Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

This has been covered time and time again.

You have argued for the compatibilist position, free will and determinism: how compatibilism is defined. I have argued for the incompatibilist position, the problems relating to the idea of free will within a deterministic system and why they are incompatible.

We are in repeat mode.
We have been for some time.
Is it worth going around in circles like this?
Is it going to achieve anything?
Do you want to keep going?

I like to think that anyone popping in on this discussion is going to learn something useful. But, as you say, the discussion is already there in the thread.

But if you continue proselytizing against free will, then I will feel free to jump into any of your discussions with others here, because you seem to be willing to go around in circles attempting to convince them that free will cannot exist in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. To me, that is a lie. And I may feel obligated to challenge that lie wherever I see it. (Nothing personal).

One more thing, the claim that there is no free will has some bad moral effects. In a comment by SPGRK in Reddit this morning, he posted a link to this study The Freedom to Pursue Happiness: Belief in Free Will Predicts Life Satisfaction and Positive Affect among Chinese Adolescents. There are also earlier studies like Why ‘Willusionism’ Leads to ‘Bad Results’ indicating how it affects people's moral choices.

 

[Jarhyn]

From the outside we cannot see the logical operation that actually accomplishes this mysterious task of reducing the menu to a dinner order.

I would rather think we CAN, we just won't for the most part because doing that for a human, trapped in the same system as the thing being observed, is messy and difficult.

Instead, I content myself with seeing what happens in a dwarf's head when a dwarf accomplishes this "mysterious" task and come to understand exactly why he ordered as he did.

It's no wonder though, as to your second post. When someone lets a review mechanism for their behavior go unleveraged, it usually means a shoddier work product, especially when it's the top layer.

 

[bilby]

The intervention is itself inevitable.

Then why did you say: "The threat of a penalty modifies behaviour"?

 

[fromderinside]

So, we have the science of psychology that explores the inner workings of that black box, and uncovers the logical steps of decision making, and we have the science of neurology that explores what parts of the brain are activated as it performs this logical process.

Last time I Iooked as a comparative psycho-physiologist was in 2002 the day before I retired. All I did was apply psychophysical methodology. I employed the use of a flight simulator. That consisted of mechanical and electrical computer models of flight mimicry inputs. I used trained fighter pilots to 'fly' simulated low and high computer reproduced missions.

There was no looking at a black box. There were just performance comparisons between actual recorded flight performance and the simulations. We used both pre existing models using situation based historical performance generalizations and actual simulated response measurements, The results of these 'experiments' were analyzed and used to 'improve' the models and to 'evaluate' pilot performance. Through this process we have pretty good performance models and criteria with which to test and evaluate pilots.

Specialized Psychiatrists and a few medically trained military Human Engineering scientists ever record from humans. In fact I was among the first at FSU to participate as a subject in early CAT scan methodology in the mid seventies while studying for my doctorate in psychophysics.

Current noninvasive methodologies using radioactive oxygen uptake provide rough real time activity when used in performance and chemical effects studies. However the studies are very limited and very-very expensive. And the research is still at the level of Martians dropping microphones into Times Square. The black box's secrets are still safe.

Yeah we have models galore and data galore of recordings substantiated by placements and hypotheses and things. Its still conjecture. A bit better than measuring lumps on the skull but nowhere near real science.

I consider the recording stuff I did in DR. Olds labs as a postdoc, after James died, in the late seventies combining chemical/electrical stimulating and sensory stimulation and recording in rats using psychophysical and chemical-motivational technique as among the most sophisticated ever done. Yes, I'm bragging because I was first by at least a decade.

As a student in the field I prefer the squirt-twitch research studies though.

Those logical steps are very speculative, still driven by accident studies. And that neurology (sacrificed dogs) of which you speak is supported by just cadaver and and chemical analytical psychiatric hospital study based on, in IMHO, wild eyed psychiatric speculations.

The brain has billions of neurons FCS. I'm still impressed by those scientists who replicated the entire ant NS in the nineties.

 

[DBT]

The intervention is itself inevitable.

Then why did you say: "The threat of a penalty modifies behaviour"?

