Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

'when ordering salad is determined, it is not possible to order steak.'

This is demonstrably false.

Don't be so silly, for the hundredth time, it's entailed in the given definition: no deviation, no randomness, no alternatives, which means that nothing can happen to alter the development of the future states of the system, just as you define it to be;

Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

There is no way around this: there can be no alternate actions within a deterministic system.

It is entailed in your own definition.

You have no case to argue.

Your Goose was cooked at the beginning.

No, DBT, a deterministic system is not a system with no choice.

Wrong.

Choice, by definition, entails selecting between two or more realizable options.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities

Determinism, according to the given definition - all events proceeding without deviation, no alternate actions - does not permit two or more realizable options to choose from.

Without realizable alternate options, where lies the choice?

Nowhere.

No alternative equates to no choice.

Freedom - the ability to choose or do otherwise - does not exist within a deterministic system, which makes the notion of free will incompatible with determinism.

Straightforward, undeniable, no way around it. Carefully worded definitions commonly used by compatibilists do not prove the proposition.

And again you fail to read that word "possibilities" and then fill it in with the compatibilist definition, and so FAIL to speak anything meaningful at all about it.

Anad again you fail to understand the implications that determinism has for freedom of choice and freedom of will;

1) (Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice) BEGGED QUESTION, DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF CHOICE.

2) No alternative action or choice, negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will does not, and cannot, make a difference to what are determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

You have no counter argument.

And again you fail to read that word "possibilities" and then fill it in with the compatibilist definition, and so FAIL to speak anything meaningful at all about it.

You didn't even make an argument in the first place. To something for which no argument is given, no counterargument is warranted.

I've pointed again and again to a definition of choice which is clearly observable and satisfied within determinism, and it does not require "indeterminism".

 

[pood]

'when ordering salad is determined, it is not possible to order steak.'

This is demonstrably false.

Don't be so silly, for the hundredth time, it's entailed in the given definition: no deviation, no randomness, no alternatives, which means that nothing can happen to alter the development of the future states of the system, just as you define it to be;

Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

There is no way around this: there can be no alternate actions within a deterministic system.

It is entailed in your own definition.

You have no case to argue.

Your Goose was cooked at the beginning.

No, DBT, a deterministic system is not a system with no choice.

Wrong.

Choice, by definition, entails selecting between two or more realizable options.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities

Determinism, according to the given definition - all events proceeding without deviation, no alternate actions - does not permit two or more realizable options to choose from.

Without realizable alternate options, where lies the choice?

Nowhere.

No alternative equates to no choice.

Freedom - the ability to choose or do otherwise - does not exist within a deterministic system, which makes the notion of free will incompatible with determinism.

Straightforward, undeniable, no way around it. Carefully worded definitions commonly used by compatibilists do not prove the proposition.

And again you fail to read that word "possibilities" and then fill it in with the compatibilist definition, and so FAIL to speak anything meaningful at all about it.

Anad again you fail to understand the implications that determinism has for freedom of choice and freedom of will;

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice.

2) No alternative action or choice, negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will does not, and cannot, make a difference to what are determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

You have no counter argument.

You assert we have no counterargument, and yet we have refuted again and again what you state above.

Your argument immediately goes off the rails at premise 1. Determinism does not permit, or for that matter, compel, anything. Your P1 is a reification fallacy, as has been repeatedly pointed out. Determinism describes what happens in the world, it does not prescribe anything at all, because determinism is not some sort of entitty. Among the things it describes is my ordering a steak for dinner, which reliably causes the waiter to bring me a steak (assuming the waiter is competent).

Since P1 is false, the rest of your argument is moot. It’s unsound.

You make the same mistake over and over when you write about stuff being “fixed by natural law.” Again and again I have challenged you on this point, and I do not believe you have ever given a straight response. I say again: Natural law DESCRIBES, and never PRESCRIBES, what happens in the world. There is no law that makes it be the case that celestial bodies follow geodesics in spacetime. Rather, they do that thing, and the general theory of relativity describes and predicts these relationships. In exactly the same way, causal determinism DESCRIBES temporal relations in the classical (though not quantum) world. And, as a matter of fact, since the whole world is actually quantum, it follows that what we call causal determinism in the so-called classical world is a statistical phenomenon, much like the second “law” of thermodynamics. The Information Philosopher (whom you yourself have quoted and who in fact is a compatibilist) calls this form of determinism “adequate determinism.”

