Do we really perceive anything?

[Perspicuo]

If humans don't really perceive and you want to prove it, what you can do as an experiment to show us all, is pluck out your eyes and puncture your ear drums and see ("see" LOL) if there's any difference in your perceptual ability.

If you now reckon you're as blind as a bat as compared to before when you didn't bump into everything, it's quite possible you were at least somewhat wrong.

 

[metacristi]

That's more or less the argument used by Samuel Johnson to 'refute' the subjective idealism promoted by Berkeley (well I'm afraid kicking a rock and being in pain afterwards is still fully compatible with idealism). Personally I don't think that what you say is enough to offer the argumentation needed to strongly 'anchor' our knowledge, likely once and forever.

The problem is that one can very well accept that truth is correspondence with observed facts and still make the common sense observation that we can nonetheless still be far from Truth (the-reality-in-itself), in other words truth can be very well domain-based and we not necessarily close to Truth. Let's take the movie Matrix as an example: before being freed from the Matrix Neo has no problems to admit that agent Smith is a human being, that he eats meat at lunch and so on. But after being freed he definitely accepts a totally different 'language game' when he visits again the Matrix even if he still accepts formally for example that it is raining in the city he once believed is his home and so on (in this new paradigm he solved also the puzzle of why he could not open his mouth when agent Smith asked him what use for a mouth if he cannot use it). Finally the conclusion is that iwhat happens in the Matrix is at least less real than what happens in the world of Morpheus at altri and of course that truth in the Matrix is 'far' from truth outside the simulated reality.

Ultimately all we accept as knowledge is 'laden' with the realist theory of perception which is the main paradigm at the moment but unfortunately we still lack the strong justification to think that this theory is the ultimate word or that it cannot be enriched in non trivial ways which to give us access to an 'outside the Matrix', possible to a Truth far from the truth we accept now. The problem here is not to claim that such an 'outside of the Matrix' is a reality (there is no such claim, as i already said i think, paradoxically for some, that we have actually more reasons at the moment to defend a sophisticated form of Realism as the first choice paradigm; the statement that, overall, science does actually approach Truth fully deserves the status of at least provisional knowledge) but to remain open to possible non trivial changes even at this level, basically nothing is outside possible rational replacement. Some scientists may easily dismiss such problems unfortunately Rationality do not allow us to do that.

 

[surreptitious57]

There is no way of actually knowing if what we perceive is reality or not. The best objective means that we have of examining the world is the scientific method. But science investigates observable phenomena without saying what that phenomena might constitute beyond its physical properties. Because that is a philosophical question and as such is beyond the remit of science. Our senses however do indicate that what we experience is reality. Although this is only because we have no other frame of reference by which to test this claim so therefore assume it to be true

 

[ontological_realist]

There is no way of actually knowing if what we perceive is reality or not. The best objective means that we have of examining the world is the scientific method. But science investigates observable phenomena without saying what that phenomena might constitute beyond its physical properties. Because that is a philosophical question and as such is beyond the remit of science. Our senses however do indicate that what we experience is reality. Although this is only because we have no other frame of reference by which to test this claim so therefore assume it to be true

Observable phenomenon? observable to whom? A human, a mouse, a whale, a bacterium or a bat?

 

[Random Person]

I am only willing to accept versions of reality that make me happy and I filter all my perceptions through that awareness.

You do to but only realize it if it makes you happy.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I propose that we do not perceive anything directly, that when we believe that we perceive something, that it is an inference.

This is from the nature of perception: some external entity or effect inducing ideas in our minds. The ideas are not the external entities, and our consciousnesses only have direct access to those ideas and not to the external entities. We unconsciously conclude that those ideas are due to external entities, and we continually maintain a model of the external world that is fitted to our perceptions.

This model is usually successful, but it sometimes has rather revealing failures. Like when we believe that a rainbow is a solid object. It looks like one, and many premodern people have believed that rainbows are solid objects, if mythology and folklore is any guide.

Something like that, yes, but hypothetical.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

This is a compelling way to think, and it certainly cannot be falsified. Like any idea that cannot be falsified it is also completely useless.

Yes, all observations are indirect and sitting in your Cartesian theatre you can never know for sure what is real and what the object and what the reflection is etc.... It is a bit like complaining in a Poker game that you cannot see your opponent's closed cards. It is part of the game and the trick is working with the data you do have. Just like science and philosophy.

Russell and Popper already solved this for you. If your idea cannot be falsified it is useless because a possible effect on your reality is what would make it falsifiable.

The falisfiability and uselessness you are thinking of are in this case assessed on the basis of things that are here deemed illusory, like matter, energy, money and Nobel prizes. Somewhat circular that.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires <snip> pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge <snip>

Misrepresentation, there is nothing abstract or Platonic in subjective experience.

