Do we really perceive anything?

[ontological_realist]

We percieve sense data. The source of that data is beyond our capacity to know because we only have the.sense data. However, we do know that it models. The one axiom required for thinking to work at all is that the universe is consistent.

We know that it models? And how could we possibly know that? We normally believe that our sense data models a material world but I fail to see how we could possibly know it does.
EB

Yes, to know that it models, we also need to know that reality which we think our sense data models. Since we do not know that reality, we can not know that our sense data models that reality. (just spelling out your short statement.)

 

[Testy Calibrate]

We percieve sense data. The source of that data is beyond our capacity to know because we only have the.sense data. However, we do know that it models. The one axiom required for thinking to work at all is that the universe is consistent.

We know that it models? And how could we possibly know that? We normally believe that our sense data models a material world but I fail to see how we could possibly know it does.
EB

Sorry, I meant that the data is modelable by whatever mechanism modeling happens.

- - - Updated - - -

We know that it models? And how could we possibly know that? We normally believe that our sense data models a material world but I fail to see how we could possibly know it does.
EB

Yes, to know that it models, we also need to know that reality which we think our sense data models. Since we do not know that reality, we can not know that our sense data models that reality. (just spelling out your short statement.)

We know that the sense data conforms to modeling. i.e. the law of non contradiction.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You said, "Because we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Why do you think that perceiving through body does not give knowledge of environment? How come we are able to walk mostly without bumping in to things?

Planets mostly orb around suns so there may be a good reason that our bodies don't bump into things, mostly, and science might be able to offer some theory about bony bodies as it does about heavenly ones. Let's say it's the way nature works. However, any consideration we may have about nature, about our environment, about our bodies and how well they negotiate the mechanics of not bumping into things, has to come through our bodies' representation of our environment, if any. Mostly not bumping is in itself a fact of our mental representations, not a fact of an environment we don't have a direct access to. If there is such a thing as our environment it may also be true that there is something which is some sort of counterpart to our impression that we don't bump into things. Yet, as we don't have access to this counterpart, because it seems to be in our environment, if any, we don't actually know what it is.

One could perhaps try to argue that our body does know. Yet we don't know our body to start with. Or maybe we do, i.e. perhaps our subjective experience is actually a part of our body, but even if this is so we don't know that this is. Well, I certainly don't and it doesn't seem necessary that I did.

Again, I would note that knowledge is not necessary. What is necessary is that nature, if nature there is, is such that our bodies mostly don't bump into things. Maybe this involves some sort of knowledge but if computers can negotiate the dynamic trajectory of probes such that they don't bump into things when it's required that they don't, we don't know that there are things to bump into to begin with just as we sometimes don't know that there is something to bump into, and we do bump into it, unwillingly.
EB

 

[Togo]

I tend to think of the idea of an object as being an invention of the human brain, rather than a real feature of the universe. The brain tends to divide the world in to discreet objects, such that buildings become seperate from the ground, windows seperate from the wall, and so on. There's very little physical support for this view - it seems to be largely a convenient way of chopping up the universe and making it easier to understand.

 

[fromderinside]

Again, I would note that knowledge is not necessary. What is necessary is that nature, if nature there is, is such that our bodies mostly don't bump into things. Maybe this involves some sort of knowledge but if computers can negotiate the dynamic trajectory of probes such that they don't bump into things when it's required that they don't, we don't know that there are things to bump into to begin with just as we sometimes don't know that there is something to bump into, and we do bump into it, unwillingly.
EB

The study of primitive and simple visual systems correlated with evolutionary development of the brain has lead scientists to conclude that by the time of the sea cucumber animals had developed an awareness of shape and light having evolved to the point where they could make use of such information arriving their through visual detectors. Shortly thereafter the first memories began to appear. The point? A philosophical question has been reduced to a physical evolutionary question where by determining how such systems worked we could develop models based upon the results of studies based on such questions that successfully recapitulated those actions via computer.

