Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

... I don't have the ability to run a 4 minute mile. Of course, if I'd trained hard and were a little younger... I can't just choose an ability into existence.

Then you currently do not have that ability. Right now, that is an impossibility, something that you cannot accomplish, even if you chose to.

(the stipulation "in exactly the same circumstances" should have left you in no doubt that I was deliberately eliminating any possibility of alternative choosings).

How is choosing possible without at least two real possibilities to choose from?

This doesn't seem to follow from I said. I'm not eliminating choices, I'm eliminating multiple choosings. A single choosing is still a choice.

Okay, I'm getting lost in that set of thoughts. Perhaps if we used the term "possibilities" for the list of available things we can choose from and the term "choice" for the output of the choosing operation.

A real possibility is one that you are able to actualize if you choose to do so. If you are able to actualize it, but choose not to do so, then it remains something that you could have done.

When simply choosing to do something, the two possibilities are (a) do it and (b) don't do it. That's what I'm guessing a "single choosing" would mean. But, like I said, I'm not sure I'm following you in that series of comments.

You surely can see that the difference between 'will never happen' and 'cannot happen' exists only in the mind of philosophers.

No. The distinction must be maintained to make sense of what we are saying. For example:

There's no practical distinction.

There is a significant practical distinction. For example, if something cannot happen then it will not happen. But if something will not happen, and we do not know that it will not happen, then we had better be prepared in the possibility that it does happen. For example, people in areas prone to hurricanes board up their houses just in case. The possibility that it will happen is sufficient to cause action.

On the other hand, if we know for certain that it will happen, then the notions of possibilities and things that can happen never come to mind.

The only practical use of the context, the logic, and the language of possibilities is to deal rationally with matters of uncertainty. Either we don't know what will happen, or, in the case of free will, we do not know what we will choose.

The fact that we find ourselves using the language of possibilities as often as we do is the result of the many things we are uncertain about.

... I'm suggesting that one possible way forward is to challenge DBT's assumption that 'couldn't do otherwise' (in his sense of the expression) really does not threaten free will.

For me, it is simpler to demonstrate that "could have done otherwise" is always true when choosing happens. DBT's (and other incompatibilist's) only justification is grounded in figurative speech. Their argument, when made explicit, is simply this: if our choice was always inevitable, then it is AS IF we had no choice, and it is AS IF choosing never happened, and it is AS IF someone or something else had made that choice before us, before we were born. Like all figurative statements, each of these claims is literally false. And we can demonstrate it is false by watching people in a restaurant making choices, right before our eyes.

Their only response is "Well, who are you going to believe, me, or your lying eyes?"

 

[The AntiChris]

... I'm suggesting that one possible way forward is to challenge DBT's assumption that 'couldn't do otherwise' (in his sense of the expression) really does not threaten free will.

For me, it is simpler to demonstrate that "could have done otherwise" is always true when choosing happens.

Yes, we're back to "could have if I'd wanted to" (in other words if circumstances were different) and I can't imagine even the the most die-hard incompatibilist disagreeing with you but they'll just say that's not what they mean by could do otherwise.

Anyway, I think I'm just about done for now.

Cheers.

 

[Jarhyn]

No, it's not. I don't have the ability to run a 4 minute mile. Of course, if I'd trained hard and were a little younger... I can't just choose an ability into existence

Well, you can, but it takes some work.

You can't choose it by saying "I shall run a four minute mile".

You can choose it by cutting your feet off, replacing them with carbon fiber blades, doing a fuckton of physical therapy to relearn how how to run, do a bunch more work training, and so on.

From certain points certain choices get very hard to make, perhaps impossible depending on the choice.

There is a philosophical separation, a boundary that exists at the point of "I can do these things to get X" vs "while these things can be done to get X, I cannot do them."

This hinges on "could" of the vein "if I decided in some moment", and the other is just unavailable at the get-go.

I see a specific weight on "if I decided..." Vs other things because of the nature of regulatory control: one operates on a choice function over which the entity will arbitrate, and other things, all the other things operate on "I have no decision on".

This is what the hard determinist loses function from: they proclaim, erroneously, that they have no decision on things; they proclaim that there is no "if I decided" that could possibly make sense.