That is how we perceive it. We image that if the law as a deterrent was not in place, people would be more careless. And that is true as far as we see it.

As described, the law is necessarily put in place and human behaviour is necessarily modified, 'as we see it'....yet given a deterministic system, of these events were inevitable and there was never a possibility that the laws would not be put in place.

So in fact nothing was modified and all events evolve as determined.

 

[DBT]

This has been covered time and time again.

You have argued for the compatibilist position, free will and determinism: how compatibilism is defined. I have argued for the incompatibilist position, the problems relating to the idea of free will within a deterministic system and why they are incompatible.

We are in repeat mode.
We have been for some time.
Is it worth going around in circles like this?
Is it going to achieve anything?
Do you want to keep going?

I like to think that anyone popping in on this discussion is going to learn something useful. But, as you say, the discussion is already there in the thread.

But if you continue proselytizing against free will, then I will feel free to jump into any of your discussions with others here, because you seem to be willing to go around in circles attempting to convince them that free will cannot exist in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. To me, that is a lie. And I may feel obligated to challenge that lie wherever I see it. (Nothing personal).

One more thing, the claim that there is no free will has some bad moral effects. In a comment by SPGRK in Reddit this morning, he posted a link to this study The Freedom to Pursue Happiness: Belief in Free Will Predicts Life Satisfaction and Positive Affect among Chinese Adolescents. There are also earlier studies like Why ‘Willusionism’ Leads to ‘Bad Results’ indicating how it affects people's moral choices.

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument.

Compatibilism hasn't established the reality of free will, so there are two sides to the debate, where each side puts their own case.

When you say 'proselytizing against free will.' it gives the impression of theism...along the lines of 'railing against God" or why do you 'hate God.'

The comment is astonishing.

 

[Jarhyn]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument.

"Incompatibilism" thus far has only been a valid argument against libertarian free will.

Compatibilism hasn't established the reality of free will

Compatibilism has established the reality of free will. Proven it in fact from set theory.

Compatibilism does not argue for libertarian free will and libertarian free will is all you have argued against.

When you say 'proselytizing against free will.' it gives the impression of theism...along the lines of 'railing against God" or why do you 'hate God.'

This is exactly what you are doing, calling 'god' by a different name and providing no evidence that this thing which you name differently "causal necessity unto predestination implying systemic optimizations which would gainsay all attempts at deviation against provisionally predicted outcome" actually exists.

The thing is, thats just a fancy way of saying "a god willed it to happen, so no matter what you do, no matter what you know of the system you cannot avoid it happening. You cannot avoid anything through any cleverness or foresight; if the oracle were to say you will kill your dad and fuck your mom, you will kill your dad and fuck your mom no matter if you try to avoid it," while not trying to say "god".

It's that disbelief in deviation from even simulated outcome that drags in the secret belief in God, mutated and transformed so as to hide in that little crack, as it would itself be an uncaused effect.

Your own comments are astonishing insofar as you do not seem to understand that your beliefs about determinism and free will are in fact a belief in a proactive God, while playing the game "don't say 'God' explicitly".

 

[steve_bank]

I can't stand it anymore! I confess! I confess! I am a closet theist!!!!

 

[DBT]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument.

"Incompatibilism" thus far has only been a valid argument against libertarian free will.

Compatibilism hasn't established the reality of free will

Compatibilism has established the reality of free will. Proven it in fact from set theory.

Compatibilism does not argue for libertarian free will and libertarian free will is all you have argued against.

When you say 'proselytizing against free will.' it gives the impression of theism...along the lines of 'railing against God" or why do you 'hate God.'

This is exactly what you are doing, calling 'god' by a different name and providing no evidence that this thing which you name differently "causal necessity unto predestination implying systemic optimizations which would gainsay all attempts at deviation against provisionally predicted outcome" actually exists.

The thing is, thats just a fancy way of saying "a god willed it to happen, so no matter what you do, no matter what you know of the system you cannot avoid it happening. You cannot avoid anything through any cleverness or foresight; if the oracle were to say you will kill your dad and fuck your mom, you will kill your dad and fuck your mom no matter if you try to avoid it," while not trying to say "god".

