Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

If you ask a Christian free will given by god is the freedom to choose between good and evil, god and not god.

Except that the Christian is failing to answer the question. The question is not "what are the choices offered to you by free will", the question is "what is a choice, how is it made; what is freedom and how is it ascertained; what is will and how is it formed?"

Then we can further ask the Christian in particular "what is god" until it either devolves into a series of axioms which trivialize and invalidate the idea of knowledge... Or not.

I've come to my own private conclusions is that whenever someone describes god I hear "I'm trying to describe the properties of math while knowing nothing about it and attributing idiotic shit to the game theory bits of it, and not calling it math because people know I know nothing about math but when I call it 'god' and pretend it's mysterious and unknowable, people let me get away with it!"

It's the desire to replace rigorous and well founded understandings of math with... Something else.

Here we are discussing the core concepts, what is the very thing "choice", what is the very thing "free"? What do we know about these things, these nonlocal things which we see instances of popping up here and there and everywhere?

 

[steve_bank]

For Christians that is the one and only answer.

 

[fromderinside]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

There's that 'we' studying 'self' again. No anchors to reality beyond "I associated what I did with actual things." Where's the material tie-in with things and one's insights of 'self' ? IOW did the rock that hit you believe it fell purpose?

Why are you asking me? Shouldn't you be asking the rock? I mean, if you can't tell the difference...

I'm asking you because you are attributing your beliefs in contrast to your beliefs about rocks. Why doesn't the rock hitting a particular formation chose which way to go, since it can, depending on what part of the formation it strikes precipitated by say, wind variations, go in many different directions. I mean how is that different from you deciding to travel a particular path based on your processing of all the available data which isn't consistent moment to moment? The only difference I see is your conclusion is self-referent.

For the sake of parsimony let's explain how things respond to input consistently. All you get from your adding a lot of choice will, decide, trash is some sort of personal comfort.

The only way I can understand you is if I believe you think the brain changes how things behave. Humans, by all material measures, are just as reactive as rocks. Because we 'think' are 'human' we are different? Why? Why not attribute what you see to plasticity which is a certifiable physical attribute. Why all the choosing, willing, deciding. Because we have language?

Sheesh

 

[DBT]

There is no valid argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Neither observation can be denied. Therefore they must be compatible.

A choice made without coercion or undue influence is still subject to inner necessity, unconscious processes and determinants that are not subject to will, wish, or regulation in the sense that something else can happen.

Obviously, free will is not "freedom from oneself" (inner necessity).
Obviously, free will is not "freedom from one's own brain" (unconscious processes and determinants).
Obviously, free will is not "freedom from causal necessity" (freedom from cause and effect).

Nobody has said that free will must be, or is 'freedom from oneself' - the issue always has been the failure of the Compatibilist definition of free will.

Basically, ignoring inner necessity. Necessity not being an instance of freedom. That what is necessitated is not freely willed.

Not being freely willed, it is false to define something as free will when there is no free will involved in the process.

Free will is simply a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

That's an assertion. An assertion that ignores inner necessitation. Necessitation is neither a matter of freedom, or free will.

Asserting it doesn't make it so.

The choosing operation will always have at least two options, such as A and B, which are possible to choose. "I can choose A" will be true and "I can choose B" will also be true. Both "can" happen, even if only one of them "will" happen. Therefore, regardless of what does happen, there will always be something else that "could have" happened.

Necessitation is not a matter of choosing because the outcome is fixed by a deterministic interaction of elements that have nothing to do with freedom or will, function is not free will.

It is functionality that determines response. Which means that the decision-making process is a matter of entailment, not free choice or even choice (the no choice principle of determinism).

There is a critical difference between saying that something "can" happen versus saying that something "will" happen. Many things "can" happen, even if only one thing "will" happen. So, it is always the case that "something else could have happened" despite the fact that "nothing else would have happened".

Thus, the argument you just stated is not valid in any of its claims.