They do not lose but rather abdicate both the power and responsibilities of decision making. Of course as a society, just like with 'sovereign citizens' abdicating the social contract, we don't care that folks try to so abdicate: we recognize what they do not, regardless, that they have responsibility, and we perhaps shall judge them more harshly for such abdication.

It is the difference between "if I decided to" and "if something I have no control over". One is a decision and the other is wishing.

 

[fromderinside]

The idea that anything subjective is something objective is ludicrous

Ah, so you then believe "a painting of a pipe" (subjective) is not also a piece of canvas with various materials applied to it stretched over a square frame of wood with several square frames of cardboard laid atop it, a pane of glass laid upon that, and a wooden frame assembled around all of it with a wire across the back?

You deny this is the case?

Again FDI loudly proclaiming that objects aren't objects.

How is a painting like a subjective experience. A subjective experience is a mind interpreting what sensed/communicated. A painting on a canvas is a material object. It is only when it is processed by the being that it becomes a subjective experience.

'splaining to Jarhyn using subjective experience to insist what another wrote is actually objective?.

 

[Jarhyn]

A painting on a canvas is a material object.

Man, it would sure be nice then if you could take this recognition and turn it towards a computer, specifically the computer on my floor in my office with a number of bits flipped in very particular ways.

I keep trying to explain that much: one of these things is not unlike the others...

In fact that it is "a painting of a pipe" is the subjective part. I would think you could understand such a simple concept.

 

[The AntiChris]

No, it's not. I don't have the ability to run a 4 minute mile. Of course, if I'd trained hard and were a little younger... I can't just choose an ability into existence

Well, you can, but it takes some work.

You can't choose it by saying "I shall run a four minute mile".

You can choose it by cutting your feet off, replacing them with carbon fiber blades, doing a fuckton of physical therapy to relearn how how to run, do a bunch more work training, and so on.

From certain points certain choices get very hard to make, perhaps impossible depending on the choice.

There is a philosophical separation, a boundary that exists at the point of "I can do these things to get X" vs "while these things can be done to get X, I cannot do them."

This hinges on "could" of the vein "if I decided in some moment", and the other is just unavailable at the get-go.

I see a specific weight on "if I decided..." Vs other things because of the nature of regulatory control: one operates on a choice function over which the entity will arbitrate, and other things, all the other things operate on "I have no decision on".

This is what the hard determinist loses function from: they proclaim, erroneously, that they have no decision on things; they proclaim that there is no "if I decided" that could possibly make sense.

They do not lose but rather abdicate both the power and responsibilities of decision making. Of course as a society, just like with 'sovereign citizens' abdicating the social contract, we don't care that folks try to so abdicate: we recognize what they do not, regardless, that they have responsibility, and we perhaps shall judge them more harshly for such abdication.

It is the difference between "if I decided to" and "if something I have no control over". One is a decision and the other is wishing.

I really do understand the distinction you're making here. I do understand, and fully accept and endorse, the sense of "ability to do otherwise" that Marvin and others on the compatibilist side present here.

I'm just not sure it's sufficiently persuasive to sway those (such as DBT) who insist that the mere fact that we never will do otherwise robs us of free will - it's an irrational position, but a fervently held one.

 

[DBT]

DBT, don’t you find it ludicrous to quote Marvin Edwards, who is a compatibilist like me and disagrees with you? Why do you quote so many people, inlcluding links offsite, who don’t actually agree with your position?

What's ludicrous is that you still haven't grasped that we agree on the given definition of determinism.

I agree with the definitions given by both Marvin and Jarhyn.

We all agree on the terms.

The issue here is not the given definition of determinism, that we all agree on, but that compatibilists define free will in a way that circumvents the terms. Defining free will as acting without force or undue influence, regardless that the terms of determinism necessitate the will to act and its related action, ie, that neither the will to act or the following action is freely willed.

It's right there in the given definition of determinism: all actions proceed without deviation as entailed, not freely willed.

Yet the flawed definition of free will is asserted regardless. That is absurdity of compatibilism for you.

I’ll attend to the rest of your stuff later, but in the meantime I suggest you cut the condesencsion, which at this point borders on trolling. The fact of the matter is I know far more about all this stuff than you do, whether you like it or not.

There is nothing to attend to.

Definitions of determinism have been given and agreed on. The issue is that some seek to circumvent the terms of their own definition.