It's that disbelief in deviation from even simulated outcome that drags in the secret belief in God, mutated and transformed so as to hide in that little crack, as it would itself be an uncaused effect.

Your own comments are astonishing insofar as you do not seem to understand that your beliefs about determinism and free will are in fact a belief in a proactive God, while playing the game "don't say 'God' explicitly".

Nah, you are still barking up the wrong tree.

Your comment ''your beliefs about determinism'' is an example. I have no 'belief about determinism, I use the given definitions of determinism, I use your definition, Marvin's definition, the formal definitions given by philosophers....all of which I have quoted and referred to countless times.

You are way off track, running blindly in the dark.

You still can't grasp the implications of your own definition of determinism. That is astonishing.

 

[DBT]

I can't stand it anymore! I confess! I confess! I am a closet theist!!!!

Just say your Hail Mary's and you'll be fine.

 

[Jarhyn]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument.

"Incompatibilism" thus far has only been a valid argument against libertarian free will.

Compatibilism hasn't established the reality of free will

Compatibilism has established the reality of free will. Proven it in fact from set theory.

Compatibilism does not argue for libertarian free will and libertarian free will is all you have argued against.

When you say 'proselytizing against free will.' it gives the impression of theism...along the lines of 'railing against God" or why do you 'hate God.'

This is exactly what you are doing, calling 'god' by a different name and providing no evidence that this thing which you name differently "causal necessity unto predestination implying systemic optimizations which would gainsay all attempts at deviation against provisionally predicted outcome" actually exists.

The thing is, thats just a fancy way of saying "a god willed it to happen, so no matter what you do, no matter what you know of the system you cannot avoid it happening. You cannot avoid anything through any cleverness or foresight; if the oracle were to say you will kill your dad and fuck your mom, you will kill your dad and fuck your mom no matter if you try to avoid it," while not trying to say "god".

It's that disbelief in deviation from even simulated outcome that drags in the secret belief in God, mutated and transformed so as to hide in that little crack, as it would itself be an uncaused effect.

Your own comments are astonishing insofar as you do not seem to understand that your beliefs about determinism and free will are in fact a belief in a proactive God, while playing the game "don't say 'God' explicitly".

Nah, you are still barking up the wrong tree.

Your comment ''your beliefs about determinism'' is an example. I have no 'belief about determinism, I use the given definitions of determinism, I use your definition, Marvin's definition, the formal definitions given by philosophers....all of which I have quoted and referred to countless times.

You are way off track, running blindly in the dark.

You still can't grasp the implications of your own definition of determinism. That is astonishing.

Assertions without evidence yet again?

Your belief about determinism, the belief which is different but which you refuse to acknowledge, is your clear (but doggedly unstated) fatalism.

If you could grasp determinism AND I were wrong, you would be able to highlight the actual element in my post which would break free from "no randomness or real deviation".

All compatibilist wills require so as to achieve freedom of a given outcome is to deviate not from reality but the output of a simulation.

So long as the rules of the simulation and the state of the simulation mirror the rules and state of reality (though with known delta on state), this will give a simulated future that may be deviated from in identifiable ways.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, we have the science of psychology that explores the inner workings of that black box, and uncovers the logical steps of decision making, and we have the science of neurology that explores what parts of the brain are activated as it performs this logical process.

Last time I Iooked as a comparative psycho-physiologist was in 2002 the day before I retired. All I did was apply psychophysical methodology. I employed the use of a flight simulator. That consisted of mechanical and electrical computer models of flight mimicry inputs. I used trained fighter pilots to 'fly' simulated low and high computer reproduced missions.

There was no looking at a black box. There were just performance comparisons between actual recorded flight performance and the simulations. We used both pre existing models using situation based historical performance generalizations and actual simulated response measurements, The results of these 'experiments' were analyzed and used to 'improve' the models and to 'evaluate' pilot performance. Through this process we have pretty good performance models and criteria with which to test and evaluate pilots.