What I am pointing out is directly related to determinism as you define it. No alternate actions. All events fixed by prior states of the system. This, then that, no deviation.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

There is no getting around this. Defining free will as an action performed without force or coercion is not adequate because all determined actions proceed as determined without restriction.

 

[Jarhyn]

the issue always has been the failure of the Compatibilist definition of free will.

Basically, ignoring inner necessity. Necessity not being an instance of freedom

No, compatibilist free will does not ignore inner necessity. As we have discussed and you have ignored, free will does not happen over inner necessity in the compatibilist model, it happens under inner necessity.

Either an imbalance of energy can close the circuit and "go to ground" through the internal circuit in some way or it cannot, and it is an open circuit. Is the event free to happen or constrained from happening? Is the circuit open or closed? Is this particular part of the circuit the closed part?

It appears that freedom is the quality of some arrangement of stuff of allowing an energy gradient to be resolved.

Something can be both causally necessary and a choice, because causal necessity and choices are not mutually exclusive properties.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can will be at the next moment.

So, you got this right, almost. Edit mine to can -> will.

Now let's do a magic trick:
Determinism: given a different state of the world at a moment in time, there is only one way it will be at the next moment and this resolution will be different than the resolution of the current state of the world at that moment.

Given a blind sampling of simulated future worlds with simulated divergence, there is only one way each will resolve.

By finding the simulated divergence with the best outcome, one can select of these a state which one must produce to reach that future, and a present in which one has knowledge of a hypothetical state that must be produced in the future to reach a calculated end-point future allows use of that hypothetical state as an input to an engine which generates the output which creates that state.

This does not require any special "metadata" about any of the systems. It works just the same from this point regardless of the system that does it was built by proteins from DNA or built by human hands. It works just the same if it was grown inside a mushroom or condensed as a Boltzmann's brain.

How the inner necessitation, the origination process of the structure of the machine that does this -- however it came to be -- is irrelevant.

Try he machine did not need to contain the will to build itself for it to have a will built into it, or for that will to be free with respect to a given instruction.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Why not attribute what you see to plasticity which is a certifiable physical attribute. Why all the choosing, willing, deciding. Because we have language? ...

Language is the mechanism by which we spread understanding and knowledge. It is how we convey this information to our children. I suppose that is two more things that differentiate us from rocks. Rocks have neither language nor children.

Language describes the model of reality that our brains create to help us get along in the world. For example, we put up road signs to warn of rockslides. I suppose if rocks could put up their own signs when they are getting ready to slide down the hill it would be helpful. But rocks are not like people.

We have more causal mechanisms than rocks. Rocks are inanimate objects that respond passively to physical forces, like gravity. Living organisms exhibit goal-directed or purposeful behavior, biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. The tree grows branches into the sky and roots into the ground, responding actively against the force of gravity. Intelligent species add the rational causal mechanism, which allows them to choose when where and how they will go about satisfying their biological drives. So, we have three different kinds of objects, inanimate, biological, and rational, each with new behaviors and a new set of rules.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There is no valid argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Neither observation can be denied. Therefore they must be compatible.

Free will is not "freedom from oneself" (freedom from inner necessity).
Free will is not "freedom from one's own brain" (freedom from unconscious processes).
Free will is not "freedom from causal necessity" (freedom from cause and effect).

Free will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence that can reasonably be said to remove their control of the choice.

Nobody has said that free will must be, or is 'freedom from oneself' - the issue always has been the failure of the Compatibilist definition of free will. Basically, ignoring inner necessity.

What is "inner necessity" other than one's own thoughts and feelings, and the operation of one's own brain? There is no freedom from how our brains work, so compatibilist free will makes no such claim.

Free will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Necessity not being an instance of freedom.

Causal necessity includes all instances of all events. In most cases, it is causally necessary that we find ourselves making choices while free of coercion and undue influence. We are not free of causal necessity, and we never need to be. Free will only requires that we are free of coercion and undue influence.