You, yourself do not appear to understand the nature and implications of determinism as defined by your own comrades in compatibilism.

 

[DBT]

As I have stated before — many times! — Marvin and I are in almost perfect substantive agreement, but we do have a terminological dispute. As I just explained upthread, and many times before, I do not recognize a modal category called “causal necessity.” Is that clear enough, DBT? You know, I was just talking about that … nomic necessity, nomological necessity, physical necessity … how did you miss that, DBT?

It doesn't matter what you recognize or don't recognize. What you fail to grasp is that if all events without deviation - which is the definition given by Marvin and Jarhyn - they must necessarily proceed without definition. There cannot be deviations without breaking the terms of the definition.

So, without any possibility of alternate actions - which are deviations - everything that happens must necessarily happen.

Can you not understand this? It's not hard to grasp.

Don't get hung up on terminology or words. Just try to realize that 'no deviation' means that what happens must happen precisely as determined.

Anything else would be a deviation, which would falsify the given definition of determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

No, it's not. I don't have the ability to run a 4 minute mile. Of course, if I'd trained hard and were a little younger... I can't just choose an ability into existence

Well, you can, but it takes some work.

You can't choose it by saying "I shall run a four minute mile".

You can choose it by cutting your feet off, replacing them with carbon fiber blades, doing a fuckton of physical therapy to relearn how how to run, do a bunch more work training, and so on.

From certain points certain choices get very hard to make, perhaps impossible depending on the choice.

There is a philosophical separation, a boundary that exists at the point of "I can do these things to get X" vs "while these things can be done to get X, I cannot do them."

This hinges on "could" of the vein "if I decided in some moment", and the other is just unavailable at the get-go.

I see a specific weight on "if I decided..." Vs other things because of the nature of regulatory control: one operates on a choice function over which the entity will arbitrate, and other things, all the other things operate on "I have no decision on".

This is what the hard determinist loses function from: they proclaim, erroneously, that they have no decision on things; they proclaim that there is no "if I decided" that could possibly make sense.

They do not lose but rather abdicate both the power and responsibilities of decision making. Of course as a society, just like with 'sovereign citizens' abdicating the social contract, we don't care that folks try to so abdicate: we recognize what they do not, regardless, that they have responsibility, and we perhaps shall judge them more harshly for such abdication.

It is the difference between "if I decided to" and "if something I have no control over". One is a decision and the other is wishing.

I really do understand the distinction you're making here. I do understand, and fully accept and endorse, the sense of "ability to do otherwise" that Marvin and others on the compatibilist side present here.

I'm just not sure it's sufficiently persuasive to sway those (such as DBT) who insist that the mere fact that we never will do otherwise robs us of free will - it's an irrational position, but a fervently held one.

I figured you probably did. I just figure it's good to have a well laid out conversation, mostly because my coworkers and friends I occasionally end up having this conversation with (usually much more productively), I generally get through on these points, and practicing them here makes it easier to deliver there.

In such situations, I can do it by asking questions and actually getting buy-in on the primitive elements before building them into "free" and "will", or even sticking with "met requirement" and "algorithm" until I can just point out fact that these forms are the same as those of "free" and "will", that "can" is "would, of StateB" and that math can be done on the calculated value "SoA U X", on "StateB" sensibly, and that this is in fact the whole point of studying physics in the first place: to learn how to operate such math forward more reliably and with fewer errors on the  generalized state and so to be able to calculate more "could" on "SoA".

Then, I've only met one hardline hard determinist in my days who ever said as much, and that was... A few months before this thread kicked off, before I had distilled my understanding to here, and I did not budge them.

The issue is that this person I met also sets off my "uncanny valley" alarm bells, not dissimilarly from that patronizing PNG file DBT was going on with posting, and his D&D character was screaming "psychopath" with his tropes: he had a character who was always friendly and kind and downright bland, and a "dark side" character he could summon that loved havoc and violence that he wanted to progress towards giving more freedoms to, and which would eventually just be able to come out and express itself violently

 

[DBT]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened.

Your definition of determinism entails the no choice principle. The events of the universe, the world, human affairs, etc, must - according to the given terms - proceed without deviation.

No alternatives equates to no choice.

It's not figurative. If determinism is true, as you yourself define it, it is literal and objective.

