Michael S. Pearl
Member
- Joined
- Jun 20, 2004
- Messages
- 298
I am not putting forth a break in what is supposed to be a sequence utterly devoid of the sort of indeterminateness associated with deliberation. I am just pointing out that during deliberation even a devotee of determinism might have what could be well described as a momentary sense of determinism not being a fact. And please, please do not refer to that momentary sense as an illusion. That is a maneuver I often see. It contributes nothing that recommends determinism as fact. In any event, I am more interested in deliberation than I am in whether determinism is fact - - although I do not regard determinism as fact.to say this (meta)physical actuality of actualizable possibilities is a temporary denial of determinism as fact, could be misleading because it sounds like your reasoning is allowing for a break in the deterministic causal chain. I'm just concerned that the way you're explaining deliberative thinking will give compatibilists a way to sneak in free will, which doesn't exist in any way, shape, or form.
With regards to compatibilists, I am under the impression that the actuality of actualizable possibilities is something which only an historically small portion of self-deemed compatibilists would emphasize as being a key facet of compatibilism. Putting aside the fact that people can call themselves whatever they want, the could-have-done-otherwise compatibilists attribute an ability to do otherwise to a person by saying the person could have (indeed would have) done otherwise had conditions been other than as they were. See section 4.1.1 here. If that is a matter of the actuality of actualizable possibilities, then it does not seem to be the same actuality of actualizable possibilities that regards the deliberation context.
Let me ask you this: Do determinists and compatibilists differ in the way they deliberate as a result of their being (or describing themselves as) determinists or compatibilists?