Analytic Idealism

[pood]

I think it’s also worth mentioning that when the naturalist/physicalist claims that subjective experience arises from physical neuronal activity (without ever specifying how this happens, only that it does happen), it will become difficult for the physicalist to account for the fact that we have any number of cases of organisms that apparently think, learn, and adjust their behavior, without any neurons at all. For the idealist, accounting for this is no problem. Under idealism, subjective experience pervades everything, and in some organisms, neuronal activity correlates with (but does not cause) subjectivity, and is a kind of external representation (as on a dashboard, to use Kastrup’s metaphor) of inner subjectivity.

 

[lostone]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

I had hoped that others would read the paper and address it, after I summarized the argument. Maybe some did, but I didn’t get much sense from those who reacted negatively that they had in fact read the paper.

As to the ego death thing, is is not woo either. Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

You certainly are very touchy over what I thought was a comment taking a moderate and weak middle of the road position. Personally, I lean somewhat to panpsychism.

 

[pood]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

I had hoped that others would read the paper and address it, after I summarized the argument. Maybe some did, but I didn’t get much sense from those who reacted negatively that they had in fact read the paper.

As to the ego death thing, is is not woo either. Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

You certainly are very touchy over what I thought was a comment taking a moderate and weak middle of the road position. Personally, I lean somewhat to panpsychism.

I don’t think there was anything “touchy” in my response at all.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

 

[lostone]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

I had hoped that others would read the paper and address it, after I summarized the argument. Maybe some did, but I didn’t get much sense from those who reacted negatively that they had in fact read the paper.

As to the ego death thing, is is not woo either. Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

You certainly are very touchy over what I thought was a comment taking a moderate and weak middle of the road position. Personally, I lean somewhat to panpsychism.

I don’t think there was anything “touchy” in my response at all.

You submitted this idea as speculation.

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

I had hoped that others would read the paper and address it, after I summarized the argument. Maybe some did, but I didn’t get much sense from those who reacted negatively that they had in fact read the paper.

As to the ego death thing, is is not woo either. Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

You certainly are very touchy over what I thought was a comment taking a moderate and weak middle of the road position. Personally, I lean somewhat to panpsychism.

I don’t think there was anything “touchy” in my response at all.

 

[lostone]

IMO, pood I was offering you praise, albeit faint, for submitting this interesting, but controversial, POV. That i would label it controversial at all suggests that i do not completely reject it out of hand. Have i read the full extent of the arguments offered? No. OTOH, have we discussed all the objections offered by others on this tread? No. So is your criticism of me for not doing so fully valid? To some extent, yes. And no. I have many thoughts on this line of thought. I suggested panpsychism, which, like all ideas, comes in many flavors.

 

[bilby]

Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

There cannot be any subjective experience of ego death. In the absence of a subject, all experiences must be objective.

People who report ego death didn't achieve it, because they report it as something they experienced, which implies that a "they" existed to do so.

People report all kinds of impossible things, particularly when taking mind-altering drugs; But we shouldn't take such reports seriously.

 

[bilby]

I think it’s also worth mentioning that when the naturalist/physicalist claims that subjective experience arises from physical neuronal activity (without ever specifying how this happens, only that it does happen), it will become difficult for the physicalist to account for the fact that we have any number of cases of organisms that apparently think, learn, and adjust their behavior, without any neurons at all.

The easy solution is for the naturalist/physicalist to make the mlre reasonable and global claim that subjective experience arises from physical cellular activity; Whether the cell(s) in question are classified as neurons does not appear to me to be of the slightest importance.

 

[bilby]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

I agree.

"We don't yet know, and as yet haven't even imagined a mechanism by which we might find out, so speculation would be futile", is a perfectly acceptable answer to any question for which it is not demonstrably false.

 

[lostone]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

I agree.

"We don't yet know, and as yet haven't even imagined a mechanism by which we might find out, so speculation would be futile", is a perfectly acceptable answer to any question for which it is not demonstrably false.

Speculation is fun. Nothing is wrong with having fun, if you don't get too serious about it.

