Similar to an argument I tried (clumsily) to make

[ruby sparks]

Based purely upon whether or not it is in your current awareness, you either were or were not the person who experienced being carried away by the pig as a boy?

I would venture to say that whoever I call 'me' at this moment, it was not the same 'me' it was at the time of the pig incident, strictly speaking, because of what I said about self being a fleeting user illusion in flux and not necessarily tied to particular content.

Think of the implications of that. What you consider your experience (and who you consider yourself to be) is entirely a matter of what is being presented to your conscious mind right now, as this. But why must your experiences be presented in the brain of a certain entity, among all those that ever or will live, in order to qualify as yours? Suppose the neurological pattern of that memory could be exactly replicated by a system of electrodes, such that any individual could experience the same phenomenal sensation by wiring up the electrodes to their brain and running the simulation. When that experience is represented in another brain, and is fully realized in just the way you remembered it, doesn't that satisfy every requirement for it to be yours? The only way you could say otherwise would be to claim there is something special about the brain of ruby sparks, wherein a memory summoned within it would qualify as yours, but the same memory summoned within a different brain would not qualify as yours. Is this an accurate interpretation of your position?

At the risk of repeating myself ad nauseam, I think that is making an unwarranted step, for reasons already given.

There is no reason why, hypothetically, what you say could not happen, and if it did, whatever 'system' was having the experiences would call them 'me' (within certain limits and with the caveats I mentioned). But that does not seem to mean that I am another, just that I could be, or that another system could call itself me (would call 'itself' 'me'). In a nutshell, the experience of self is private and individual to the system having the experiences, even if all systems, hypothetically, would use the same word ('me'). That does not get us, I think, to commonality or universalism of the sort I think you are talking about. It would just mean that being 'me' or to be more precise something calling itself 'me' is relative, subjective, illusory, fleeting, but not universal.

No offence meant, but I think you are repeating thought experiments that you have already used? And I'm still not getting it. Not seeing the step you are. And if I'm honest, when you say stuff like 'that which is having all experiences' I get a bit confused, because it implies that there is something having all experiences, which there very well might be but I don't see how it can be established by argument.

 

[PyramidHead]

Based purely upon whether or not it is in your current awareness, you either were or were not the person who experienced being carried away by the pig as a boy?

I would venture to say that whoever I call 'me' at this moment, it was not the same 'me' it was at the time of the pig incident, strictly speaking, because of what I said about self being a fleeting user illusion in flux and not necessarily tied to particular content.

And all I am trying to get you to realize is that you have the same relationship with that 'me' as you do with anybody having any experience. Right? You would describe that relationship as not-being-the-same-person (as either the person involved in the pig incident or any other person in any other experience). I would describe it as being-the-same-person. But materially, how are our positions any different? Either way, there is nothing to distinguish the experience you are having right now from any other in terms of its possessor--either because there is no possessor and just an instantaneous user illusion, or because this user illusion is the same one that appears in all experience! I think we are pretty much on the same page, just expressed in different ways.

At any given point in time, the brain generates a subjectivity phenomenon that makes it seem as though it has a first-person perspective. The strangeness of this situation is that seeming to have a first-person perspective is actually the same thing as having a first-person perspective. Suffering from the illusion of being a persistent subject turns out to be identical in every way to being a persistent subject. So, call that what you will, but it's the thing that I'm very concerned about when I consider my self-interest, as well as the prospects for my future survival. For both of our positions, death is not a problem: you die with every instant that passes, only to be replaced by the next slice of awareness, belonging to no one, untethered to anything that came before or after it, where each sliver is privy to only the experiences occurring to it before vanishing forever. In my interpretation of the same reality, it makes sense to ask why I should be present in any of those moments, or why I would be in some but not others, and that leads me to conclude I must be there in all of them, and so I will be there in any of them. At the very least, we both seem to reject the ordinary view of a fixed identity starting at birth, persisting within the confines of a changing body, and finally being extinguished upon death. That, to me, is a step in the right direction.

 

[Treedbear]

Based purely upon whether or not it is in your current awareness, you either were or were not the person who experienced being carried away by the pig as a boy?

I would venture to say that whoever I call 'me' at this moment, it was not the same 'me' it was at the time of the pig incident, strictly speaking, because of what I said about self being a fleeting user illusion in flux and not necessarily tied to particular content. ...

I would think of it as the same "me" but one that has changed. It's all about recognizing a continuity of existence. And if you aren't able to remember the earlier me or remember it entirely at any moment it's still the same "you" objectively speaking. The truth of the matter must be the more objective truth. Otherwise you get woo.

 

[PyramidHead]

Based purely upon whether or not it is in your current awareness, you either were or were not the person who experienced being carried away by the pig as a boy?

