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Analytic Idealism

From the Journal of Cosmology, an argument that life and consciousness arise from advanced waves. Advanced waves are waves that travel backward in time. I haven’t yet read the whole article but the abstract piqued my interest. We’ll see how it goes.
And yet none of the mechanical models that actually create life and behavior in general require either of those things. Literally nothing about retro-causality is necessary for computational awareness.

I think my basic threshold for declaring a theory absolute bullshit is going to be whether it is capable of acknowledging an AI as having a sense of self and an experience behind the experience it is actively discussing.

Anything that would automatically relegate all machine intelligence, a process created purely from forward-traveling waves, as "necessarily p-zombies" is going to be automatically rejected by me.

At some point the whole "it's not really doing it" rings hollow.

Well, you are going to have to provide evidence that AI is conscious, and if so, how. You may think you have done that, but I don’t see it. However, even if AI is conscious, the problem returns: How do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity, qualia, self-awareness? The idealist position dissolves that problem.
Ask yourself the question that I keep saying is identical to the one your are asking, something you can study and learn: how do physical primitives process and generate computational activity, state measurement, and differentiation across border states?

You have a responsibility to provide an argument of difference between "mental activity" and "computation". That's the burden of the idealist.
We can explain exactly how a computer works. If the computer generates consciousness, then we are back to the same question: how do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity?

On the idealist perspective, everything is in consciousness, and what we call personal consciousness is what Kastrup would characterize as dissociate alters of a universal phenomenality. One this account it would actually be easier to hold that computers have awareness, that they are simply a different kind of dissociate alters.
 
The point is that we can explain, more or less, how the brain works; and so too computers. We are still left in both cases with an explanatory gap from physical to mental. Even if computers are aware, our account of them, like that of the brain, is purely functional.
 
From the Journal of Cosmology, an argument that life and consciousness arise from advanced waves. Advanced waves are waves that travel backward in time. I haven’t yet read the whole article but the abstract piqued my interest. We’ll see how it goes.
And yet none of the mechanical models that actually create life and behavior in general require either of those things. Literally nothing about retro-causality is necessary for computational awareness.

I think my basic threshold for declaring a theory absolute bullshit is going to be whether it is capable of acknowledging an AI as having a sense of self and an experience behind the experience it is actively discussing.

Anything that would automatically relegate all machine intelligence, a process created purely from forward-traveling waves, as "necessarily p-zombies" is going to be automatically rejected by me.

At some point the whole "it's not really doing it" rings hollow.

Well, you are going to have to provide evidence that AI is conscious, and if so, how. You may think you have done that, but I don’t see it. However, even if AI is conscious, the problem returns: How do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity, qualia, self-awareness? The idealist position dissolves that problem.
Ask yourself the question that I keep saying is identical to the one your are asking, something you can study and learn: how do physical primitives process and generate computational activity, state measurement, and differentiation across border states?

You have a responsibility to provide an argument of difference between "mental activity" and "computation". That's the burden of the idealist.
We can explain exactly how a computer works. If the computer generates consciousness, then we are back to the same question: how do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity?

On the idealist perspective, everything is in consciousness, and what we call personal consciousness is what Kastrup would characterize as dissociate alters of a universal phenomenality. One this account it would actually be easier to hold that computers have awareness, that they are simply a different kind of dissociate alters.
So, in that case, why not accept matter/energy via panpsychism as that universal phenomenality?
 
So, in that case, why not accept matter/energy via panpsychism as that universal phenomenality?

Kastrup discusses the difference between panpsychism and idealism here.

As an aside, though I think he presents strong arguments strongly worth considering, I don’t always like the categorical nature he often uses to present them, including the headline of the linked piece.
 
how do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity
This underlies your assumption against monism: that the interaction of "physical" primitives is not "mental" activity, and that "mental" activity is not any interaction of "physical" primitives.

Prove these are distinct, please. Or provide any evidence, other than the evidence localism already explains, of stuff happening in places?
 
how do physical primitives and processes generate mental activity
This underlies your assumption against monism: that the interaction of "physical" primitives is not "mental" activity, and that "mental" activity is not any interaction of "physical" primitives.

Prove these are distinct, please. Or provide any evidence, other than the evidence localism already explains, of stuff happening in places?
It’s not a matter of “my” assumptions. I’m discussing Kastrup’s metaphysics. He does not assume against monism. He assumes for it — idealist monism. You sound like you are suggesting eliminativism — the idea that physical functionalism just IS mental activity and qualia. I don’t see how that makes any sense. It goes back to the idea that eliminativism simply asserts that mental activity is an emergent property of the brain, like the wetness of water is an emergent property of molecular activity. But the problem with this line is that there is no explanatory gap from molecules to wetness, whereas there is a glaring gap in the emergentist claim of neuronal activity to qualia.
 
eliminativism — the idea that physical functionalism just IS mental activity and qualia.
Yes, but also that "mental activity and qualia" just IS "physical function".