Also, it should be said that many philosophers today embrace science without any substantial restriction.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's pretty much it. We don't *directly* perceive the objects that we think that we perceive.

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

Cognitive scientists seem pretty relaxed about the idea and so should they of course. If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like.

However, they wouldn't linger on the question of whether in the first place we really have a brain as we tend to think of it. Science produces best-guess theories and keep those that haven't been falsified. Prove to me I haven't something like a brain.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

How would one disentangle epistemology from neurology? It strikes me as a pretty tight weave.

It's the pragmatic attitude. Let's do it and see how it goes. What science did until quantum physics came to puzzle all of us.

We can do neurology without asking metaphysical questions. All the more so if we assume there is no God watching over our shoulders. One day, though, somebody (or something else altogether) may come up with a more rounded perspective on things.
EB

 

[Togo]

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

They're broadly happy with the idea that perpception is not direct. They're quite deep into the details of exactly how we build up our picture of the world, what cells are involved, and how the impression is built up to heavily bias things like faces, edges of objects and rapidly moving predators, and the like. The dubious bit, from the point of view of cognitive psychology, is the existance of a 'we' to do the perceiving, since cognitive models have no need for such an entity.

 

[Perspicuo]

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires <snip> pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge <snip>

Misrepresentation, there is nothing abstract or Platonic in subjective experience.

Also, it should be said that many philosophers today embrace science without any substantial restriction.
EB

Notice I said "traditional".

Don't suppose other people are terribly ignorant blokes. Try and see the truth in what other people say, even if you don't agree with most of what was said.

Other than your unfortunate interpretation of what I said, I fully agree with you.

 

[ontological_realist]

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

Cognitive scientists seem pretty relaxed about the idea and so should they of course. If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like.

However, they wouldn't linger on the question of whether in the first place we really have a brain as we tend to think of it. Science produces best-guess theories and keep those that haven't been falsified. Prove to me I haven't something like a brain.
EB

" If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Yes, it seems to me to be true and very important to remember. But could you please explain (spell it out) why you think so (how have you reached this conclusion) and what are it's implications?

-------

 

[ontological_realist]

That's more or less the argument used by Samuel Johnson to 'refute' the subjective idealism promoted by Berkeley (well I'm afraid kicking a rock and being in pain afterwards is still fully compatible with idealism). Personally I don't think that what you say is enough to offer the argumentation needed to strongly 'anchor' our knowledge, likely once and forever.

The problem is that one can very well accept that truth is correspondence with observed facts and still make the common sense observation that we can nonetheless still be far from Truth (the-reality-in-itself), in other words truth can be very well domain-based and we not necessarily close to Truth. Let's take the movie Matrix as an example: before being freed from the Matrix Neo has no problems to admit that agent Smith is a human being, that he eats meat at lunch and so on. But after being freed he definitely accepts a totally different 'language game' when he visits again the Matrix even if he still accepts formally for example that it is raining in the city he once believed is his home and so on (in this new paradigm he solved also the puzzle of why he could not open his mouth when agent Smith asked him what use for a mouth if he cannot use it). Finally the conclusion is that iwhat happens in the Matrix is at least less real than what happens in the world of Morpheus at altri and of course that truth in the Matrix is 'far' from truth outside the simulated reality.

Ultimately all we accept as knowledge is 'laden' with the realist theory of perception which is the main paradigm at the moment but unfortunately we still lack the strong justification to think that this theory is the ultimate word or that it cannot be enriched in non trivial ways which to give us access to an 'outside the Matrix', possible to a Truth far from the truth we accept now. The problem here is not to claim that such an 'outside of the Matrix' is a reality (there is no such claim, as i already said i think, paradoxically for some, that we have actually more reasons at the moment to defend a sophisticated form of Realism as the first choice paradigm; the statement that, overall, science does actually approach Truth fully deserves the status of at least provisional knowledge) but to remain open to possible non trivial changes even at this level, basically nothing is outside possible rational replacement. Some scientists may easily dismiss such problems unfortunately Rationality do not allow us to do that.

What exactly is "the realist theory of perception" ? Do you accept it as the best theory of perception available at present time?

 

[Testy Calibrate]

We percieve sense data. The source of that data is beyond our capacity to know because we only have the.sense data. However, we do know that it models. The one axiom required for thinking to work at all is that the universe is consistent.

 

[Speakpigeon]

We percieve sense data. The source of that data is beyond our capacity to know because we only have the.sense data. However, we do know that it models. The one axiom required for thinking to work at all is that the universe is consistent.