Specialized Psychiatrists and a few medically trained military Human Engineering scientists ever record from humans. In fact I was among the first at FSU to participate as a subject in early CAT scan methodology in the mid seventies while studying for my doctorate in psychophysics.

Current noninvasive methodologies using radioactive oxygen uptake provide rough real time activity when used in performance and chemical effects studies. However the studies are very limited and very-very expensive. And the research is still at the level of Martians dropping microphones into Times Square. The black box's secrets are still safe.

Yeah we have models galore and data galore of recordings substantiated by placements and hypotheses and things. Its still conjecture. A bit better than measuring lumps on the skull but nowhere near real science.

I consider the recording stuff I did in DR. Olds labs as a postdoc, after James died, in the late seventies combining chemical/electrical stimulating and sensory stimulation and recording in rats using psychophysical and chemical-motivational technique as among the most sophisticated ever done. Yes, I'm bragging because I was first by at least a decade.

As a student in the field I prefer the squirt-twitch research studies though.

Those logical steps are very speculative, still driven by accident studies. And that neurology (sacrificed dogs) of which you speak is supported by just cadaver and and chemical analytical psychiatric hospital study based on, in IMHO, wild eyed psychiatric speculations.

The brain has billions of neurons FCS. I'm still impressed by those scientists who replicated the entire ant NS in the nineties.

Cool! What a fascinating life you've had.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

 

[fromderinside]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

There's that 'we' studying 'self' again. No anchors to reality beyond "I associated what I did with actual things." Where's the material tie-in with things and one's insights of 'self' ? IOW did the rock that hit you believe it fell purpose?

 

[DBT]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

A choice made without coercion or undue influence is still subject to inner necessity, unconscious processes and determinants that are not subject to will, wish, or regulation in the sense that something else can happen.

Will plays no part in information processing, information processing determines response, therefore will cannot be defined as being free....and the compatibilist definition fails to prove its proposition.

Compatibilism habitually ignores that it is inner necessity - the state of neural networks in any given instance - rather than free will that is the agency of response.

Again:
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''


What you do want to do is determined by prior causes:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.''

So:
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

 

[fromderinside]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.''

So:
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Searle testifies to the uselessness of arguing for or having to defend against for such as 'will'. Nice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Why do you say ''proselytizing against free will?' Incompatibilism is a valid argument. ...

The argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, has no valid argument. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Two empirical observations cannot logically contradict each other. Therefore, they must be compatible.

There's that 'we' studying 'self' again. No anchors to reality beyond "I associated what I did with actual things." Where's the material tie-in with things and one's insights of 'self' ? IOW did the rock that hit you believe it fell purpose?

Why are you asking me? Shouldn't you be asking the rock? I mean, if you can't tell the difference...

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There is no valid argument that free will, as a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is inconsistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. We empirically observe reliable causation in everything we think and do. We empirically observe people deciding for themselves what they will do. Neither observation can be denied. Therefore they must be compatible.

A choice made without coercion or undue influence is still subject to inner necessity, unconscious processes and determinants that are not subject to will, wish, or regulation in the sense that something else can happen.

Obviously, free will is not "freedom from oneself" (inner necessity).
Obviously, free will is not "freedom from one's own brain" (unconscious processes and determinants).
Obviously, free will is not "freedom from causal necessity" (freedom from cause and effect).

Free will is simply a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

The choosing operation will always have at least two options, such as A and B, which are possible to choose. "I can choose A" will be true and "I can choose B" will also be true. Both "can" happen, even if only one of them "will" happen. Therefore, regardless of what does happen, there will always be something else that "could have" happened.

There is a critical difference between saying that something "can" happen versus saying that something "will" happen. Many things "can" happen, even if only one thing "will" happen. So, it is always the case that "something else could have happened" despite the fact that "nothing else would have happened".

Thus, the argument you just stated is not valid in any of its claims.

Will plays no part in information processing, information processing determines response, therefore will cannot be defined as being free....

A person's will is the intention that is currently motivating and directing their thoughts and actions. For example, it is my intention to respond to these odd claims. Thus, my thinking and my typing are engaged in carrying out that intent. That is my will at this moment. I have decided that "I will do this now".