No need any more for the bumping into things basis for analysis, no need for nature, and a real need for knowledge.

 

[fromderinside]

I tend to think of the idea of an object as being an invention of the human brain, rather than a real feature of the universe. The brain tends to divide the world in to discreet objects, such that buildings become seperate from the ground, windows seperate from the wall, and so on. There's very little physical support for this view - it seems to be largely a convenient way of chopping up the universe and making it easier to understand.

The subjective experience of object may be an invention of mind (I don't think brain applies to aware experience), but, that isn't what the brain does. The brain is a collection of evolved processes that permit analysis of what arrives before those processes modulated by feed back from what has already been processed to some extent to arrive at a calculation of some aspect of what is being fed through the brain. Those aspects are then aggregated by other processes which serve memory and globalization of throughput into elements that are sorted by previous actions into information that are articulated as mind aware scenarios which serve to explain what the brain is doing.

 

[ontological_realist]

You said, "Because we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Why do you think that perceiving through body does not give knowledge of environment? How come we are able to walk mostly without bumping in to things?

Planets mostly orb around suns so there may be a good reason that our bodies don't bump into things, mostly, and science might be able to offer some theory about bony bodies as it does about heavenly ones. Let's say it's the way nature works. However, any consideration we may have about nature, about our environment, about our bodies and how well they negotiate the mechanics of not bumping into things, has to come through our bodies' representation of our environment, if any. Mostly not bumping is in itself a fact of our mental representations, not a fact of an environment we don't have a direct access to. If there is such a thing as our environment it may also be true that there is something which is some sort of counterpart to our impression that we don't bump into things. Yet, as we don't have access to this counterpart, because it seems to be in our environment, if any, we don't actually know what it is.

One could perhaps try to argue that our body does know. Yet we don't know our body to start with. Or maybe we do, i.e. perhaps our subjective experience is actually a part of our body, but even if this is so we don't know that this is. Well, I certainly don't and it doesn't seem necessary that I did.

Again, I would note that knowledge is not necessary. What is necessary is that nature, if nature there is, is such that our bodies mostly don't bump into things. Maybe this involves some sort of knowledge but if computers can negotiate the dynamic trajectory of probes such that they don't bump into things when it's required that they don't, we don't know that there are things to bump into to begin with just as we sometimes don't know that there is something to bump into, and we do bump into it, unwillingly.
EB

I could not understand what you say here.

 

[ontological_realist]

I tend to think of the idea of an object as being an invention of the human brain, rather than a real feature of the universe. The brain tends to divide the world in to discreet objects, such that buildings become seperate from the ground, windows seperate from the wall, and so on. There's very little physical support for this view - it seems to be largely a convenient way of chopping up the universe and making it easier to understand.

I also think so. Objects as humans percieve are not real features of universe (all that exist). By objects, I mean not only as perceived by human visual sense but as perceived or cognized by all faculties of human mind. Humans cognize the universe to be having sub atomic particles. waves or force fields etc.

But my question is that why your mind or brain divides the world in to the objects as it does and not in to other objects. What I mean is why
you perceive a table (when you do percieve a table) instead of perceiving a tiger? What actually exists there
which you perceive as a table?

If my question is not clear, let me know, I will try to put it in a different way.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Again, I would note that knowledge is not necessary. What is necessary is that nature, if nature there is, is such that our bodies mostly don't bump into things. Maybe this involves some sort of knowledge but if computers can negotiate the dynamic trajectory of probes such that they don't bump into things when it's required that they don't, we don't know that there are things to bump into to begin with just as we sometimes don't know that there is something to bump into, and we do bump into it, unwillingly.
EB

The study of primitive and simple visual systems correlated with evolutionary development of the brain has lead scientists to conclude that by the time of the sea cucumber animals had developed an awareness of shape and light having evolved to the point where they could make use of such information arriving their through visual detectors. Shortly thereafter the first memories began to appear.

