted by or reflected from something.

If you think I misunderstand your specific claim about independence, which I might, then please clearly and succinctly state what that claim, about morality, is, and leave off analogies with other things at least initially?

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Side note: this issue of the applicability or not of analogies, or supposed contradictions between them and the issue at hand, comes up in other moral discussions, eg abortion. In order to decide if abortion is right or not, it is often compared, via analogy, to other things, but in the end, it seems, abortion is not the same as any of those other things, and so in the end there is nothing to fully compare it to, and we are left having to decide without recourse to analogies, in the end. It's possible this may be the case with the issue here, where we are comparing morality itself to other things.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

For example, are you claiming that there was morality and moral facts, in the universe, before there were any living things, and therefore independent of them?

 

[ruby sparks]

Regardless of any answer to that last question, I can't think of a single moral 'fact', ie something that all 'fully non-defective' humans (temporarily assuming there is such a thing objectively-speaking, which I doubt) agree on that could not be fully explained by saying it's dependent on human brains, and by extension human values, beliefs, attitudes, etc.

Can anyone think of one? Even, 'slowly torturing a human infant to death for fun is wrong' (I can't think of anything worse off the top of my head) wouldn't qualify. That could be fully explained by saying that's merely what is deemed to be the case by human brains. It's not a law of the universe, which, in case anyone hadn't noticed, is a very, very hostile and dangerous place, where damage and destruction happen a LOT, including the harm and suffering and deaths of living things, sometimes at the hands of other living things, sometimes at the hands of their own species, sometimes even, infants at the hands (or paws or hoofs or whatever) of their own mothers.

I'm not saying the animals that do that find it pleasurable, necessarily, I'm not sure if all species can experience pleasure, but there will nonetheless always be that type of reason, that it will fit, be ok, be what the chemicals in the system dictate is what feels right, or what is automatically the thing to do in the case of creatures that can't have feelings at all (beetles perhaps). The underlying reason is likely to be that it doesn't tend to reduce, and may even enhance, the chances of survival and reproduction of the species (or the genes in the gene-carrying vehicles that are the members of that species). In any case, you get the point. There are full explanations without recourse to supposed brain-independent moral facts.

Saying something like, 'X is or was still a wrong even in a universe where there are no humans and never have been (eg our universe 500 million years ago)' would be controversial, undemonstrated, possibly unfalsifiable, and redundant.

Saying something like, "humans don't have to be instantiated at a particular time for it to be a fact that it would be wrong if humans were instantiated" doesn't help much. It seems to help, if we imagine a future universe in which all humans, or even all living things, have gone, because we can then say "it was a fact when there were humans and it would be a fact if humans were ever to exist again" but that's really no different. Moral facts could still be human brain-dependent and it being otherwise would be untestable and redundant to explanations.

And if someone wants to make claims like that about morality, well, good luck to them. I guess it can't be demonstrated to be incorrect. When they're done they can do the existence of invisible elves. I don't see why not, if they want to. It'd be open season. Almost anything could be claimed.

 

[Treedbear]

Regardless of any answer to that last question, I can't think of a single moral 'fact', ie something that all 'fully non-defective' humans (temporarily assuming there is such a thing objectively-speaking, which I doubt) agree on that could not be fully explained by saying it's dependent on human brains, and by extension human values, beliefs, attitudes, etc.

Can anyone think of one? ...

Actually, yes. I think all moral values are traceable to a basic metaphysical truth of the universe (the largest context). And that is that things exist because they survive. If they don't survive they cease to be part of the universe. And in the case of living things they need to have the ability to survive, which is the evolutionary basis of morality. It's also the reason that it is (in the broadest conception of the term) relative. Species exist because they have the ability to adapt and evolve. In a nutshell you might say that at the most fundamental level existence = good, and extinction = bad. In the case of human morality it applies primarily to our own species, and all moral decisions have their roots in that which benefits our species.

 

[fromderinside]

Why need an attitude be dependent on anything. The 'explanation' would work as well if one pulled it out of one's arse or related it to a butterfly.

I'm starting off day in a bad mood I guess.

Excuse. Just finished taxes.

 

[ruby sparks]

Regardless of any answer to that last question, I can't think of a single moral 'fact', ie something that all 'fully non-defective' humans (temporarily assuming there is such a thing objectively-speaking, which I doubt) agree on that could not be fully explained by saying it's dependent on human brains, and by extension human values, beliefs, attitudes, etc.

Can anyone think of one? ...

Actually, yes. I think all moral values are traceable to a basic metaphysical truth of the universe (the largest context). And that is that things exist because they survive. If they don't survive they cease to be part of the universe. And in the case of living things they need to have the ability to survive, which is the evolutionary basis of morality. It's also the reason that it is (in the broadest conception of the term) relative. Species exist because they have the ability to adapt and evolve. In a nutshell you might say that at the most fundamental level existence = good, and extinction = bad. In the case of human morality it applies primarily to our own species, and all moral decisions have their roots in that which benefits our species.