 

[Marvin Edwards]

We don't blame it on the Big Bang, however, determinism is defined as the conditions at time t and how things go ever after being fixed by natural law - ''precisely one inevitable way, without deviation,'' with all its implications.

It is a specific implication that you have failed to prove. You have not proved that if things "would" not have gone another way, that they also "could" not have gone another way. "Would not" does not logically imply "could not". It may "sound" like it does, but it does not.

I've explained many times why such an implication is false. For example, when making a simple choice between ordering the salad versus ordering the steak, I have the "ability" to order either one. I "can" order the steak, and, I "can" order the salad.

No matter which one I choose, my ability to choose the other one remains constant. If "I can order the steak" was ever true at a given time, then "I could have ordered the steak" will be forever true when referring to that same moment in time.

So, when we say, "I ordered the salad" and "I could have ordered the steak", both statements true. The statement "I ordered the salad" never implies that "I could not have ordered the steak".

Although I "would" not order the steak, I "could" have ordered the steak. So, what I would do does not imply what I could do.

What I "can" do implies the limits of what I "will" do, because if I cannot do it then I will not do it.

But what I "will" do never implies what I "can" do. What I "can" do is only limited by my ability to carry out the option if I choose to do so.

Finally, whenever choosing happens, there will always be multiple things that I "can" choose, even though there will be only one thing that I "will" choose.

So, the notion that "what I would do implies what I could do" is simply false.

 

[DBT]

At this point I'm still trying to figure out who's a chatbot, and who isn't.

I have met DBT IRL, so if he’s a chatbot, he’s an extraordinarily advanced model that drinks beer.

It’s funny, though, because under DBT’s hard determinism, we really are all extraordinarily advanced models of chatbots, aren’t we? We have no “choice” over what we say. It was all pre-scripted at the big bang.

Yet it’s this “extraordinarily advanced model” bit that is so puzzling. I’m going to assume chatbots are not conscious, and yet we are. What for? What possible selective advantage does consciousness, particularly higher-order consciousness, have in a pre-scripted world?

It seems clear to me what the advantage of consciousness is — it maximizes choices. It moves organisms away from blind instinct and enables them to evaluate, weigh, measure, and choose, to better their chances of survival and reproductive success.

Yet it is just this thing called choice that hard determinism denies, rendering the evolution of consciousness in such a world wholly inexplicable.

The really funny thing is the insistence that it's ''DBT's hard determinism,' when the definition I use is precisely the same as given by the compatibilists on this forum....which I quote time and time again.

The only difference being is the question of whether free will is compatible with that very same definition of determinism.

The answer, for the given reasons, being: no, it is not.

And yet, you didn’t address the point I made in the bit from me that you quoted. I’ve posed this question in the past, too, and I don’t think I’ve ever really received an answer.

The diference between standard causal determinism and your hard determinism is that causal determinism takes no stand on free will, while hard determninism argues it is incompitible with free will. So you are a hard determinist, QED.

Again, the point of contention is the compatibility of the notion of free will in relation to the given definition of determinism.

Both sides have agreed on a definition of determinism.

The definition is neither 'hard' or 'soft'....it is determinism, as it is agreed to be.

Which just makes it a question of: is free will compatible with determinism?

And it has been pointed out why the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism (as defined).

Basically:

Choice; an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice.

2) No alternative action or choice negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will cannot make a difference to determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Choice; an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice

And yet again, an unsupported assertion.

Marvin has shown you a thing.

That thing is the clear action of people making choices.

Your No-True-Scotsman is tiresome, but you can't seem to get past it.

Neither could JC get past his fallacious thinking.

Maybe you would do better talking it through with a shrink WHY you keep wanting so badly for there to be no choice.

 

[DBT]

'when ordering salad is determined, it is not possible to order steak.'

This is demonstrably false.