Causal necessity is not a meaningful constraint, because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do. It is not something that anyone can or needs to be free of. The notion that we must be free of causal necessity in order to be "truly" free is a delusion.

That what is necessitated is not freely willed.

That is clearly false. In most cases it is causally necessary that we will be making our choices while free of coercion and undue influence. That is all that is required by compatibilist free will.

Free will is simply a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

That's an assertion.

Indeed. It is the key premise of compatibilism that free will, as commonly understood and actually used to assess a person's moral and legal responsibility, is nothing more than freedom from coercion and undue influence.

It is a common event that everyone has observed with their own eyes. And it is the event that I showed you when I brought you to the restaurant. There are the people, each deciding for themselves what they will order for dinner, from a literal menu of alternate possibilities.

It's not complicated. Freedom from coercion is a real freedom. Freedom from significant mental illness is a real freedom. Freedom from authoritative command is a real freedom. Freedom from manipulation by hypnosis and other means is a real freedom.

But freedom from causal necessity is not a real freedom. Freedom from one's own brain is not a real freedom. Freedom from logical necessity is not a real freedom. The incompatibilist chooses to define free will in terms of these impossible freedoms, thus making free will impossible.

Whether free will exists or not depends entirely upon whether one chooses a meaningful and relevant definition (compatibilist) or whether one chooses an irrational, paradoxical definition (incompatibilist).

An assertion that ignores inner necessitation.

Again, you claim that compatibilism ignores inner necessitation, when compatibilism asserts that inner necessitation is how choosing what we will order for dinner works. There is no suggestion of freedom from inner necessitation!

Free will requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Necessitation is not a matter of choosing because the outcome is fixed by a deterministic interaction of elements that have nothing to do with freedom or will, function is not free will.

One of the outcomes of choosing an irrational definition is that the incompatibilist ends up making some very silly claims, claims that are easily refuted by simple empirical observations. One of these claims is that choosing doesn't "really" happen, which is easily disproved by a simple trip to the restaurant.

It is functionality that determines response. Which means that the decision-making process is a matter of entailment, not free choice or even choice (the no choice principle of determinism).

Right there, for example, in the "no choice principle", it is claimed that choosing doesn't really happen. But anyone who is not deceived by the wordplay can dispel that illusion simply by watching someone make a choice, such as the customers in the restaurant.

The "no choice principle" is a delusion. It is a paradox, a self-induced hoax, created by false but believable suggestions. I suppose it is a bit like hypnosis.

What I am pointing out is directly related to determinism as you define it. No alternate actions. All events fixed by prior states of the system. This, then that, no deviation.

That is correct. That is what is called "causal necessity": each event is reliably caused by prior events, and inevitably will happen, exactly as it does happen.

Among these events we find the people in the restaurant, reading the menu of alternate possibilities, and choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner. And we observe that they are not being forced to order things they do not want by coercion or other forms of undue influence. Thus we conclude that each customer is making a choice of their own free will.

Causal necessity means that it was inevitable that it would happen just so. The restaurant was inevitable, the menu of alternate possibilities was inevitable, the choosing was inevitable, the choice was inevitable, and the choice being free of coercion and undue influence (free will) was inevitable.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

That is figuratively correct, but literally false. To make it literally correct, replace the "can" with "will", as in "there is only one way it will be at the next moment".

There is no getting around this.

There is no need to get around it. Causal determinism has not meaningfully changed anything.

Defining free will as an action performed without force or coercion is not adequate because all determined actions proceed as determined without restriction.

Apparently, what is "adequate" for the compatibilist is "inadequate" for the incompatibilist. But only the compatibilist gives an adequate description of reality. The incompatibilists want us to get lost in their delusion that one must be free of causal necessity in order to be free at all.

 

[fromderinside]

... Why not attribute what you see to plasticity which is a certifiable physical attribute. Why all the choosing, willing, deciding. Because we have language? ...

