What does it mean for something to be "logically possible"?

[Speakpigeon]

I already replied to that.

This seems to show you really don't understand what I say.

You're just a waste of time.
EB

You replied by saying the issue is somehow unclear.

It isn't.

And when you are asked to prove it is unclear you have nothing to say.

I can see how you are confused about wastes of time.

I'm starting to suspect you not just fail to understand what I say but that you don't understand English, not enough certainly to understand or make any decent argument.

Good bye!
EB

 

[untermensche]

You replied by saying the issue is somehow unclear.

It isn't.

And when you are asked to prove it is unclear you have nothing to say.

I can see how you are confused about wastes of time.

I'm starting to suspect you not just fail to understand what I say but that you don't understand English, not enough certainly to understand or make any decent argument.

Good bye!
EB

I think all categories are human creations.

And you have not provided one argument to think otherwise.

Good. Go away and think. You are not doing much of that here.

 

[beero1000]

Eh, all by himself, and without any human intervention, my dog seems to have defined at least two categories of things: "food" and "not food". There seems to be some mismatch between our category definitions...

Does your dog have a mind?

That is what I said was necessary.

Gaslighting is real.

 

[untermensche]

Your dog does not have categories.

It has individual items it will eat and individual items it will not.

The only categories that exist exist in YOUR mind.

 

[fast]

It seems to me there are differences in nature that stand good for the reason we assign labels with demarcating lines in our classifacatory systems. That it takes a human to recognize those differences and group them accordingly is no good reason to deny human independent categories. There are seemingly endless potential categories.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It seems to me there are differences in nature that stand good for the reason we assign labels with demarcating lines in our classifacatory systems.

You say "differences in nature" but the question is whether the differences we see in nature are real, i.e. whether they are "in nature" or merely in our view of nature.

That it takes a human to recognize those differences and group them accordingly is no good reason to deny human independent categories.

Absolutely. That's one way to say it. Well put.

There are seemingly endless potential categories.

Whoa. An infinity of categories?

UM's mind buckles under the horror of your suggestion!
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Logically possible

 

[untermensche]

It seems to me there are differences in nature that stand good for the reason we assign labels with demarcating lines in our classifacatory systems. That it takes a human to recognize those differences and group them accordingly is no good reason to deny human independent categories. There are seemingly endless potential categories.

To notice anything in nature requires a mind.

End of lesson.

 

[fast]

It seems to me there are differences in nature that stand good for the reason we assign labels with demarcating lines in our classifacatory systems. That it takes a human to recognize those differences and group them accordingly is no good reason to deny human independent categories. There are seemingly endless potential categories.

To notice anything in nature requires a mind.

End of lesson.

Truth is independent of knowledge.

When the driver races his dune buggy up the sand dune, he does not KNOW there is an obstacle awaiting his arrival up upon the other side of the hill, but the TRUTH is that there is (this time) something exactly right where he is to land, and I submit to you that his impending crash rests squarely not on his knowledge of the truth but the fact that it's true an obstacle is there.

There are eight celestial bodies of particular characteristics (planets) orbiting Sol (our sun); meanwhile, many smaller (yet quite large) spherical objects (moons) orbit those celestial bodies (I.e. Juno orbits Earth). I'm talking about the objects, not the names, so I speak of the name independent referent--the objects. However, I speak of these only because I exist to do so, but there are those objects there just as the object that lies in wait upon the far side of the before mentioned sand dune.

That is one (just one) description of our solar system which even in a world independent of humans is true, as truth lies in wait of discovery. Just one. Knowledge of the truth effects it not.

There are other ways to categorize the physical make up of our solar system that would hold true, and yes indeed, to bring forth the knowledge of what that is would indeed include either us humans or some alien with agency, but the knowledge of what? The knowledge of what is true. That which is true need no being of agency, knowledge of the truth is not a necessary condition of truth.

 

[untermensche]

Truth is independent of knowledge.

A category needs to be defined. It needs to be outlined.

It cannot appear without a mind creating it.

That is truth.

There are eight celestial bodies of particular characteristics

There are eight unique bodies.

Classifying them as the same thing is an abstraction.

Some features counted and some rejected.

It is an arbitrary mental process.

It is nothing evident.

 

[fast]

You say "differences in nature" but the question is whether the differences we see in nature are real, i.e. whether they are "in nature" or merely in our view of nature.

Are you doing that idealism thingy again? If yes, then Naive Realism is my stance. If I see it, it's there. If the next question is "how do I know," then I want a convincing response that shows you truly realize just how issue changing that question is.

