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Subjective and objective time

PyramidHead

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If subjective experience is a matter of what is happening in the brain, then it seems that there may be a difference between the time that elapses for the brain itself and the time that elapses in subjective experience. I'm not talking about the psychological effect of feeling like a speech has gone on forever when it's only been 20 minutes, or 'time flies when you're having fun.' I'm talking about a more obvious difference, which can be illustrated by (surprise surprise) some thought experiments.

A simple one to imagine is that the you are living in a simulation. Your brain is being fed impulses by a machine programmed to exactly replicate whatever the brain would have received if you were navigating the actual world. The program is entirely artificial and will go the way it goes regardless of your conscious control, although it will feel as though you are making conscious choices at times because the corresponding neural patterns will be so activated at those points in the simulation. One afternoon, a technician on duty accidentally hits the "pause" button on her way out, and your brain state is kept in stable stasis at that line of code for the duration of the night. The next morning, noticing her mistake, she un-pauses the machine and the program continues normally.

It might be tempting to think that, when the "pause" button was hit, you suddenly became aware that you were lying down in a lab somewhere (or worse yet, a brain in a vat of chemicals), and were paralyzed in terror for the entire night. Yet, there is no reason to think that this is true, because if it were, your brain state would have changed accordingly, which is not possible given the stipulation that the machine keeps your brain signals static while "pause" is active. The only alternative, then, is that you wouldn't notice the change at all. Your subjective experience would be seamless and uninterrupted, even if there had been a year or a decade between pausing and un-pausing the machine. Do you agree so far?

Let me add a wrinkle to this thought experiment. For some unknown reason, your brain has been divided into four parts. Each part is in a separate room, and is being fed impulses by the same kinds of machines, only the machine for each quarter of your brain is optimized to feed it only the necessary signals that would have been naturally received by that part, were it connected to the others and were you actually out there in the real world. There is no connection whatsoever among the four quarters of your brain, but the signals they are receiving individually are exactly what they would be receiving if they were integrated physically.

The inescapable conclusion is that you would still not notice anything different in your subjective experience. If subjective experience is a function of brain activity, and brain activity is reducible to inputs and outputs, then a sufficiently detailed machine capable of replicating the inputs and outputs of isolated segments of your brain would be a perfect stand-in for the regular kind of interconnected activity of your brain while intact. Remember, the entire program of your experiences is already planned ahead of time, and the machines know just what signals they would have gotten from the other parts of your brain during these experiences, and are programmed to provide exactly those signals without being connected to the others. The four parts of your brain could be separated by miles, even located in different countries, and as long as the correct information were being fed to each one, your experience would be no different. Do you still agree?

When we combine the two scenarios, there is a further complication. Suppose the careless technician accidentally hit the "pause" button on the machine that sent impulses to just your front-left segment before leaving for the night. Elsewhere, perhaps across the ocean, the other three segments continue to receive information from their respective machines. What would your experience be like during the night? What would it be like the next morning when she un-paused the front-left segment's machine, thus making it about 14 hours "out of sync" with the others?

Surprisingly, if we are being consistent with the functional activity of the brain ( and nothing else) determining subjective experience, you would still not notice any change. After all, your brain would still be receiving just the same signals as it would have under ordinary circumstances. In every functional respect, every part of your brain would still have the same inputs and outputs as your intact brain would if you were actually awake and in the real world. Since the four machines in charge of sending signals to the four quarters of your brain were never connected to each other anyway, why should it matter the order in which they carry out their respective programs? In fact, each portion of your brain could be fed its entire sequence of impulses separately, with a month passing between the activation and deactivation of each one, and your experience would not feel any different from the inside.

In fact, the sequence of "events" in the simulation itself could be scrambled, so that the machines first provide the impulses you would have received tomorrow, followed by the ones you would have received yesterday, followed by the ones you would have received today. As long as those impulses exactly replicate every part of your experience (including memory and the internal sensations associated with the passage of time), it would still appear to you as though you had lived yesterday, then today, and then tomorrow.