Don't be so silly, for the hundredth time, it's entailed in the given definition: no deviation, no randomness, no alternatives, which means that nothing can happen to alter the development of the future states of the system, just as you define it to be;

Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

There is no way around this: there can be no alternate actions within a deterministic system.

It is entailed in your own definition.

You have no case to argue.

Your Goose was cooked at the beginning.

No, DBT, a deterministic system is not a system with no choice.

Wrong.

Choice, by definition, entails selecting between two or more realizable options.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities

Determinism, according to the given definition - all events proceeding without deviation, no alternate actions - does not permit two or more realizable options to choose from.

Without realizable alternate options, where lies the choice?

Nowhere.

No alternative equates to no choice.

Freedom - the ability to choose or do otherwise - does not exist within a deterministic system, which makes the notion of free will incompatible with determinism.

Straightforward, undeniable, no way around it. Carefully worded definitions commonly used by compatibilists do not prove the proposition.

And again you fail to read that word "possibilities" and then fill it in with the compatibilist definition, and so FAIL to speak anything meaningful at all about it.

Anad again you fail to understand the implications that determinism has for freedom of choice and freedom of will;

1) (Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice) BEGGED QUESTION, DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF CHOICE.

2) No alternative action or choice, negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will does not, and cannot, make a difference to what are determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

You have no counter argument.

And again you fail to read that word "possibilities" and then fill it in with the compatibilist definition, and so FAIL to speak anything meaningful at all about it.

You didn't even make an argument in the first place. To something for which no argument is given, no counterargument is warranted.

I've pointed again and again to a definition of choice which is clearly observable and satisfied within determinism, and it does not require "indeterminism".

You haven't pointed anything out. You have yet to grasp the implications of your own definition of determinism.

Given the track record, there is not much hope of that happening.

Do you understand that events that are fixed by antecedents entails no choice?

Are you able to grasp that with all actions being entailed by the system as it evolves, acting without external coercion or force is not an example of free will? That entailment does not equate to free will? That nothing within a deterministic system is freely willed? Apparently not.

 

[Jarhyn]

You haven't pointed anything out. You have yet to grasp the implications of your own definition of determinism

Yes, I did, I very clearly pointed out a choice happening, as per our definition of the word, in a deterministic system. See my first post on the choice function ListA.pop()

Choices don't have to be more than that.

Possibilities don't HAVE to discuss anything more than imaginary extensions of the universe.

You have yet to grasp the implications of physics and the fact that YOU are abandoning the definitions we are presenting to argue against a straw man and your posts make you out to not actually be smart enough to understand that.

I could go through the very important difference, the difference yet again but I won't. You have demonstrated that there is one thing in this universe that is most certainly not a possibility: you growing the ability to understand more than two abstractions at the same time.

 

[DBT]

We don't blame it on the Big Bang, however, determinism is defined as the conditions at time t and how things go ever after being fixed by natural law - ''precisely one inevitable way, without deviation,'' with all its implications.

It is a specific implication that you have failed to prove. You have not proved that if things "would" not have gone another way, that they also "could" not have gone another way. "Would not" does not logically imply "could not". It may "sound" like it does, but it does not.

It's entailed in the given definition. Your own definition. As defined, 'fixed' and 'no deviation' entails it.

I've explained many times why such an implication is false. For example, when making a simple choice between ordering the salad versus ordering the steak, I have the "ability" to order either one. I "can" order the steak, and, I "can" order the salad.

That contradicts your own definition of determinism:

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment''

No matter which one I choose, my ability to choose the other one remains constant. If "I can order the steak" was ever true at a given time, then "I could have ordered the steak" will be forever true when referring to that same moment in time.

Then it is not determinism.

So, when we say, "I ordered the salad" and "I could have ordered the steak", both statements true. The statement "I ordered the salad" never implies that "I could not have ordered the steak".

You feel that you could have, but if events determined, each action is fixed and your perception of could have done otherwise had I wanted to is an illusion.

Think of errors....a moment after something bad happens, you think, I shouldn't have done, or said that. Had it been possible to do otherwise, you would not have made the error in the first place.

