Does everything boil down to (meta-meta-meta-) hedonism?

[PyramidHead]

Hedonism is the school of thought that says, do what feels good. Obvious counterexamples are when you should be doing something that doesn't feel good, but helps somebody in need. But if you decide to do that, you're choosing it over something else, presumably (primarily?) on grounds related to how you feel about doing it. Is there a sort of meta-hedonism at play, where people who don't always take the direct route to feeling good are nonetheless always doing things that are instrumental to that goal? Is it even possible in principle to voluntarily do something you don't want to do, compared to the alternatives? That's my main question, and I don't expect to get a complete answer, it's just something I've been mulling over.

More fundamentally, though, I am exploring the implications of a philosophy that suggests the following: maximize activities wherein you feel good about doing them, feel good while doing them, and feel good after doing them (with the upper end of each scale representing activities that are more worth doing by this metric). Supposing one could achieve a measure of success in this philosophy by doing things that harm others, but the negative consequences of harming others are vastly outweighed by the good feelings about/during/after whatever he does, is there really any point in condemning him? If all behavior is hedonistic in the way I suggested in the first paragraph, meaning everybody is just doing what they feel good about doing in the end, all I can reasonably do is try to distance myself from someone like that, or try to convince him of the feel-good side of altruism--both of which would, again, be self-serving endeavors on my part--but I don't see how I can consistently denounce him.

 

[Veritass]

I have been toying with similar philosophical questions. Last year I read the Dalai Lama's book Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World and Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, and I was actually struck with the similarities between them. Both of them deal with defining morality in secular terms of human well-being and human suffering, while trying to take into account the micro and the macro, the current and the future.

Harris argues that we can scientifically determine ways to maximize this, though not perfectly yet. Think of the analog for health: we know certain behaviors are generally better than others, but there is a lot of variance between people. The Dalai Lama argues for a more Eastern view in terms of the well-being of societies more than the individual.

They both come back to a vaguely-defined "well-being" of the individual and society. Sure, we all want to be healthy and happy and connected and loved, but there is a wide variety of personal preferences for all of these, and a large number of trade-offs to be made between them. To me, that is where morality comes back to basic human freedoms. Only I can decide for myself how much to sacrifice, for example, longer-term health benefits for more tasty food now, or to impose deferred gratification on myself to go to college in exchange for more material success in my future.

On a more societal level, since we have yet to come up with a system maximizes societal well-being without trampling and killing individual well-being, I have to believe in a system that allows for maximal personal choice, while protecting society from people's sociopathic choices.

No matter how you slice it, though, if you believe there is no afterlife (as I do), then it all boils down to what you make of your one life here. There are still trade-offs to be made between pure hedonism, and choices like child-rearing that have higher personal costs but often higher personal satisfactions.

 

[Bronzeage]

"Feels good," is as subjective as any other human sensation. Even an irrational person who intentionally injures themselves, sees some benefit to their actions, even if it is to scratch an itch until the bone is exposed.

 

[Unbeatable]

Hedonism is the school of thought that says, do what feels good. Obvious counterexamples are when you should be doing something that doesn't feel good, but helps somebody in need. But if you decide to do that, you're choosing it over something else, presumably (primarily?) on grounds related to how you feel about doing it. Is there a sort of meta-hedonism at play, where people who don't always take the direct route to feeling good are nonetheless always doing things that are instrumental to that goal?

Yes.

The direct route is going inside your own mind, accessing the memory of what "good" feels like, and keeping your attentional focus upon that. It's possible to learn to feel good at will just as it's possible to learn to solve a mathematical equation in one's head at will. But in practice, our biology makes doing that process counterintuitive, and civilization is set up to condition us against learning to do it on a consistent basis. The next most direct route would be something like "thinking happy thoughts", but we're conditioned against doing too much of that as well. What our genes "want" us to do is earn our good feelings and (temporary) relief from bad feelings by performing physical actions which affect the external world, but if we stopped at this level, we'd just be stereotypical lustful, gluttonous hedonists. Those sorts of hedonists aren't very useful cogs to society, so society, with help from our genes, programs us to go for the even more indirect level of performing physical actions which positively affect the social group to which we belong. And from there, the degree of indirectness increases the larger the social group gets. Acting in accordance with moral principles is a stand-in for "being a useful cog", which prevents us from having to constantly consciously calculate the indirect consequences of our actions upon others.

