Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
IF you actually can prove that you read the book in its entirety and actually understood it (which, btw, no one here or anywhere has done proving a lack of complete understanding), convening to clarify that compatibilism is not a valid concept on your part, then writing a book together wouldn't be out of the question. Stranger things have happened.
If no respect is given, all bets are off unfortunately. There is no respect for this author which then turns into permission to put down, demoralize and unfairly condemn. This is no different than the Catholic Church who condemned Galileo. It's just a different setting.
Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
IF you actually can prove that you read the book in its entirety and actually understood it (which, btw, no one here or anywhere has done proving a lack of complete Seeunderstanding), convening to clarify that compatibilism is not a valid concept on your part, then writing a book together wouldn't be out of the question. Stranger things have happened.
Peacegirl, please just... Leave. I will never want to talk to you or interact with you. Interacting with my posts is, honestly, disrespectful at this point. I was writing to pood, not you.
Please just pretend I don't exist or put me on Ignore so I don't have to deal with getting pinged when someone else responds to garbage you post in response to me.
Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
Hey Pood, I'm really trying here to discuss the title topic, whether or not it has much to do with the actual links, specifically reality as it is beyond physics.
I would love to talk about physics and the way that if it is systemically "complete" by some measure, how it can emulate any other system within the family of systems that are "complete" in that way, such as digital systems and Turing completeness.
This in some ways means physics, if it has some "completeness" in this manner, generates some family of "meta-physics", the physics of physics as a family, as it were, in the same way that there is a set of math surrounding Turing complete systems and abstract algebras and transforms on modular rings and all that junk.
So within reality, we may see reality locally bound to some really weird properties defined by local "arbitrary" events.
To the ancient mind and sensibilities this would seem as something beyond nature rather than something of it, because as an analog to Turing machines, Turing machines can emulate a vast variety of other systems, and a system that uses "events" rather than digital calculation to evaluate things can do that much more efficiently and make a much more exotic range of machines much more easily, perhaps even some machines Turing machines cannot construct at all (the sort that require machines that can calculate infinitely complex numbers of a range, or that can easily handle complex numbers with rotational components and math).
Anything you could imagine writing a program to do, you might imagine reality itself having some similarly physically bound behavior to some complex part of it, or at least the potential to support that, especially in proximity to anything that orients towards "goals" as part of its behavioral process. Such a program could imply the creation of a virtual environment of some kind. I mean anything from a simple "hello world" to "exactly what an LLM does/is", to "SillyTavern" kinds of shit.
Arguably even things like command lines are virtual environments of a very linear sort. In an abstract way, this could well apply to all interfaces, the most trivial of which being lookup tables, followed by interpolations on tables, and so on through Moore-Penrose processes of multidimensional regression, and on and on and on, to include neural interfaces and the sorts of logics those engage in.
To be fair, I can only dimly imagine neural logics, these days, with only the most simple of examples. Among these include a structure that 'neuralizes' a hormone value into a neural impulse value across some number of neurons, and a other one that can detect discretely any of a reference failure, an inverse of that value, or the presence of the value as separate outputs, and an AND structure.
To be fair, these are probably well known neural structures, but that's AND and NOT, and I could probably assemble an OR without needing NAND, and that's boolean-complete and boolean-completeness allows construction of turing-completeness.
Arguably, the smoothness of neuronal function allows much more complex algorithms to arise from far fewer units, and to create much more continuous logical units, which I am under the impression are "tensors" and have interesting transform rules.
The more complex algorithms allowed by neurons could very well be complete on the same family of operations as the universe itself seems to be, allowing this to create whole new physical systems inside, between, and among physical matter in the same way computers emulate.
In this way reality IS beyond a simple physics, the "completeness" of it already being 'turing' complete and many other kinds of 'complete' as well, as it allows such instantaneous events as which accomplish approximations that take many iterations of time otherwise.
Let's talk about... Anything. Anything other than "daddy's book".
Maybe if you want, write a book with me that does all the things "daddy's book" claims to want to do, but actually succeeds?