I would venture to say that whoever I call 'me' at this moment, it was not the same 'me' it was at the time of the pig incident, strictly speaking, because of what I said about self being a fleeting user illusion in flux and not necessarily tied to particular content. ...

I would think of it as the same "me" but one that has changed. It's all about recognizing a continuity of existence. And if you aren't able to remember the earlier me or remember it entirely at any moment it's still the same "you" objectively speaking. The truth of the matter must be the more objective truth. Otherwise you get woo.

It's actually impossible, in objective terms, to explain why the "me" of a childhood memory should be the same "me" as the one now remembering it. For any plausible candidate explanation, there are scenarios that could conceivably alter it by degrees or remove it entirely, and no satisfying answer for which side of the Ship of Theseus to come down on. Either you go the eliminativist route and abandon any notion of identity with the prior remembered self, or you go the universalist route and infer identity with any self, but there is no way to justify being the same "me" as the subject of my childhood experience without opening one of those doors.

 

[Treedbear]

I would think of it as the same "me" but one that has changed. It's all about recognizing a continuity of existence. And if you aren't able to remember the earlier me or remember it entirely at any moment it's still the same "you" objectively speaking. The truth of the matter must be the more objective truth. Otherwise you get woo.

It's actually impossible, in objective terms, to explain why the "me" of a childhood memory should be the same "me" as the one now remembering it. For any plausible candidate explanation, there are scenarios that could conceivably alter it by degrees or remove it entirely, and no satisfying answer for which side of the Ship of Theseus to come down on. Either you go the eliminativist route and abandon any notion of identity with the prior remembered self, or you go the universalist route and infer identity with any self, but there is no way to justify being the same "me" as the subject of my childhood experience without opening one of those doors.

Ahh, very interesting! So this is the axiom which your theory rests on. The age old Ship of Theseus paradox. Now I understand your point! But I have my own solution, and I say my own because I see it nowhere in the discussion but is curiously the basis for all belief in the supernatural (metaphysical or otherwise). Which is that things (sentient or otherwise) are defined by some essense. Aristotle's "what-it-is"ness. Of course that fails as a starting point. My point is rather that things are defined by their relationships to other things. Their properties being that by which they interact with other things. There is no essence before existence, as Sartre insisted. Yes, but existence is not simply what something does, but what something has in its relationships with other things. Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship. The continuity of its existence remains coherent and meaningful. The reconstructed version is only a relic even though it might contain all of the parts from the ship as it originally existed. The same thing holds true for a human being.

 

[PyramidHead]

I would think of it as the same "me" but one that has changed. It's all about recognizing a continuity of existence. And if you aren't able to remember the earlier me or remember it entirely at any moment it's still the same "you" objectively speaking. The truth of the matter must be the more objective truth. Otherwise you get woo.

It's actually impossible, in objective terms, to explain why the "me" of a childhood memory should be the same "me" as the one now remembering it. For any plausible candidate explanation, there are scenarios that could conceivably alter it by degrees or remove it entirely, and no satisfying answer for which side of the Ship of Theseus to come down on. Either you go the eliminativist route and abandon any notion of identity with the prior remembered self, or you go the universalist route and infer identity with any self, but there is no way to justify being the same "me" as the subject of my childhood experience without opening one of those doors.

Ahh, very interesting! So this is the axiom which your theory rests on. The age old Ship of Theseus paradox. Now I understand your point! But I have my own solution, and I say my own because I see it nowhere in the discussion but is curiously the basis for all belief in the supernatural (metaphysical or otherwise). Which is that things (sentient or otherwise) are defined by some essense. Aristotle's "what-it-is"ness. Of course that fails as a starting point. My point is rather that things are defined by their relationships to other things. Their properties being that by which they interact with other things. There is no essence before existence, as Sartre insisted. Yes, but existence is not simply what something does, but what something has in its relationships with other things. Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship. The continuity of its existence remains coherent and meaningful. The reconstructed version is only a relic even though it might contain all of the parts from the ship as it originally existed. The same thing holds true for a human being.

So in effect, if a mad scientist created a duplicate of you, whose presence in your place would interact with its surroundings in just the same way that you would have, then you would have no problem being annihilated and replaced by this duplicate? Or would you feel that something about the duplicate was inadequate for continuing your experience?

 

[Treedbear]

Ahh, very interesting! So this is the axiom which your theory rests on. The age old Ship of Theseus paradox. Now I understand your point! But I have my own solution, and I say my own because I see it nowhere in the discussion but is curiously the basis for all belief in the supernatural (metaphysical or otherwise). Which is that things (sentient or otherwise) are defined by some essense. Aristotle's "what-it-is"ness. Of course that fails as a starting point. My point is rather that things are defined by their relationships to other things. Their properties being that by which they interact with other things. There is no essence before existence, as Sartre insisted. Yes, but existence is not simply what something does, but what something has in its relationships with other things. Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship. The continuity of its existence remains coherent and meaningful. The reconstructed version is only a relic even though it might contain all of the parts from the ship as it originally existed. The same thing holds true for a human being.