A complete and perfect functional package of brain impulses, regardless of the objective timing, spatial location, and order in which its information is delivered, must therefore always be "stitched together" by subjective experience as a seamless package. This should give us compelling reason to doubt that there is anything absolute or reality-reflective in the way we subjectively experience time as constantly flowing.
 
I'm not sure what your thought experiment is supposed to show.

I don't think we have any subjective experience of time. All we seem to have is a subjective experience of "now", the present moment. And then we have a construct based on memory data that we call time. But this time is not experienced as such. And, obviously, I have no idea why that is except that this probably reflects the way our brain works. So, it's not a matter of subjective experience, it's a matter of how the brain works. That's how I see it anyway. And then objective time is just yet another construct, also based on our memory, but taking account of what other people say. Subjective time is produced by one subject. Objective time is a collaborative effort. But the main point is that at no point do we experience any time at all, be it objective or subjective.

I also think there's a problem with your thought experiment in that we don't know yet how the brain really works. In particular, I believe one crucial aspect must be the overall consistency of the data recorded and produced within the brain. If you put one quarter of the brain on pause, I doubt very much that you'll still have a consistent set of data. And then, I have absolutely no idea, nor do you, as to what it does to subjective experience. Me, I suspect that subjective experience is limited to particular areas of the brain so that you could cut out the rest of the brain and keep feeding the appropriate input data to the areas preserved and the "subject" would be just fine. Yet, there may be more to subjective experience than input data, we just don't know. That's all very speculative.
EB
 
Interesting. Thanks for bringing it up. My question, in your example with the brain in 4 pieces, isn't the brain itself superfluous at that point if the four devices can perfectly simulate the other 3 pieces of the brain for each part it is connected to? To me that's even more interesting in a way. If you threw that brain in the recycle bin, and just connected the four machine pieces together, and programmed the resulting output to again be put into the simulation, then would you notice?

It reminds me of the thought experiment where you ask if you are still you after we replace one neuron with a synthetic equivalent one at a time until the entire brain is replaced by machine.
 
Interesting. Thanks for bringing it up. My question, in your example with the brain in 4 pieces, isn't the brain itself superfluous at that point if the four devices can perfectly simulate the other 3 pieces of the brain for each part it is connected to? To me that's even more interesting in a way. If you threw that brain in the recycle bin, and just connected the four machine pieces together, and programmed the resulting output to again be put into the simulation, then would you notice?

You wouldn't notice a thing. You just proved functionalism is true.
 
You wouldn't notice a thing. You just proved functionalism is true.

Proved?!

Whoa.

No longer my world, it seems.
EB

Suppose that the left part of my visual cortex were replaced by a gadget that has precisely the same input/output relationship to the rest of the brain as the left visual cortex had. Under any view but functionalism, the content of my visual experience would be radically different as a result of the intrinsically different makeup of the gadget, compared to the piece of my visual cortex it replaced. But if all the inputs and outputs are exactly preserved with the gadget, there is at least no logical way that my behavior could be different, since behavior (including thought) is straightforwardly determined by brain activity. So, I would be talking, moving around, and altogether acting as though there were no change to my visual experience. But if half my vision had disappeared or changed I’d be speaking, thinking and acting like someone with problems on the right side of his vision. It stands to reason that if there would be no change to my experience with part of my visual cortex replaced by a functional equivalent, the same should be true of any or all parts of my brain. This conclusion, combined with the idea that the operation of a brain or brain-gadget do not need to be synchronized as long as they are functionally preserved in lieu of synchronization, decouples conscious experience from the objective constraints of space and time in a strange and interesting (to me) way.
 
You wouldn't notice a thing. You just proved functionalism is true.

Proved?!

Whoa.

