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The purpose of our rational faculties isn't to be rational

DrZoidberg

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https://www.theguardian.com/science...of-human-understanding-science-weekly-podcast

Here's an interesting new theory on what our brains are for. Jean Nicod’s new theory is an expansion of Daniel Khaneman's Thinking fast and thinking slow. Khanneman's idea is that the point of our intuition is to be fast and economic. It's a compromise to get us safely through the day without taxing the brain unnecessarily.

Khanneman then goes on to say that we have a parallel system, which he calls, "thinking slow", which is our rational faculties. Which is switched on and off, depending on the situation.

Nicod agrees with Khanneman on the fast system. But disagrees on the slow system. He makes the argument that Khanneman isn't taking account of the cognitive biases. The brain isn't particularly rational. It gets it wrong, awfully often, even when we're going slow.

Nicod makes the case that the slow system is about helping us function in large social groups. Of all creatures, humans are among the most complex socially. Certainly the most socially advanced if we focus on social flexibility.

The slow system's purpose is partly to transfer complex information between people, and also to convince others that we can be trusted. Quite rapidly after this system evolves, it becomes an arms race to exploit other people credulity. This is why Nicola thinks we are so rigid in our beliefs. Why we so often think we are correct, when all the evidence points against it.

Anyway... it is an attempt to explain why we brain so badly. What do you think?

The podcast includes interviews with several scientists, who have theories along the same lines.
 
In any situation which calls for a choice, there are always a limited number of possible choices, good or bad. It can be trivial or critical, but the mind can quickly dismiss the ridiculous and the hazardous, which leaves the plausible. The paradox here is that knowledge always limits the choices, instead of increasing them.

Intuitive reasoning, which is sort of a contradiction in terms, cuts to the plausible choices.

A better question than "Why do we get so much wrong?" would be "Why do we ever get anything right?", but both questions are quite silly. We get stuff right all day long. I once worked at the same place 22 years. In all that time, I never went to the wrong place. Through 2 decades of changing roads and scenery, all of which required multiple decisions, I always arrived at the correct address. That's impressive, but only in an analytical way. An intuitive observation would declare it quite ordinary.

No one thinks they are wrong. It's an impossibility. The moment we comprehend an error, either in observation or conclusion, our mind changes to instantly correct things. It's not so difficult to understand why so many people hold incorrect views, but only people who hold the correct views can recognize incorrect views. As a person who holds an enormous amount of correct views, I can see the flaw I in this line of reasoning.
 
I don't see a conflict between the two views, unless I only understand them superficially. Thinking slow isn't meant to be 'rational', as in 100% correct all the time (impossible), it's to 'rationalize' with the information we have available. Nicod is probably right, though, in that this would have been largely necessary to navigate complex social systems. Humans are unique in that they mostly come across other humans.
 
A decision is only as good as the available information and the ability of the brain to recognize the implications and consequences of the options being presented.
 
A decision is only as good as the available information and the ability of the brain to recognize the implications and consequences of the options being presented.

That's circular. You've already defined the brain as having the purpose of making good decisions. Instincts work just fine at keeping us alive, without taxing the brain unnecessarily. As all the other species on this planet prove. So it's not self evident that our slow system is needed for that. Also, our slow system isn't so much better at figuring things out than our instincts anyway. In some cases it's worse. So having a second system doing aproximately the same thing, would be redundant. Redundant systems tend to be sorted out pretty quickly. Especially systems as expensive as our clever brain.

I don't think you've given this new theory enough thought.
 
A decision is only as good as the available information and the ability of the brain to recognize the implications and consequences of the options being presented.

That's circular. You've already defined the brain as having the purpose of making good decisions.

I had no intention of implying that the purpose of the brain is to always make good decisions. Just decisions. Decisions based on information available to the brain and the capacity of the brain to process that information. A combination of both.
 
That's circular. You've already defined the brain as having the purpose of making good decisions.

I had no intention of implying that the purpose of the brain is to always make good decisions. Just decisions. Decisions based on information available to the brain and the capacity of the brain to process that information. A combination of both.

What's the point of having two reasoning faculties that do the same thing?
 
What's the point of having two reasoning faculties that do the same thing?

There seems to be a misunderstanding, information itself isn't a ''reasoning faculty''

I never said is was. But the brain processes information, yes? Both the fast and the slow thinking does it. That leads to the conclusion that they both process information. But do it in different ways. What sets the systems apart?
 
There seems to be a misunderstanding, information itself isn't a ''reasoning faculty''

I never said is was. But the brain processes information, yes? Both the fast and the slow thinking does it. That leads to the conclusion that they both process information. But do it in different ways. What sets the systems apart?

I'm not sure I buy into the new theory yet. Fast or slow response appears to be a matter of how the brain responds to any given situation, which doesn't necessarily require two distinct reasoning faculties.
 
I never said is was. But the brain processes information, yes? Both the fast and the slow thinking does it. That leads to the conclusion that they both process information. But do it in different ways. What sets the systems apart?

I'm not sure I buy into the new theory yet. Fast or slow response appears to be a matter of how the brain responds to any given situation, which doesn't necessarily require two distinct reasoning faculties.

Khanneman's theories are based on experimental data. So there seems to be two distinct systems at work. When the slow system is working a lot more of the brain is activated. The fast system just seems to be semi-hard-wired short cuts analogous to how muscles work at the gym. If you want a muscle to grow you need to shock it by using it in novel ways. According to Khanneman, that's what the slow system is about. But not according to Nicod

In infants they only have the slow system. It takes about two years before that gets trimmed down do something resembling adults. And when that stage occurs development is rapid. They start running around and talking. This is stuff we can physically see in the brain with scannings, and it strongly correlated to behaviour. So it seems to be at least two different systems for thinking. This is Khanneman's theory. Nicod's is a bit different. Both are new.