So in effect, if a mad scientist created a duplicate of you, whose presence in your place would interact with its surroundings in just the same way that you would have, then you would have no problem being annihilated and replaced by this duplicate? Or would you feel that something about the duplicate was inadequate for continuing your experience?

Since two objects can't occupy the same space at the same time there would necessarily be discernable differences between them and in how they interact with their environment. If I was annihilated, whatever "takes my place" would be something different with a unique history.

 

[PyramidHead]

Ahh, very interesting! So this is the axiom which your theory rests on. The age old Ship of Theseus paradox. Now I understand your point! But I have my own solution, and I say my own because I see it nowhere in the discussion but is curiously the basis for all belief in the supernatural (metaphysical or otherwise). Which is that things (sentient or otherwise) are defined by some essense. Aristotle's "what-it-is"ness. Of course that fails as a starting point. My point is rather that things are defined by their relationships to other things. Their properties being that by which they interact with other things. There is no essence before existence, as Sartre insisted. Yes, but existence is not simply what something does, but what something has in its relationships with other things. Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship. The continuity of its existence remains coherent and meaningful. The reconstructed version is only a relic even though it might contain all of the parts from the ship as it originally existed. The same thing holds true for a human being.

So in effect, if a mad scientist created a duplicate of you, whose presence in your place would interact with its surroundings in just the same way that you would have, then you would have no problem being annihilated and replaced by this duplicate? Or would you feel that something about the duplicate was inadequate for continuing your experience?

Since two objects can't occupy the same space at the same time there would necessarily be discernable differences between them and in how they interact with their environment. If I was annihilated, whatever "takes my place" would be something different with a unique history.

Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship.

Which is it? If the parts of the ship can be replaced gradually and it stays the "one true ship" as long as its function is maintained, then why can't the same thing be done all at once with a perfect replica of your body?

 

[Treedbear]

...

Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship.

Which is it? If the parts of the ship can be replaced gradually and it stays the "one true ship" as long as its function is maintained, then why can't the same thing be done all at once with a perfect replica of your body?

It's physically impossible in theory and practice. Replacing it all at once surely involves annihilating it before the substitution takes place. One ends before the other begins. Replacing it piece-by-piece is not destruction. That is to say, as long as the replacements are limited in extent, depending on the case I would think. Removing someone's brain would pretty much be a termination of one's functional existence.

 

[The AntiChris]

Regarding Theseus' ship, as long as it goes on functioning as a ship within whichever context it is confined, it remains the one true ship.

Which is it? If the parts of the ship can be replaced gradually and it stays the "one true ship" as long as its function is maintained, then why can't the same thing be done all at once with a perfect replica of your body?

It can (if I understand you correctly).

If you duplicate a human, then what would result would be two distinct individuals both of whom have equal claim to be continuations of the original human prior to duplication. That does not mean they are the same person. It simply means they are two individuals with a shared past.

 

[ruby sparks]

It is not commonly known, but Theseus had a brother, Thaseus. Thaseus was a fisherman and he had a small fishing boat. Then war broke out, and Thaseus' boat was comandeered and converted to a war vessel; the fishing winches were removed and it was armoured and fitted with a cannon and so on. Was that the same boat? Later, after the war, when the local fishing industry had declined, it was fitted with wheels and Thaseus drove it on land making grocery deliveries. After several years it was reconfigured and extended to become a house for Thaseus to retire to in the forest. He lived beside a man who had built a conventional stone house. Could we say that Thaseus' house was the other man's house?

 

[ruby sparks]

To add, of what interest is it to one house if the other is knocked down? Maybe the occupant of one gets a better view or something, or the two guys move in together or one moves away and the other is either glad to get rid of him or misses his company.

Similarly, the two houses may share something. 'Houseness'. But that does not mean that there actually is a universal house anywhere. It may be (likely is imo) an abstract concept only.

Now it's fair to say that both houses could undergo many hypothetical changes. Both could be rebuilt via incremental repairs, like Theseus' ship. And then we might ask which is the true house in each case. Or the two houses could be repaired/altered using bits swopped with the other, until both are hybrids and we could ask which is the house that was a boat and which is the stone house.

But those are only a hypothetical possibilities. As things stand they are not the same. They only could be (under Theseus' ship analogy or similar scenario). There isn't necessarily any reason for one house to share the interests of the other, and certainly not, it seems to me, on the basis of one house 'really being' (whatever that means) the other house. So I am not that Roman, I think. Though I could be.