You would have to see the entire universe as a singularity, described not by any point but by a broad function, and offering zero information about any given event inside this infinite list of events... And then you literally don't know the future of any specific point without processing the function to that point.
Fuck I wish I could access someone who could help me arrange my thoughts on this.
Like, there's this thing involving einsteins tilings and decidability of location and relativity and finite/infinite choice that have been tumbling about in my head as an analog to some things about field theory.
Einstein tilings are interesting because it has been proven that *you can fill an infinite euclidean 2d space with them*, that the field produced *has local repetitions, but not global ones*.
Now, if you could select any point at random from this field, and knew only that it was generated an infinite time ago by some grand unifying theory of *tile placement*, you wouldn't be able to know where you were, even if you successfully identified a place that looks like "the known origin". ...
Okay, let me take a shot at this. Via suggestions. And we'll see where that takes the discussion.
Determinists are positing (meta)physical determinism and not epistemic certainty. That determinism does not depend on what anyone knows or can possibly know. It is more an assumption than a testable hypothesis. So, not being able to know the future is immaterial. Likewise, not knowing how, when, where, or if there was an origin is likewise immaterial to the most basic determinist position. This means that you do not need to express in terms related to knowledge, certainty, and the like.
You also said:
infinite parts look like the center but slightly different at one point and then completely different from thereon out and it is a *deterministic* pattern
It might help (me) were you to express
deterministic differently. You have an aperiodic tiling covering an infinite area. By
deterministic, do you mean that the tiling is set, fixed? I ask, because that would be the determinist claim. Of course, given that the determinist claim is that the infinite tiling is fixed, the determinist is thereby also asserting that there is no actualizable alternative arrangement for the tiles; that is why it is describable as fixed, set, determined. Someone might imagine being able to shift a tile and then realize the cascade of differences that would effect (ignoring, of course, that such a shifting would eliminate the fixed condition). Someone might imagine any number of alternative ways of shifting that tile with all of those different ways of shifting effecting a veritably incalculable number of alternative states/arrangements. But all of those imaginings - those logical possibilities - are not actualizable if the infinite aperiodic tiling is actually set/fixed. Essentially, the determinist holds that the tiling pattern is unalterable, ineliminable. I guess you could say that the determinist would say that the tiling can be neither destroyed nor disrupted, and that is why the imagined logical alternative possibilities can never be actual outside of what amounts to an ineffectual imagination.
Again, that is just to emphasize the (meta)physical focus of determinism as distinct from its epistemic status. Anyhow, if you deny that the tiling is set/fixed (meaning you deny that it is unalterable), then you are denying/objecting to determinism. If you think it is (meta)physically possible to break the fixed condition of the tiling, then you are denying/objecting to that determinism. And that is fine. There are good reasons for denying such a determinism.