Is it even possible in principle to voluntarily do something you don't want to do, compared to the alternatives?

It depends on how broadly or narrowly you choose to use labels like "voluntarily" and "want". Personally, I'd say it's impossible in principle.

More fundamentally, though, I am exploring the implications of a philosophy that suggests the following: maximize activities wherein you feel good about doing them, feel good while doing them, and feel good after doing them (with the upper end of each scale representing activities that are more worth doing by this metric). Supposing one could achieve a measure of success in this philosophy by doing things that harm others, but the negative consequences of harming others are vastly outweighed by the good feelings about/during/after whatever he does, is there really any point in condemning him?

A point is a purpose, and a purpose is an intended outcome. There are outcomes to the act of condemnation which some would regard as favorable and other would not. So yes, for some people there is a point, and for others there is not.

If all behavior is hedonistic in the way I suggested in the first paragraph, meaning everybody is just doing what they feel good about doing in the end, all I can reasonably do is try to distance myself from someone like that, or try to convince him of the feel-good side of altruism--both of which would, again, be self-serving endeavors on my part--but I don't see how I can consistently denounce him.

Do you not realize that "inconsistently denounce him" is an option that's available to you? People do that sort of thing all the time and get away with it. IMO, people in this forum care much more about the reliability of their epistemological methods and logical consistency of their statements than people who don't hang out on philosophy debate forums.

 

[untermensche]

Hedonism is the school of thought that says, do what feels good. Obvious counterexamples are when you should be doing something that doesn't feel good, but helps somebody in need. But if you decide to do that, you're choosing it over something else, presumably (primarily?) on grounds related to how you feel about doing it. Is there a sort of meta-hedonism at play, where people who don't always take the direct route to feeling good are nonetheless always doing things that are instrumental to that goal? Is it even possible in principle to voluntarily do something you don't want to do, compared to the alternatives? That's my main question, and I don't expect to get a complete answer, it's just something I've been mulling over.

More fundamentally, though, I am exploring the implications of a philosophy that suggests the following: maximize activities wherein you feel good about doing them, feel good while doing them, and feel good after doing them (with the upper end of each scale representing activities that are more worth doing by this metric). Supposing one could achieve a measure of success in this philosophy by doing things that harm others, but the negative consequences of harming others are vastly outweighed by the good feelings about/during/after whatever he does, is there really any point in condemning him? If all behavior is hedonistic in the way I suggested in the first paragraph, meaning everybody is just doing what they feel good about doing in the end, all I can reasonably do is try to distance myself from someone like that, or try to convince him of the feel-good side of altruism--both of which would, again, be self-serving endeavors on my part--but I don't see how I can consistently denounce him.

People do things they claim doesn't feel very good a lot of the time, raising children.

The desire to raise children is not for the individual raising them. It is for the species.

It is a subconscious impulse like the impulse a bird has to build a nest.

 

[Bronzeage]

Hedonism is the school of thought that says, do what feels good. Obvious counterexamples are when you should be doing something that doesn't feel good, but helps somebody in need. But if you decide to do that, you're choosing it over something else, presumably (primarily?) on grounds related to how you feel about doing it. Is there a sort of meta-hedonism at play, where people who don't always take the direct route to feeling good are nonetheless always doing things that are instrumental to that goal? Is it even possible in principle to voluntarily do something you don't want to do, compared to the alternatives? That's my main question, and I don't expect to get a complete answer, it's just something I've been mulling over.

More fundamentally, though, I am exploring the implications of a philosophy that suggests the following: maximize activities wherein you feel good about doing them, feel good while doing them, and feel good after doing them (with the upper end of each scale representing activities that are more worth doing by this metric). Supposing one could achieve a measure of success in this philosophy by doing things that harm others, but the negative consequences of harming others are vastly outweighed by the good feelings about/during/after whatever he does, is there really any point in condemning him? If all behavior is hedonistic in the way I suggested in the first paragraph, meaning everybody is just doing what they feel good about doing in the end, all I can reasonably do is try to distance myself from someone like that, or try to convince him of the feel-good side of altruism--both of which would, again, be self-serving endeavors on my part--but I don't see how I can consistently denounce him.

People do things they claim doesn't feel very good a lot of the time, raising children.

The desire to raise children is not for the individual raising them. It is for the species.

