I think I missed that...
There's three notions:
1) Your honor, I didn't want to do what I did. I feel I had no reasonable choice under the circumstances but to do what I did. Surely, you can see that I didn't do what I did of my own free will.
2) Your honor, it was an awful choice I had to make. Even though I was threatened, I ultimately did what I thought was right.
3) Your honor, what I did was caused, not just on the macroscopic scale, but on the microscopic scale as well. The actions, the intentions, the thinking, everything, boils down to atoms in motion which themselves are caused, so of course I did what I did, just as you must (not will but must) take the very singular path you must take. There is no free will when it's already written in the stone of physics.
I agree with the first notion, which carries with it a refined notion of free will.
Yes, I guess (1) is definitely better than (2) or (3)...
Still, I think the wording you used is misleading, and I would rephrase like this: 1) Your honor, I certainly didn't
want like what I did. But I couldn't find any alternative course of action
acceptable to me under the circumstances. So, I guess I have to accept I did what I did of my own free will.
It's certainly a different conception of free will compared to your own but it seems more in line with our expectation about what the accused could possibly say in the context.
EB
There's a slight of hand occurring by the compatibilist that arrives at the scene as a third party long after the party had started. The free will debate has long been between the determinist and the indeterminist. The free will to which they speak of is highly similar to your definition, but the free will introduced by the soft determinist compatibilist is more aligned with mine.
There are two free wills at play, the long standing traditional one fought over and the newer slightly altered one. I like the altered one, but I'm afraid it's not spot on in addressing the original feud.
Free will was originally introduced as if born to oppose strict causality. The hard determinist leaves no room for free will as introduced as it's set up to be contrary to determinism. Any mention of choices we make is a linguistic circle between choices that MUST be made and therefore no real but rather illusory choices being made; hence the idea that free will is an illusion.
The compatibilist shifts the stilts upon which the foundation was built. The soft compatibilist alters the very meaning to align with lexical usage such that free will has to do with wants and compulsion--not as a contrary to causation.
When the labels are buried, the burning issue remains, could we have done otherwise, even in times of making choices while not under any kind of duress? The compatibilist says TEST ME and I'll show you that I can defy whatever choice you think I MUST make, and the hard determinist says, awe but whatever choice you make is not a contingent event but a necessary one, so your show of defiance proves nothing.
So, even if we do in fact have free will (even as portrayed by compatibilists), there's a special lurking darkness that must leave the hard determinist in the grip of fear, as free will would not merely be illusory but manicially so.
There seems to be little room for comfort when the raging river comes because contingent truths share no assistance in the interruption of the waters flow. It seems quite so that things will transpire just as the laws of nature allow. I take comfort in thinking that at the micro level, we as conscious beings have the ability to interact with nature such that the interplay disallows for the notion that our future thoughts and actions were as if written in stone or the script of a movie.