Free will is not some entity floating around willy-nilly. It is a specific chosen direction for our efforts: Such as my efforts to "process the information" you have provided in order to provide better "information for you to process".

and the compatibilist definition fails to prove its proposition.

The compatibilist proposition is simple. Free will, as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is still a useful and necessary distinction, even in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect (deterministic causal necessity).

The proof of free will is all around us, as people go about their day making choices for themselves. For example, the diners in the restaurant will choose from the menu what they will order for dinner, while free of coercion and undue influence, and they are held responsible for their deliberate dinner orders by paying for the dinner they ordered.

Compatibilism habitually ignores that it is inner necessity - the state of neural networks in any given instance - rather than free will that is the agency of response.

We're not ignoring inner necessity. We simply do not require that our choices must be free of our own brains in order to qualify as free will.

Free will is a choice we make while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less. We fully expect this choice to be made by our own brain, operating deterministically, as brains normally do.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

The bank teller is not held responsible for turning over the bank's money to the robber, who is pointing a gun at her head. She is not acting of her own free will, but is instead being coerced. The robber, having decided to rob the bank of his own free will, is held responsible for his actions.

As you can see, the compatibilist definition of free will, as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is precisely the definition used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

The incompatibilist's definition of free will, as a choice we make while free of cause and effect, and free of our own brains, and free of our own genetic dispositions (nature), and free of our own prior lives (nurture), is NEVER USED to assess anyone's responsibility for their actions, because such freedoms are impossible. Compatibilist free will does not require any irrational/impossible freedoms.

Thus, the claim regarding responsibility has no merit (nor any sense) at all.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.''

Compatibilist free will does not require freedom from prior causes. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, nothing more and nothing less.

To suggest that free will and responsibility require freedom from cause and effect is simply irrational.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Compatibilist free will does not require freedom from one's own neurobiology. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, nothing more and nothing less.

To suggest that free will and responsibility require freedom from our own brain is irrational.

So, I would suggest that the incompatibilists stop making irrational demands upon free will, and accept instead the compatibilist definition, "a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence", which is consistent with both deterministic causation and neuroscience.

 

[Jarhyn]

There's that 'we' studying 'self' again

No that's "anything" studying "a material object" again.

No anchors to reality beyond "I associated what I did with actual things."

It is in fact "what I did is necessary and sufficient to the actual events".

As has been pointed out, sadly, we cannot send search-and-rescue into the particular cave you find yourself occupying.

The rock does not identifiably have structures satisfying the requirements for being classified as "belief" or "intent": there are no transistive structures which yield non-chaotic information.

@DBT As it is, a will (at least the kind of will imposed upon something) can regulate itself: scripts can be written which in fact re-write portions of the script in various ways. FYI, will = script = program for these purposes.

This is in fact a major behavior of the "genetic will" of an organism, as the genetics contain instructions which activate and deactivate other instructions in the genetics on the basis of... Instructions in the genetic code.

Will can be modified through an operation of will.

 

[steve_bank]

Free will means capability to choose, and freedom of choice means possiblity to choose. For example, one can have free will while not having freedom to choose what he wills. If you have any reference that makes this distinction that might be helpful.Mar 16, 2019

If you ask a Christian free will given by god is the freedom to choose between good and evil, god and not god.

If you ask an avergae American consumer free will and free choice are probably synonymous.

If yiu ask a hard core libererian free will means the individual as an absolue free and independent entity living in a vacuum. Each man is a god unto himself.

China has limited social and political choice.

We are born a clean slate with genetic capacities. I see free will as something that is learned as we grow up. It is cultural.

Hiltter came close to having a generation of young people so thoroughly indoctrinated into Nazism that they had no capacity to chose an alternative.



Christians and atheists argue god without any definition o god.

Philsophy can be the same form withiut definitions.

Pick a definition then argue the definition. Modify definition based on debate. Analogous to the scientific method applied to philosophy.

Theissi, test thesis, accept-reject or modify thesis, retest thesis...

When definitions are difficult, metaphors and examples.

What would an example of free will versus free choice be?