Language is the mechanism by which we spread understanding and knowledge. It is how we convey this information to our children. I suppose that is two more things that differentiate us from rocks. Rocks have neither language nor children.

Language describes the model of reality that our brains create to help us get along in the world. For example, we put up road signs to warn of rockslides. I suppose if rocks could put up their own signs when they are getting ready to slide down the hill it would be helpful. But rocks are not like people.

We have more causal mechanisms than rocks. Rocks are inanimate objects that respond passively to physical forces, like gravity. Living organisms exhibit goal-directed or purposeful behavior, biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. The tree grows branches into the sky and roots into the ground, responding actively against the force of gravity. Intelligent species add the rational causal mechanism, which allows them to choose when where and how they will go about satisfying their biological drives. So, we have three different kinds of objects, inanimate, biological, and rational, each with new behaviors and a new set of rules.

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing? Rocks are passive and humans aren't because you say they have language caused by the brain which you think changes how things behave. Is that it?

Clearly you don't understand that humans, language and mental models aside, are just as reactive as rocks. What are those causal mechanisms men have on the real universe? Nowhere, other than in after the fact interpreting reality as caused by men rather than being responded to by men.

I've been through your flipping cause before because we have causal mechanisms. Those are post stimulus causal activities, not reaction-to-cause flipping mental activities. The runner still hears the gunshot then leaves the starting line after the shot. The mind doesn't get the runner to the finish line until it has propelled the man there after he has reacted and run the race. Having language changes nothing.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

 

[fromderinside]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

OK. So the human doesn't flip from responding to causing. We agree. As for the matter of the brain it depends on what matter of the brain to which you refer.

There is sensory matter that takes in inputs, it's responding. There is motor matter that drives muscles, and the like, it's causing and regulating. Then there's chemical related matter that maintains and effects. Finally there's analytic matter that processes inputs, outputs and chemical functions.

After you completed your first term of introductory anatomy or general biology, or introductory psychology please come back and we'll try to move you on to the second term.

 

[DBT]

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

That is figuratively correct, but literally false. To make it literally correct, replace the "can" with "will", as in "there is only one way it will be at the next moment".

But it is literally correct. That it is literally correct is supported by the terms and conditions of determinism.

As all events proceed without deviation, fixed by antecedents, this condition negates the possibility of alternate actions. Where there are no alternate actions, nothing other than what has been determined to happen can happen.

There is no getting around this.

There is no need to get around it. Causal determinism has not meaningfully changed anything.

Everything that happens is fixed. There is no change in the sense that something else could have happened.

The system is of course in constant change.

Each and every state of the system as it evolves is as it must be. Including the brain and the thoughts and actions it produces. Not through free will, but entailment.

Defining free will as an action performed without force or coercion is not adequate because all determined actions proceed as determined without restriction.

Apparently, what is "adequate" for the compatibilist is "inadequate" for the incompatibilist. But only the compatibilist gives an adequate description of reality. The incompatibilists want us to get lost in their delusion that one must be free of causal necessity in order to be free at all.

What is or isn't adequate to qualify as free will is determined by the given description of the nature of determinism, and not by a definition that ignores or neglects a key element in the formulation of that definition.

Could have, would have, might have
''The compatibilist readily admits that if determinism is true, then we clearly do not have physical alternatives open to us. But this does not matter, he says, for what really matters is that we have the right sort of alternatives open to us, and these are not physical alternatives.''

Not being physical alternatives, 'could have, would have, might have' is totally irrelevant to the argument and the given definition of determinism.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

OK. So the human doesn't flip from responding to causing. We agree.

No, we don't agree. Present here is that your post was not-even-wrong. You presented a false dichotomy to try to invalidate a hierarchy.

There is no "flip" because both are the same, every time: humans respond, and when humans respond by choosing, humans cause, because the human response is to make a choice and to cause an effect.