It is a subconscious impulse like the impulse a bird has to build a nest.

I'm not sure if I buy this. What people say is often contradicted by what they do. What innate desire humans may have to create and raise offspring is buried deep in our brain, covered over by many layers of consciousness and self awareness. When my children were young, there were many situations when I was not having a good time, but on the whole, it was one of the most satisfying experiences of my life. None of my children's conceptions were well planned, and if I have been more aware, none of them would exist today. It's my good fortune to have limited ability to see into the future.

One of the advantages of self awareness and self consciousness is the ability to distinguish the unpleasant from the painful.

 

[untermensche]

People do things they claim doesn't feel very good a lot of the time, raising children.

The desire to raise children is not for the individual raising them. It is for the species.

It is a subconscious impulse like the impulse a bird has to build a nest.

I'm not sure if I buy this. What people say is often contradicted by what they do. What innate desire humans may have to create and raise offspring is buried deep in our brain, covered over by many layers of consciousness and self awareness. When my children were young, there were many situations when I was not having a good time, but on the whole, it was one of the most satisfying experiences of my life. None of my children's conceptions were well planned, and if I have been more aware, none of them would exist today. It's my good fortune to have limited ability to see into the future.

One of the advantages of self awareness and self consciousness is the ability to distinguish the unpleasant from the painful.

My point is that it isn't something that automatically produces pleasure.

It certainly can, but that is a bit of a gamble, because it can also create incredible displeasure.

It isn't a path where future pleasure or displeasure are even considered.

It is a path people take because of incredibly strong subconscious impulses.

 

[Togo]

I'm suspicious that meta-hedonism is the result of equivocation between 'doing what feels good' and 'doing what you choose to do'.

Let's seperate the two. Take something that feels good, like smashing a window. A great sound, very satisfying. All the windows in my house are intact. But we know smashing them feels good. So what stops me? Let's say that having my windows smashed would make me feel bad, because I'd get cold. So I want not to feel cold more than I want to smash windows, and thus I'm still doing what feels good. Sort of. But then say I have double glazing installed, to lower my fuel bills. That requires a lot of money, which would otherwise be spent on drink, and taking out my old windows, in order to replace them. So I'm tolerating a clean and sober life for a year, and freezing in my own living room, because it feels good? True hedonism is staying sober, and carefully saving your money for double glazing?

The only way we can save hedonism here is to forget about what it's supposed to mean - short term pleasure - and instead go with a philosphical definition of maximising pleasure overall. This means hedonism no longer resembles the original feel, but it's a perfectly coherant concept. But is it really an adequate model of human beahviour. Is that really what motivates us?

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

 

[dx713]

Hedonism is the school of thought that says, do what feels good. Obvious counterexamples are when you should be doing something that doesn't feel good, but helps somebody in need. But if you decide to do that, you're choosing it over something else, presumably (primarily?) on grounds related to how you feel about doing it. Is there a sort of meta-hedonism at play, where people who don't always take the direct route to feeling good are nonetheless always doing things that are instrumental to that goal? Is it even possible in principle to voluntarily do something you don't want to do, compared to the alternatives? That's my main question, and I don't expect to get a complete answer, it's just something I've been mulling over.

More fundamentally, though, I am exploring the implications of a philosophy that suggests the following: maximize activities wherein you feel good about doing them, feel good while doing them, and feel good after doing them (with the upper end of each scale representing activities that are more worth doing by this metric). Supposing one could achieve a measure of success in this philosophy by doing things that harm others, but the negative consequences of harming others are vastly outweighed by the good feelings about/during/after whatever he does, is there really any point in condemning him? If all behavior is hedonistic in the way I suggested in the first paragraph, meaning everybody is just doing what they feel good about doing in the end, all I can reasonably do is try to distance myself from someone like that, or try to convince him of the feel-good side of altruism--both of which would, again, be self-serving endeavors on my part--but I don't see how I can consistently denounce him.

I've always felt that, as you explain, on a meta level, egoism and altruism (or at least utilitarianism) meet. Because for someone aware and emphatic enough, it does feel good to help others, even if it's not the same kind of gratification. On a political level, I'd also think that by promoting a kinder, more peaceful society, one can decrease his own stress level thus enjoy his day-to-day life more.