No longer my world, it seems.
EB

Suppose that the left part of my visual cortex were replaced by a gadget that has precisely the same input/output relationship to the rest of the brain as the left visual cortex had. Under any view but functionalism, the content of my visual experience would be radically different as a result of the intrinsically different makeup of the gadget, compared to the piece of my visual cortex it replaced. But if all the inputs and outputs are exactly preserved with the gadget, there is at least no logical way that my behavior could be different, since behavior (including thought) is straightforwardly determined by brain activity. So, I would be talking, moving around, and altogether acting as though there were no change to my visual experience. But if half my vision had disappeared or changed I’d be speaking, thinking and acting like someone with problems on the right side of his vision. It stands to reason that if there would be no change to my experience with part of my visual cortex replaced by a functional equivalent, the same should be true of any or all parts of my brain.

Thank you so much for explaining what functionalism is.

I didn't even have to ask.

I didn't need to ask, though. I understand functionalism pretty good already, thank you.

I still had to read the stuff to see if you were replying to my observation. No luck, though.

So, "proved"?

Er, no.

This conclusion, combined with the idea that the operation of a brain or brain-gadget do not need to be synchronized as long as they are functionally preserved in lieu of synchronization, decouples conscious experience from the objective constraints of space and time in a strange and interesting (to me) way.

If you say so.

We're definitely not synchronised you and me and functionally, that's definitely a problem.
EB
 
Suppose the careless technician accidentally hit the "pause" button on the machine that sent impulses to just your front-left segment before leaving for the night. Elsewhere, perhaps across the ocean, the other three segments continue to receive information from their respective machines. What would your experience be like during the night? What would it be like the next morning when she un-paused the front-left segment's machine, thus making it about 14 hours "out of sync" with the others?

Surprisingly, if we are being consistent with the functional activity of the brain ( and nothing else) determining subjective experience, you would still not notice any change.

Not seeing this. Or to put it another way, why would I not notice?

After all, your brain would still be receiving just the same signals as it would have under ordinary circumstances. In every functional respect, every part of your brain would still have the same inputs and outputs as your intact brain would if you were actually awake and in the real world. Since the four machines in charge of sending signals to the four quarters of your brain were never connected to each other anyway, why should it matter the order in which they carry out their respective programs? In fact, each portion of your brain could be fed its entire sequence of impulses separately, with a month passing between the activation and deactivation of each one, and your experience would not feel any different from the inside.

If the timings were not together, it would seem that the experience would likely not be the same. How could it be?

I think I'm fine with functionalism, by the way.
 
Suppose that the left part of my visual cortex were replaced by a gadget that has precisely the same input/output relationship to the rest of the brain as the left visual cortex had. Under any view but functionalism, the content of my visual experience would be radically different as a result of the intrinsically different makeup of the gadget, compared to the piece of my visual cortex it replaced. But if all the inputs and outputs are exactly preserved with the gadget, there is at least no logical way that my behavior could be different, since behavior (including thought) is straightforwardly determined by brain activity. So, I would be talking, moving around, and altogether acting as though there were no change to my visual experience. But if half my vision had disappeared or changed I’d be speaking, thinking and acting like someone with problems on the right side of his vision. It stands to reason that if there would be no change to my experience with part of my visual cortex replaced by a functional equivalent, the same should be true of any or all parts of my brain.

Thank you so much for explaining what functionalism is.

I didn't even have to ask.

I didn't need to ask, though. I understand functionalism pretty good already, thank you.

I still had to read the stuff to see if you were replying to my observation. No luck, though.

So, "proved"?

Er, no.

This conclusion, combined with the idea that the operation of a brain or brain-gadget do not need to be synchronized as long as they are functionally preserved in lieu of synchronization, decouples conscious experience from the objective constraints of space and time in a strange and interesting (to me) way.

If you say so.

We're definitely not synchronised you and me and functionally, that's definitely a problem.
EB

Has anyone looked in the pudding. I understand it's there. Hey! Maybe it's important to what we attribute as functional or perhaps it might be better said if we specified to what functionalism is relative?
 