We may look at the past and wish we knew then what we know now, but of course that was impossible, you were what your were at the time, things were not different, and cannot have been different, consequently events happen as they must.

We don't choose our own condition or the events of the world that shape our thoughts and actions.

Although I "would" not order the steak, I "could" have ordered the steak. So, what I would do does not imply what I could do.

No deviation entails no choice.

What I "can" do implies the limits of what I "will" do, because if I cannot do it then I will not do it.

Not only will not do it, but literally cannot do it. Fixed means it can't happen.

But what I "will" do never implies what I "can" do. What I "can" do is only limited by my ability to carry out the option if I choose to do so.

Finally, whenever choosing happens, there will always be multiple things that I "can" choose, even though there will be only one thing that I "will" choose.

So, the notion that "what I would do implies what I could do" is simply false.

What you do, you must necessarily do. That is what determinism means;


What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

 

[Jarhyn]

It's entailed in the given definition. Your own definition. As defined, 'fixed' and 'no deviation' entails it.

"Possibility" does not require "deviation".

Your unargued assertion is that possibility requires deviation.

We have explained multitude times now possibility does not require deviation of the actual universe.

Possibility merely requires logical sensibility of applying some given (imaginary) state against the rules of physics, and seeing what physics makes of that imaginary state.

As such possibilities are always "possibilities (IF the universe were [imaginary state])". Since that state is imaginary, it does not matter whether the actual universe conforms to that image.

Even so, we have a set of language that describes when it is, in fact, conformant: actuality.

When possibilities are actualities, and a will is targeting that possibility for actualization, we call that will "free".

 

[pood]

At this point I'm still trying to figure out who's a chatbot, and who isn't.

I have met DBT IRL, so if he’s a chatbot, he’s an extraordinarily advanced model that drinks beer.

It’s funny, though, because under DBT’s hard determinism, we really are all extraordinarily advanced models of chatbots, aren’t we? We have no “choice” over what we say. It was all pre-scripted at the big bang.

Yet it’s this “extraordinarily advanced model” bit that is so puzzling. I’m going to assume chatbots are not conscious, and yet we are. What for? What possible selective advantage does consciousness, particularly higher-order consciousness, have in a pre-scripted world?

It seems clear to me what the advantage of consciousness is — it maximizes choices. It moves organisms away from blind instinct and enables them to evaluate, weigh, measure, and choose, to better their chances of survival and reproductive success.

Yet it is just this thing called choice that hard determinism denies, rendering the evolution of consciousness in such a world wholly inexplicable.

The really funny thing is the insistence that it's ''DBT's hard determinism,' when the definition I use is precisely the same as given by the compatibilists on this forum....which I quote time and time again.

The only difference being is the question of whether free will is compatible with that very same definition of determinism.

The answer, for the given reasons, being: no, it is not.

And yet, you didn’t address the point I made in the bit from me that you quoted. I’ve posed this question in the past, too, and I don’t think I’ve ever really received an answer.

The diference between standard causal determinism and your hard determinism is that causal determinism takes no stand on free will, while hard determninism argues it is incompitible with free will. So you are a hard determinist, QED.

Again, the point of contention is the compatibility of the notion of free will in relation to the given definition of determinism.

Both sides have agreed on a definition of determinism.

The definition is neither 'hard' or 'soft'....it is determinism, as it is agreed to be.

Which just makes it a question of: is free will compatible with determinism?

And it has been pointed out why the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism (as defined).

Basically:

Choice; an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice.

2) No alternative action or choice negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will cannot make a difference to determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

As I’ve noted several times now, it’s as if your responses are on a save-get key. You keep repeating yourself over and over without addressing what is actually being said to you. This is no way to hold a discussion.

You write, “both sides have agreed on a definition of determinism.” Yet I have repeatedly told you that I agree to no definition of determinism outside of “effects reliably follow causes,” i.e., Hume’s constant conjunction. And I have told you that I do not accept any modal category called “causal necessity.” If you don’t wish to address what I am saying, then I suggest you at least stop writing as if I agree to things that I do not agree to. It’s rather tiresome.