The test between literal and figurative is simply to objectively observe what is actually happening in the real world. For example, we watch people in the restaurant reading the menu and placing their orders. This corresponds to the definition of "choosing". From the Oxford English Dictionary: "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference."

Sure, that is how we see the world and how we communicate with each other.

This is not about communication, but a question of the ultimate nature of the world, if deterministic, how determinism relates to our thoughts and actions; whether we have free will.

Each customer in the restaurant, who orders the dinner they prefer from those available on the menu, is choosing. That is what is literally happening.

To claim that it is not really happening is objectively false. Thus the only way to account for your claim is figurative thinking.

They are not choosing, not if their selection and action is entailed before they even think about it, and the option they take, rather than being freely chosen, is fixed by prior states of the system.

The term ''Free Will'' implies the ability to choose, to have actual realizable options whenever you are presented with them.

Yet, given the given terms, that is not possible.

Consequently, compatibilists are left with 'acting without being compelled or unduly influenced.'

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The issue here is not the given definition of determinism, that we all agree on, but that compatibilists define free will in a way that circumvents the terms. Defining free will as acting without force or undue influence, regardless that the terms of determinism necessitate the will to act and its related action, ie, that neither the will to act or the following action is freely willed.

The definition of determinism makes no mention at all of free will. We agree that determinism reasonably asserts that all events are the reliable result of prior events, such that every event is necessitated by prior causes.

The chain of reliably caused events can, and does, contain events in which we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. And since free will is defined as such an event, it fits naturally within that causal chain.

The incompatibilists define free will as a choice we make for ourselves while free of causation. And nobody really uses such a definition of free will outside of this debate, because no event is ever uncaused.

The notions of moral and legal responsibility for one's actions is linked to the first definition of free will (freedom from coercion or undue influence) and not to the second (freedom from causal necessity).

So, the incompatibilists use the second definition (freedom from causal necessity) which makes free will impossible, while the compatibilists use the practical definition (freedom from coercion and undue influence) which is not just compatible with a deterministic universe, but is also compatible with the notions of moral and legal responsibility.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened. The problem is that choosing does happen. We can walk into any restaurant and watch people choosing what they will order for dinner.

Your definition of determinism entails the no choice principle.

Determinism only entails that all events will reliable be caused by prior events, forming an unbroken "chain" of causation from any point in the past to any point in the future.

There is nothing in the definition of determinism that excludes the event of a person choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner. It is just another event, just like every other event, reliably caused by prior events, and reliably causing subsequent events (for example, the chef preparing the dinners that were ordered).

The "no choice principle" is not a valid principle, due to the simple fact that choosing from a menu of options actually happens in the real world (and, it happens deterministically, of course).

The events of the universe, the world, human affairs, etc, must - according to the given terms - proceed without deviation.

Absolutely.

No alternatives equates to no choice.

But there are always alternatives, and choices, within the choosing operation itself. So, "no alternatives", is simply false, and "no choice" continues to be false as well. Both alternatives and choices are found indelibly written within the causal chain.

The test between "literal" and "figurative" is simply to objectively observe what is actually happening in the real world. For example, we watch people in the restaurant reading the menu and placing their orders. This corresponds to the definition of "choosing". From the Oxford English Dictionary: "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference."

This is not about communication, but a question of the ultimate nature of the world, if deterministic, how determinism relates to our thoughts and actions; whether we have free will.

But, when we use figurative thinking and speaking, we distort the truth about the actual nature of the world and what is actually happening.

They are not choosing, not if their selection and action is entailed before they even think about it, and the option they take, rather than being freely chosen, is fixed by prior states of the system.

What you continue to miss is that determinism means that, it was entailed and fixed, that the event in which they decided for themselves what they would order for dinner, would actually happen in the real world, exactly as we saw it happening in the restaurant.

The term ''Free Will'' implies the ability to choose, to have actual realizable options whenever you are presented with them.

Both the ability to choose and the menu of actual realizable options are right there, in the restaurant, for all to see.

Yet, given the given terms, that is not possible.