Fine but no news to me.

The point? A philosophical question has been reduced to a physical evolutionary question where by determining how such systems worked we could develop models based upon the results of studies based on such questions that successfully recapitulated those actions via computer.

I'm not sure which philosophical question you think you have reduced but it's clearly irrelevant to my post.

No need any more for the bumping into things basis for analysis, no need for nature, and a real need for knowledge.

Which suggests to me you didn't understand my explanation. Oh, well...

My view is independent of current science. Maybe one day some dude will turn up some awesome result that will render my analysis obsolete but we're not there yet and there's not even the slightest hint we will ever get there.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I tend to think of the idea of an object as being an invention of the human brain, rather than a real feature of the universe. The brain tends to divide the world in to discreet objects, such that buildings become seperate from the ground, windows seperate from the wall, and so on. There's very little physical support for this view - it seems to be largely a convenient way of chopping up the universe and making it easier to understand.

Yet any object should be no less real than any abstraction, according to your view on them. We nearly all accept there's such an object as the Sun, the Moon or the Earth. We would agree on there being a tree, a car, a box of chocolates, and we hardly disagree about there being electrons, protons and neutrons. So perhaps you would say that these things exist only as abstractions and therefore not in the physical world?
EB

 

[Togo]

I tend to think of the idea of an object as being an invention of the human brain, rather than a real feature of the universe. The brain tends to divide the world in to discreet objects, such that buildings become seperate from the ground, windows seperate from the wall, and so on. There's very little physical support for this view - it seems to be largely a convenient way of chopping up the universe and making it easier to understand.

Yet any object should be no less real than any abstraction, according to your view on them. We nearly all accept there's such an object as the Sun, the Moon or the Earth. We would agree on there being a tree, a car, a box of chocolates, and we hardly disagree about there being electrons, protons and neutrons. So perhaps you would say that these things exist only as abstractions and therefore not in the physical world?
EB

I'd say we mainly understand them as abstractions, but I have no problem with the Sun and the Moon etc. being part of the physical world as well.

I'd categorise the questions onotlogical realist is describing as questions as to how much, if anything, is left of our perceptions when the effects of our perceptual system is removed. There is clearly something there. We can measure the effects it has on the universe. I have no problems with there being a physical phenomenon there that is entirely distinct from our perceptions of it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You said, "Because we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Why do you think that perceiving through body does not give knowledge of environment? How come we are able to walk mostly without bumping in to things?

<snip>.

I could not understand what you say here.

Thanks for allowing me to try concision!

The idea that we are able to walk mostly without bumping into things is itself part of the representation of our environment, if any.


So we cannot check directly with the environment to confirm we are doing well in it.

We don't even know if there is an environment to start with. Or if there is one, we don't know what would really be "doing well" or "not bumping into things" as opposed to just having this representation that we are doing well and we are not bumping into things, representation we cannot check against the reality of our environment, if any.
EB

 

[ontological_realist]

You said, "Because we don't perceive our environment directly but mediated by our body so we don't know what the environment is like. "

Why do you think that perceiving through body does not give knowledge of environment? How come we are able to walk mostly without bumping in to things?

<snip>.

I could not understand what you say here.

Thanks for allowing me to try concision!

The idea that we are able to walk mostly without bumping into things is itself part of the representation of our environment, if any.


So we cannot check directly with the environment to confirm we are doing well in it.

We don't even know if there is an environment to start with. Or if there is one, we don't know what would really be "doing well" or "not bumping into things" as opposed to just having this representation that we are doing well and we are not bumping into things, representation we cannot check against the reality of our environment, if any.
EB

Yes I understand it and agree with it almost completely.

But I suspect that there is an environment but this environment may not be physical world or not only a physical world.

I doubt if there is in actual reality a physical world having stars galaxies etc. or sub atomic particles, force fields etc.

I doubt the reality of common sense world or present day universe of physics.