I note once again that you STILL do not address my question of why complex, higher-level consciousness would evolve, a cognitive apparatus that clearly makes it easer to remember, foresee, evaluate, and choose, if in fact we have no choice about anything!

And then again you just blithely go off and repeat yourself:

1) Determinism, by definition, does not permit alternative action or choice.

2) No alternative action or choice negates freedom of choice.

3) Absence of choice (no possible alternate actions) negates freedom of will

4) Will cannot make a difference to determined outcomes.

5) Free will is incompatible with determinism.

But I explicitly CHALLENGED this a few posts up, showing why P1 fails. Are you unable or unwilling to deal with that challenge?

You ignore my point that determinism DESCRIBES but does not PRESCRIBE what happens in the world, and my point, repeatedly made, that “natural” law also DESCRIBES but does not PRESCRIBE what happens in the world. You ignore all this and just go on repeating yourself. At this point I have to conclude you are unable to deal with these points and so you just ignore them.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It is a specific implication that you have failed to prove. You have not proved that if things "would" not have gone another way, that they also "could" not have gone another way. "Would not" does not logically imply "could not". It may "sound" like it does, but it does not.

It's entailed in the given definition. Your own definition. As defined, 'fixed' and 'no deviation' entails it.

Nope. As I keep pointing out, what was fixed and entailed, with no deviation, was that I "could have" ordered the steak would necessarily be true under those precise circumstances, despite the fact that I never "would have" ordered the steak under those same circumstances.

It is a simple matter of English grammar, the logic of the language, that if "I can order the steak" was ever true at any point in the past, then "I could have ordered the steak" will be forever true when referencing that same point in time from the future. It is a simple matter of the tense of the verb, present tense and past tense.

Now, was "I can order the steak" ever true? Yes. When choosing between the salad and the steak, it was required that there be two things that "I can do". By logical necessity, "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were both true. We know this because if one of them were false, then the choosing would immediately stop. There would be only one option, and we would simply proceed with that option without further thought.

But that was not the case. We had two options, the salad and the steak, and it was possible to choose either one. Choosing the salad was "possible". Choosing the steak was also "possible". Both were things that I was "able" to do at that time and place. Both were things that I "could" do, even though I only "would" do one of them. So, the choosing operation continued to the evaluation step. While considering the steak option, I recalled having bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. And I recalled that my dietary goal was to eat more fruits and vegetables. So I chose the salad for dinner instead of the steak.

Due to those prior causes (the bacon and eggs and cheeseburger) it was always inevitable that I would choose the salad for dinner. But I did not know that until I recalled from memory my breakfast and lunch. That is how choosing works. It inputs two or more things that we "can" do, evaluates them, and outputs the single inevitable thing that we "will" do.

At the end of every choosing operation, there will always be both the single thing that we "will" do, plus the other things that we "could" have done, but decided not to do.

Now, you seem to think that determinism magically makes the sentence, "I could have ordered the steak" false. But it doesn't.

If we were to run this through a replay, it would always be the same. At the beginning there will always be at least two different things that I can choose. At the end, there will always be the single inevitable thing that I will choose as well as the other thing(s) that I would not choose, but could have chosen.

It is how the words work. The single inevitable thing that we "will" do is chosen from among the many things we "can" do.

But if you illogically conflate "can" with "will", you end up with false conclusions.

Determinism does not change what these words mean. Determinism can only assert that the notions of "can" and "will" will appear as mental events that are reliably caused by prior mental events. Both our "could have" and our "would have" are equally causally necessary and inevitably will appear, exactly when they do.

In short, the "could have" is just as inevitable as the "would have".

You feel that you could have, but if events determined, each action is fixed and your perception of could have done otherwise had I wanted to is an illusion.

That's still incorrect. The notion that I "would" have done otherwise, given my same goals and reasons, would be an illusion. But the notion that I "could" have done otherwise, given different goals and reasons, would be a matter of fact. Keep in mind that "could have" always implies different circumstances.

Think of errors....a moment after something bad happens, you think, I shouldn't have done, or said that. Had it been possible to do otherwise, you would not have made the error in the first place.

The possibility to do otherwise is logically required to correct the error. If there is no possibility to do otherwise, then there is nothing we can call an "error".

