The essence of determinism is "would" not have done otherwise. That is sufficient for determinism. Determinism cannot rationally assert "could" not have done otherwise. That would be a fallacy.
Yes. And thanks for noticing.
Semantics is about the meaning of the words we use. And I've been explaining the distinction between saying that "we would not have done otherwise" versus "we could not have done otherwise". We might think that the distinction between "would" and "could" is rather obvious. But the discussion of determinism, long ago, made the figurative leap that effectively conflated the two terms, by falsely suggesting that if something "will not" happen then it is AS IF it "cannot" happen (or, if something "would not" happen then it is AS IF it "could not" happen).
What can I say, other than that philosophy screwed things up, and created a paradox (a self-induced hoax, created by one or more false, but believable, suggestions).
If saying 'would not have done otherwise' seeks to imply freedom or the possibility of doing otherwise, it does not relate to determinism.
The fact is that there is always the possibility of doing otherwise, even if the otherwise is simply between doing something or not doing it. But, of course, there is no possibility of both doing it AND not doing it. Such would be physically and logically impossible. But whether I decide to do it, or to not do it, one will be the thing I did, and the other will be the thing I "could have" done instead.
When deciding between the salad and the steak, each is a real, true, and actual possibility. Both are actually things that I actually "can" choose to order, even though I
inevitably "will" only choose one. And the one that I do not choose will
inevitably become the thing that I "could have" chosen instead.
As to freedom, there is no "freedom from causal necessity", of course. But there is a freedom to choose for myself whether to have the steak or the salad, where the "freedom" refers implicitly to freedom from coercion and undue influence. This is the freedom which is referenced by the "free" in operational "free will".
We've discussed the two distinctly different definitions of free will. And, yes, the distinction between the two is also a matter of semantics. And we can certainly discuss both definitions again if you like. But operational free will has no problem with determinism.
If it's just said because, well, it's ''sufficient to say,'' it doesn't alter anything, events proceed as determined. Will, what you 'choose to do,' is determined, and events proceed without deviation, as determined....
Of course.
... and 'would not have done otherwise' is precisely the same as 'could not have done otherwise.
If they were precisely the same then there would be no need for two distinct words. But they are
not the same at all. For example, I "could" have ordered anything on the menu, but, given my goals and reasons, I "would" only order the salad that night.
To say to someone, "I have two ice cream cones. One is chocolate. The other is vanilla. You can choose either one, and I will have the other." And then, when they choose the chocolate, tell them "You could not have chosen the vanilla", creates a
cognitive dissonance. Because the statement "You can choose the vanilla" directly contradicts "You could not have chosen the vanilla". One of those two statements must be a lie.
This contradicts the terms of your definition.
No. It doesn't. After all, the distinction between "could" and "would" was causally inevitable from any prior point in time. And so was the philosopher's error to conflate them, leading to your confusion.
You want it both ways, events fixed by antecedents and events not fixed by antecedents.
No! All events are fixed by antecedent events. For example, the meaningful antecedent events, of my choosing the salad rather than the steak, included my recalling that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch versus my chosen goal of eating more fruits and vegetables daily. Those were the immediate prior causes that fixed my choice.
Those prior causes had their own prior causes, of course, such as my genetic enjoyment of high protein and high fat meals, and my education over the years that more fruits and vegetables would lead to better health. And those prior causes had their own prior causes, etc. etc. etc., all the way back to the Big Bang. But only the more recent causes are meaningful causes, things that we might do something about to change my dietary choices. Viewing the Big Bang as a "meaningful" cause would be silly nonsense.
When presented with options within a deterministic system, it is the state of the system as it evolves from prior to current and future states that determines all actions, no exceptions.
Yep. Just like I have repeatedly described. But I am providing meaningful information about the prior states that caused me to choose the salad. You seem eager to sweep meaningful information under the rug of a broad, abstract generality.
When you present someone with two ice cream cones, itself a determined action, it cannot be a matter of probability chance or you are 'free to take either one in any instance in time,' it has to be the determined action. If chocolate is chosen, chocolate is necessarily chosen.
Correct. The choice of chocolate was causally necessary. And the phenomenon of the person choosing the chocolate instead of the vanilla was also causally necessary. And the logical fact that the person "could have" chosen the vanilla was also causally necessary.
The whole performance goes as it must, thinking of presenting a test, formulating the terms and carrying it out, no deviation.
All of these events, including the choices and the people making them, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.
But back to the ice cream example:
If you tell a person that they
can choose the vanilla, then you tell them that they
could not have chosen the vanilla, they will object. Those two statements are direct
contradictions. So, one of them must be false. If you have a "can" now, then you will also have a "could have" tomorrow. It's the same fact expressed with the present tense and then with the past tense.
They choose precisely what they must choose.
Every time.
Any and every instance is determined by the prior state of the system.
Sure 'nuff. In the ice cream example, the prior state of the system was the person's genetic preference for chocolate over vanilla. So, although they "could" have chosen vanilla, they "would" choose the chocolate instead.
How do we know that they "could" have chosen vanilla? Well, we can easily test for this ability. Offer them the choice between a vanilla ice cream cone or a bowl of spinach. Did they choose the vanilla ice cream? Yes? Then obviously they had the ability to choose vanilla. And they had that same ability when offered the chocolate, they simply chose not to exercise their ability to choose the vanilla.
The fact that they "would" not choose the vanilla under one set of circumstances does not mean that they "could" not choose vanilla under different circumstances. The term "could have happened" always logically implies that (1) it "did not" happen and (2) that it only "would" have happened under "different circumstances".
Determinism cannot honestly assert "could not have done otherwise". It can only honestly assert "would not have done otherwise".
What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''
That remains correct. Determinism will always produce the same results, without randomness or variation. Given a choice between a vanilla ice cream cone versus a chocolate ice cream cone, one of these options will always be the single inevitable "I will" and the other will always be the single inevitable "I could have". Thus, determinism, without randomness or variation.