Both systems are about as resistant to change
 
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I'm not sure I buy into the new theory yet. Fast or slow response appears to be a matter of how the brain responds to any given situation, which doesn't necessarily require two distinct reasoning faculties.

Khanneman's theories are based on experimental data. So there seems to be two distinct systems at work. When the slow system is working a lot more of the brain is activated. The fast system just seems to be semi-hard-wired short cuts analogous to how muscles work at the gym. If you want a muscle to grow you need to shock it by using it in novel ways. According to Khanneman, that's what the slow system is about. But not according to Nicod

In infants they only have the slow system. It takes about two years before that gets trimmed down do something resembling adults. And when that stage occurs development is rapid. They start running around and talking. This is stuff we can physically see in the brain with scannings, and it strongly correlated to behaviour. So it seems to be at least two different systems for thinking. This is Khanneman's theory. Nicod's is a bit different. Both are new.

Both systems are about as resistant to change

What would separate these two different systems of thought in relation to brain regions or lobes? Would only part of the PFC come into play during slow thinking with more activity being evident during fast thinking or is it some other region coming into play, for example?
 
Khanneman's theories are based on experimental data. So there seems to be two distinct systems at work. When the slow system is working a lot more of the brain is activated. The fast system just seems to be semi-hard-wired short cuts analogous to how muscles work at the gym. If you want a muscle to grow you need to shock it by using it in novel ways. According to Khanneman, that's what the slow system is about. But not according to Nicod

In infants they only have the slow system. It takes about two years before that gets trimmed down do something resembling adults. And when that stage occurs development is rapid. They start running around and talking. This is stuff we can physically see in the brain with scannings, and it strongly correlated to behaviour. So it seems to be at least two different systems for thinking. This is Khanneman's theory. Nicod's is a bit different. Both are new.

Both systems are about as resistant to change

What would separate these two different systems of thought in relation to brain regions or lobes? Would only part of the PFC come into play during slow thinking with more activity being evident during fast thinking or is it some other region coming into play, for example?

I can't see why the pfc ever would be engaged during fast thinking? It's function is to figure out emotions; in oneself, and others. The fast system is barely thinking at all. But that's just me, an amateur, speculating wildly.

The way I've imagined the fast and slow system is analogous to when trying to find my keys. Usually I put my keys in the same places all the time. So that's where I go looking first. I'm calm and my mind is usually on other stuff. The fast system. But then they're not where I expected to find them, panic. So now all my focus is on the keys. I'm a lot more stressed than necessary. I'm employing a hell of a lot more resources in the slow system. This is Khanneman's theory.

Nicod argues that our slow system is not better at solving problems, even though we're using more of the brain. To go back to my key examples, he has observed that when the slow system kicks in we might go looking at the same places, over and over aggressively. Because the slow system isn't to solve problems, it's to communicate emotions to our tribe, and convince them that we're super serious, or that trained raccoons really have crept in through the window during the night and stolen our keys. Or something like that. He's saying that the slow system, experimentally, doesn't seem to be smarter than the fast system.

But both agree that the fast system uses a hell of a lot less of the brain for solving problems. The fast system is a hell of a lot more economic. So if the two systems are as good at solving problems, we should stick to only using the fast system. That's a problem neurologists need to solve. Nicod is having a try.

The human mind's lack of rationality is a problem for researchers to explain.
 
What would separate these two different systems of thought in relation to brain regions or lobes? Would only part of the PFC come into play during slow thinking with more activity being evident during fast thinking or is it some other region coming into play, for example?

I can't see why the pfc ever would be engaged during fast thinking? It's function is to figure out emotions; in oneself, and others. The fast system is barely thinking at all. But that's just me, an amateur, speculating wildly.

The way I've imagined the fast and slow system is analogous to when trying to find my keys. Usually I put my keys in the same places all the time. So that's where I go looking first. I'm calm and my mind is usually on other stuff. The fast system. But then they're not where I expected to find them, panic. So now all my focus is on the keys. I'm a lot more stressed than necessary. I'm employing a hell of a lot more resources in the slow system. This is Khanneman's theory.

Nicod argues that our slow system is not better at solving problems, even though we're using more of the brain. To go back to my key examples, he has observed that when the slow system kicks in we might go looking at the same places, over and over aggressively. Because the slow system isn't to solve problems, it's to communicate emotions to our tribe, and convince them that we're super serious, or that trained raccoons really have crept in through the window during the night and stolen our keys. Or something like that. He's saying that the slow system, experimentally, doesn't seem to be smarter than the fast system.

But both agree that the fast system uses a hell of a lot less of the brain for solving problems. The fast system is a hell of a lot more economic. So if the two systems are as good at solving problems, we should stick to only using the fast system. That's a problem neurologists need to solve. Nicod is having a try.

The human mind's lack of rationality is a problem for researchers to explain.

Fair enough. It's hard to say. More reading to do in the pipeline..
 
I congratulate Dr. Zoidberg for this thread. In my view the problem is with whether we are evolving group behavior as we become more social. At first blush, since everyone appears to have a social brain it seems contrary to intuition (little thread joke here) that there is anything like group pressure (selection) to do so.

So I present this article as evidence for normal individual factors being at the root of social evolution rather than there being some factor favoring groups. No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation: Non-competitive thresholds are as effective as competitions between groups for increasing human cooperative behavior https://www.researchgate.net/profil...e_behavior/links/57a9c7ad08aece739f2ff01e.pdf

Seems to me the drives for improving social comprehension are purely fitness related at the individual level. The fast system may just be the result of similar situations and conditions.
 
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