Apparently, you're wrong about that. We cannot say that the menu, the restaurant, or the people choosing are "not possible", because we're standing there looking at it. The correct understanding of determinism would lead us to conclude that it was inevitable that each person would be making that choice for themselves, and would do so while free of coercion and undue influence. It is not necessary (and actually impossible) to be free of causation in order to be free of coercion and undue influence.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

And this is why we use the restaurant example, Dr. Searle. We can set subjectivity to the side, and describe the objectively observed behavior. Each customer picked up the menu, containing many options, and from these options produce a single dinner order, which they communicated to the waiter. We observed that no one was holding a gun to their head. And as far as we could tell, each was behaving rationally, so no one was subject to any significant mental illness or other form of undue influence. So, we can objectively state that they were free to make this decision for themselves. Not "free of causation", of course, but certainly "free of coercion and undue influence". Thus, we conclude that they acted "of their own free will", as free will is commonly understood. And, finally, the waiter presented each one with a bill for their dinner, holding them responsible for their deliberate act (ordering their dinner).

How they felt about their experience is irrelevant to the notion of free will. What we objectively observed is sufficient to establish the fact of free will. And we may assume perfectly reliable cause and effect held true throughout all of these events.

 

[fromderinside]

ladies, ladies, ladies. Rationality has little to do with reality. It's just too, too, subjective.

 

[DBT]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened. The problem is that choosing does happen. We can walk into any restaurant and watch people choosing what they will order for dinner.

Actions are not chosen, they are determined. Each action is entailed by the prior state of the system.

You may be able say 'chosen' if there was a selection. Unfortunately, that's not the case. As there are no possible alternatives, each and every state of the system being entailed by its prior state, no choice exists.

That is the no choice principle in determinism.

Your definition of determinism entails the no choice principle.

Determinism only entails that all events will reliable be caused by prior events, forming an unbroken "chain" of causation from any point in the past to any point in the future.

The given definition of determinism stipulates that events are fixed by the prior state of the system. That certainly is reliable. So reliable that it eliminates alternatives and choice.

There is nothing in the definition of determinism that excludes the event of a person choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner. It is just another event, just like every other event, reliably caused by prior events, and reliably causing subsequent events (for example, the chef preparing the dinners that were ordered).

Nobody chooses for themselves because everybody and everything is an aspect of the system as it evolves without deviation.

No independent or autonomous decisions are possible.

The "no choice principle" is not a valid principle, due to the simple fact that choosing from a menu of options actually happens in the real world (and, it happens deterministically, of course).

It's entailed in the given terms: ''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn

The 'No Choice Principle' is just another way of saying ''causally necessary'' and ''no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

The events of the universe, the world, human affairs, etc, must - according to the given terms - proceed without deviation.

Absolutely.

Including the implications for the notion of free will.

No alternatives equates to no choice.

But there are always alternatives, and choices, within the choosing operation itself. So, "no alternatives", is simply false, and "no choice" continues to be false as well. Both alternatives and choices are found indelibly written within the causal chain.

There are no alternatives. ''Without deviation' rules out alternatives. As pointed out, each option, menu list, to be a doctor, lawyer, chemist, must necessarily be realized, not chosen. Nobody chose to be Einstein or Hawking, events, life the world produced these geniuses, their genetic makeup, circumstances and life experiences shaped and formed their personalities, drives and ambitions.

The test between "literal" and "figurative" is simply to objectively observe what is actually happening in the real world. For example, we watch people in the restaurant reading the menu and placing their orders. This corresponds to the definition of "choosing". From the Oxford English Dictionary: "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference."

It has the appearance of choosing. Given the terms and conditions of determinism, that appearance is an illusion.

Each customer has only one possible action. Bob (makeup, personality, taste in food, how he feels on the day) must necessarily order steak, his wife Betty, being on a health kick, wanting to slim, feeling bloated, must necessarily order salad. Each and every customer according to their state and condition in that instance in time, no deviation.

All the options on the menu are ordered, but not freely willed or freely chosen.

Not freely chosen because there was never a possibility of anything else.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn

This is not about communication, but a question of the ultimate nature of the world, if deterministic, how determinism relates to our thoughts and actions; whether we have free will.

But, when we use figurative thinking and speaking, we distort the truth about the actual nature of the world and what is actually happening.

No we don't. Our figurative or abstract thinking is entailed by the state of the system as it evolves because nothing is external the system is at work. The brain is an aspect of the system and its abilities are determined by its makeup.

What we think is a matter of information - external inputs - interacting with neural architecture as it processes the information, producing thoughts, feeling, imagination, projecting ideas and 'options' that may or may not be realizable for you.