Note that I say egoism, not hedonism, because that meta dimension is already present in hedonism. The hedonism doctrine is a two-parter, "enjoy AND make enjoy". By summarizing it as "do what feels good", you oversimplify it and miss the second part, which actually supports your post.

Note also that all this, as you note, only applies to people with awareness and empathy above a certain threshold. Your try to convince option will work on people who just lack awareness, but on real "relational delinquents", people bound on taking without giving, or real sociopaths, only your other option, cut interactions with them, is going to work, and if I remember well, is actually the one supported by the hedonism philosophy founders and proponents.
(of course, it was easier for Epicurus to not allow them entrance to his garden than it is to us in our modern societies to really cut ties with them, what with a lot of big bosses, bankers, and politicians being close to sociopathic. Promoting a society able to defend itself against them and or minimize interaction with them opens another political can of worms)

 

[untermensche]

I'm suspicious that meta-hedonism is the result of equivocation between 'doing what feels good' and 'doing what you choose to do'.

Let's seperate the two. Take something that feels good, like smashing a window. A great sound, very satisfying. All the windows in my house are intact. But we know smashing them feels good. So what stops me? Let's say that having my windows smashed would make me feel bad, because I'd get cold. So I want not to feel cold more than I want to smash windows, and thus I'm still doing what feels good. Sort of. But then say I have double glazing installed, to lower my fuel bills. That requires a lot of money, which would otherwise be spent on drink, and taking out my old windows, in order to replace them. So I'm tolerating a clean and sober life for a year, and freezing in my own living room, because it feels good? True hedonism is staying sober, and carefully saving your money for double glazing?

The only way we can save hedonism here is to forget about what it's supposed to mean - short term pleasure - and instead go with a philosphical definition of maximising pleasure overall. This means hedonism no longer resembles the original feel, but it's a perfectly coherant concept. But is it really an adequate model of human beahviour. Is that really what motivates us?

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

The idea of maximizing overall pleasure should lead to everybody in the pink box.

I don't see a difference?

 

[dx713]

I'm suspicious that meta-hedonism is the result of equivocation between 'doing what feels good' and 'doing what you choose to do'.

Let's seperate the two. Take something that feels good, like smashing a window. A great sound, very satisfying. All the windows in my house are intact. But we know smashing them feels good. So what stops me? Let's say that having my windows smashed would make me feel bad, because I'd get cold. So I want not to feel cold more than I want to smash windows, and thus I'm still doing what feels good. Sort of. But then say I have double glazing installed, to lower my fuel bills. That requires a lot of money, which would otherwise be spent on drink, and taking out my old windows, in order to replace them. So I'm tolerating a clean and sober life for a year, and freezing in my own living room, because it feels good? True hedonism is staying sober, and carefully saving your money for double glazing?

The only way we can save hedonism here is to forget about what it's supposed to mean - short term pleasure - and instead go with a philosphical definition of maximising pleasure overall. This means hedonism no longer resembles the original feel, but it's a perfectly coherant concept. But is it really an adequate model of human beahviour. Is that really what motivates us?

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

Hedonism being about short term pleasure is a narrative constructed by Plato followers and the early Church to discredit the philosophy, that had atheist (or what passed as atheist at the time, let's say apatheist) and libertarian overtone that clashed with the way the power was consolidated over society at the time.
Epicurus, by what his followers descriptions have reached us, actually lived a very simple life, where the imagined orgies by the early Christians or Plato followers were actually a meal made of a goat cheese and a little honey. And, from what writing escaped the burning orchestrated by Plato followers and time, he placed great value on interactions with friends, in his garden.

The meta outlook presented by PyramidHead is actually very compatible with hedonism.

 

[PyramidHead]

Re: the sociopath

Do you not realize that "inconsistently denounce him" is an option that's available to you? People do that sort of thing all the time and get away with it. IMO, people in this forum care much more about the reliability of their epistemological methods and logical consistency of their statements than people who don't hang out on philosophy debate forums.

Obviously, being inconsistent is an option. But the kind of consistency I shoot for isn't particularly rigorous in the logical sense. Maybe 'denounce' wasn't the right word, either.

Re: having children

My point is that it isn't something that automatically produces pleasure.

It certainly can, but that is a bit of a gamble, because it can also create incredible displeasure.

It isn't a path where future pleasure or displeasure are even considered.

It is a path people take because of incredibly strong subconscious impulses.