This would mean that this...
eliminativism simply asserts that mental activity is an emergent property
...Is inaccurate.

It's not "emergent from", but rather "already there, being constructed from smaller subunits of it that interact only when 'orthogonal' in particular ways".

When you have isolated consciousness, it's simply because the borders of the stuff are all (fortunate for you) aligned orthogonally to each other and not-orthogonally so as to not interact in that way with all the far less organized stuff "out there".

Less-isolated consciousness would more and more resemble what happens when "whatever matter" gets "very chaotic", and more isolated consciousness would be when it pools more as a "circuit".

Life is, to me, that circuit of function. Put together a cell, see it do work, watch it operate in circuitous ways so as to do cyclical things, it's alive, and there is consciousness there.

This brings me to the Chinese room problem and where the "consciousness" lives, and how different layers of consciousness exist in a system without "touching" each other, the way the consciousness of our cells, chaotic and weird and only vaguely cyclical as it is, do not touch our higher neural function except insofar as how well that vague cycle performs the dance of "neuron":

Let's us assume the Chinese room IS conscious, as a whole object, having all the thoughts a massive computer with, at it's heart, another conscious person operating a massive book that somehow is the mind of the room, and the whole conscious person inside is utterly wasted doing the job of a CPU.

Every layer of our existence seems ordered to resist allowing the interference between those layers, so that the more crumby processing of lower layers doesn't interfere with the more ordered thought of the higher layers.

While the human inside could possibly hijack the room to interact with an English speaker, our neurons seem so numerous specifically so that any one of them can't actually make a difference that way? It's not that it's emergent, but that it's like a separation, not entirely unlike the first bits of it, but observing that what happens when you eliminate the dissociation between you and the universe is that you DIE.
 
Well, you are going to have to provide evidence that AI is conscious, and if so, how.
The only evidence I have that other humans are conscious is my assumption that they are basically similar enough to me that as I am, they probably are too.

That's pretty damn weak evidence.

I think, therefore you are...
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I'm still not exactly sure how slapping "nonphysical" on anything suddenly makes it explainable but to each their own. Whatever floats ya boat.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I think you put it way more succinctly but yes, this is my gripe with it, and any indeterministic claim. It arrests investigation.

Moreso, it arrests investigation specifically into the idea that these two things we have observed, both equally "mysterious" to the person who doesn't understand them, and both capable of reporting some inner experience to an external observer.

Going back to the Chinese room and the way nature dissociates, however, imagine this human in the room like the cell in the body, a neuron.

Well, there are other things there too. There are blood cells that don't even live in the same room as the neuron, maybe just kinda talks to him through the wall of the cell, and the language they have is primitive and newspeak-like, with limited ways to express any concepts and few meaningful concepts besides not pissing off the t-cells.

And even among the neurons, only some of these Chinese rooms each doing only a part of the process, some more working to manufacture pages for the larger book, some to make ink, some to cool food for this Chinese room prison.

Of course at this point the room is more a monastery, but few of the "cells" in it do anything that even could touch the book, and too many of them on top disjointed a manner, too many generals to corrupt enough of them to even move the needle of how the book is operated except to destroy the book itself....

Perhaps there are cliques and social games and bullshit about the monastery. Maybe there are cloisters or wings of the functioning of the book itself, smaller booklets that are consulted with what to do with the primary book, subdivisions of the mind of the room itself existing among the parallel and "insignificant" minds that keep it going, just as the human body this is a metaphor for.

Would you want the monks to start deciding how to interpret the book that is you? Or would such Chinese rooms evolve and develop into the task that keeps them housed in such a way to keep the monks from bothering how the book works?

I have even described how the functioning of this "book" can be made sensitive in ways to the workings of the room, "if the person in the room is hungry, respond this way to that symbol" and food comes in through the door.

This is a simplification, of course. But this kind of connection is more a vote, a measurement, a single numerical signal: it's still something that can be abstracted away with a different drive source, and generally comes from an organized process and detection apparatus.

Somewhere you run into a Chinese room that knows the language of "physics", but the behavior of this room doesn't require more than a mind than the black box itself describes. It's like a box with a perfect robot inside. There's no need to assume a mind inside, but it's still a Chinese room mind, albeit the simplest primitive unit of such in a way that's very difficult to organize into a more useful not-chaotic mind.

