Mr. lpetrich and Mr. Higgins missives are among the several posts expressing dewy-eyed longings and gushing sentiments for HSR, singing praises to its "healing" of America's transport infrastructure hypochondria. Before you drink their snake oil (or let them lay hands upon you) perhaps you ought to look at the ingredients?
As Robert Samuelson pointed out four years ago, if you can do fourth grade math you would know that for this massive investment, California gets next to nothing.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/31/AR2010103104260.html
He points out that high speed rail that can travel 250 mph are potentially the most competitive over planes and cars for distances of less than 500 miles. The Congressional Research Service examined the 12 corridors of 500 or fewer miles in 2007 and the LA-SF corridor led the list with 13,838 passengers. If every one of them switched to trains the total number of California daily air passenger drop would be a minuscule 2.5 percent. (The total fuel savings would be less than that, as trains also use energy).
Of course, most inter-city passengers will not switch to a rail system that takes 4 to 4.5 hours when driving from Oakland/SF to LA only takes 6 to 6.5 hours (and you arrive with your own car to use, essential for LA).
Even in places with much higher urban densities such as Europe and Asia high speed rail does not earn enough revenue to cover capital and operating cost.
The reason report highlights many of the other realities studiously ignored by the HSR hired "experts" (the same folks who produced the 2010 report that was excoriated by UC Berkeley's Transportation Group Report).
http://reason.org/files/california_high_speed_rail_report.pdf
First, the train speed projection of peak speeds of 220mph is unrealistic. The fastest trains that operate at a peak speed are the French TGV peak at 199mph. The average peak speeds for world high speed rail is 192mpg.
Second, the original 2hr 40 min projection is no longer valid. The blended system will use existing urban rail. The average rail speed in rural areas is 150 mph (with 200 mph peaks). In Urban areas the Transportation Research Board said maximum speed estimates are 60 to 100. Taking into account lower speeds in urban areas (60 to 100mph) then the travel time increases to 3hr 50 minutes to 4hr 30 minutes.
Third, while California HSR did not seemingly adjust its ridership projections downward to reduced attraction of a downgraded speed, even so its latest forecast suffers from classic government "optimism bias" and the usual project booster misreprestantion (aka lying).
For example:
You see, "international experience indicates that most high speed rail ridership comes from two sources, former rail passengers and former airline passengers." For example:
In France, the Paris to Lyon and Marseille intercity travel market had a rail market share of 40% before high speed rail service. High speed rail increased the rail market share to 72%, Most of the high speed rail ridership was transferred from the previous train service and the airlines. Only 11% of the ridership was from automobiles (Figure 4).
In Spain, the Madrid to Seville intercity travel market had a rail market share of 16% before high speed rail service. High speed rail increased the rail market share to 51%. Most of the high speed rail ridership was transferred from the previous train service and the airlines. Only 16% of the ridership was from automobiles (Figure 5).
However, California is relying on 75% of its ridership from former automobile commuters. Only 3 percent of California passenger transport is currently by rail.
In California, forecasts call for three or more times as many riders to be attracted from cars as from the airlines, virtually the reverse of the ratio of automobile to air passenger attraction in Europe (Figure 6).
But HSR does not compete against cars, it competes against air travel. Like air travel, it requires travel to the SF station or airport, leaving one's car, and arriving with the need to rent a car. People currently take cars because they will not have to rent an automobile, they may be traveling with a companion (or family) to distribute costs, etc.
The CHSRA California high speed rail automobile attraction forecasts are considered implausibly high. Based upon the experience in France and Spain, the passenger attraction from cars would be far less than forecast, at 90% lower. If the ridership model were adjusted to reflect this experience, intercity ridership in 2035 would fall from 21.1 million to 7.6 million, a reduction of 64% (Figure 7).46 Even this forecast could be considered optimistic, because the higher cost of fuel in Europe would tend to result in a higher rate of diversion from automobiles than in California This Due Diligence Update estimates that the cumulative effect of the ridership miscalculations and other factors outlined above could be substantial, as follows (Table 2 and Figure 8):
§ The “European Ridership Profile” assumes CHSRA-projected speeds, but applies the
European ratio of car trips diverted to high speed rail. Moreover, as noted above, if the
European automobile passenger attraction experience were applied to the California
forecasts, ridership would be substantially lower, even assuming the likely unattainable
higher CHSRA speeds. Ridership would be 64% lower (Figure 8).
§ Estimated Higher Speed Ridership Projection: Assuming the optimistic travel time
projection of 3:50, the 2035 interregional ridership would be approximately one-third
(67%) below CHSRA-projected levels at 6.9 million annually.
§ Estimated Lower Speed Ridership Projection: Assuming realistic automobile costs and
more-plausible outside-the-corridor ridership, the 2035 interregional ridership would be
77% below the CHRSA-projected forecast, at 4.8 million annually.
Given that the financials are dependent upon ridership for just O&M the fact that ridership will likely be 1/3 (or less) than that projected then those without train infatuation should face up to the reality: it's a boondoggle.
http://reason.org/files/california_high_speed_rail_report.pdf