The is/ought issue.

[ruby sparks]

But still, since you think I'm making some kind of error, could you explain what it is - not vaguely, but show me the error?

It would help me in trying to answer that if I could even work out what it was you were trying to get at half the time. As it is, I strongly suggest something dodgy.

This for example:

In the way that after considering the matter, it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments based on information about non-moral matters to say that an 'ought' doesn't follow from an 'is', or that moral assessments do not logically followed from information described using only nonmoral terms.

But let me go with an example.

Suppose that Bob accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with ordinary color vision would see this ball as red, under ordinary lighting conditions, and on the basis of that, he reckons that the ball is probably red. Bob rejects the idea that he is committing any fallacy in making that assessment.
Bob also accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral. Now, when Alice uses that information as evidence that the actions in question were indeed very immoral, Bob objects and says that Alice is incurring the is/ought fallacy, because it does not follow from the premise that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral, that the actions were indeed very immoral.

One of my aims is to get readers to realize that Bob is making a mistake, more precisely if Alice is committing a fallacy for the stated reason, then so is Bob with his color assessment, and for the same reason (roughly; one might raise implicit premises as an objection, but that can be properly dealt with too). Note that saying that color is somehow different from morality or that there is an objective fact of the matter would miss the point. The question is about what follows from what, and whether these are cases of making fallacious assessments, or else cases in which one is not deriving the assessment by means of deductive logic but in some other way, and that is not itself a fallacy.

I have no idea what your underlying point is or how what you write demonstrates it. The whole thing is just confusing. I can only go back to what I said before, yes you can get an ought from an is fairly readily if you want to, but your 'is' already contains a moral judgement, and it has not been reasonably demonstrated to be objectively or universally true.

Regarding the bit in bold, can you give me an example of a moral assessment that logically follows from something described using only nonmoral terms?

I think I can reduce what you said to, "It is not reasonable to object...that moral assessments do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms".

So an example would help. Because personally, at this point, I would say that moral assessments do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms. If anyone said they did, I would object. Where is my mistake?

If possible, keep it short.

ps I believe the ball itself is not actually red.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I have no idea what your underlying point is or how what you write demonstrates it. The whole thing is just confusing. I can only go back to what I said before, yes you can get an ought from an is fairly readily if you want to, but your 'is' already contains a moral judgement, and it has not been reasonably demonstrated to be objectively or universally true.

I am sorry, but it is very clear to me, and I do not know how to make it more clear.

Regarding the bit in bold, can you give me an example of a moral assessment that logically follows from something described using only nonmoral terms?

Yes, I can, but it would be irrelevant, and the fact that you're asking this question tells me that you do not understand what I'm saying in this thread. That is of course fine. What is find more problematic is that you keep charging me with making some errors. You would have to understand me to assess that.

As for your example:

P1: The ball is red, and it is not the case that the ball is red.

From that it follows that Hitler was an evil person (though of course, you may want to say that you need an implicit premise containing logical terms, even if it's conditional. That really would take us in the direction of a discussion of what it for something to follow from something else that is not at all related to the matter at hand).



And no, I am not saying that moral assessments ordinarily logically follow from something described using only nonmoral terms (those would be just like odd cases as above, and still debatable). Rather, I am saying it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments because of that, given that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only noncolor terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only nonillness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

So an example would help. Because personally, at this point, I would say that moral assessments do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms.

I actually agree with that assessment, save perhaps for anomalous cases that are not relevant anyway because contradictory descriptions are false. The point is that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow from something described using only non-color terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only non-illness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

And if you're going to tell me that the analogy is not good because there are objective facts about color, illness, etc., then you missed the point entirely. The point is that it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments on the basis that they do not logically followed from information described using only nonmoral terms, not that it's not reasonable to object on other grounds that could be debated separately .

 

[ruby sparks]

If I had to guess, I'd guess that you are trying to say there is some sort of inconsistency involved in the way the judgement about the red and the moral judgement are treated differently? If so, then so far, I'm not seeing an inconsistency.

 

[ruby sparks]

And no, I am not saying that moral assessments ordinarily logically follow from something described using only nonmoral terms (those would be just like odd cases as above, and still debatable). Rather, I am saying it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments because of that, given that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only noncolor terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only nonillness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

So an example would help. Because personally, at this point, I would say that moral assessments do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms.

