No. It's "enemy uniform" = "enemy". Perfectly normal standard everywhere.
That might be a reasonable standard in a conventional war between uniformed armies—but Gaza is not that. And you know it.
There is no Palestinian army. There are no formal uniforms. There is no clear front line. You are applying the rules of state-on-state warfare to a densely populated civilian area under occupation, where “enemy uniform” might mean a scarf, a T-shirt, or simply being male and of fighting age. That’s not a legal standard—it’s a pretext.
The Geneva Conventions don’t allow you to presume enemy status based on appearance alone in a civilian context. Civilians retain their protections unless and until they take direct part in hostilities. That’s the legal threshold. If you lower it to “looks suspicious” or “wore the wrong color,” you’ve erased the civilian category altogether.
And that’s how massacres happen—how entire neighborhoods become “valid” targets in hindsight because someone nearby might have matched a profile. What you’re defending isn’t the law. It’s a rationale for abandoning it.
It's the marking of the enemy, that's all you need. Geneva requires soldiers to fight in readily distinguishable attire to prevent targeting mistakes, it says nothing about not shooting people in said attire. (It's not specifically uniforms, merely that they match. "Militia, we are expecting infiltrators. The uniform of the day is green over orange brassards.")
Then you’ve just proven the point—by flattening the legal standard into a visual cue, you’re erasing the entire foundation of civilian protection in asymmetric conflict.
Yes, combatants are required to distinguish themselves. But Geneva does not say that anyone who resembles a fighter—or wears something “green and orange”—can legally be shot. That’s a misapplication. The distinction goes both ways: if someone is not taking direct part in hostilities, then they retain full civilian protection—even if they’re dressed in a way you find suspicious.
Wearing a headband, carrying a flag, or even attending a funeral in militant colors is not sufficient under international humanitarian law to make someone a lawful target. That’s not “realism.” That’s precisely why the principle of distinction exists: to stop militaries from replacing evidence with assumption, from collapsing legal status into clothing, and from targeting based on affiliation rather than action.
So no—Geneva doesn’t hand you a free pass to shoot anyone wearing the wrong colors. It demands more: positive identification, direct participation in hostilities, and a real-time threat. If you can’t distinguish that, you can’t engage. That’s not a loophole. That’s the law.
That's relevant how??
The words you failed to quote: "because they live in Gaza, express political opinions, or wear a color associated with a group"
You are providing no evidence that they were targeted for any of these reasons. And you are providing no evidence one way or the other about those who were hit. Your argument simply amounts to "you didn't prove they were Hamas". You think Israel is going to reveal how it identifies people?! It's just their track record is very good--an awful lot of the "civilians" they kill later get Hamas funerals.
It’s relevant because it demonstrates a fundamental failure of the principle you’re defending—the requirement to distinguish between civilians and combatants, especially in pre-designated civilian safe zones. You can’t champion Israel’s “track record” while ignoring documented incidents where that track record collapses under scrutiny.
The Al-Mawasi strike isn’t just a tragic accident—it’s a case study in the failure of precautionary obligations under Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Israel instructed civilians to move to Al-Mawasi, designated it a humanitarian zone, then conducted lethal strikes within it. Whether or not Hamas fighters were present does not absolve the legal burden. Under international law, the presence of combatants among a civilian population does not negate civilian protections. The obligation is on the attacking party to either avoid the strike or delay it if the collateral damage would be disproportionate to the expected military advantage.
Furthermore, your assertion that many of those killed “later get Hamas funerals” is not a reliable legal or evidentiary standard. Funerary affiliation is not a legal test for combatant status. Under customary IHL and ICC jurisprudence, the definition of a combatant includes those directly participating in hostilities, not those whose bodies are later draped in flags or given symbolic honors. The ICRC and legal scholars have repeatedly emphasized that posthumous political framing does not retroactively convert a civilian into a lawful military target.
And no—states are not required to reveal operational intelligence, but that doesn’t exempt them from providing credible evidence that their strikes are lawful. Merely asserting “we believe a militant was there” without substantiation, particularly after civilians were directed to that location by the military itself, does not satisfy the legal threshold of distinction, proportionality, or precaution.
In short, your argument hinges on presumed legitimacy and post-hoc rationalizations rather than adherence to legal principles. The laws of war were created precisely to avoid this kind of ambiguity—where civilians are killed, responsibility is denied, and every corpse is presumed guilty by association. That’s not a defense. It’s the breakdown of lawful conduct in armed conflict.
Of course no real time evidence is offered before the strike. What are you smoking to think that they would do that??
And you realize that when an entire family is pulled from the rubble that almost always one of their senior commanders was in said rubble? There are typically fewer civilians around when someone is at home than when they are out somewhere.
And that’s precisely the danger of the logic you’re defending.