We may look at the past and wish we knew then what we know now, but of course that was impossible, you were what your were at the time, things were not different, and cannot have been different, consequently events happen as they must.

One cannot look at the past and wish it were different without the notion of "possibility". Learning from past mistakes involves imagining what we "could" have done differently. If there are no other possibilities then we cannot plan a different future. The future would simply repeat the same mistakes over and over.

That's the cost of conflating "can" with "will". If only a single thing "can" happen, then only that single thing "will" ever happen. But the logic of our language allows for multiple things that "can" happen, multiple "possibilities", while restricting us to a single thing that "will" happen and a single "actuality".

We don't choose our own condition or the events of the world that shape our thoughts and actions.

You keep saying these weird things that contradict the facts on the ground. Our choices cause our actions. Our actions cause changes in our own condition as well as producing events in the world. So, we are actually part of what creates our own condition and the events of the world that shape our thoughts and actions.

You cannot have determinism if you keep erasing us from the causal chain. Our chosen actions cause events. Any version of determinism that ignores or excludes us is incomplete, and therefore false.

 

[Jarhyn]

Keep in mind that "could have" always implies different circumstances.

Not always.

First the different circumstances are imaginary. You shouldn't leave that out with someone who can't abstract well.

Second, Sometimes "could have..." is also capable of terminating linguistically with "...and so I did, because I decided to in that moment...", in which case the imaginary circumstance is not in fact a different circumstance and the phrase "...thus my will to do so was free" also applies, assuming truth of the predicate

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Keep in mind that "could have" always implies different circumstances.

Not always.

First the different circumstances are imaginary. You shouldn't leave that out with someone who can't abstract well.

Second, Sometimes "could have..." is also capable of terminating linguistically with "...and so I did, because I decided to in that moment...", in which case the imaginary circumstance is not in fact a different circumstance and the phrase "...thus my will to do so was free" also applies, assuming truth of the predicate

Right. When speaking in the past tense, "Last night, in the restaurant, I could have ordered the salad and I could have ordered the steak, and I actually did order the salad, but not the steak".

And, yes, different circumstances are being imagined. All possibilities exist solely within the imagination. When actualized, they are immediately renamed "actualities".

But, while being imagined, they are not "imaginary" in the sense of being "unreal" possibilities. A "real" possibility is something that we can actually do, if we choose to, and we're imagining that possibility to decide whether to choose to do it or not.

We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, a possibility is real in the sense that it has real effects in the real world (it is part of how an actual bridge comes about).

 

[Jarhyn]

Keep in mind that "could have" always implies different circumstances.

Not always.

First the different circumstances are imaginary. You shouldn't leave that out with someone who can't abstract well.

Second, Sometimes "could have..." is also capable of terminating linguistically with "...and so I did, because I decided to in that moment...", in which case the imaginary circumstance is not in fact a different circumstance and the phrase "...thus my will to do so was free" also applies, assuming truth of the predicate

Right. When speaking in the past tense, "Last night, in the restaurant, I could have ordered the salad and I could have ordered the steak, and I actually did order the salad, but not the steak".

And, yes, different circumstances are being imagined. All possibilities exist solely within the imagination. When actualized, they are immediately renamed "actualities".

But, while being imagined, they are not "imaginary" in the sense of being "unreal" possibilities. A "real" possibility is something that we can actually do, if we choose to, and we're imagining that possibility to decide whether to choose to do it or not.

We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, a possibility is real in the sense that it has real effects in the real world (it is part of how an actual bridge comes about).

Well yes, not everything in the hierarchy of "imaginary" is "possible", and both "possible" and "impossible" are infinitely large sets.

You can absolutely drive across what was five years ago the possibility of a bridge. It's just that the possibility was also an "eventuality", the past tense of an actuality, and of the future tensed "inevitability".

 

[fromderinside]

As they rattle on and on and on without ever stopping to consider the implications of their words.

To get to choice and free one must insert self thereby adding a variable which isn't implied in determinism.

Get rid of your Descartes silliness. There is no "I am" in determinism. It is not part of the material construction of what is determined, Its never "being determined" it's just determined. "You" plays no part. With no part to play "choice", "self", "will" aren't there.