I actually agree with that assessment, save perhaps for anomalous cases that are not relevant anyway because contradictory descriptions are false. The point is that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow from something described using only non-color terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only non-illness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

And if you're going to tell me that the analogy is not good because there are objective facts about color, illness, etc., then you missed the point entirely. The point is that it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments on the basis that they do not logically followed from information described using only nonmoral terms, not that it's not reasonable to object on other grounds that could be debated separately .

Again, I object to the claim that moral judgements logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms. Where is my mistake? If I have not made a mistake, then there is obviously an is/ought problem.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

If I had to guess, I'd guess that you are trying to say there is some sort of inconsistency involved in the way the judgement about the red and the moral judgement are treated differently? If so, then so far, I'm not seeing it.

You do not need to guess. I'm saying just that - at least, that there is such inconsistency in the way people who raise the is/ought objection act, at least in the cases I'm familiar with, included all I've seen in TFT and previous incarnations of this forum or others.
I'm sorry that you are not seeing it. I've done my best, making the points with plenty of details repeatedly. I do not know how to do better. I hope other readers see it, though.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I am sorry, but it is very clear to me, and I do not know how to make it more clear.



Yes, I can, but it would be irrelevant, and the fact that you're asking this question tells me that you do not understand what I'm saying in this thread. That is of course fine. What is find more problematic is that you keep charging me with making some errors. You would have to understand me to assess that.

As for your example:

P1: The ball is red, and it is not the case that the ball is red.

From that it follows that Hitler was an evil person (though of course, you may want to say that you need an implicit premise containing logical terms, even if it's conditional. That really would take us in the direction of a discussion of what it for something to follow from something else that is not at all related to the matter at hand).



And no, I am not saying that moral assessments ordinarily logically follow from something described using only nonmoral terms (those would be just like odd cases as above, and still debatable). Rather, I am saying it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments because of that, given that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only noncolor terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only nonillness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

So an example would help. Because personally, at this point, I would say that moral assessments do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms.

I actually agree with that assessment, save perhaps for anomalous cases that are not relevant anyway because contradictory descriptions are false. The point is that also color assessments do not ordinarily follow from something described using only non-color terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only non-illness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

And if you're going to tell me that the analogy is not good because there are objective facts about color, illness, etc., then you missed the point entirely. The point is that it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments on the basis that they do not logically followed from information described using only nonmoral terms, not that it's not reasonable to object on other grounds that could be debated separately .

Again, I object to the claim that moral judgements logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms. This is the essence of the is/ought issue. Where is my mistake?

You make several mistakes in this thread, but in this particular post, your mistake is that I do not claim that moral judgments logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms, save perhaps for anomalous cases that are irrelevant anyway. In other words, your mistake is that you misconstrue what I'm saying, and object to something that is not related to it.

 

[ruby sparks]

If I had to guess, I'd guess that you are trying to say there is some sort of inconsistency involved in the way the judgement about the red and the moral judgement are treated differently? If so, then so far, I'm not seeing it.

You do not need to guess. I'm saying just that - at least, that there is such inconsistency in the way people who raise the is/ought objection act, at least in the cases I'm familiar with, included all I've seen in TFT and previous incarnations of this forum or others.
I'm sorry that you are not seeing it. I've done my best, making the points with plenty of details repeatedly. I do not know how to do better. I hope other readers see it, though.

Where is the inconsistency? In one case, we are talking about getting an ought from an is. In the other case(s) we are talking about something else, nothing to do with oughts. The is/ought problem, unsurprisingly, is about getting an ought (from an is).

 

[ruby sparks]

Again, I object to the claim that moral judgements logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms. This is the essence of the is/ought issue. Where is my mistake?

You make several mistakes in this thread, but in this particular post, your mistake is that I do not claim that moral judgments logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms, save perhaps for anomalous cases that are irrelevant anyway. In other words, your mistake is that you misconstrue what I'm saying, and object to something that is not related to it.

I know you have now said you agree with me that moral judgements do not logically follow from information described in nonmoral terms. I was glad to hear it, given that you initially used an example of an 'is' that was not described in nonmoral terms.

So where then is our mistake?

Because if we are not mistaken, which I think we agree neither of us are, there is an is/ought problem, the problem being that an ought does not follow from an is. Is that not the case?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Where is the inconsistency? In one case, we are talking about getting an ought from an is. In the other case(s) we are talking about something else, nothing to do with oughts. The is/ought problem, not unsurprisingly, is about getting an ought (from an is).