You’re saying that because Israel doesn’t want to disclose evidence in real time, we should take its word on trust—while simultaneously dismissing all independent reporting from humanitarian organizations, UN bodies, or even allied governments as unreliable if it contradicts that narrative. That’s not just selective skepticism—it’s a double standard that places one side above verification and the other beneath credibility by default.
And no, the presence of a “commander” in a building doesn’t automatically render every strike lawful. International humanitarian law, again, doesn’t say “kill the target no matter the cost.” It says do not attack if the expected civilian harm is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (Article 51(5)(b), Additional Protocol I). You can’t just presume legality after the fact by discovering—or claiming—a target was there. That reverses the burden. Civilians aren’t acceptable losses in hindsight.
Your point about families being at home during a strike only reinforces the core problem: civilians are being killed in predictable, repeatable patterns because the rules of precaution and proportionality are not being meaningfully applied. If commanders are targeted in civilian homes, and the military knows that will mean killing their families, that’s not morally or legally neutral. That’s a decision to prioritize a single kill over an entire family’s life.
The law doesn’t say you can’t strike high-value targets. It says you must not do so in a way that knowingly causes disproportionate harm to civilians. And when strike after strike results in that exact outcome, it ceases to be “unfortunate.” It becomes policy.
I expect them to do what they feasibly can. I do not expect them to do the impossible. And I see them consistently being the world's best at avoiding civilian casualties. I also see the stuff with Hezbollah--human shield tactics aren't used much there, and we see 85-90% of deaths being combatants. Look at the beeper bombs--one death that was certainly civilian, but immediate family of the target. The other "civilian" deaths we get no details--nope, they weren't civilians.
Then what you’re defending isn’t law—it’s a moving target of excuses, defined by trust in one side’s claims and total skepticism toward any opposing evidence.
You “expect them to do what they feasibly can,” but ignore the legal definition of that standard. Feasibility isn’t whatever a military says it tried. It means taking all practicable precautions to verify the nature of the target, to choose means and methods that minimize civilian harm, and to refrain from the attack if that harm is excessive in relation to the anticipated military gain. That’s not opinion—it’s Article 57 of Additional Protocol I. And it’s binding.
You praise Israel as “the world’s best” at avoiding civilian casualties. But that’s not how legal accountability works. International law doesn’t say “do better than most,” it says follow the rules—always, and without exception. “We’re better than Russia or Syria” is not a defense under the Geneva Conventions.
As for Hezbollah: cherry-picking one front and one set of casualty ratios doesn’t prove anything about the legality of operations in Gaza. The terrain, density, and conditions are radically different—and so is the scale. Civilian death rates in Gaza aren’t some mystery. Over 70% of the reported dead are women and children, a claim now broadly accepted even by Israeli analysts. If you think that can be waved off by labeling them “immediate family of the target,” then you’re not applying international law. You’re dismantling it with euphemism.
And your dismissal of deaths where “we get no details” as not civilians is exactly the problem. Unknown is not guilt. Proximity is not guilt. Family is not guilt. If you reverse that burden—assuming civilian deaths are justified unless proven otherwise—you’ve erased the entire foundation of the law of armed conflict. That’s not justice. That’s rationalized brutality.
This is completely unrealistic.
Unrealistic doesn’t mean unlawful.
The laws of armed conflict aren’t designed around what’s most convenient for a military. They exist precisely because in war, the temptation to cut corners and justify assumptions is overwhelming. If the only standard is what a military thinks is reasonable in the moment, then there is no law—only discretion. And discretion without external accountability is how atrocities happen.
Saying “we can’t wait for certainty” doesn’t grant permission to act on guesses. The legal requirement is not perfect knowledge—it’s due diligence. That means real efforts to distinguish combatants from civilians before using lethal force. It means avoiding strikes where the expected civilian harm is excessive compared to the military gain. That’s the legal bar. Calling it unrealistic is just another way of saying you don’t want to be bound by it.
If law only applies when it’s easy, then it isn’t law. It’s theater.
Read it again. "Civilians". Not members of the group. Identifying group membership is enough to pull the trigger.
(And there's a reason we didn't ratify that part of Geneva. That piece you are referring to is protecting two of the 10/7 butchers because they simply joined the attack without being members of a terrorist organization. The words "and for such a time as" are an abomination that does not belong.)
Your interpretation dangerously rewrites the law to suit a rationale that strips civilians of protection by association—not by action. That’s not how international humanitarian law works, and it’s not a loophole the U.S. or any other state can simply invent by fiat.
First, Article 51(3) protects all civilians, regardless of affiliation or ideology. The only condition under which that protection is suspended is direct participation in hostilities—not mere identification, group membership, or political sympathy. That includes members of non-state armed groups, unless they are actively engaged in a military function at the time. This isn’t controversial—it’s the consensus view of the ICRC, the International Criminal Court, and military manuals around the world.