DBT has nailed it. You guys just want to play a game where somehow "you" is relevant. Determinism as a mechanism stands for everything material. "You" is something else, certainly not part of determinism. Again, "you" is incompatible with determinism.

Let me be clear. Science is incompatible with "you". "You" is never part of the scientific method. Sure, someone conducts experiments but the experiments don't include that one as part of the procedure. The designer is purposely excluded from the calculations by protocol. That was settled about 140 years ago. Looking inward for cause contaminates the method.

 

[DBT]

It's entailed in the given definition. Your own definition. As defined, 'fixed' and 'no deviation' entails it.

"Possibility" does not require "deviation".

If ''possibility'' implies realizable alternate options, that something else can happen, that is deviation.

That is the point.

Your unargued assertion is that possibility requires deviation.

'Possibility' means that something can in fact happen. Determinism means that only that which is determined by antecedents can happen.

That what happens must necessarily happen.

If something must necessarily happen, it's not a 'possibility' that it will happen, it is an inevitability that it happens.

Inevitability eliminates the possibility of alternate actions.

We have explained multitude times now possibility does not require deviation of the actual universe.

As explained above, you have yet to grasp the basics of determinism and its implications for choice and free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

If ''possibility'' implies realizable alternate options, that something else can happen, that is deviation

And again you keep inserting your own belief rather than reading what we wrote.

The deviation doesn't happen in reality. It happens in the imagination.

What makes the "possibility" "realizable" in the context includes language you don't seem to understand as existing between the lines.

"Realizable" operates in the same context of CAN: that the only thing constraining the will is not an external requirement to the person but an internal one, that the only thing constraining them from doing it is merely their decision not to.

It does not mean that they will deviate from what the math says they will do. It means "they can, if the state of the universe solely with respect to their brain state conforms to some assumption".

There is even a special word, a set of words really, we have been trying to teach you that is used to describe when this is a true assumption: "freeness".

Whether that assumption is true and whether such an impossible deviation would be required for some thing to happen is exactly "freeness" of the will.

 

[DBT]

As I’ve noted several times now, it’s as if your responses are on a save-get key. You keep repeating yourself over and over without addressing what is actually being said to you. This is no way to hold a discussion.

Yet you feel the need to participate regardless?

It's repetitive on both sides. Compatibilists make assertions in regard to the notion of free will, acting without force or undue influence, etc, and incompatibilists point out the errors with the claim.

Who's right? It's clear that freedom is incompatible with determinism for all the given reasons.

Acting without coercion or force is still an action determined by antecedents, fixed by prior states of the system, neither freely willed or chosen.

Yet free will is asserted.

You write, “both sides have agreed on a definition of determinism.” Yet I have repeatedly told you that I agree to no definition of determinism outside of “effects reliably follow causes,” i.e., Hume’s constant conjunction. And I have told you that I do not accept any modal category called “causal necessity.” If you don’t wish to address what I am saying, then I suggest you at least stop writing as if I agree to things that I do not agree to. It’s rather tiresome.

I don't think you understand the implications of ''effects reliably follow causes,' how it works, or what makes 'reliability' possible.

If you think using the word 'reliable' permits the ability to regulate the system and bend it to our will, that our minds are exempt from the process of determinism, you are a Libertarian, not a compatibilist.

I note once again that you STILL do not address my question of why complex, higher-level consciousness would evolve, a cognitive apparatus that clearly makes it easer to remember, foresee, evaluate, and choose, if in fact we have no choice about anything!

Your question is flawed, and it has been addressed, described, articles on evolutionary biology, psychology quoted, cited, etc, ad nauseum.

The brain/organism has evolved to navigate it's complex environment, to respond to its challenges as a parellel information processor, not as a free will agent.

Ring any bells?

Do I have to repeat this again, only to have it ignored and get the lament; you repeat?

 

[Jarhyn]

Who's right? It's clear that freedom is incompatible with determinism for all the given reasons

And it's clear to JC that the world is created for all the "given" reasons which amount to the same quantity of reasons you have given: because some people have an infinite capability to ignore what other people write.