IF you actually can prove that you read the book in its entirety and actually understood it (which, btw, no one here or anywhere has done proving a lack of complete Seeunderstanding), convening to clarify that compatibilism is not a valid concept on your part, then writing a book together wouldn't be out of the question. Stranger things have happened.
I will never want to talk to you or interact with you. Interacting with my posts is, honestly, disrespectful at this point. I was writing to pood, not you.
Please just pretend I don't exist or put me on Ignore so I don't have to deal with getting pinged when someone else responds to garbage you post in response to me.
Within a specific language can it be proven that the code once started will end?
Start
a = 1
b = 2
c = a + b
stop
Plus the Incompleteness Theorem, within any logically consistent system there are truths not provable in the system. In Euclidean geometry that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points can not be proven.
Another interesting fact of this sort of completeness is the fact that this means various processes, complete in their own way and which are entirely capable of containing an internal "virtual" space, are ubiquitous, further supporting my contention that the systemic internality of the computer was exactly the black swan event we needed to validate the existence of "mind", not as some thing outside reality, but by something always emminently real itself, and that every "subjective" experience is associated with some broad structure of events, and that wherever an event is described as experienced, that description will invariably be something that has switch-like action (or event-like action), but not necessarily switches of the same material or switch speed.
This would imply that a series of water pipes and pressure switches has the same "experience" as a system of wires and electrons and semiconductor switches with the same I/O and adequately separated high/low to prevent failure of binary function.
And if reality allows the construction and emulation of all variety of systems, of people can together achieve group puppetry as the planchette in the ouija board, all manner of "supernatural" entity can see reification in the space of the games and characters that would come to fore among human interaction.
This brings me, if we are truly discussing things beyond physics, to the subject of Fairies.
Imagine for a moment that so many stories were told of a certain class of "entity" that now your own mind can't avoid getting roped into the game whenever someone is playing 'fairies'. Is it really 'playing' or 'just a game' at that point if it's automatic and irresistible and often enough lethal?
People have been danced to literally to death by their own bodies playing those 'games'.
And how well does it serve someone to "disbelieve" such entities when they are understood in terms of this very real phenomena and action? At best they could not be disbelieved without unhealthy cognitive dissonance. At best they could be fought and resisted and avoided but never again truly "disbelieved" in.
Some weapons exist, such as corrupting the stories or adding new traits others will "buy into", this mutating the actions and personalities of beings generated or "hosted" in this way.
If you were to subscribe to this idea that whole entities could be cached away in the human zeitgeist popping up occasionally like mushrooms as they find fertile ground between humans to spread their ideological mycelium and to fruit in the telling of new stories so as to put down spores in a new mind, then you might wonder what the limits on the size and scope of such an entity might be, as may be "hosted" by so much weird stuff as all the human brains.
we
It may make you wonder what other processes adjacent to this model may be underway. I certainly do contemplate it, and contemplating it has allowed me to accept the "spiritual" experiences and reality others discuss, because I can see a real mechanism that would support and reify those experiences.
That a fairy looks more like many miles worth of neural connections, a bunch of vibrations in the air, a bunch of ink arranged on a page, and a bunch of people playing make believe all at the same time, so as to create a real phenomena makes that phenomena no less real than if the fairy had some non-human flesh-and-blood instantiation.
To that end, it's not really productive or useful to treat anything as "merely" imaginary. Something that is "merely" imaginary is still made of part of your brain and your brain happens to be attached to all the strength and dexterity of a 130+ lb great ape, and that in turn can be attached to much more dangerous and fucked up stuff (like a nuclear bomb). "Imaginary" things very much CAN hurt you. An "imaginary" fairy could, ostensibly, destroy the world.
By knowing this, however, we can limit their influence, and "fairies" are far from the only class of influence. What do we do about the darker adversarial natures that must exist in us as a corollary of having the ability to anticipate and understand evil? What of our inner demons?
Reality, when one accepts that physics allows some further family of "meta-physics" to see instantiation across it, becomes intensely weird, comporting more to discussions humans have about spiritual things moreso than science.