They are not choosing, not if their selection and action is entailed before they even think about it, and the option they take, rather than being freely chosen, is fixed by prior states of the system.

What you continue to miss is that determinism means that, it was entailed and fixed, that the event in which they decided for themselves what they would order for dinner, would actually happen in the real world, exactly as we saw it happening in the restaurant.

I don't miss it, I reject it. I reject it because it contradicts the given terms and conditions of a determined system.

''Over the past few decades, gathering evidence from both psychology and the neurosciences has provided convincing support for the idea that free will is an illusion. (Read this and this, but for a contrarian view, also read this.) Of course, most people can’t relate to the idea that free will is an illusion, and there’s a good reason why. It feels as if we exercise free will all the time. For instance, it seems that you are exercising free will in choosing to read this article. Similarly, it seems that you exercise free will when you deny yourself the pleasure of eating tasty-but-unhealthy food, or when you overcome laziness to work out at the gym.

But these choices do not necessarily reflect free will. To understand why, consider why you sometimes deny yourself an unhealthy-but-tasty snack. It’s because you were, at some point in your life, made to recognize the long-term negative effects of eating such food. Perhaps you noticed that consuming unhealthy food makes you feel heavy, or that regularly consuming such food makes your blood pressure shoot up. Or perhaps your doctor told you that you need to stop eating unhealthy food; or maybe you read about the negative effects of consuming unhealthy food in a magazine. In other words, you deny yourself the pleasure of consuming unhealthy food because of exposure to external inputs—feedback from your body or from others—over which you had no control. Had you been exposed to a different set of inputs—e.g., despite consuming unhealthy food, your health did not suffer, or your doctor never dissuaded you from eating unhealthy food—you wouldn’t deny yourself the pleasure of eating tasty-but-unhealthy food.

If you think carefully about any decision you have made in the past, you will recognize that all of them were ultimately based on similar—genetic or social—inputs to which you had been exposed. And you will also discover that you had no control over these inputs, which means that you had no free will in taking the decisions you did. For instance, you had no choice in where, to whom, and in what period of time, you were born. You also had no choice in the kind of neighbors and friends to whom you were exposed during early childhood. You therefore had no choice in how you made your decisions during that time.''

The term ''Free Will'' implies the ability to choose, to have actual realizable options whenever you are presented with them.

Both the ability to choose and the menu of actual realizable options are right there, in the restaurant, for all to see.

Different people, different actions, each (necessarily) according to their own state and condition in that time and place.

Yet, given the given terms, that is not possible.

Apparently, you're wrong about that. We cannot say that the menu, the restaurant, or the people choosing are "not possible", because we're standing there looking at it. The correct understanding of determinism would lead us to conclude that it was inevitable that each person would be making that choice for themselves, and would do so while free of coercion and undue influence. It is not necessary (and actually impossible) to be free of causation in order to be free of coercion and undue influence.

You miss the point.

Each and every customer must necessarily order the meal that was determined by an interaction of their own physical and mental makeup in that place and instance in time....and of course, each and every customer is in a different state and condition, different needs, wants, states, etcetera, etcetera; “It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane


''The brain directs our body’s internal functions. It also integrates sensory impulses and information to form perceptions, thoughts, and memories. The brain gives us self-awareness and the ability to speak and move in the world. Its four major regions make this possible: The cerebrum, with its cerebral cortex, gives us conscious control of our actions. The diencephalon mediates sensations, manages emotions, and commands whole internal systems. The cerebellum adjusts body movements, speech coordination, and balance, while the brain stem relays signals from the spinal cord and directs basic internal functions and reflexes.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened, and it is AS IF we had no choice, and it is AS IF the choice was already made by someone or something else . The problem is that these figurative statements are literally false. Choosing does happen. We can walk into any restaurant and watch people choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of alternative choices, what they will order for dinner.

Actions are not chosen, they are determined.

And what determines the actions? Choosing to do that action.

It is not "either chosen or determined", but both. That's how determinism works. The menu determines that we must make a choice. The choosing determines what we will order for dinner. An unbroken chain of causes and effects.

Each action is entailed by the prior state of the system.