If you're not doing that idealism thingy again, then I bring your attention to a very important distinction: our view vs what our view is a view of.

I gave Untermensche a description of our solar system earlier. Here's another: there is a belt of mostly smaller than dwarf planet sized celestial objects orbiting our star with four planets between the belt and the sun and four planets on the other side farther from the sun. This is a second view.

There are other ways to describe, other divisions to be made, other differences to note, many different views. The view, or let's say, the view held requires a view holder, but what the view is a view of (on the other hand) does not. It takes a perceiver to perceive, but that which is perceived ... no perceiver required. *

* there is a semantic issue I could explain, but I'm afraid the explanation would serve to confuse rather than illuminate.

 

[fromderinside]

To notice anything in nature requires a mind.

End of lesson.

Really?

So a manta which distinguishes between food and other - that's noticing differences - has a mind? So do insects, sea squirts, hydra, ..... notice difference. New theory of mind you presenting here?

Extra extra untermenche claims tropisms, mind caused

Maybe you need some larnin', bubba.


obviously not logically possible.

It's more parsimonious to postulate no basis for mind in living organisms than one that has an entrance requirement like the one you just posted.

 

[DBT]

Categories assigned by humans are not arbitrary. They are based on the observable features and characteristics of objects and events within the world at large.

To categorize is a mental activity.

It is not something that occurs without a mind.

It first requires something that can recognize similarity.

Did you read what I said?

 

[Speakpigeon]

You say "differences in nature" but the question is whether the differences we see in nature are real, i.e. whether they are "in nature" or merely in our view of nature.

Are you doing that idealism thingy again?

You said there are differences in nature. How can you possibly know these are "in nature" rather than just in your mind? All you have available to judge are the differences that appear within your mind.

I'm not claiming there are no differences in nature, maybe there are, but whether there are differences in nature or not, the differences that appear in our minds may not provide us with any knowledge about the possible differences in nature. It seems to me we just don't know. I certainly don't know but I also doubt very much anybody does. I still haven't seen any convincing argument either way.

If yes, then Naive Realism is my stance. If I see it, it's there. If the next question is "how do I know," then I want a convincing response that shows you truly realize just how issue changing that question is.

I see Naïve Realism as something we do, including me, and we do it every moment of our lives. But I also think it's a belief. I don't actually know that Naïve Realism is true of the world. What I really know are my impressions, but then I don't know anything else and certainly not the world itself.

You do as you please, though. I'm not trying to preach. I'm only interested in any potential counterargument you could have.

If you're not doing that idealism thingy again, then I bring your attention to a very important distinction: our view vs what our view is a view of.

I gave Untermensche a description of our solar system earlier. Here's another: there is a belt of mostly smaller than dwarf planet sized celestial objects orbiting our star with four planets between the belt and the sun and four planets on the other side farther from the sun. This is a second view.

There are other ways to describe, other divisions to be made, other differences to note, many different views. The view, or let's say, the view held requires a view holder, but what the view is a view of (on the other hand) does not. It takes a perceiver to perceive, but that which is perceived ... no perceiver required. *

* there is a semantic issue I could explain, but I'm afraid the explanation would serve to confuse rather than illuminate.

I think I'm pretty up to speed as to what we mean with the words we use. There's really no need for you to go into that. Expounding on the semantic of words does not carry any water as to the reality of what we think they refer to.

The question remains. How could you possibly know that the differences that are apparent to you as real differences, differences in nature, differences in the ontology of reality? I haven't seen argument from you so far.
EB

 

[untermensche]

To notice anything in nature requires a mind.

End of lesson.

Really?

So a manta which distinguishes between food and other - that's noticing differences - has a mind? So do insects, sea squirts, hydra, ..... notice difference. New theory of mind you presenting here?

Extra extra untermenche claims tropisms, mind caused

Maybe you need some larnin', bubba.


obviously not logically possible.

It's more parsimonious to postulate no basis for mind in living organisms than one that has an entrance requirement like the one you just posted.

A series of reflexes is not "noticing" something.

Mere reaction is not "noticing" something.

Taking note of something requires a mind.

- - - Updated - - -

To categorize is a mental activity.

It is not something that occurs without a mind.

It first requires something that can recognize similarity.

Did you read what I said?

You talked of "observable features".

That requires an observer.

Try again.

 

[fast]

When the standard for knowledge is so crippling that we deny what we commonly otherwise claim to know, the standard is a radical skewing of what it means to know something. One tell tale sign of skewing the common ordinary sense of knowledge is the use of the term, "really," as in, "yes, but, we don't REALLY know."

