NOt a good example Derec. There is nothing wrong with that award given the facts of the case.
Really? Millions in
punitive damages because two idiots
trespassed and almost got themselves killed. Why should they be millionaires just because they did something incredibly stupid.
This is the court document for that lawsuit. It contains some interesting things.
Both Birdwell and Klein knew that they had climbed onto property that did not belong to them and that neither was invited to do so.
So they admit they trespassed.
Birdwell and Klein both knew that the catenary wire or wires like the ones noticed by Birdwell were dangerous. Birdwell and Klein both knew that electricity could kill. Birdwell knew that wires like the ones above FLRX5502 carried electricity and he would never voluntarily touch such wires if he knew they were live. Neither plaintiff, however, realized the wires were energized until after the accident
So, that last attempt at evasion notwithstanding, they knew the danger.
The two plaintiffs were injured when Klein, then 5’8” tall, stood on a hopper hatch lid and contacted, or came within 2” of, the catenary wire at around 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2002.13) Catenary wires, the wires that power electrified trains, carry approximately 12,000 volts of electricity.
It is certainly possible for 12kV line to arc 2", especially on a humid day. That does not mean it's Amtrak's fault that these two idiots approached a live wire. It certainly should not mean that Amtrak should pay these morons 24 million dollars.
Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Another thing that should be changed in the law.
Namely, § 339, or the “attractive nuisance” section, provides for possessor liability in a case of trespassing children.
They were teenagers, they should have known better. Another law in dire need of a repeal. Also, luckily the new idiot was over 18 (chronological, not mental age alas) so he cannot use this law. Small mercies.
Specifically the defendants argue that § 339 does not and can not apply to this case as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs are unable to show the defendants’ conduct rose to the level of “willful and wanton,” and that the plaintiffs’ own actions qualify as “willful and wanton” and provide a complete bar to their requested recovery.
I fail to see how anyone can view Amtrak having high voltage on their own property as "willful and wanton" but these skateboarding idiots trespassing and climbing onto a train as not being "willful and wanton". Yet somehow the judge and the jurors did.
Definition of "wilful and wanton" the court was supposed to use.
the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences.
Use of high voltage is reasonable and everybody who has any business being in vicinity of the lines is properly trained. Therefore there was no "conscious indifference to the consequences".
On the other hand, the behavior of the skateboarders was intentional, unreasonable, disregarded all risk known to them and they were in conscious indifference to the consequences. Using the court's own definition, how was this verdict possible? The jury found the teens 0% responsible for the accident mind you. 0%!
It is enough if Amtrak should have realized that putting the laddered Norfolk car under the energized catenary line, in a residential area, was an unreasonable act in disregard of a known risk that would likely put someone in grave peril.
No, they did not put anyone in grave peril. The teens put themselves in grave peril. Having a ladder does not mean they were compelled to trespass and climb it.
n this case, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs makes it clear that catenary power lines present a grave danger to anyone who comes near them,
So why did the plaintiffs (i.e. idiotic teens) come near them then?
the public in general is not likely to know about the dangers involved with the catenary lines.
Really? We had electricity for over 100 years. General public should be aware of the dangers.
c. Children. In the great majority of the cases in which the rule here stated has been applied, the plaintiff has been a child of not more than twelve years of age. The earliest decisions as to the turntables all involved children of the age of mischief between six and twelve. The later cases, however, have included a substantial number in which recovery has been permitted, under the rule stated, where the child is of high school age, ranging in a few instances as high as sixteen or seventeen years. The explanation no doubt lies in the fact that in our present hazardous civilization some types of dangers have become common, which an immature adolescent may reasonably not appreciate, although an adult may be expected to do so. The rule stated in this Section is not limited to “young” children, or to those “of tender years,” so long as the child is still too young to appreciate the danger, as stated in Clause (c).
A few courts have attempted to state arbitrary age limits, setting a maximum age of fourteen for the possible application of the rule. This usually has been taken over from the rule, in these states, as to the presumed capacity of children over the age of fourteen for contributory negligence, which has in turn been derived from the rule of the criminal law as to their presumed capacity for crime. The greatmajority of the courts have rejected any such fixed age limit, and have held that there is no definite age beyond which the rule here stated does not apply. As the age of the child increases, conditions become fewer for which there can be Under Pennsylvania law, minors under the age of seven years are presumptively incapable of negligence; minors between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumed incapable of negligence, but such a presumption is rebuttable and grows weaker with each year until the fourteenth year is reached; and minors over the age of fourteen are presumptively capable of negligence. Dunn v. Teti, 421 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa. Super. 1980).
recovery under this rule, until at some indeterminate point, probably beyond the age of sixteen, there are no longer any
such conditions.
The law should be changed to at the very least specify a reasonable age limit (like 14). 17 is old enough to know better. Of course, the best approach is to do away with "attractive nuisance" laws entirely. Teach your own children dammit rather than for example mandate all homeowners have to have tall fences around pools lest some stupid kid scale a short fence and drown.