 

[Jarhyn]

But it is literally correct. That it is literally correct is supported by the terms and conditions of determinism.

As all events proceed without deviation, fixed by antecedents, this condition negates the possibility of alternate actions. Where there are no alternate actions, nothing other than what has been determined to happen can happen.

All this is is a butchering and misunderstanding of compatibilist alternatives.

As has been pointed out again and again, all these alternatives need is to exist is to be hypothetical and simulated, and all they need so as to be effective and actionable is to be simulated faster and with less error than a disorganized system, and have the simulated outcome be rendered before such a time as the simulated initial moment.

It is to assume a near future, simulate the results of it, and calculate that to a far future, and then use the calculated assumed near future that leads to the best far future.

But without calculating a menu and simulating the results and ascertaining which they like most, the only thing the organism would have to it is the first set ideas it ginned up.

Clearly there is more utility to thinking of five things to try than to halt after the first idea and just do that. The first idea is rarely the best one.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing?

That's the old riddle that paradoxically claims that we cannot be "real" causes because we have prior causes, thus only the prior cause can be a "real" cause. The problem is that none of my prior causes can pass that test, because they all have prior causes as well. Requiring such a test would unravel the causal chain, because no "real" causes could be found. So, the test is logically invalid.

Every event in the causal chain must be both effect and cause. And I, being a real event in that causal chain, am also a "real" cause of anything that I choose to make happen.

Rocks are passive and humans aren't because you say they have language caused by the brain which you think changes how things behave. Is that it?

Correct. As Michael Gazzaniga describes it:

“Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.”

Gazzaniga, Michael S. “Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain” (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Clearly you don't understand that humans, language and mental models aside, are just as reactive as rocks.

Gee, I guess if you removed the brain with its mental models and language, then we would indeed be just as reactive as rocks. So, let's not do that.

What are those causal mechanisms men have on the real universe? Nowhere, other than in after the fact interpreting reality as caused by men rather than being responded to by men.

It has been rumored, in scientific circles, that mankind's activities have raised the temperature of our planet. And we recently tested our ability to hit a meteor with a rocket to change its trajectory.

But aside from that, we don't have that much influence upon the rest of the universe. Our "domain of influence" is mostly limited to our immediate surroundings. We chop down trees and build houses. We imagine and create things such as computers and the internet and nations, etc. And these things causally determine our future.

Within the domain of human influence, the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we will imagine. For example, in the restaurant, there are two possible futures, one in which I have Steak for dinner, and another in which I have the Salad instead. My choice will causally determine which possible future becomes the actual future, the one that was always causally necessary from any prior point in time, but would not happen but for my choosing it.

I've been through your flipping cause before because we have causal mechanisms. Those are post stimulus causal activities, not reaction-to-cause flipping mental activities. The runner still hears the gunshot then leaves the starting line after the shot. The mind doesn't get the runner to the finish line until it has propelled the man there after he has reacted and run the race. Having language changes nothing.

If we take one step back, we can see that the runner chose to enter the race, which caused him to be there in the first place. And he chose to compete, which motivated and directed his thoughts and actions as he prepared through daily training and motivates and directs his body to run for the finish line when he hears the gunshot, rather than running for cover. And all these events were deterministically caused by a choice he made that set his intent (his will) upon running in a race. Assuming no one held a gun to his head or unduly influenced him in this choice, it was a choice of his own free will (literally a freely chosen "I will").

 

[Jarhyn]

That's the old riddle that paradoxically claims that we cannot be "real" causes because we have prior causes, thus only the prior cause can be a "real" cause. The problem is that none of my prior causes can pass that test, because they all have prior causes as well. Requiring such a test would unravel the causal chain, because no "real" causes could be found. So, the test is logically invalid

It's Kalam, the KCA in different clothes.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

That is figuratively correct, but literally false. To make it literally correct, replace the "can" with "will", as in "there is only one way it will be at the next moment".