Most of what you say is true from both the perspective of the person having children and the perspective of the children themselves. However, as Togo says, I don't think it's a counterexample to universal hedonism/self-interest, because parents generally hope that long-term satisfaction will coincide with their choices in having and raising children. Surely you must think SOME people consider future pleasure when deciding whether to start a family?

Re: the bliss machine

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

Pleasure is too narrow a word to describe what everybody is after. If there were a machine that could produce feelings of contentment, mimic the up-and-down rhythm of gaining something after hard work, and generate just the right amount of pleasant melancholy to achieve a perfect balance, the only thing preventing someone from entering it would be the knowledge that they would be abandoning their prior life. Obviously, that prospect is something they associate with a decrease in happiness, even if they wouldn't be aware of it once they entered the machine. So, even the people who hesitate are nonetheless primarily concerned with their happiness and the instrumental happiness of knowing that their kin are taken care of. It's an interesting thought experiment, but not really a counterexample. Personally, I would jump in the box.

 

[Togo]

I'm suspicious that meta-hedonism is the result of equivocation between 'doing what feels good' and 'doing what you choose to do'.

Let's seperate the two. Take something that feels good, like smashing a window. A great sound, very satisfying. All the windows in my house are intact. But we know smashing them feels good. So what stops me? Let's say that having my windows smashed would make me feel bad, because I'd get cold. So I want not to feel cold more than I want to smash windows, and thus I'm still doing what feels good. Sort of. But then say I have double glazing installed, to lower my fuel bills. That requires a lot of money, which would otherwise be spent on drink, and taking out my old windows, in order to replace them. So I'm tolerating a clean and sober life for a year, and freezing in my own living room, because it feels good? True hedonism is staying sober, and carefully saving your money for double glazing?

The only way we can save hedonism here is to forget about what it's supposed to mean - short term pleasure - and instead go with a philosphical definition of maximising pleasure overall. This means hedonism no longer resembles the original feel, but it's a perfectly coherant concept. But is it really an adequate model of human beahviour. Is that really what motivates us?

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

The idea of maximizing overall pleasure should lead to everybody in the pink box.

I don't see a difference?

In practice, people don't choose the the big pink box*. If we're really led by hedonism, then why would this be the case?

----

although PyramidHead is claiming otherwise, which is interesting.

I certainly wouldn't choose the box. Does that mean only some people are hedonists?

 

[dx713]

Re: having children

My point is that it isn't something that automatically produces pleasure.

It certainly can, but that is a bit of a gamble, because it can also create incredible displeasure.

It isn't a path where future pleasure or displeasure are even considered.

It is a path people take because of incredibly strong subconscious impulses.

Most of what you say is true from both the perspective of the person having children and the perspective of the children themselves. However, as Togo says, I don't think it's a counterexample to universal hedonism/self-interest, because parents generally hope that long-term satisfaction will coincide with their choices in having and raising children. Surely you must think SOME people consider future pleasure when deciding whether to start a family?.

From my own experience, it's also that most people are bad at computing consequences. There's a "grass is greaner on the other side" effect there.
I know that despite having been warned about it, despite knowing why some hedonist philosophers advised against having children, I didn't fully realize how much freedom I had lost until already married and with the kids.
Not that they don't bring me some happiness, but this was totally not a correctly made decision.

Re: the bliss machine

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting. Which suggests perhaps, that whatever motivates us isn't hedonism at all, but something a little more complicated.

Pleasure is too narrow a word to describe what everybody is after. If there were a machine that could produce feelings of contentment, mimic the up-and-down rhythm of gaining something after hard work, and generate just the right amount of pleasant melancholy to achieve a perfect balance, the only thing preventing someone from entering it would be the knowledge that they would be abandoning their prior life. Obviously, that prospect is something they associate with a decrease in happiness, even if they wouldn't be aware of it once they entered the machine. So, even the people who hesitate are nonetheless primarily concerned with their happiness and the instrumental happiness of knowing that their kin are taken care of. It's an interesting thought experiment, but not really a counterexample. Personally, I would jump in the box.

I would too, if the box offered (in a provable way) happiness.
As you correctly remark, happiness is different from pure pleasure.
I'm not even sure, at that time of my life, it would be possible to promise me happiness while making me cut ties with friends and family, except by proposing to erase all my memories of them, which would be akin to suicide for me and make me refuse beforehand.
I'd guess people less fortunate with their life might accept a "happiness box". I'm less sure about the "pleasure box", there's a reason all hedonists don't die of a drug overdose.