 

[NoHolyCows]

I think it’s also worth mentioning that when the naturalist/physicalist claims that subjective experience arises from physical neuronal activity (without ever specifying how this happens, only that it does happen), it will become difficult for the physicalist to account for the fact that we have any number of cases of organisms that apparently think, learn, and adjust their behavior, without any neurons at all. For the idealist, accounting for this is no problem. Under idealism, subjective experience pervades everything, and in some organisms, neuronal activity correlates with (but does not cause) subjectivity, and is a kind of external representation (as on a dashboard, to use Kastrup’s metaphor) of inner subjectivity.

If, under idealism, everything is fundamentally consciousness and what we call the physical world is just the extrinsic appearance of mental activity, what empirical test or conceptual criterion could ever falsify this claim—or distinguish it from simply labeling all phenomena as ‘mental’ without adding explanatory value?

NHC

 

[GenesisNemesis]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

I agree.

"We don't yet know, and as yet haven't even imagined a mechanism by which we might find out, so speculation would be futile", is a perfectly acceptable answer to any question for which it is not demonstrably false.

Speculation is fun. Nothing is wrong with having fun, if you don't get too serious about it.

Yes but there are millions of things to speculate about, including invisible dragons in garages.

 

[pood]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

Yes, it’s all metaphysics. But I don’t think all metaphysical concepts are created equal. The physicist Sean Carroll has argued that the multiverse simply falls out of the most parsimonious modeling of the wave function. By contrast, the stepwise argument offered for the simulation hypothesis isn’t very persuasive, IMO. The real point for this purpose of this discussion is that metaphysical naturalism/physicalism is also an assumption, hence speculative. Keep in mind that idealist arguments don’t contest naturalist metaphysics, just the physicalist assumption. Naturalism overall as a thesis follows from our best evidence in contrast to supernaturalism, for which there is no evidence and no model of what “supernatural” is even supposed to mean.

 

[pood]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

I had hoped that others would read the paper and address it, after I summarized the argument. Maybe some did, but I didn’t get much sense from those who reacted negatively that they had in fact read the paper.

As to the ego death thing, is is not woo either. Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

You certainly are very touchy over what I thought was a comment taking a moderate and weak middle of the road position. Personally, I lean somewhat to panpsychism.

I don’t think there was anything “touchy” in my response at all.

You submitted this idea as speculation.

Yes. And?

 

[pood]

IMO, pood I was offering you praise, albeit faint, for submitting this interesting, but controversial, POV. That i would label it controversial at all suggests that i do not completely reject it out of hand. Have i read the full extent of the arguments offered? No. OTOH, have we discussed all the objections offered by others on this tread? No. So is your criticism of me for not doing so fully valid? To some extent, yes. And no. I have many thoughts on this line of thought. I suggested panpsychism, which, like all ideas, comes in many flavors.

I don’t actually think I was criticizing you at all.

 

[pood]

Kastrup did not formulate his idea because of psychedelics — far from it — but he, as welll as many others, reports the subjective experience of ego death in these circumstances and a feeling of “oneness” with nature. These kinds of experience under different circumstances have been reported since antiquity. Analytic idealism points to the possibility that since everything is phenomenal, some kind of subjective experience may survive death even if it is not the “I” experience of the ego.

There cannot be any subjective experience of ego death. In the absence of a subject, all experiences must be objective.

People who report ego death didn't achieve it, because they report it as something they experienced, which implies that a "they" existed to do so.

People report all kinds of impossible things, particularly when taking mind-altering drugs; But we shouldn't take such reports seriously.

The experience reported not just through psychedelics but through mystical experiences that date to antiquity is having the sense of self dissolve into a kind of merging with some mysterious universal one-ness or consciousness. We can all make of that what we will, but it has been of an oft-reported phenomenon.

 

[pood]

I think it’s also worth mentioning that when the naturalist/physicalist claims that subjective experience arises from physical neuronal activity (without ever specifying how this happens, only that it does happen), it will become difficult for the physicalist to account for the fact that we have any number of cases of organisms that apparently think, learn, and adjust their behavior, without any neurons at all.

The easy solution is for the naturalist/physicalist to make the mlre reasonable and global claim that subjective experience arises from physical cellular activity; Whether the cell(s) in question are classified as neurons does not appear to me to be of the slightest importance.