Ostensibly spirituality is how people studied such phenomena surrounding computation before it came to be understood under the axioms of math, and anything that you find there that is in any way accurate will have some description under math and engineering as well, including the concepts people have about "freedoms" and "wills".
That's focusing more on the how than the what or the why: the interesting part comes not from the differential or the path between them, but by the way that the flow control can be used to model other systems of dynamic flow, often in advance of such events, as certain "important" aspects can be calculated without need to calculate every detail.
Usually a quality of a stable system is going to include some definition of "self" or "here" or "location" to bound any stabilizing properties to, and something sufficiently "goal-like" which finds and processes in some way to restore the differential.
It would be apparent that such stability can only occur across some larger differential, and so thought in this way could at best break even, and only for short periods of time in any real world example.
I am a software engineer, and wizard, principally interested in meta-physics, and to me this requires a more academic approach to be taken than simply cracking open a book written by sophists about the subject.
It requires finding general definitions to the ideas of "meta" and "physics" and doing so in ways that are generally well understood (if not quite in those exact terms). To me that means "that which is of or about the attached cognate; a recursively applied idea", and "the rules by which the evolution of states within a system occurs", so to combine them, it would inevitably resemble what Turing studied in his study of the completeness of Turing systems, and what could be said about them, and what they couldn't be used to calculate, particularly about themselves, and so on.
There are likely corollaries, for example, between the things we can say of Turing machines, in the same way that properties of the natural numbers can be used to understand things about complex numbers (and visa versa).
Some operations are faster on certain Turing machines than others, just as some operations may be faster or easier in this new "non-digital event" space, as is evidenced by the fact that we can out-think many constructions of matter to reach a conclusion of their actions long before the action occurs in and of the object itself.
Again, this relies on the sort of metaphysics we learn not from navel gazing but from understanding the abstract math that allows us to translate functions between various systemic topologies through representation.
This would indicate that as much as there is bad/junk metaphysics, there is also good metaphysics, the latter of which we tend to call "math" or at least "math-like".
Libet's experiments did not prove that the conscious agent isn't responsible for his decision because it's the conscious agent ONLY who makes it. You can't separate the brain from the agent who gives permission for the action to be executed. The courts don't say, "your brain made the decision, not your conscious self, so you're off the hook of culpability. This in no way means the agent was morally responsible or free to have chosen otherwise.
No, it's not. Consciousness is based on prior information processing. It is the processing that determines the form that consciousness takes, thoughts, feelings, etc, and it is underlying processing that 'feeds' conscious experience as information is acquired and integrated into conscious form.
Consciousness is generated not only after the event, but after the senses have acquired the information and the brain has processed it. That's where the milliseconds of delay between the event and a response comes from. Reflex response being the fastest, nerve loops, etc, with prefrontal deliberation the slowest.
Even if it takes a millisecond of delay to reach conscious awareness, it takes a conscious will to make a decision.
Abstract
The real question that Libet's experiments raise is whether our conscious wills cause the willed actions. What is at issue is the effects rather than the causes of conscious will. The question is whether conscious will is impotent, not whether it is free. If conscious will is impotent, then we cannot control our actions by means of conscious will, and this disability might reduce our freedom of action. Libet's experiments raises or sharpens this new question. By raising a new issue in a new way, Libet's work made (and continues to make) many people rethink their assumptions. The assumptions at stake are both normative and descriptive. The relevant normative assumption is, roughly, that causation by conscious will is necessary for responsibility. The descriptive assumption that Libet questions is, again roughly, that conscious will causes the willed action. This chapter addresses these assumptions in turn. It concludes that Libet's experiments do not undermine responsibility in general, but they do illuminate some particular cases as well as common standards of responsibility.
Wrong, will is not autonomous, nor is will the decision maker.
Nothing can happen consciously before information is acquired, processed, integrated with memory to enable recognition and understanding, at which point the event is represented in conscious form, including conscious will, which is the urge or impulse to act, and not some special veto function that is exempt from the process of cognition.[/url]
Reality can’t be beyond reality. It can it?
If we each inhabit discrete realities then reality goes way beyond the reality that any of us inhabits. Which would render discussion of reality meaningless.