---

 

[ontological_realist]

Yet any object should be no less real than any abstraction, according to your view on them. We nearly all accept there's such an object as the Sun, the Moon or the Earth. We would agree on there being a tree, a car, a box of chocolates, and we hardly disagree about there being electrons, protons and neutrons. So perhaps you would say that these things exist only as abstractions and therefore not in the physical world?
EB

I'd say we mainly understand them as abstractions, but I have no problem with the Sun and the Moon etc. being part of the physical world as well.

I'd categorise the questions onotlogical realist is describing as questions as to how much, if anything, is left of our perceptions when the effects of our perceptual system is removed. There is clearly something there. We can measure the effects it has on the universe. I have no problems with there being a physical phenomenon there that is entirely distinct from our perceptions of it.

Yes, you have understood me right.

My central question is, "How much is left of our percepts, when that part which we bring to the percepts is removed?"

In other words, "What is the contribution of the perciever or cognizer to what he perceives or the cognizes?"

 

[ontological_realist]

--

Perhaps this was also the central question which Kant was dealing with? What do you think?


---

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes I understand it and agree with it almost completely.

But I suspect that there is an environment but this environment may not be physical world or not only a physical world.

I doubt if there is in actual reality a physical world having stars galaxies etc. or sub atomic particles, force fields etc.

I doubt the reality of common sense world or present day universe of physics.

Yes, exactly, provided you also doubt just about any conceivable alternative, includng the one which says that there may be nothing beyond impressions.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

--

Perhaps this was also the central question which Kant was dealing with? What do you think?


---

Isn't that what we are all dealing with, i.e. trying to figure out what is real and what is mere impression.

Then, philosophy, maybe just a part of it, though a big one, and Kant no doubt, could be said to be the professionalisation of that activity.
EB

 

[ontological_realist]

Yes I understand it and agree with it almost completely.

But I suspect that there is an environment but this environment may not be physical world or not only a physical world.

I doubt if there is in actual reality a physical world having stars galaxies etc. or sub atomic particles, force fields etc.

I doubt the reality of common sense world or present day universe of physics.

Yes, exactly, provided you also doubt just about any conceivable alternative, including the one which says that there may be nothing beyond impressions.
EB

Seems right to me what you are saying here. As I have said many times, what actually exists seems to be unknowable to humans including human science.

This process of going on discovering illusions in our world view and rejecting them, what do you think about this activity?

 

[ontological_realist]

--

Perhaps this was also the central question which Kant was dealing with? What do you think?


---

Isn't that what we are all dealing with, i.e. trying to figure out what is real and what is mere impression.

Then, philosophy, maybe just a part of it, though a big one, and Kant no doubt, could be said to be the professionalisation of that activity.
EB

I agree that a part of philosophy is and Kant was doing this activity professionally. And right now we are doing this activity also.

But an overwhelming majority of people in many ways do not want to discover delusions in their world views, and they are not only ignorant, they are willfully ignorant (self-deceiving).

What do you think?

 

[fromderinside]

I'm a sensory psychologist who just can't pull the trigger on this topic. Is the goal of philosophy to get at reality or is it to get at the reality that humans survive in. My take is that reality is way beyond what humans can process even that which is right around them. On the other hand reality of survival or that reality we use to get from this generation to the next, still well beyond what the classicists had in mind, may be approachable.

Thus thinking, I want to stick my toe in here by suggesting the reality of survival leads to approximations getting ever nearer what biological systems can do with what they are embedded in. The mind being no more than a construct which it appears is going to be reduced to some sort of a social descriptor in the next few decades. My impression is that the the aware human being is several aware things at once with one or another of them holding sway at any onetime. Yet it is apparent that we come to appreciate stimuli to some very low level and seem able to scale it to relatively high levels in our expected environment.

Integrating these sensations to world view seems well beyond our current abilities to determine except by making huge self evident claims. I'm beginning to feel like 'Sutherland did in the fifties when computers were coming into the research arena.