Yes. I hadn't thought of that.

It would mean stretching the definition of 'moral' a bit. It wouldn't necessarily be a propositional attitude, or at least not a reported one (a fox can't report it) and a flower surely can't even have an attitude.

So whether it's something that's at the root of morality as opposed to being morality itself, might be debatable.

But it does satisfy in some ways, because it's an answer. It's a universal cause, possibly even a motivation, at a pinch (even one not consciously felt) at least for living things, therefore also a basis and a reason (for what become moral facts). I hesitate to call it a life force but maybe I shouldn't.


I'll certainly have to agree with Angra that there's at least one universal fact about.....something .....about morality....that does not depend on human brains, or even the having of a brain at all.

It still leaves the question of whether this fact was true before life existed. Some moral realists, perhaps all of them for all I know, would say that it did. That, I think, would be going beyond accepting that it is independent.

Nor would it seem to help to decide whether punishment or forgiveness was deserved. That would seem to pragmatically depend on outcomes, including all the ones that happened already during evolution. As such, there would still seem to be a place for forgiveness, as part of this or that strategy, even if not as often as punishment, at least for very social species such as ours.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The experiment would seem to undermine that suggestion. What was believed about the 'like me' and 'not like me' puppets was not false. Interpreting scientific results correctly does not seem to be your strong suit. I wonder if that's why you feel you can try to reject them so often, especially when they don't agree with your own claims and beliefs. Try again with that one.

First, no, your attack is merely an attack, not based on reality. You should know better, though you will not.

Second, actually, it is not known what sort of intuitive probabilistic assessments the infants in question were making about the 'like me' vs. 'not like me' puppets. So, the experiment tells us nothing about that, one way or another. On the other hand, my assessment "While humans often seem biased against strangers, the bias takes the form of false beliefs about what those strangers intend, believe, etc." is based on observations that are available to you as well: just take a look at different websites in which people show their bias against strangers, and you will see that sort of false (and unwarranted) beliefs all over the place. So, instead of focusing on a study of infants that does not tell you anything about it, you should look at the actual evidence you can find. It is everywhere.

I read the rest of your post carefully but I find a lot of it very questionable. In particular, the way you are comparing things like cancer or AIDS or Tourette's Syndrome, grass, wavelengths, etc, to morality is imo very confused for reasons previously given many times.

First, no, I did not compare AIDS or cancer to morality. Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS/cancer is the counterpart of Ted Bundy.

Second, yes, I did compare Tourette's Syndrome to some moral properties as a means of debunking one of your lines of argumentation. Indeed, the comparison shows that your argument fails. I thought that that was obvious, but let me explain it again. You made the following argument:

For the latter (AIDS, cancer, grass or wavelengths) there are apparently facts that are independent of humans and for the former (morality) there apparently aren't. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that their was ever human morality when there weren't human brains, or even when there were but moral facts were not asserted? No. Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever grass or electromagnetic radiation when there merely were no human brains? Yes. The latter two are therefore, by any reasonable standard, demonstrably independent of human brains and the former isn't that, and you are more or less left with nothing but an arguably controversial bald assertion about the supposed independence of morality, an assertion that has no evidence, can't be demonstrated, and that is also redundant to explanations.

Take a look at what you are doing here. You argue that grass or electromagnetic radiation are by any reasonable standard, demonstrably independent of human brains because it can be reasonably demonstrated (i.e., shown) that there was grass and electromagnetic radiation when there were no human brains.. Then you go on to say that this is relevantly different from morality because it cannot be reasonably demostrated that there ever was human morality when there weren't any human brains. And then you use that to claim I have only a bald assertion, whatever.

Now, let us consider Tourette's Syndrome, and let us ask your very question: Can it be reasonably demonstrated that there was ever Tourette's Syndrome when there weren't human brains?
And the answer is no. You see, in that regard - i.e., with respect to your question, Tourette's Syndrome is on the same boat as human morality, not on the same boat as grass or electromagnetic radiation. Do you see that this line of questions you use in your argument is misguided, as is your idea of "independence"?

But I can cut through all that and just say I think you are wrong about moral judgements, and indeed moral 'facts', being independent of what humans deem them to be. We are now talking about the claim that morality is independent. The rest, as they say, is now merely commentary on that.

No, this idea of "independent" you talk about is just a confusion on your part. This is what my Tourette example shows (actually, the color and illness example showed that too, but you failed to see it as you bit the bullets).