Other than a few generalized medical reports, however, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that they were unable to appreciate the risks of electrocution associated with
Although several courts from other jurisdictions have imputed a common knowledge status to the dangerousness of electricity, it is possible a reasonable jury may conclude that the plaintiffs failed to appreciate the risks involved in this case because of their youth. See Levonas v. Acme Paper Board Company, 40 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Md. 1944) (court found it is a matter of common knowledge that any line carrying electric current is dangerous to a more of less degree); Hamilton v. Southern Nevada Power Company, 273 P.2d 760 (Nev. 1954) (court affirmed
dismissal of a sixteen year-old’s case where he contacted electrical wires while raising a metal pipe); Peterson v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., 288 N.W. 588, 589 (Minn. 1939) (court found the danger of electrical energy is a matter of common knowledge); and Texas Utilities Electric Company v. Timmons, 947 S.W. 2d 191 (Tex. 1997) (court denied recovery to a fourteen year-old boy who was electrocuted after climbing a utility wire after the court found such a plaintiff is charged with knowledge that electric wires are ordinarily dangerous).
See Scarborough, 518 A.2d 563 (Pa. Super. 1986).Climbing to the top of a freight car. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that Klein was not within two inches of the catenary wires when he was electrocuted. Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, I find that it is for a jury to decide whether the plaintiffs failed to appreciate the risks because of their youth. The combination of the plaintiffs medical reports regarding seventeen year-olds generally, and that the plaintiffs failed to realize the lines were energized meets the plaintiffs mere scintilla threshold.
The "mere scintilla" threshold is a travesty, especially when punitive damages are involved. It is obvious they knew, or should have known the risks involved in climbing the train. They should not be rewarded for their stupid risk taking.
The defendants argue that their actions were reasonable because under Pennsylvania law, they do not have a duty to fence in their main lines, and mandating electrical warning signs be permanently stenciled on all train cars that travel under electrified lines is preempted by 49 C.F.R. § 215.301 of the Rail Safety Act of 1970(FRSA).
Companies should not be penalized even if they follow all the applicable safety laws.
For example, the plaintiffs suggest that the defendants could have parked the trains at another location, de-energized the wires over the tail track, or placed warning signs either adjacent to, or temporarily on, the parked cars. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, I find there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the accident.
Yes, let's force a company to change all their procedures so idiots don't get shocked.
And here we have again the travesty of mandating all evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff. Another thing that can be rectified by amending the law.
Even if the defendants’ misconduct was willful and wanton, the plaintiffs may be barred from recovering if their conduct was also willful and wanton. Under Pennsylvania law, a party cannot use comparative negligence as a defense to a finding of willful and wanton misconduct on its part. Lewis v. Miller, 543 A.2d 590 (Pa. Super. 1988). There is no statutory law similar to the Comparative Negligence Act which would permit a jury to compare relative degrees of wantonness on the part of each party. Id. at 592-93. Therefore, a finding of willful and wanton misconduct on the part of a plaintiff is a complete bar to recovery.
That actually sounds reasonable. Unfortunately, the court did not find their behavior "willful and wanton" even though it most certainly was.
In order for the plaintiffs’ actions to be willful and wanton, they would have acted in disregard of a risk known to them or so obvious as they should have known, and their injuries must have been a highly probable result of their actions.
Check, check and check. The case should have been over right here. Do not cross start, do not collect $24 million. In fact, go straight to jail for trespassing.
In Hansen, a twenty year-old trespasser was injured when he climbed a catenary structure to wave to friends and contacted its wires. The court found the plaintiff’s conduct wanton because he had a choice and should not have climbed the catenary structure.
And these two idiots somehow did not have a choice? Did somebody chase them onto the train or what? No, they wanted to see the view. Not much different than waving to friends. So what's the problem Your Dishonor?
In this case, the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish themselves from Hansen and Lewis by arguing that the actors in those cases were intoxicated adults. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that, similar to their arguments under § 339(c), they had no way of understanding the dangers posed by the catenary wires above the train.
So if you are under 18 you have no choice but to climb structures in vicinity of high tension wires. And turning 18 and drinking somehow gives you working knowledge of electricity you lack while being sober and 17. The decision just makes no sense at all.
In order to obtain punitive damages, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants’ conduct was “outrageous” because it was done with an “evil motive” or that it was “outrageous” because it was done with a “reckless indifference to the interests of others.” Furthermore, punitive damages must be based on conduct which is ‘malicious,’ ‘wanton,’ ‘reckless,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘oppressive’ . . .
How is Amtrak parking a train under some wires either of these things, especially "evil"?
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Here's the most important thing: we don't know the facts of this case.
We know enough. What facts do you think could come to light to somehow make all this Amtrak's fault?
What goes into this^ one little holding contains an excruciating amount of law that was developed over more than a century--at least.
And much of that is incredibly misguided because it ends up rewarding people (via punitive damages) for doing stupid shit.