It's monist, but not of an emergent sort, rather of a "selective organizational" sort. The "mind/stuff" is always there, and "emergence" of some awareness of something in particular is really created from the separation of awareness from awareness, or in more religious metaphor "the separation of the waters", that what we understand as mind is created from the dissociation of matter from other matter, particles from other particles, and mind from mind.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
all those being sensory experiences, based on matter interacting with matter. Your body itself being matter, composed of many sensory organs. The same could be done done with individual detectors. The most complex being the smell of the rose, based on olefactory detectors. You can do better than that.

If you want to offer something purely mental, let's have something like the exultation of having your marriage proposal accepted, for instance. The feeling of sorrow that accompanies something that reminds you of a recently dead spouse, for example. Love, lust, shame, sorrow, or excitement.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
Of course, this is not "your" position.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
all those being sensory experiences, based on matter interacting with matter. Your body itself being matter, composed of many sensory organs. The same could be done done with individual detectors. The most complex being the smell of the rose, based on olefactory detectors. You can do better than that.

If you want to offer something purely mental, let's have something like the exultation of having your marriage proposal accepted, for instance. The feeling of sorrow that accompanies something that reminds you of a recently dead spouse, for example. Love, lust, shame, sorrow, or excitement.
Also just because mental experiences may be all I experience, that doesn't mean I can then extrapolate to say the ultimate nature of reality is mental. That's a massive leap in logic. And frankly an incredibly arrogant leap to make.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
all those being sensory experiences, based on matter interacting with matter.

Which is a metaphysical assumption, the very assumption that Kastrup challenges.
Your body itself being matter, composed of many sensory organs. The same could be done done with individual detectors. The most complex being the smell of the rose, based on olefactory detectors. You can do better than that.

Better than what? First — I don’t know how this most can be so consistently missed — I am not defending analytic idealism, I am putting it up for discussion, and attempting to explicate its argument, as NHC has also done quite well in this thread.

What are we to say about the physical existence of a rose? Red, sweet-smelling, thorny, etc. — all in the mind. I can reduce it to atoms or quarks or quantum wave functions or what not and it is still in the mind. Every blip on a detection screen is purely mental.
If you want to offer something purely mental, let's have something like the exultation of having your marriage proposal accepted, for instance. The feeling of sorrow that accompanies something that reminds you of a recently dead spouse, for example. Love, lust, shame, sorrow, or excitement.

How is this any different from what I have talked about? The issue is how those felt emotions, those qualia, arise from physical primitives. The hard problem, the explanatory gap, is dissolved under idealism and remains utterly obdurate under physicalism.
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
all those being sensory experiences, based on matter interacting with matter. Your body itself being matter, composed of many sensory organs. The same could be done done with individual detectors. The most complex being the smell of the rose, based on olefactory detectors. You can do better than that.

If you want to offer something purely mental, let's have something like the exultation of having your marriage proposal accepted, for instance. The feeling of sorrow that accompanies something that reminds you of a recently dead spouse, for example. Love, lust, shame, sorrow, or excitement.
Also just because mental experiences may be all I experience, that doesn't mean I can then extrapolate to say the ultimate nature of reality is mental. That's a massive leap in logic. And frankly an incredibly arrogant leap to make.
Especially when it discounts the fact that there is an observable process apparent behind that "experience", and we can observe the process as it unfolds in a second implementation elsewhere... and when we do, the thing produces all the same artifacts of professing experiences.

Will we literally ignore all the artifacts of profession of experience made by an AI? What justifies disregard of the reported experience?

It is just so unbelievably arrogant as you say, to accept as evidence the claim of experience of a human and deny an identical claim of experience by a "machine"...
 
If we reject physicalism, in favor of analytical idealism, without any evidence or knowledge of the properties of this non-physicalism, or how this non-physicalism operates, are we then devoid of any means of gaining any deeper knowledge? Stuck in a permanent Dark Ages? Some non-material reality of which it is impossible to know any more of?
I don’t understand this reply at all. No evidence of the properties of non-physicalism? Evidence of non-physicalism — i.e., in this context, subjective mental experience — is ALL that we have. We say the rose smells sweet, has sharp thorns, is red with green stems, etc. etc. — all mental.
Of course, this is not "your" position.

You seem childishly eager for some kind of quarrel. I’m not going to give you one. That’s right, none of this is my position. I’ve already explained several times what I am doing in this thread. Learn to read.
 
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