Suppose the careless technician accidentally hit the "pause" button on the machine that sent impulses to just your front-left segment before leaving for the night. Elsewhere, perhaps across the ocean, the other three segments continue to receive information from their respective machines. What would your experience be like during the night? What would it be like the next morning when she un-paused the front-left segment's machine, thus making it about 14 hours "out of sync" with the others?

Surprisingly, if we are being consistent with the functional activity of the brain ( and nothing else) determining subjective experience, you would still not notice any change.

Not seeing this. Or to put it another way, why would I not notice?

After all, your brain would still be receiving just the same signals as it would have under ordinary circumstances. In every functional respect, every part of your brain would still have the same inputs and outputs as your intact brain would if you were actually awake and in the real world. Since the four machines in charge of sending signals to the four quarters of your brain were never connected to each other anyway, why should it matter the order in which they carry out their respective programs? In fact, each portion of your brain could be fed its entire sequence of impulses separately, with a month passing between the activation and deactivation of each one, and your experience would not feel any different from the inside.

If the timings were not together, it would seem that the experience would likely not be the same. How could it be?

I think I'm fine with functionalism, by the way.

Think about it for a second: what would you notice, and why? Consider what it takes for your conscious mind to register that something has changed in your experience. Somewhere in your brain, a signal that carries information about the change in your environment must be propagated to the relevant systems. In order for you to gasp in surprise, or stop dead in your tracks in bewilderment, the brain systems in charge of respiration and muscle control must act accordingly. But in the example, no such signals are being generated. Only the program that is being run by the machines dictates what each part of the brain receives. To even have a thought that represents the realization "something has changed", there must be a corresponding brain event. No such thought is part of the program run by the machines. How could you possibly notice any change without thinking about it or reacting to it physically?
 
Think about it for a second: what would you notice, and why? Consider what it takes for your conscious mind to register that something has changed in your experience. Somewhere in your brain, a signal that carries information about the change in your environment must be propagated to the relevant systems. In order for you to gasp in surprise, or stop dead in your tracks in bewilderment, the brain systems in charge of respiration and muscle control must act accordingly. But in the example, no such signals are being generated. Only the program that is being run by the machines dictates what each part of the brain receives. To even have a thought that represents the realization "something has changed", there must be a corresponding brain event. No such thought is part of the program run by the machines. How could you possibly notice any change without thinking about it or reacting to it physically?

The corresponding brain event, the difference, would be that only 75% of the inputs were received at the time of the processing of that 75%. In another scenario, where the 4th input device had not been accidentally paused, there would have been 100% inputs. How can that not make a difference?
 
Think about it for a second: what would you notice, and why? Consider what it takes for your conscious mind to register that something has changed in your experience. Somewhere in your brain, a signal that carries information about the change in your environment must be propagated to the relevant systems. In order for you to gasp in surprise, or stop dead in your tracks in bewilderment, the brain systems in charge of respiration and muscle control must act accordingly. But in the example, no such signals are being generated. Only the program that is being run by the machines dictates what each part of the brain receives. To even have a thought that represents the realization "something has changed", there must be a corresponding brain event. No such thought is part of the program run by the machines. How could you possibly notice any change without thinking about it or reacting to it physically?

The corresponding brain event, the difference, would be that only 75% of the inputs were received at the time of the processing?

Received where? Be specific, and remember the parts of the brain are not connected to each other in any way. What is doing the "total" receiving?
 
Think about it for a second: what would you notice, and why? Consider what it takes for your conscious mind to register that something has changed in your experience. Somewhere in your brain, a signal that carries information about the change in your environment must be propagated to the relevant systems. In order for you to gasp in surprise, or stop dead in your tracks in bewilderment, the brain systems in charge of respiration and muscle control must act accordingly. But in the example, no such signals are being generated. Only the program that is being run by the machines dictates what each part of the brain receives. To even have a thought that represents the realization "something has changed", there must be a corresponding brain event. No such thought is part of the program run by the machines. How could you possibly notice any change without thinking about it or reacting to it physically?

