According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[peacegirl]

If @DBT had bothered to read the article, the first paragraph from which he quoted, he would have observed that most of the rest of the article goes on to contest the definition of determinism given at the outset. This is very typical for articles at SEP and other places — supply a certain definition and then pick it apart.

The problem here is that DBT is not defending determinism, he is defending hard determinism — which rules out free will a priori by definition. But one must prove hard determinism at the conclusion of an argument, not establish it as a first premise. What we have here is one big fat exercise in question begging.

There is no difference between hard, soft, and adequate determinism. These terms are confusing and don't have any real substance when it comes to human decision-making. We either have no free will or we have free will. You cannot skirt around this in order to save free will of any kind. Stop making this debate more convoluted than it needs to be.

 

[steve_bank]

Looking at choice and stimulus as an experiment.

Will the same stimulus or set of conditions always result in the same choice?

I always drink Coke but for some reason this tine I pick Pepsi. Are all choices made completly in colossus thinking?

Seem to me free will even without determinism is a complicated question.

If our bran/universe are not causal determinism does that imply free will? I do not think so.

The question can be backed into by asking for free will to exist how must the brain operate?

 

[peacegirl]

Looking at choice and stimulus as an experiment.

Will the same stimulus or set of conditions always result in the same choice?

I always drink Coke but for some reason this tine I pick Pepsi. Are all choices made completly in colossus thinking?

Seem to me free will even without determinism is a complicated question.

If our bran/universe are not causal determinism does that imply free will? I do not think so.

The question can be backed into by asking for free will to exist how must the brain operate?

No, the same stimulus will not always result in the same choice. Each moment offers a new set of alternatives, presenting you with the opportunity to choose differently based on slightly different variables. Maybe, as you were getting ready to buy your usual Coke, you felt bored, so you changed what you normally drank and decided to try the Pepsi. There are no moments exactly the same because time itself changes the landscape we are choosing from; therefore, the possibility of making a different choice always exists, which it did in your case. The next moment, you may go back to the Coke, or you may realize that your taste buds changed and now you like the Pepsi better. You then make a decision to switch to Pepsi in the direction of greater satisfaction. Your will was not free to choose the Pepsi because you were compelled to make a choice that was more satisfying. Therefore, choosing the Coke at that moment would have been an impossibility since it would have given you less satisfaction under the circumstances, which cannot be done.

 

[BSilvEsq]

The SEP discussion of Causal Determinism explains that Fatalism is most commonly considered to be a paradigm about gods and spirits, but that Fatalism need not involve that sort of reason for future events being fated, and that "it is true that under the assumption of determinism, one might say that given the way things have gone in the past, all future events that will in fact happen are already destined to occur." As with its discussion of Fatalism, the SEP discussion of Causal Determinism states that "there is no agreement over whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known true or false), and what the import for human agency would be in either case."

The SEP entry on Fatalism similarly explains that the word has multiple meanings -- one of which is the product of Causal Determinism, which involves no gods, no intelligent, deliberate or purposeful determination of what must occur of necessity, and no other problems the proclaimed supporters of Compatibilism on this thread repeatedly espouse. After explaining the multiple versions of Fatalism, and after summarizing and evaluating the various arguments against all forms of Fatalism -- including Causal Determinism -- the SEP entry ends with the statement that "it is, of course, always possible, for all that has been said, that fatalism is correct."

Of course, SEP is not the beginning and end of all knowledge by any means. It is, however, a respectable source, and it does not accept the argument that has been trotted out on this thread over and over and over again that the type of Fatalism that flows from Causal Determinism is logically contradictory and impossible. To the contrary, the SEP entry acknowledges both (i) that Causal Determinism may be true, and (ii) that it is possible that the form of fatalism that flows from Causal Determinism is correct.

The folks on this thread who abjectly reject even the possibility of Determinism being true are NOT Compatibilists -- which, by definition, would mean that that they believe that the truth of Determinism is compatible with the existence of Free Will. A person who rejects the very possibility of the truth of Determinism does not, in any way, view the truth of Determinism as being compatible with anything -- not even any possible state of reality. Rather, a person who dismisses the possibility of the truth of Determinism and espouses the existence of Free Will is, by definition, a Libertarian. I believe this to be the point DBT repeatedly seeks to make, but which falls on the deaf ears of the self-proclaimed Compatibilists who stubbornly insist that they view the truth of Determinism and existence of Free Will to be compatible while denouncing even the possibility of the truth of Determinism.