Yes. And it goes like this:
1. The state of the system was that we were hungry, which entailed we would decide to go to the restaurant.
2. The state of being in the restaurant entailed that we would browse the menu of realizable possibilities.
3. The state of facing multiple possibilities entailed that we would consider what to order.
4. The state of having considered what we would order entailed fixing our will upon ordering the salad.
5. The state of having fixed our will upon having the salad entailed us telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".
6. The state of having eaten the salad entailed that we would be presented with a bill for our meal.
7. The state of having responsibility for the bill entailed us paying the cashier on the way out.

Each action was entailed by the prior state of the system.

You may be able say 'chosen' if there was a selection.

There was a literal menu of selections and one of those items on the menu was selected.

Unfortunately, that's not the case. As there are no possible alternatives, each and every state of the system being entailed by its prior state, no choice exists.

We've just demonstrated once again that choice not only exists, but that it is compatible with determinism.

That is the no choice principle in determinism.

I couldn't find any reference to a "no choice principle". I think what you are talking about is the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). And, since the restaurant menu clearly presented us with alternative possibilities, and each customer chose for themselves the possibility they wanted for dinner, the PAP is fully satisfied.

There is nothing in the definition of determinism that excludes the event of a person choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner. It is just another event, just like every other event, reliably caused by prior events, and reliably causing subsequent events.

Nobody chooses for themselves because everybody and everything is an aspect of the system as it evolves without deviation.

Because we objectively observe people routinely choosing for themselves what they will do, we must conclude that the only "truth" to your claim is found in figurative thinking and figurative speech. Because of determinism, it seems AS IF nobody "really" chooses.

The test between "literal" and "figurative" is simply to objectively observe what is actually happening in the real world. For example, we watch people in the restaurant reading the menu and placing their orders. This corresponds to the definition of "choosing". From the Oxford English Dictionary: "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference."

It has the appearance of choosing. Given the terms and conditions of determinism, that appearance is an illusion.

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's probably a duck, and not just an illusion.

The real illusion, that people are not making choices, is created by taking figurative notions literally.

 

[The AntiChris]

It has the appearance of choosing.

Can you describe real "choosing".

 

[DBT]

It has the appearance of choosing.

Can you describe real "choosing".

A real choice means that an alternate action is possible. Determinism does not allow the ability to choose otherwise.

Once again:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Actions, of course, proceed as determined, neither freely willed or freely chosen.

 

[Jarhyn]

It has the appearance of choosing.

Can you describe real "choosing".

A real choice means that an alternate action is possible. Determinism does not allow the ability to choose otherwise.

Once again:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Actions, of course, proceed as determined, neither freely willed or freely chosen.

So no,you can't describe "real choosing" because the kind of choosing you demand to do is literally not real according to your broken and nonsensical definition of "possible" and "choice".

It sounds like you don't know what you are talking about.

 

[DBT]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened, and it is AS IF we had no choice, and it is AS IF the choice was already made by someone or something else . The problem is that these figurative statements are literally false. Choosing does happen. We can walk into any restaurant and watch people choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of alternative choices, what they will order for dinner.

Every action is inevitable. That is entailed in the given definition of determinism: no deviation from the big bang to the present moment and beyond makes every action inevitable.

If the World is under the sway of determinism, everything happens as determined, not willed or subject to change. Change is a deviation.

The process is not figurative. Events must necessarily proceed without deviation, as you have defined it.

Actions are not chosen, they are determined.

And what determines the actions? Choosing to do that action.

No, it's entailed by the prior state of the system, which is entailed by the prior state of the system right back to time t.

You can take any point as time t and everything proceeds as determined by the state of the system at that point.

There is no choice. Every action is fixed by prior state. Thoughts, feelings, everything.

Input entails the action and the associated thoughts and feelings. The action is initiated before it's brought to consciousness.

I've supplied more than ample information from neuroscience to show the sequence of events that drive behaviour.

It is not "either chosen or determined", but both. That's how determinism works. The menu determines that we must make a choice. The choosing determines what we will order for dinner. An unbroken chain of causes and effects.

Choice implies the ability to do and choose otherwise. Determinism negates the ability to do and choose otherwise.

choice
[tʃɔɪs] NOUN

1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Each action is entailed by the prior state of the system.