The corresponding brain event, the difference, would be that only 75% of the inputs were received at the time of the processing?

Received where? Be specific, and remember the parts of the brain are not connected to each other in any way. What is doing the "total" receiving?

It's still a total system. Physical separation is not the issue, if it can be overcome so as to be the equivalent.

That is not the case when 25% of the inputs don't enter the system though, at the time the other 75% are processed.
 
Received where? Be specific, and remember the parts of the brain are not connected to each other in any way. What is doing the "total" receiving?

It's still a total system. Physical separation is not the issue, if it can be overcome so as to be the equivalent.

That is not the case when 25% of the inputs don't enter the system though, at the time the other 75% are processed.

Okay: so, in your opinion, what would you experience as a result of the delay?
 
It's 'the system' which is having the experience. Is anyone suggesting that each quadrant is having it? That wouldn't seem to be at all likely.

- - - Updated - - -

Okay: so, in your opinion, what would you experience as a result of the delay?

No idea. Would most probably be different. Can't see how it could be otherwise. Functionalism might be fucked if it was, for starters. :)
 
It's 'the system' which is having the experience. Is anyone suggesting that each quadrant is having it? That wouldn't seem to be at all likely.

- - - Updated - - -

Okay: so, in your opinion, what would you experience as a result of the delay?

No idea. Would most probably be different. Can't see how it could be otherwise. Functionalism might be fucked otherwise, for starters. :)

The point is that any difference must be reflected by a difference in a brain state, and there is no difference in brain state if the program is running properly. Regardless of the timing with which individual isolated portions are activated, if each component of the system receives the correct inputs in the right order, and only those inputs, there is no "room" for the distinct experience of noticing something has changed. All of the hallmarks of that experience--surprise, confusion, an altered visual field, disorientation, etc.--would have to be instantiated by brain states, but the brain states are unable to vary from exactly what has been programmed for them by the machines.
 
....remember the parts of the brain are not connected to each other in any way.

Are they not still interconnected, via a different means?

- - - Updated - - -

The point is that any difference must be reflected by a difference in a brain state, and there is no difference in brain state if the program is running properly. Regardless of the timing with which individual isolated portions are activated, if each component of the system receives the correct inputs in the right order, and only those inputs, there is no "room" for the distinct experience of noticing something has changed. All of the hallmarks of that experience--surprise, confusion, an altered visual field, disorientation, etc.--would have to be instantiated by brain states, but the brain states are unable to vary from exactly what has been programmed for them by the machines.

If 25% of the inputs are paused, then how does that not likely alter the experience?
 
Would the system notice? Probably not. How would it be able to compare what it experienced with something it would have experienced if there had been more inputs?
 
....remember the parts of the brain are not connected to each other in any way.

Are they not still interconnected, via a different means?

- - - Updated - - -

The point is that any difference must be reflected by a difference in a brain state, and there is no difference in brain state if the program is running properly. Regardless of the timing with which individual isolated portions are activated, if each component of the system receives the correct inputs in the right order, and only those inputs, there is no "room" for the distinct experience of noticing something has changed. All of the hallmarks of that experience--surprise, confusion, an altered visual field, disorientation, etc.--would have to be instantiated by brain states, but the brain states are unable to vary from exactly what has been programmed for them by the machines.

If 25% of the inputs are paused, then how does that not likely alter the experience?

They are not interconnected in any way, nor are they connected to a common output. They are just separated masses of brain tissue being fed impulses by separate machines.
 
They are not interconnected in any way, nor are they connected to a common output. They are just separated masses of brain tissue being fed impulses by separate machines.

But the machines are providing (before the accidental pause) all the signals that would have been naturally received by each part, so it's the equivalent, functionally, of being 'actually' interconnected. In fact, in informational as well as functional terms, they are still (before the pause) 'as good as' fully interconnected, just not the usual way.

And then they're not, when the accidental pause affects some of the inputs.
 
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