When we ordinarily say we know something, we have justification for a true belief. Of course justified beliefs can be false, but what matters (most often matters) is not whether the justified belief is possibly false but instead actually true, so my claim that I know my username is fast is something I do in fact know if it's actually true, regardless of the fact that I'm possibly mistaken. If I'm actually mistaken, that's something quite different than being possibly mistaken.

You want to use the term such it's impossible to be mistaken, but that's an extremist position far removed from common usage. It's not that I must be correct but rather that I am correct.

 

[fromderinside]

A series of reflexes is not "noticing" something.

Mere reaction is not "noticing" something.

Taking note of something requires a mind.

First there is a difference between tropisms and reflexes. Second the creatures I listed all have nervous systems with centers to which information is passed usually before responses are generated. So your hand wave of \series of reflexes is not meaningful. Sine any cognitive function can be described as such. There is a difference between such as a bee locating a food source and a series of reflexes since, being social honey bees communicate sites of nectar with complex dances, for instance.

Notices a difference just doesn't discriminate between consciousness and instinct.

Put your waving appendage back in storage until you learn the difference between motivated and reflexive behavior.



-

 

[Speakpigeon]

When the standard for knowledge is so crippling that we deny what we commonly otherwise claim to know, the standard is a radical skewing of what it means to know something. One tell tale sign of skewing the common ordinary sense of knowledge is the use of the term, "really," as in, "yes, but, we don't REALLY know."

When we ordinarily say we know something, we have justification for a true belief. Of course justified beliefs can be false, but what matters (most often matters) is not whether the justified belief is possibly false but instead actually true, so my claim that I know my username is fast is something I do in fact know if it's actually true, regardless of the fact that I'm possibly mistaken. If I'm actually mistaken, that's something quite different than being possibly mistaken.

You want to use the term such it's impossible to be mistaken, but that's an extremist position far removed from common usage. It's not that I must be correct but rather that I am correct.

You're wrong as to meaning and usage: my interpretation complies with meaning and usage. Same meaning and proper explanation of usage.

When we realise we were wrong about knowing something, we revise our initial claim "I know" to "I didn't know" and not, crucially, to "I was wrong to know". Crucially, the claim "I believe" doesn't work like the claim "I know". On realising our mistake in our belief, we will maintain our original claim to say, "I believed", and we will also admit that "I was wrong to believe this". This shows that the meaning of "I know" is radically different from the meaning of "I believe".
Also, since people routinely revise their claims that they know, they contradict themselves. They don't need me to admit they didn't know.

Further, if people really knew when it is that they know, they would never be wrong in saying they know. Yet, even scientists have to revise their claims. This shows that the way people say "I know" is more complex than what you suggest. Essentially, people can believe that they know. If you believe you know your name, you will say "I know my name" even if you're wrong. And people can be wrong even about knowing their names. And if people can be wrong about knowing their names, I don't see any reason to assume any of them know their names since, broadly, they will all have the same kind of justification as those who are wrong.

This accounts perfectly for what people actually mean and how they use the word "know".

And we don't need to assume people know anything just because they or you like to say so.
EB

 

[George S]

It ain't what you don't know that gets you in trouble; it's what you know that just ain't so.

The belief that a proposition is true is a judgment call. First I have to assess what I think the proposition means. Then I have to compare that meaning with my assessment of the state of reality. If there is no doubt in my mind I say that I believe that proposition to be true (e.g. I am). If there are degrees of doubt then Bayes' Theorem applies.

If a random person on TFT believes he knows that proposition A is false he will dismiss without reading any proof of A.

Categorizing is noticing. Noticing certain patterns in nature. Which automatically categorizes because the same neurons are activated with each repeat of the pattern.

Nonverbal children have been shown to know the difference between animate and inanimate.

 

[untermensche]

Descartes takes "knowing" to it's essence.

If there is awareness of things, even if the things are a lie, there MUST be that which is capable of being aware of things.

We know beyond doubt there must be something capable of being aware of things.

Then we must consider the mountain of evidence, we are aware of, that shows why there is a thing capable of being aware of things. The desire to survive in living organisms and the advantage being aware of things provides.

This is not like knowing there must be something capable of being aware of things.

But to reject all this evidence without cause is irrational. It defies a parsimonious outlook. It creates the need for extraneous entities that have no evidence to support their existence.

So in this case we "know" it is true because to think otherwise is not reasonable.