Yes. And it goes like this:
1. The state of the system was that we were hungry, which entailed we would decide to go to the restaurant.
2. The state of being in the restaurant entailed that we would browse the menu of realizable possibilities.
3. The state of facing multiple possibilities entailed that we would consider what to order.
4. The state of having considered what we would order entailed fixing our will upon ordering the salad.
5. The state of having fixed our will upon having the salad entailed us telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".
6. The state of having eaten the salad entailed that we would be presented with a bill for our meal.
7. The state of having responsibility for the bill entailed us paying the cashier on the way out.

None of this has an alternative possibility, all of these events must necessarily proceed as determined (and defined in the given definition).

To claim chosen would require the possibility of having done otherwise.

Choice: 1 - an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Each action was entailed by the prior state of the system.

Which denies choice.

Choice: 1 - an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

You may be able say 'chosen' if there was a selection.

There was a literal menu of selections and one of those items on the menu was selected.

The determined item, each according to the state and condition of each customer. None having the ability to do otherwise, as entailed by your given definition of determinism.

Choice: 1 - an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Unfortunately, that's not the case. As there are no possible alternatives, each and every state of the system being entailed by its prior state, no choice exists.

We've just demonstrated once again that choice not only exists, but that it is compatible with determinism.

You asserted choice in the face of a reality that denies all possibility of doing otherwise, which is the essence meaning of choice'

Choice: 1 - an act of choosing between two or more possibilities is the very opposite of ''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

That is the no choice principle in determinism.

I couldn't find any reference to a "no choice principle". I think what you are talking about is the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). And, since the restaurant menu clearly presented us with alternative possibilities, and each customer chose for themselves the possibility they wanted for dinner, the PAP is fully satisfied.

There is nothing in the definition of determinism that excludes the event of a person choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner. It is just another event, just like every other event, reliably caused by prior events, and reliably causing subsequent events.

1 Compatibilism and the no choice principle​

''The difference between determinist and indeterminist views of history. The distinction between physically possible futures and futures which have a physically possible connection to the actual world. The idea that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is compatible with many parts of the world being deterministic ‘for all intents and purposes.’

Van Inwagen notes that the fact that there is only one physically possible future if determinism is true has led many people to think that there is a conflict between free will and determinism. He imagines the compatibilist replying to this perceived incompatibility roughly as follows: we can say that a future is open to us just in case, were we to make some choice, that future would be realized. It can be true that many futures are open to us, in this sense, even if only one future has a physically possible connection to the actual state of the world. Does free will really require anything more than that many futures are open to us, in this sense of open?

Van Inwagen thinks that it does. He defends the view that free will is, despite the compatibilist’s best efforts, genuinely in conflict with the possibility of free will. He says: “...compatibilists can make their doctrine seem like robust common sense only by sweeping a mystery under the carpet ...I believe that it is possible to lift the carpet and display the hidden mystery. The notion of ‘not having a choice’ has a certain logic to it. One of the principles of this logic is, or so it seems, embodied in the following thesis, which I shall refer to as the No Choice Principle:

Suppose that p and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether p. And suppose also that the following conditional (if-then) statement is true and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether it is true: if p, then q. It follows from these two suppositions that q and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether q.
...The No Choice Principle seems undeniably correct. How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitably consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.”

 

[Jarhyn]

Again, DBT failing to understand "choice", "possibility", and "ability".

For the peanut gallery, this post contains exactly the thing DBT fails to understand:

I guess this all hangs on "ability".

According to determinism a specific state of affairs (SoA) will only ever produce one outcome - that SoA has no capability (ability) to produce any other outcome. There is no possibility that it "could".

So I've been trying to simplify my language for a while, and I will admit, it is HARD because this is a very hard thing to communicate concisely:

"Could", for me and for most, does not operate in the context of "Actual state of affairs".

First we take all the "regular laws" of the universe and keep them.

Then, we take all the state of the universe, copy that, and assume something of it. I will call this "image" of the state of affairs StateB.

So, in a lot more words than normal "could" is "in this moment he will IF the SoA is StateB."

Let's assume that this is not the case for the sake of discussion, that SoA is not StateB.

It is a TRUE statement that "in this moment he will IF the SoA is StateB."

It will always a true statement. It will have always have been a true statement. This is because the statement does not say anything about the actuality of the SoA being StateB, it only discusses IF it were. It will always have been true that he "could".

What will not be true is that SoA is StateB, and thus while he could, he will not.