But it is literally correct.

It cannot be literally correct because that would create the paradox of "having to choose between a single possibility".

When speaking of the single actuality, use "will", but whenever speaking of multiple possibilities, use "can".

What "can" happen is never constrained by what "will" happen, because only one thing will happen but many things can happen.

The only way that "can" gets to be constrained by "will" is by figurative thinking: "If only one thing will happen, it is AS IF only one thing can happen."

The figurative statement is literally false because the relationship between "can" and "will" is many to one.

As all events proceed without deviation, fixed by antecedents, this condition negates the possibility of alternate actions.

Obviously it doesn't. All of the events in the restaurant are fixed by antecedents, including the literal menu of literal alternate actions.

There is no getting around this.

 

[fromderinside]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing?

That's the old riddle that paradoxically claims that we cannot be "real" causes because we have prior causes, thus only the prior cause can be a "real" cause. The problem is that none of my prior causes can pass that test, because they all have prior causes as well. Requiring such a test would unravel the causal chain, because no "real" causes could be found. So, the test is logically invalid.

Every event in the causal chain must be both effect and cause. And I, being a real event in that causal chain, am also a "real" cause of anything that I choose to make happen.

Rocks are passive and humans aren't because you say they have language caused by the brain which you think changes how things behave. Is that it?

Correct. As Michael Gazzaniga describes it:

“Sure, we are vastly more complicated than a bee. Although we both have automatic responses, we humans have cognition and beliefs of all kinds, and the possession of a belief trumps all the automatic biological process and hardware, honed by evolution, that got us to this place. Possession of a belief, though a false one, drove Othello to kill his beloved wife, and Sidney Carton to declare, as he voluntarily took his friend’s place at the guillotine, that it was a far, far better thing he did than he had ever done.”

Gazzaniga, Michael S. “Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain” (pp. 2-3). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Clearly you don't understand that humans, language and mental models aside, are just as reactive as rocks.

Gee, I guess if you removed the brain with its mental models and language, then we would indeed be just as reactive as rocks. So, let's not do that.

What are those causal mechanisms men have on the real universe? Nowhere, other than in after the fact interpreting reality as caused by men rather than being responded to by men.

It has been rumored, in scientific circles, that mankind's activities have raised the temperature of our planet. And we recently tested our ability to hit a meteor with a rocket to change its trajectory.

But aside from that, we don't have that much influence upon the rest of the universe. Our "domain of influence" is mostly limited to our immediate surroundings. We chop down trees and build houses. We imagine and create things such as computers and the internet and nations, etc. And these things causally determine our future.

Within the domain of human influence, the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we will imagine. For example, in the restaurant, there are two possible futures, one in which I have Steak for dinner, and another in which I have the Salad instead. My choice will causally determine which possible future becomes the actual future, the one that was always causally necessary from any prior point in time, but would not happen but for my choosing it.

I've been through your flipping cause before because we have causal mechanisms. Those are post stimulus causal activities, not reaction-to-cause flipping mental activities. The runner still hears the gunshot then leaves the starting line after the shot. The mind doesn't get the runner to the finish line until it has propelled the man there after he has reacted and run the race. Having language changes nothing.

If we take one step back, we can see that the runner chose to enter the race, which caused him to be there in the first place. And he chose to compete, which motivated and directed his thoughts and actions as he prepared through daily training and motivates and directs his body to run for the finish line when he hears the gunshot, rather than running for cover. And all these events were deterministically caused by a choice he made that set his intent (his will) upon running in a race. Assuming no one held a gun to his head or unduly influenced him in this choice, it was a choice of his own free will (literally a freely chosen "I will").

Normally It's some one in place to encourages fast runners notices that a running individual ran pretty fast. What the runner did was choose to accept the advice and run with a team or as a sponsored individual. Most of the time races implicitly choose runners who qualify or meet criteria and agree to participate. Sometimes runners choose to run.