 

[untermensche]

The idea of maximizing overall pleasure should lead to everybody in the pink box.

I don't see a difference?

In practice, people don't choose the the big pink box*. If we're really led by hedonism, then why would this be the case?

----

although PyramidHead is claiming otherwise, which is interesting.

I certainly wouldn't choose the box. Does that mean only some people are hedonists?

It's just not that simple. The mere stimulation of nerves causes the stimulating nerves and the nerves being stimulated to change. A brain is like a river, never the same thing, always in constant flux.

I think we all know that to really maximize the sensation of pleasure requires not having that pleasure for some time.

The pleasure box would also have to be a displeasure box.

But who would go into a displeasure box?

 

[ronburgundy]

The idea of maximizing overall pleasure should lead to everybody in the pink box.

I don't see a difference?

In practice, people don't choose the the big pink box*. If we're really led by hedonism, then why would this be the case?

----

although PyramidHead is claiming otherwise, which is interesting.

I certainly wouldn't choose the box. Does that mean only some people are hedonists?

If you don't choose the box, it is because it does not sound pleasurable to you and/or you imagine greater pleasure outside the box.
The problem with the thought experiment is that we apply an abstract, vague, and simplistic notion to the phrase "most pleasurable" and then reject that experience as being the most pleasurable and thus wrongly conclude we have rejected actual pleasure.
For example, most people would find it hard to imagine that life in the box, the box being a single thing in a constant place, would be as variable as life outside the box, and since we find variety pleasurable, we reject the box. But that means we are choosing pleasure and just not truly accepting the terms of the hypothetically scenario that whatever set of experiences in life that would actually be most pleasurable is what the box has to offer. Put differently, most people likely imagine that the box only offers a single sensation, whatever single sensation is most pleasurable in a world of variable sensations. But that sensation is only most pleasurable in the context of real world variable sensation. Thus, stripping it of that context and isolating it in a box actually makes it no longer the most pleasurable. So again, we reject the box because on some level our imagining violates the terms of the hypothetical and imagines it to be less pleasurable that life outside the box.

 

[Veritass]

One of the "pleasures" I get out of life is having a wide variety of "pleasures". I remember an exercise in a class once, where we were told to construct a "perfect day". I had a hard time with it, because all of the things that I enjoy cannot all fit in a single day.

I enjoy a good, sweaty game of racquetball, and the sweaty relaxation of yoga, as well as theater, fine food, creating art, playing computer games, traveling to new places, family time, alone time, reading, writing, singing, playing the piano, learning new things, movies, naps, and sex, not necessarily in that order.

That is why the "pleasure box" doesn't work for me.

 

[Togo]

If you don't choose the box, it is because it does not sound pleasurable to you and/or you imagine greater pleasure outside the box.

No, it isn't.

If you want to claim that everyone who doesn't claim to be motivated by pleasure, are in fact motivated by pleasure, you need a pretty good argument to back that up.

 

[fromderinside]

If you don't choose the box, it is because it does not sound pleasurable to you and/or you imagine greater pleasure outside the box.

No, it isn't.

If you want to claim that everyone who doesn't claim to be motivated by pleasure, are in fact motivated by pleasure, you need a pretty good argument to back that up.

What's that you're holding in your hand in front of your computer. QED.

 

[Unbeatable]

The usual counter-example is the bliss machine, or big pink box. This is a device where you step inside, and you feel nothing but pleasure for the rest of your life. But you can't ever leave. In theory, a hedonist should accept with alacrity, but the prospect doesn't sound particularly tempting.

On Lesswrong, they call something of this sort wireheading(the technology is smaller in their thought experiment). I for one have always seen great appeal in the idea.

When people object to it, it's because thinking about the idea makes them feel bad on some level. It runs into conflicts with various hoop systems set up in their heads.

A hoop system is my term for a series of conditions which must be met for a person to give themselves permission to feel good or stop feeling bad. We could just feel what we want directly through mind hacking, but people aren't born with the metacognitive skills for mind hacking; they're born not knowing how to control their feelings. Hoop systems are developed by them and also programmed into them via socialization so that they'll remain motivated to engage in externally productive activity.