Second, saying the U.S. didn’t ratify Additional Protocol I doesn’t erase the principle. Much of it, including Article 51, has been recognized as customary international law—binding on all states regardless of ratification. The U.S. Department of Defense even follows the “direct participation” standard in its own Law of War Manual.
Third, your framing turns suspicion into a death sentence. If “group membership” is enough, then anyone in Gaza who looks the part—teenagers, political supporters, aid workers accused by proxy—becomes a lawful target. That collapses the entire foundation of distinction, which is what separates combat from slaughter.
The law doesn’t exist to make war easy. It exists to prevent it from becoming total. You don’t get to declare that because some parts are inconvenient, the civilians cease being civilians. If that’s the argument, then you’re not upholding international law. You’re erasing it.
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities makes clear that civilians remain protected unless and only while they directly participate in hostilities. Simply identifying someone with a group—through clothing, symbolism, or political alignment—is not sufficient grounds for targeting. The standard is conduct, not affiliation.
This principle has been reinforced by international tribunals. In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY affirmed that individuals must be targeted based on their active role in hostilities—not assumptions based on group membership or demographics. The law requires a functional assessment, not a symbolic one.
Even the U.S. Department of Defense, despite not ratifying Additional Protocol I, follows this logic. Its own Law of War Manual states that civilians cannot be targeted unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. It also warns against targeting based on indirect signs or assumptions, acknowledging the legal and moral danger of doing so.
Customary international law, which binds all parties regardless of treaty ratification, affirms the same thing. Civilians are protected at all times unless their actions directly and concretely forfeit that protection. This is not a fringe interpretation—it’s foundational to modern laws of war.
So when you say identification is enough, you are arguing against the explicit standards laid down by international courts, humanitarian law, and even the military doctrines of states like the United States. That position isn’t just legally incorrect—it’s how civilian protections are eroded into justifications for atrocity.
The issue was whether it's possible for a "civilian" to be a combatant. It's relevant in that establishing that someone is a "civilian" isn't proof they are not a combatant. Multiple hostages were rescued that were being held by "civilians".
Then you’ve just illustrated the very principle you’re trying to sidestep.
Yes—some civilians may secretly engage in hostilities. That’s exactly why the law sets a high bar before lethal force can be used: it requires proof of direct participation, not assumption based on possibility. International humanitarian law accounts for the fact that conflict is murky—but it errs on the side of protection, not preemption.
The presence of a few civilians who violate their protected status does not justify treating all civilians as potential threats. That logic flips the burden of proof—turning a presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt by proximity or suspicion. That’s not how law works. It’s how massacres are rationalized.
So yes, a “civilian” can forfeit protection by taking up arms—but only for as long as they are actively doing so. You don’t get to rewrite that rule just because some hostages were guarded by people in plain clothes. That fact proves the need for care, not its abandonment.
t's not two out of a thousand. It's three out of four. (I'm looking at the situations where we have the most data--rescued hostages) And the point is simply about showing that "civilian" is not automatically "noncombatant".
And once again, you’re collapsing a legal distinction that exists precisely to prevent that kind of reasoning.
The existence of a few civilians who violate their protected status does not change the default legal presumption: civilians are not to be treated as combatants unless and until they directly participate in hostilities. That’s not optional, and it’s not conditional on anecdotal ratios from a handful of hostage rescues.
You say “three out of four”—but you’re extrapolating from an extreme, unrepresentative subset. Hostage rescues are not a neutral sample of Gaza’s population. They’re high-risk, targeted operations where Hamas specifically uses civilians as human shields, precisely to blur the lines. You can’t use the most manipulated, worst-case scenarios to redefine the entire civilian population as suspect.
International law draws a clear boundary for a reason: suspicion isn’t enough. Pattern isn’t enough. The threshold is direct participation, not guilt by association. If you abandon that, you’re not identifying combatants. You’re justifying the erasure of civilian protection altogether.
Fool me twice, shame on me.
Any symbol of noncombatant status that is repeatedly misused ceases to be an indication of noncombatant status. And all of them have been widely misused in Gaza.
Then what you’re advocating is the erosion of the very system that distinguishes war from massacre.
“Fool me twice” may work in personal grudges—but international humanitarian law is not built on vengeance or trust. It’s built on standards—precisely because war is chaotic, manipulated, and filled with bad actors. The moment you say that a vest, a symbol, a hospital, or a designation “no longer counts” because it’s sometimes abused, you make every protected status conditional. And once protection becomes conditional, it becomes meaningless.
If a press vest no longer shields a journalist because others lied while wearing one—then journalists become targets. If a hospital loses protection because an enemy used one—then patients become targets. That’s not accountability. That’s collective suspicion turned into lethal policy.
International law doesn’t require you to be naïve. It requires you to distinguish. You hold individuals accountable when evidence supports it. But you don’t erase protections for everyone because of the actions of some. That’s not “shame on me”—it’s shame on the world if we allow it.
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