First, no, that is not it. As I explained carefully, the is/ought alleged problem is not about getting an 'ought' from an 'is'. One can get an 'ought' from an 'is' easily (see my previous example). No, the problem is about getting a moral assessment from some information that is not described in moral terms.

Second, even if it were about getting an 'ought' from an 'is', the point remains that the person raising the objection is objecting on the basis that the moral assessment (with or without an 'ought') does not follow from the logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms. Yet, the same person accepts all other kinds of assessments that do not follow from the information on which they are based. The inconsistency is that that person only realizes that and objects when it comes to moral assessments, and even believes that a problem for moral assessments is that they do not logically follow from information described using only nonmoral terms. But they do not realize (or fail to see it's the same that they object to in the moral case) that color assessments do not ordinarily follow from something described using only noncolor terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only nonillness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.



But let me go with an example.

Suppose that Bob accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with ordinary color vision would see this ball as red, under ordinary lighting conditions, and on the basis of that, he reckons that the ball is probably red. Bob rejects the idea that he is committing any fallacy in making that assessment.
Bob also accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral. Now, when Alice uses that information as evidence that the actions in question were indeed very immoral, Bob objects and says that Alice is incurring the is/ought fallacy, because it does not follow from the premise that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral, that the actions were indeed very immoral.


Do you not realize that Bob is making a mistake here?

Because if we are not mistaken, which I think we agree neither of us are, there is an is/ought problem, the problem being that an ought does not follow from an is. Is that not the case?

No, that is not at all the case. I have been argued all over the thread that that is not a problem. I have argued that it is not a problem because, apart from the fact that if there were a problem it would not be an is/ought issue but a moral terms/nonmoral terms issue, also color assessments do not ordinarily follow from something described using only noncolor terms, illness assessments do not ordinarily follow rom something described using only nonillness terms, and even scientific assessments do not logically follow from the information on which they are based.

Either there is a logical error in all of those cases (and if so, then this is a logical error that is generally not a problem), or it's probabilistic assessments with some implicit premises (and in that case, there is no reason to suspect the moral case is different). Regardless, my point is that there is no problem.

 

[ruby sparks]

Regardless, my point is that there is no problem.

Well, there clearly is if we both agree that a moral conclusion does not follow from a nonmoral premise.

I know we have come a way since the OP, when your premise was couched in moral terms. But now that we are past that, we seem to agree that there is that problem.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Regardless, my point is that there is no problem.

Well, there clearly is if we both agree that a moral judgement does not follow from a nonmoral issue.

Perhaps there is a logical error in all the cases you mention. So what? It is still the case that there is a problem with one of them. The relevant one in fact.

The person raising the is/ought issue objects to moral assessments on the basis that they do not follow logically from the assessments on which they are based and allegedly that is a problem, but the same person all the time makes assessments that do not follow follow logically from the assessments on which they are based, and fails to see that by the very same standards they raise against morality, their own assessments about pretty much everything everywhere would be equally flawed.


That of course unless they do follow with implicit probabilistic premises and they are also probabilistic, but in that case, the same can apply to the moral case.

 

[ruby sparks]

The person raising the is/ought issue objects to moral assessments on the basis that they do not follow logically from the assessments on which they are based and allegedly that is a problem, but the same person all the time makes assessments that do not follow follow logically from the assessments on which they are based...

This does not mean that there is no problem in the case of deriving an ought, does it?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The person raising the is/ought issue objects to moral assessments on the basis that they do not follow logically from the assessments on which they are based and allegedly that is a problem, but the same person all the time makes assessments that do not follow follow logically from the assessments on which they are based...

This does not mean that there is no problem in the case of deriving an ought, does it? There is a problem with that.

That means that the person raising the objection is not being consistent. But that is only part of what I have been arguing in the thread. I also argued that there is no is/ought problem for moral assessments because there is no problem for all of the other assessments that do the same thing. It's what is called a 'partners in innocence' kind of argument. This is not to say that people actually derive the 'ought' from the 'is'. Again, there may well be probabilistic premises, or - depending on the case -it might be an immediate intuitive moral assessment, not derived from something else either by deduction or some other means, such as induction. But I have not taken a stance on the specific way in which it happens. Rather, I argue that this is not a problem because it is a feature of human judgments in general (not just moral ones), and that includes non-problematic judgements.

 

[ruby sparks]

The person raising the is/ought issue objects to moral assessments on the basis that they do not follow logically from the assessments on which they are based and allegedly that is a problem, but the same person all the time makes assessments that do not follow follow logically from the assessments on which they are based...