We know that it models? And how could we possibly know that? We normally believe that our sense data models a material world but I fail to see how we could possibly know it does.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Cognitive scientists seem pretty relaxed about the idea and so should they of course. If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like.

However, they wouldn't linger on the question of whether in the first place we really have a brain as we tend to think of it. Science produces best-guess theories and keep those that haven't been falsified. Prove to me I haven't something like a brain.
EB

" If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Yes, it seems to me to be true and very important to remember. But could you please explain (spell it out) why you think so (how have you reached this conclusion) and what are it's implications?

I don't believe there is much to say that is not also pretty obvious. First, we tend to take our impression of the world as the world itself, i.e. we don't usually immediately understand that our mental representation of the world is not the world itself. Then we start to realise that some of our perceptions are contradicting others or our mental model of the world. And we discuss the issue among ourselves. The Ancient Greeks already had views on this. Then science came to confirm the general idea and dispel any doubt people could possibly have. I guess that while we need to have a sufficiently accurate representation of our environment if we are to survive, we never really needed to have anything like a perfect model of the material world so provided we were intelligent enough it was bound to happen that we would realise our condition.

Of course we still can't say we know that our mental impressions are not the world but reflections of an external world. It's just seems to be the best guess.

Implications? Your guesses are just as good as mine!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The traditional philosophical way, used in the West for thousands of years, requires <snip> pretending we are some sort of abstract Platonic entities that float around and happen to be imprisoned in corrupt bodies that get in the way of full knowledge <snip>

Misrepresentation, there is nothing abstract or Platonic in subjective experience.

Also, it should be said that many philosophers today embrace science without any substantial restriction.
EB

Notice I said "traditional".

Don't suppose other people are terribly ignorant blokes. Try and see the truth in what other people say, even if you don't agree with most of what was said.

Other than your unfortunate interpretation of what I said, I fully agree with you.

Yeah, I noticed, but you concluded by saying "This is, without fear of exaggeration, reactionary". Notice you didn't say, "this was" but "this is", which unambiguously suggested your critic applied to today's philosophy. I'm sure there are still a lot of Neo-Platonists floating around somewhere but they're not exactly flourishing nowadays.


Even your depiction of the "traditional philosophical" way as having required us for thousands of years to pretend we were some sort of "abstract Platonic" entities is remarkably inaccurate. Without being particularly knowledgeable on Aristotle, I'm quite sure he radically departed from Plato in this respect as in many others and that he had a far greater subsequent notoriety and influence than Plato did almost anywhere and including the West. This still seems true today. I also believe that Aristotle prefigured the West's scientific and technological orientation, against Plato and against Platonic abstract entities. If what you said had been true it would also make the Enlightenment really difficult to understand since it was essentially the work of the many philosophers of the time, including Descartes, who spent his philosophical career trying to argue, surely against Plato, how knowledge of the physical world was accessible to human beings (irrespective of how idiotic some of Descartes' arguments were).
EB

 

[ontological_realist]

" If you think of our cognitive capabilities in terms of mental models (or representations) of our environment it's a no brainer: we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body and so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Yes, it seems to me to be true and very important to remember. But could you please explain (spell it out) why you think so (how have you reached this conclusion) and what are it's implications?

I don't believe there is much to say that is not also pretty obvious. First, we tend to take our impression of the world as the world itself, i.e. we don't usually immediately understand that our mental representation of the world is not the world itself. Then we start to realise that some of our perceptions are contradicting others or our mental model of the world. And we discuss the issue among ourselves. The Ancient Greeks already had views on this. Then science came to confirm the general idea and dispel any doubt people could possibly have. I guess that while we need to have a sufficiently accurate representation of our environment if we are to survive, we never really needed to have anything like a perfect model of the material world so provided we were intelligent enough it was bound to happen that we would realise our condition.

Of course we still can't say we know that our mental impressions are not the world but reflections of an external world. It's just seems to be the best guess.

Implications? Your guesses are just as good as mine!
EB

You know, some thing may be obvious to one person but may be an unsolvable mystery to others. As what you said is very important (at least it seems so to me), I would like to examine it in detail.

You said, "Because we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Why do you think that perceiving through body does not give knowledge of environment? How come we are able to walk mostly without bumping in to things?

---------------

 

[ontological_realist]

At least that is what idealist philosophers are saying. Does anybody here know what present day cognitive science says about it exactly?

They're broadly happy with the idea that perpception is not direct. They're quite deep into the details of exactly how we build up our picture of the world, what cells are involved, and how the impression is built up to heavily bias things like faces, edges of objects and rapidly moving predators, and the like. The dubious bit, from the point of view of cognitive psychology, is the existance of a 'we' to do the perceiving, since cognitive models have no need for such an entity.

Interesting! thanks.