Again, look at what we mean by "can".

If ''possibility'' implies realizable alternate options, that something else can happen, that is deviation

And again you keep inserting your own belief rather than reading what we wrote.

The deviation doesn't happen in reality. It happens in the imagination.

What makes the "possibility" "realizable" in the context includes language you don't seem to understand as existing between the lines.

"Realizable" operates in the same context of CAN: that the only thing constraining the will is not an external requirement to the person but an internal one, that the only thing constraining them from doing it is merely their decision not to.

It does not mean that they will deviate from what the math says they will do. It means "they can, if the state of the universe solely with respect to their brain state conforms to some assumption".

There is even a special word, a set of words really, we have been trying to teach you that is used to describe when this is a true assumption: "freeness".

Whether that assumption is true and whether such an impossible deviation would be required for some thing to happen is exactly "freeness" of the will.

 

[DBT]

It is a specific implication that you have failed to prove. You have not proved that if things "would" not have gone another way, that they also "could" not have gone another way. "Would not" does not logically imply "could not". It may "sound" like it does, but it does not.

It's entailed in the given definition. Your own definition. As defined, 'fixed' and 'no deviation' entails it.

Nope. As I keep pointing out, what was fixed and entailed, with no deviation, was that I "could have" ordered the steak would necessarily be true under those precise circumstances, despite the fact that I never "would have" ordered the steak under those same circumstances.

''Could have'' is false. What you do is fixed by prior states of the system. How it evolves is not your choice.

The circumstance are always precisely as they must be, not as they 'could be.' Word games such as ''could have'' are suggestive of a freedom that cannot exist within determinism as it is defined.

It is a simple matter of English grammar, the logic of the language, that if "I can order the steak" was ever true at any point in the past, then "I could have ordered the steak" will be forever true when referencing that same point in time from the future. It is a simple matter of the tense of the verb, present tense and past tense.

Grammar does not alter the definition of determinism and all its implications.

Grammar is being used as a tool to give an impression of a sort of freedom that is not compatible with determinism.

Now, was "I can order the steak" ever true? Yes. When choosing between the salad and the steak, it was required that there be two things that "I can do". By logical necessity, "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were both true. We know this because if one of them were false, then the choosing would immediately stop. There would be only one option, and we would simply proceed with that option without further thought.

There are never two or more possible actions within a deterministic system. Each incremental instance of action is fixed by antecedents.

If salad, salad it must necessarily be. If steak, steak it must necessarily be.

If the first impulse is salad, then on second thoughts, steak...that is how event of ordering the meal must necessarily proceed.

We are talking about determinism, not 'we can cook up anything regardless,' Libertarian free will.

We don't choose our own condition or the events of the world that shape our thoughts and actions.

You keep saying these weird things that contradict the facts on the ground. Our choices cause our actions. Our actions cause changes in our own condition as well as producing events in the world. So, we are actually part of what creates our own condition and the events of the world that shape our thoughts and actions.

It's not weird at all. It's entailed in your own definition. If determinism is true, the brain is embedded in the system, an aspect of the system, being inseparable from it, the brain is deterministic, acting deterministically in response to the information from the world at large that acts upon it.

What is strange is wanting it both ways, both determinism and freedom.

''The increments of a normal brain state is not as obvious as direct coercion, a microchip, or a tumor, but the “obviousness” is irrelevant here. Brain states incrementally get to the state they are in one moment at a time. In each moment of that process the brain is in one state, and the specific environment and biological conditions leads to the very next state. Depending on that state, this will cause you to behave in a specific way within an environment (decide in a specific way), in which all of those things that are outside of a person constantly bombard your senses changing your very brain state. The internal dialogue in your mind you have no real control over.''

You cannot have determinism if you keep erasing us from the causal chain. Our chosen actions cause events. Any version of determinism that ignores or excludes us is incomplete, and therefore false.

I don't do that. Never have, never will, quite the opposite.

What I say is related to determinism as it is defined. You are doing the very thing you accuse me of when you say ''our chosen action cause events,' as if we chose our action in the absence of antecedents, implying that 'our chosen action' is free from causality, a first cause, time t.

That is a bad error.