This does not mean that there is no problem in the case of deriving an ought, does it? There is a problem with that.

That means that the person raising the objection is not being consistent.

Away from analogies or comparisons which don't involve morals, the specific relevant item here is getting a moral ought from a nonmoral is, and there is a problem with that, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy, would you not agree?

 

[ruby sparks]

By contrast, getting a nonmoral conclusion from a nonmoral premise is not necessarily invalid. A simple example:

P1. Everyone is prejudiced against prejudiced people.
P2. Jim is prejudiced against Bob.
C1. Therefore, Angela is prejudiced against Mary.

So the two types of argument (moral from nonmoral, and nonmoral from nonmoral) are not the same.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That means that the person raising the objection is not being consistent.

Away from analogies or comparisons which don't involve morals, the specific relevant item here is getting a moral ought from a nonmoral is, and there is a problem with that, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy, would you not agree?

No, I think not, just as I do not think there is a problem in the other cases. The reason for the analogies is simply to show that in general we do not demand that our assessment follows deductively from the statements of the information we have. Let me give you an example. On the basis of a long list of observations, scientists conclude that, say, humans and chimps have a common ancestor millions of years ago. However, it does not follow from the long list in question that they have a common ancestors. On the basis of the information that ordinary humans would reckon that psychopathy is an illness, one can similarly and properly assess that it is very probably an illness (or probable enough that it is certain, depending on the case).

Maybe these are not fallacies and what we are doing is some probabilistic assessments with probabilistic premises that allow the required connections. But if that is so, then the same can happen in the moral case. The point is that this sort of assessments are run-of-the-mill, and unproblematic. Making them problematic in the moral case would be special pleading.

 

[ruby sparks]

Away from analogies or comparisons which don't involve morals, the specific relevant item here is getting a moral ought from a nonmoral is, and there is a problem with that, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy, would you not agree?

No, I think not....

There definitely is a problem though, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy. There used to be a guy in the forum here not that long ago who thought logic was very important in such matters. I wonder where he went?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

By contrast, getting a nonmoral conclusion from a nonmoral premise is not necessarily invalid. A simple example:

P1. Everyone is prejudiced against prejudiced people.
P2. Jim is prejudiced against Bob.
C1. Therefore, Angela is prejudiced against Mary.

So the two types of argument (moral from nonmoral, and nonmoral from nonmoral) are not the same.

No, that is not the right conclusion. If you are going to make a distinction about deductive arguments, then the proper distinction is between valid and invalid ones. The one you make has the implicit premise that Angela is a person, but going with that, it is valid. But that's not because it's from nonmoral to nonmoral. Let me give you a different example:

P1. Everyone believes that cancer is an illness.
C2: Cancer is an illness.

That one is invalid. But how about:

P1: Ordinary human faculties reckon that cancer is an illness.
P2: If ordinary human faculties reckon that A, then very probably A.
C: Very probably, cancer is an illness.

Well, that is valid. Now:


P1: Ordinary human faculties reckon that it is immoral for a human being to rape another just for fun.
P2: If ordinary human faculties reckon that A, then very probably A.
C: Very probably, it is immoral for a human being to rape another just for fun.

In reality, assessments are much, much more complicated, but the underlying idea is that it's special pleading to target morality or to say that somehow a different kind of argument.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Away from analogies or comparisons which don't involve morals, the specific relevant item here is getting a moral ought from a nonmoral is, and there is a problem with that, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy, would you not agree?

No, I think not....

There definitely is a problem though, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy. There used to be a guy in here not that long ago who thought logic was very important in such matters. I wonder where he went?

Again, either that is not the case and there is no fallacy (see the 'rape for fun' example) , or this sort of fallacy is in general not a problem as it happens everywhere (not just with morality), and it is special pleading to attack only morality with it.

 

[ruby sparks]

There definitely is a problem though, namely that getting a moral conclusion from nonmoral premises would not be valid, and would be a fallacy. There used to be a guy in here not that long ago who thought logic was very important in such matters. I wonder where he went?

Again, either that is not the case and there is no fallacy (see the 'rape for fun' example) , or this sort of fallacy is in general not a problem as it happens everywhere (not just with morality), and it is special pleading to attack only morality with it.

It is not special pleading. The two types of argument (moral from nonmoral and nonmoral from nonmoral) are not the same. They are different.

I wonder where that guy went to? Have you seen him? The one who thought logic was very important in such matters.