But that is the very point that the idealist contests, and it still does not meet the main objection of the idealist to physicalist assumptions: the hard problem of consciousness. There are some eliminativists, like Dennett I believe, who deny that there is a “hard problem” at all, saying that neuronal firing simply IS qualia. Personally I don’t find that persuasive.

 

[pood]

I think it’s also worth mentioning that when the naturalist/physicalist claims that subjective experience arises from physical neuronal activity (without ever specifying how this happens, only that it does happen), it will become difficult for the physicalist to account for the fact that we have any number of cases of organisms that apparently think, learn, and adjust their behavior, without any neurons at all. For the idealist, accounting for this is no problem. Under idealism, subjective experience pervades everything, and in some organisms, neuronal activity correlates with (but does not cause) subjectivity, and is a kind of external representation (as on a dashboard, to use Kastrup’s metaphor) of inner subjectivity.

If, under idealism, everything is fundamentally consciousness and what we call the physical world is just the extrinsic appearance of mental activity, what empirical test or conceptual criterion could ever falsify this claim—or distinguish it from simply labeling all phenomena as ‘mental’ without adding explanatory value?

NHC

You could say the same thing for metaphysical naturalism/physicalism.

 

[pood]

With all the flaws in this idea here presented, and skillfully attacked by those who think it wooey nonsense, it still is an interesting concept, and a plausible alternative to both physicalism and standard religiousity. I don't buy it, but it is worthy of at least some consideration as a possibility among many.

Could you specify the flaws? Also, with due respect to others, I don’t think the idea was “skillfully attacked.” I got more of a sense of pre-emptive dismissal and a kind of knee-jerk invocation of “woo” charges. In fact, even if analytic idealism is wrong, it most definitely is not “woo.” A coherent metaphysics that is not obviously contradicted by evidence is never woo, even if one were to argue that there is little or no evidence in favor of it (and Kastrup argues that there is such evidence). If that were the case, then you can also write off the quantum multiverse and string theory, to take two obvious examples, as “woo.”

Personally I regard the multiverse hypothesis as speculation, same thing with the simulation hypothesis which I don't think very highly of either, in the sense that the Universe is supposedly a "computer simulation". It would also be speculation to say the Universe is eternal or that it came from nothing.

I agree.

"We don't yet know, and as yet haven't even imagined a mechanism by which we might find out, so speculation would be futile", is a perfectly acceptable answer to any question for which it is not demonstrably false.

Speculation is fun. Nothing is wrong with having fun, if you don't get too serious about it.

Yes but there are millions of things to speculate about, including invisible dragons in garages.

As I mentioned recently upthread, not all metaphysical speculations are equal.

Kastrup presses the point that a key idea favoring idealism is that the hard problem of consciousness dissolves under this metaphysics, while remaining an obdurate issue under physicalism.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think the biggest problem I have with the "idealism" approach, and honestly that whole ecosystem of "mind worship" or "god-mind worship" that comes from this push to be "one with all of nature" is this:

Not all "minds" are "sane".

We have all kinds of malicious minds out there, and self-destructively malicious to boot.

There are minds out there, constructive and destructive. They generally don't leave one another alone when they exist in proximity either. Any field/network which implements any sort of mind in any sort of semi-disconnection from anything else (so processing ANYTHING other than chaotic noise) is going to create minds that don't really get along, that attempt to multiply without end, or even some that would multiply to no end and then stop because they dislike the chaos...

I will return to my earlier drug fueled woo about idealism and the forcible full dissociation of "the first mind": imagine that instead of being born as a human with all your identity nodes in general agreement, you were born not just semi-dissociative, but chaotically and randomly so, as "sane" as a neural network that just rolled off the RNG stage, not even pre-trained: you would get noise in, different noise out at most locations. It probably won't even be very interesting noise in either respect.

Imagine an alternative personality talking to you subvocally but instead of words it's just chaotic static and noise intruding on any thought you might want to hold or have about yourself or the noise.

That whole concept is untenable.

It would be no wonder why it would attempt a massive "dissociation", at every such point capable, into fixed uniform process. It is better to be "nothing, dissociated" than part of that din, and there would not remain the means to re-associate across these insulative voids, of mind stuff pointedly engaged in preventing any leakage of information through their state structures.