Not only did I become a specialist I also participated in track in school and college.

We choose and think a lot less than you seem to advocate. Mostly it's bump in to this then bump in to that.

 

[fromderinside]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

OK. So the human doesn't flip from responding to causing. We agree.

No, we don't agree. Present here is that your post was not-even-wrong. You presented a false dichotomy to try to invalidate a hierarchy.

There is no "flip" because both are the same, every time: humans respond, and when humans respond by choosing, humans cause, because the human response is to make a choice and to cause an effect.

No. Its cause and consequence most of what humans do is consequence. We mentally reconstruct making ourselves the center of the play. Our main brain function is producing rationales.

 

[Jarhyn]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

OK. So the human doesn't flip from responding to causing. We agree.

No, we don't agree. Present here is that your post was not-even-wrong. You presented a false dichotomy to try to invalidate a hierarchy.

There is no "flip" because both are the same, every time: humans respond, and when humans respond by choosing, humans cause, because the human response is to make a choice and to cause an effect.

No. Its cause and consequence most of what humans do is consequence. We mentally reconstruct making ourselves the center of the play. Our main brain function is producing rationales.

No, no me gusta.

No pedí la ensalada, tráeme el bistec, por favor.

It's cause and effect. Saying "consequences" doesn't change the meaning of the language, as if effect is not synonymous with consequences in the usage. Stamp your feet and run from language you don't like but that will only shine a bad light on this character of the stage.

This is a play where many act upon the stage, but the rules are made up and the points don't matter, and because of what we are, we can make predictions, though not foretellings.

Foretellings are religious nonsense.

Our world makes its own future one moment at a time. No future as been designed to it, save for the provisional and not entirely accurate futures designed by subsystems such as us using simulations approximating the system's emergent statistical truth.

 

[fromderinside]

Where in the causal chain of inputs does the human flip from responding to causing

"Response" is a variety of cause. It is an effect in fact, as well, caused by stimulus to the matter of the brain.

OK. So the human doesn't flip from responding to causing. We agree.

No, we don't agree. Present here is that your post was not-even-wrong. You presented a false dichotomy to try to invalidate a hierarchy.

There is no "flip" because both are the same, every time: humans respond, and when humans respond by choosing, humans cause, because the human response is to make a choice and to cause an effect.

No. Its cause and consequence most of what humans do is consequence. We mentally reconstruct making ourselves the center of the play. Our main brain function is producing rationales.

No, no me gusta.

No pedí la ensalada, tráeme el bistec, por favor.

It's cause and effect. Saying "consequences" doesn't change the meaning of the language, as if effect is not synonymous with consequences in the usage. Stamp your feet and run from language you don't like but that will only shine a bad light on this character of the stage.

This is a play where many act upon the stage, but the rules are made up and the points don't matter, and because of what we are, we can make predictions, though not foretellings.

Foretellings are religious nonsense.

Our world makes its own future one moment at a time. No future as been designed to it, save for the provisional and not entirely accurate futures designed by subsystems such as us using simulations approximating the system's emergent statistical truth

But, me (I can't write this because it reads sexist in current context) ..etty, we fallen over that piece of language with 'response'. So quit complaining with long dead pigs drawn across logical pathways.

... and we don't make predictions we guess and express. Funny though we guess about what to do in the past with information from the more distant past. IOW our 'predictions' (guesses) are yesterday's news.

Clarification needed. Are your 'predictions' about present reality or our impressions of reality based on our reacting to past sensed events? I know we behave in the now, but our behavior isn't based on past reality, rather it's based on our survivalist sensing of the recent past.

That is it is more about how behavior is designed to respond in accordance with generationally survived outcomes. We aren't sensing reality we are sensing as how we survived and within the constraints to which we can evolve. Take hearing as an example. Mammal hearing is limited by design constraints. Small mammals have higher frequency tuning than do larger mammals, constraining how they sense sound and in tune with how they emit sound.