So, on that issue of supposed independence (I'm underlining it for you so that you understand, I hope, that we're not talking about moral 'facts' in the way I previously accepted):

I do not know that you accepted them in any sense that, well, makes sense (i.e., is coherent) and is relevant. But let us consider the rest.

Cancer, AIDS, grass, colour, and wavelengths are still not necessarily good analogies to morality regarding independence, for several reasons given. They may be, but possibly, like all analogies, only in some ways (see side note below also).

First of all, I did not compare AIDS or cancer to morality. Instead, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS/cancer is the counterpart of Ted Bundy.

Second, while your concept of "independence" appears to be a confusion, by your own standards I already showed that color properties matched moral properties. You even granted this already. Indeed, let us take a look:

Parallel 2: Human color facts are only in human brains. There's no color facts (and no color) 'out there', and 'in there' there is merely a sense (ultimately a mental sensation or set of sensations) of or about it/them. And without that sense, they don't exist.

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765793&viewfull=1#post765793

For the last time, I hope, I am good with that.

I take it - from what you've been saying - that you reject these parallels..at least with illness (I'm less sure what you think about the color parallel now). But why? What is the relevant difference?

Double whammy. Wrong and weird, given that I've gone blue in the face making it clear I have no problem with those particular comparisons

Well, actually, you do in some posts, and you do not in others. You just jump back and forth, because the "independence" idea is apparently just a confusion on your part.

Indeed, you went on to say that

Yes, the grass stops being green if there is no entity to deem it to be green. Similar for Ted Bundy being bad. And, in the final analysis, whether anyone was ever what is called ill.

That, obviously, is false. But regardless, your biting the bullet on that shows that the comparisons between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral facts and color facts does the job here. Your new denial

Cancer, AIDS, grass, colour, and wavelengths are still not necessarily good analogies to morality regarding independence, for several reasons given. They may be, but possibly, like all analogies, only in some ways (see side note below also).

is just confused. Also, and by the way, let me remind you: you said:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM&p=765793&viewfull=1#post765793

Yes, the grass stops being green if there is no entity to deem it to be green. Similar for Ted Bundy being bad. And, in the final analysis, whether anyone was ever what is called ill.

Grass may still exist however. Cancer may still exist. There may still be wavelengths for electromagnetic radiation. Those would be facts that would be independent of what humans deem them.

So, you say that color is a good analogy to morality regarding "independence". Now you say it is not. But that seems to be because "independence" is a confusion.
At any rate, if you say you have a coherent concept of independence, then tell me, how is it that you go back and forth with regard to color? How is it that the very test for independence that you use to separate morality from AIDS, cancer, grass or wavelengths puts Tourette's Syndrome together with morality, and yet then you go on to say that "the way you are comparing things like cancer or AIDS or Tourette's Syndrome, grass, wavelengths, etc, to morality is imo very confused for reasons previously given many times."

Of course, I was not comparing cancer or AIDS to morality. Again, the comparison is between moral facts and illness/health facts, and between moral badness/evilness and illness. In those analogies, AIDS or cancer are not the counterpart of morality. AIDS/cancer is the counterpart of Ted Bundy. But the comparision with Tourette's Syndrome is spot on, by the very standard you use!

Human morality (ie the human sense of morality) did not, I would tend to assert (subject to being shown or convinced otherwise) exist before humans and would therefore cease to exist when humans cease to exist. This is not true of wavelengths, cancer or grass. It may be true of human cancer, yes, obviously, and historically the case, obviously. Duh.

Obviously, if you qualify the sense of morality as 'human', it cannot exist without humans by definition!!!. On the other hand, the moral sense began earlier, with other primates, and may very well continue with post-humans. Well, what about Tourette's Syndrome? It cannot be reasonably shown to have existed before humans. I guess it might or might not have existed in H. Erectus, while the moral sense certainly did. Now, the human moral sense did not because you exclude it by definition, but for that matter, the human Tourette Syndrome did not, either.

Colour is slightly different, that, in the end, never really exists (except in the colloquial sense, such as 'lights are red' or 'dinosaurs were green') unless there is an entity to have the experience of it, given that colour is a sensory experience, and the experiencing entity doesn't have to be human. The idea that there is actually redness and greenness 'out there' is dubious and controversial. There are, it seems, only wavelengths of a certain type of radiation that are transmitted by or reflected from something.

The meaning of the words in colloquial English is the relevant one, as we are not speaking in any other language. Dinosaurs were green or whatever color. But it is obvious that they were. If you are going to talk about some concept of color that is not the colloquial English concept, then you are simply not talking about color anymore.

If you think I misunderstand your specific claim about independence, which I might, then please clearly and succinctly state what that claim, about morality, is, and leave off analogies with other things at least initially?

Well, I explained in which sense they are independent and in which sense they are not. After that, you repeatedly misconstrued my words and came up with a very confused idea. I have no particular claim.