Pigs fly in my reality, yours has planet-sized gummy worms. What’s there to discuss?
Libet's experiments did not prove that the conscious agent isn't responsible for his decision because it's the conscious agent ONLY who makes it. You can't separate the brain from the agent who gives permission for the action to be executed. The courts don't say, "your brain made the decision, not your conscious self, so you're off the hook of culpability. This in no way means the agent was morally responsible or free to have chosen otherwise.
No, it's not. Consciousness is based on prior information processing. It is the processing that determines the form that consciousness takes, thoughts, feelings, etc, and it is underlying processing that 'feeds' conscious experience as information is acquired and integrated into conscious form.
Consciousness is generated not only after the event, but after the senses have acquired the information and the brain has processed it. That's where the milliseconds of delay between the event and a response comes from. Reflex response being the fastest, nerve loops, etc, with prefrontal deliberation the slowest.
Even if it takes a millisecond of delay to reach conscious awareness, it takes a conscious will to make a decision.
Abstract
The real question that Libet's experiments raise is whether our conscious wills cause the willed actions. What is at issue is the effects rather than the causes of conscious will. The question is whether conscious will is impotent, not whether it is free. If conscious will is impotent, then we cannot control our actions by means of conscious will, and this disability might reduce our freedom of action. Libet's experiments raises or sharpens this new question. By raising a new issue in a new way, Libet's work made (and continues to make) many people rethink their assumptions. The assumptions at stake are both normative and descriptive. The relevant normative assumption is, roughly, that causation by conscious will is necessary for responsibility. The descriptive assumption that Libet questions is, again roughly, that conscious will causes the willed action. This chapter addresses these assumptions in turn. It concludes that Libet's experiments do not undermine responsibility in general, but they do illuminate some particular cases as well as common standards of responsibility.
Wrong, will is not autonomous, nor is will the decision maker.
Nothing can happen consciously before information is acquired, processed, integrated with memory to enable recognition and understanding, at which point the event is represented in conscious form, including conscious will, which is the urge or impulse to act, and not some special veto function that is exempt from the process of cognition.[/url]
I’m just trying to establish that it is the conscious agent that permits the action to take place and therefore he is responsible for making that decision. This has nothing to do with moral responsibility. If someone runs a red light, it is his foot that is pushing on the accelerator to increase the speed. He is giving consent to this action. I’m not saying his decision is a free one.
First the event happens, then the senses acquire the information which is transmitted to the brain, which processes and represents some of that information in conscious form, sight, sound, smell, associated feelings and thoughts.
Consciousness is based on prior information processing. It is the processing that determines the form that consciousness takes, thoughts, feelings, etc, and it is underlying processing that 'feeds' conscious experience as information is acquired and integrated into conscious form.
Is this consciousness effective? Does it effect anything? Does it affect anything? Is it an inert by-product of information processing? Is this consciousness epiphenomenal?
Libet's experiments did not prove that the conscious agent isn't responsible for his decision because it's the conscious agent ONLY who makes it. You can't separate the brain from the agent who gives permission for the action to be executed. The courts don't say, "your brain made the decision, not your conscious self, so you're off the hook of culpability. This in no way means the agent was morally responsible or free to have chosen otherwise.
No, it's not. Consciousness is based on prior information processing. It is the processing that determines the form that consciousness takes, thoughts, feelings, etc, and it is underlying processing that 'feeds' conscious experience as information is acquired and integrated into conscious form.
Consciousness is generated not only after the event, but after the senses have acquired the information and the brain has processed it. That's where the milliseconds of delay between the event and a response comes from. Reflex response being the fastest, nerve loops, etc, with prefrontal deliberation the slowest.
Even if it takes a millisecond of delay to reach conscious awareness, it takes a conscious will to make a decision.
