The is/ought issue.

[ruby sparks]

Show me the standard that I held, and then I did not hold.

I already did, and have done previously when you have done similar.

Link?

Just above in this case.

Other than that........for example stressing the value and importance of logic (and repeatedly citing fallacies) in several discussions over an extended period of time, and then in this thread finding a way of saying it would not be important if is-to-ought was a fallacy. To me, it's blatant, but full marks for sophistry, as ever. Your mileage may vary.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Show me the standard that I held, and then I did not hold.

I already did, and have done previously when you have done similar.

Link?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Other than that........for example stressing the value and importance of logic (and repeatedly citing fallacies) in several discussions over an extended period of time, and then in this thread finding a way of saying it would not be important if is-to-ought was a fallacy. To me, it's blatant, but full marks for sophistry, as ever. Your mileage may vary.

First, no, I did not change my view that logic is very important.
Second, if I had, that would be an instance of changing my mind. It is not improper to change one's mind, upon further studying a matter and/or making new observations.

Third, again, let me explain again:

If it were the case that the examples of making moral assessments using information describable in non-moral terms involves a fallacy because the conclusion does not follow from the premises - which may well not be the case for all I know, because we may well have implicit probabilistic premises to connect the information with the probabilistic conclusion -then for the same reason, the fallacy would be present in our assessments about color in the examples, and about illness, and about whether water is H2O, and generally about most assessments we make about the outside world, except perhaps our immediate perception if one makes that distiction.

So, if that is indeed a fallacy, then either that particular fallacy is not a problem at all, or we cannot even get basic information about the outside world, except perhaps for immediate perceptions. Clearly, under that assumption, the former is the case. That is not remotely sophistry, at all. The alternative to considering that that particular fallacy is not a problem would be to - again, under that hypothesis -, say that there is indeed a problem, and then conclude that we cannot even tell that (for example) cancer is an illness, or that the Moon Landing ever happened. That of course, [b}also would involve changing my mind, and massively so[/b] (and also irrationally so, but that aside), so of course by your standards of accusation, you could then charge me with sophistry. Damn if you do, damn if you do not.

 

[fromderinside]

Are there facts? Anywhere it the discussions above? Or are there just presumptions about opinions. To get anything out of immediate perceptions one has to presume a lot. If one hasn't intersected with the perception in the past is that sufficient for one to call it immediate, if so what about unique is special? No immediate perceptions are not special. Its likely one has unconsciously processed such before yet one cannot point to it. So what? I can prove that if one masks a sound that sound does not interact with that which is perceived. For is there is no sound there the perception, in its absence, would be the same. No magic, just sensory limitations.

The same, more or less, is true of all presumptions presented in the above arguments, all of them. Only when there are facts can one make distinctions. That is so because those distinctions come out in the operations identifying the facts. Unless operations exist, one cannot judge argument.

 

[ruby sparks]

First, no, I did not change my view that logic is very important.
Second, if I had, that would be an instance of changing my mind. It is not improper to change one's mind, upon further studying a matter and/or making new observations.

Third, again, let me explain again:

If it were the case that the examples of making moral assessments using information describable in non-moral terms involves a fallacy because the conclusion does not follow from the premises - which may well not be the case for all I know, because we may well have implicit probabilistic premises to connect the information with the probabilistic conclusion -then for the same reason, the fallacy would be present in our assessments about color in the examples, and about illness, and about whether water is H2O, and generally about most assessments we make about the outside world, except perhaps our immediate perception if one makes that distiction.

So, if that is indeed a fallacy, then either that particular fallacy is not a problem at all, or we cannot even get basic information about the outside world, except perhaps for immediate perceptions. Clearly, under that assumption, the former is the case. That is not remotely sophistry, at all. The alternative to considering that that particular fallacy is not a problem would be to - again, under that hypothesis -, say that there is indeed a problem, and then conclude that we cannot even tell that (for example) cancer is an illness, or that the Moon Landing ever happened. That of course, [b}also would involve changing my mind, and massively so[/b] (and also irrationally so, but that aside), so of course by your standards of accusation, you could then charge me with sophistry. Damn if you do, damn if you do not.

Don't worry, I feel fairly sure that despite all the above, logic and fallacies will go back to being critical standards for you again soon, when it suits you better.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

First, no, I did not change my view that logic is very important.
Second, if I had, that would be an instance of changing my mind. It is not improper to change one's mind, upon further studying a matter and/or making new observations.

Third, again, let me explain again:

If it were the case that the examples of making moral assessments using information describable in non-moral terms involves a fallacy because the conclusion does not follow from the premises - which may well not be the case for all I know, because we may well have implicit probabilistic premises to connect the information with the probabilistic conclusion -then for the same reason, the fallacy would be present in our assessments about color in the examples, and about illness, and about whether water is H2O, and generally about most assessments we make about the outside world, except perhaps our immediate perception if one makes that distiction.

So, if that is indeed a fallacy, then either that particular fallacy is not a problem at all, or we cannot even get basic information about the outside world, except perhaps for immediate perceptions. Clearly, under that assumption, the former is the case. That is not remotely sophistry, at all. The alternative to considering that that particular fallacy is not a problem would be to - again, under that hypothesis -, say that there is indeed a problem, and then conclude that we cannot even tell that (for example) cancer is an illness, or that the Moon Landing ever happened. That of course, [b}also would involve changing my mind, and massively so[/b] (and also irrationally so, but that aside), so of course by your standards of accusation, you could then charge me with sophistry. Damn if you do, damn if you do not.

Don't worry, I feel fairly sure that despite all the above, logic and fallacies will go back to being critical standards for you again soon, when it suits you better.

Oh, no, they never stopped being so. They are still important. That has not changed at all, as described. Of course, assuming what I described above, then that particular kind of fallacy would not be important. But it's not that I would say fallacies are okay in general.