Side note: this issue of the applicability or not of analogies, or supposed contradictions between them and the issue at hand, comes up in other moral discussions, eg abortion. In order to decide if abortion is right or not, it is often compared, via analogy, to other things, but in the end, it seems, abortion is not the same as any of those other things, and so in the end there is nothing to fully compare it to, and we are left having to decide without recourse to analogies, in the end. It's possible this may be the case with the issue here, where we are comparing morality itself to other things.

Yes, but I am using the analogies to show errors in your arguments against morality, or "independence" (whatever that is).

For example, are you claiming that there was morality and moral facts, in the universe, before there were any living things, and therefore independent of them?

Based on the exchange so far, you do not appear to be using a coherent concept of independence. I am saying of course that some statements are not time-dependent. Of course, all of this is a matter of language, not of woo . As with the free will case, I talk about the meaning of the words in English, and you read 'woo'.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Even, 'slowly torturing a human infant to death for fun is wrong' (I can't think of anything worse off the top of my head) wouldn't qualify.
That could be fully explained by saying that's merely what is deemed to be the case by human brains. It's not a law of the universe, which, in case anyone hadn't noticed, is a very, very hostile and dangerous place, where damage and destruction happen a LOT, including the harm and suffering and deaths of living things, sometimes at the hands of other living things, sometimes at the hands of their own species, sometimes even, infants at the hands (or paws or hoofs or whatever) of their own mothers.

Well, it would be A human slowly torturing a human infant (or adult, which is no better) to death for fun is morally wrong'. But yes, that is deemed the case by human brains, barring malfunction. What else do you need for it to be the case? But consider red traffic lights are red, and you get the same (i.e., human eyes/brains, barring malfunction). And then I can tell you about 'AIDS is an illness', and so on.

But now you are changing the metric again (in the Tourette example, I argued against an argument of yours that used a different metric).

Saying something like, 'X is or was still a wrong even in a universe where there are no humans and never have been (eg our universe 500 million years ago)' would be controversial, undemonstrated, possibly unfalsifiable, and redundant.

The part in italics is a bit ambiguous, but it is not a claim I made. What I said is that some statements are not time-dependent. To say that a human slowly torturing a human infant (or adult, which is no better) to death for fun is morally wrong is a general statement. In order for it to be false, there would have to be a possible scenario in which a human tortures another slowly to death for fun and which is not morally wrong. You will find no such exception. Again, I'm talking language, and you see woo. You were the one who wanted to ask whether it was true even if there were no humans. If you insist in talking like that, yes, sure, it is true, because it is true of all cases, no exceptions. But it's a rather odd question to ask. One has to be very clear that one is talking about language, not metaphysics or woo. My example was that even if all humans were to die, it would remain the case that Ted Bundy was a bad person, because it is a fact in the past that cannot be changed by future events.

Moral facts could still be human brain-dependent and it being otherwise would be untestable and redundant to explanations.

And again, if you go by that, the same applies to facts about Tourette's Syndrome.

And if someone wants to make claims like that about morality, well, good luck to them. I guess it can't be demonstrated to be incorrect. When they're done they can do the existence of invisible elves. I don't see why not, if they want to. It'd be open season. Almost anything could be claimed.

Again, I talk about language, you see woo and attack me. Whatever.

 

[ruby sparks]

If you are going to talk about some concept of color that is not the colloquial English concept, then you are simply not talking about color anymore.

Wow. That is such complete nonsense, but if you think it isn't then that probably explains a LOT, possibly about a great deal of what has gone into all your arguments on several topics. No wonder you have so much trouble accepting the results of science. and/or misunderstanding them.

It was already obvious that there were some significant issues with your reliance on colloquialisms, intuitions, analogies, approximations, everyday language, folk-psychology, subjectivity, 'how things seem', incomplete analyses and inadequate definitions, and so on, but that fundamentally incorrect statement about the standards we should be using takes the whole biscuit in one mouthful.

Your underlying approach to philosophical issues is deeply flawed.

If you think I misunderstand your specific claim about independence, which I might, then please clearly and succinctly state what that claim, about morality, is, and leave off analogies with other things at least initially?

Well, I explained in which sense they are independent and in which sense they are not.

Recap?

You can just do the first bit, the ways they are independent, to keep it short. Please try to keep it as short as possible. You don't need to elaborate too much initially. Short and sweet, if possible.

And, as I said, if possible, try to do it by talking about morality, not via analogies between morality and other things which may or may not be fully comparable. If they are not fully comparable then different responses may not show any inconsistency or error, it may just be that the things analogised are different from each other in some ways. And if the standard is everyday colloquial language then that's a huge and arbitrary limitation and one which will more or less automatically introduce, from the start, vagueness and imprecision.