Abstract
The real question that Libet's experiments raise is whether our conscious wills cause the willed actions. What is at issue is the effects rather than the causes of conscious will. The question is whether conscious will is impotent, not whether it is free. If conscious will is impotent, then we cannot control our actions by means of conscious will, and this disability might reduce our freedom of action. Libet's experiments raises or sharpens this new question. By raising a new issue in a new way, Libet's work made (and continues to make) many people rethink their assumptions. The assumptions at stake are both normative and descriptive. The relevant normative assumption is, roughly, that causation by conscious will is necessary for responsibility. The descriptive assumption that Libet questions is, again roughly, that conscious will causes the willed action. This chapter addresses these assumptions in turn. It concludes that Libet's experiments do not undermine responsibility in general, but they do illuminate some particular cases as well as common standards of responsibility.
Wrong, will is not autonomous, nor is will the decision maker.
Nothing can happen consciously before information is acquired, processed, integrated with memory to enable recognition and understanding, at which point the event is represented in conscious form, including conscious will, which is the urge or impulse to act, and not some special veto function that is exempt from the process of cognition.[/url]
I’m just trying to establish that it is the conscious agent that permits the action to take place and therefore he is responsible for making that decision. This has nothing to do with moral responsibility. If someone runs a red light, it is his foot that is pushing on the accelerator to increase the speed. He is giving consent to this action. I’m not saying his decision is a free one.
We know why blame and punishment came into existence, which is to protect people from the person who steps on the accelerator and jeopardizes other people’s safety. What I am suggesting is a better way to do just that by changing the milieu of the environment such that it changes the antecedents that lead to this decision as a preferable alternative. You know as well as I that we can only go in one direction. We can change that direction by understanding what leads to the desire to hurt others whether intentional or as collateral damage. This does not veto the direction we are compelled to go DBT. I want to make sure you see that I am not in opposition with you. I am in support of what I know, not believe, is true.
What is this "one direction"? Is it forward in time? That is sensible. Except that does not fit with any "alternative" and "chang[ing] that direction". Therefore, it seems that you are positing actualizable alternative courses for going in that direction - for going forward in time. I expect DBT denies that "we" can change the course to be taken going forward in time. I expect DBT asserts that there is only one already determined course for going forward in time. If I am (close enough to being) correct about the DBT viewpoint, you appear to be "in opposition" to that perspective. In which case, how would it be possible to overcome that opposition? Is there an alternative manner of expression that would eliminate such apparent opposition?
What is this "one direction"? Is it forward in time? That is sensible. Except that does not fit with "alternative" and "chang[ing] that direction". Therefore, it seems that you are positing actualizable alternative courses for going in that direction - for going forward in time. I expect DBT denies that "we" can change the course to be taken going forward in time. I expect DBT asserts that there is only one already determined course for going forward in time. If I am (close enough to being) correct about the DBT viewpoint, you appear to be "in opposition" to that perspective. In which case, how would it be possible to overcome that opposition? Is there an alternative manner of expression that would eliminate such apparent opposition?
I know you have tried, but you haven't succeeded. Going forward in time is a phrase that presupposes time is a 4th dimension. That's already a problem. If you want to continue the conversation, could you go to my thread and we can talk? I am uncomfortable being in this thread. Thanks for your understanding.
I know you have tried, but you haven't succeeded. Going forward in time is a phrase that presupposes time is a 4th dimension. That's already a problem. If you want to continue the conversation, could you go to my thread and we can talk? I am uncomfortable being in this thread. Thanks for your understanding.
I have to take issue with the above. If I recall correctly, it was pood who somewhere remarked something along the lines of philosophy being first and foremost about being able to realize what questions need to be asked given a particular context. I am taking issue with the above quoted remark because I took a quick glance at this OP and then this as well as this along with a few of the responses. The questions raised are good (by which I mean interesting) questions, and the few responses I read are, I would say, properly regarded in somewhat Kuhnian terms as normal science representations of the prevailing paradigm perspective. Might as well call them the paradigm catechism. You know, to be provocative. But correct nonetheless. It is possible both to accept the science and question it. In fact, it is possible to both accept the science and doubt it at the same time. Without that very sort of questioning and doubting, science expires; it dies a slow death. And that's all I have to say about that. Well, not really. But I am going to be busy halter-breaking for some time.
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