If the truth of Causal Determinism (which is fatalistic in consequence) cannot be reconciled with a belief in any form of Free Will. The two are opposite bookends. It may be that neither is true, but it is impossible for them both to be true without redefining one or the other or both to fit the effort to harmonize them.

 

[BSilvEsq]

compatibilism is the idea that free will and determinism can coexist, which is an internal contradiction. How can anyone square "could have done otherwise" with "could not have done otherwise" without it being totally contradictory?

If we could not have done otherwise (determinism), free will would be false because it states we could have done otherwise given the exact same conditions. It is the proof of determinism that makes free will false, as its opposite. The two, given the definitions used in this debate (not the compatibilist definition), one necessitates the falsity of the other.

If determinism is proven true, free will, by definition, is false. If you go by the definitions used in the free will/determinism debate, you will see that "could do otherwise" or "could not do otherwise" ARE mutually exclusive. You can disagree all you want, but these are the definitions that set these two worldviews apart in a mutually exclusive way.

. . . if determinism is true, we do not have true free will (i.e., the kind that would allow us to do otherwise); therefore, it doesn't even enter into the picture. That being said, we can use the phrase, "I did this of my own free will," to mean nothing external was putting constraints on my choice (like a gun to my head or threats of any kind). I chose it because I wanted to . . .

Riddle me this Peacegirl:

If the truth of Determinism means that no person is capable of doing anything other than that which they do, doesn't that me that fact is true before, during and after the activity occurs? If so, then how can a person possibly make a decision or choice between seeming alternatives that do not truly exist?

Take the Coke and Pepsi example. If Determinism is true, then the fact that you will reach for a bottle of Pepsi is the only thing you can possibly do. That was a fact before the two bottles appeared before you, it was a fact as you were reaching for the Pepsi, and it is true looking backward to the moment you reached for the Pepsi. If that is the case, how can it be said that you made a decision or had a choice between Coke and Pepsi? It seems to me that you never had any decision or choice to make, because the potential to select Coke never truly existed. Rather, if you accept the truth of Determinism, the only thing you could possibly do is to reach for the Pepsi.

Now, if the foregoing is true, it is similarly true that there is nothing your father's book can do to bring about world peace unless that is the one and only thing that is going to occur. I suppose that you could say that writing your father's book was the only thing he could have done, advocating the book is the only thing you can do, and the consequences of your father writing the book and you advocating the book will be the only thing they can be -- which either will be that world peace results or it does not. Beyond that, however, your repeated contention that Determinism is true, Free Will does not exist, and Compatibilism is wrong is, itself, incompatible with your simultaneous contention that Determinism is true and people have the ability to make decisions that involve selecting among alternatives.

 

[The AntiChris]

@DBT has also claimed, if I have read him correctly, than any experiment with the same initial conditions will yield the same result, with the same antecedents entailing the same outcomes. Yet this is not so. See the linked article’s discussion of ceteris paribus.

Are you simply claiming that, in your view, the world is not deterministic? Or, are you saying that determinism does not necessarily mean that 'the same initial conditions' will entail 'the same outcomes'?

I'm struggling to understand what this has to do with compatibilism.

 

[DBT]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.

I believe your statement gives away too much.

To begin, I believe we both agree that the predictability of given activity is immaterial to the question of whether the given activity could be otherwise than it is as a result of antecedent activity. While some folks argue that predictability follows from Determinism, others disagree. All Incompatibilists agree, however, that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses alternatives without regard to the ability of anyone to predict the determined activity.

Secondly, I have an issue with the words "if the links are strong enough." Antecedent activity that is closest in time and proximity to subsequent activity are simply the most obvious of the nearly infinite antecedent activity that coalesces to cause the activity in question. To credit the activity that is closest in time and proximity is akin to attributing the weight of a single straw to breaking a camel's back, when the fact is that every straw is a causal antecedent, as is the age of the camel, the activities of the camel that contributed to the strength of the camel's back, the strength of the force of gravity at the location in which the came is standing, and innumerable other antecedents that combine to cause the instant of camel back collapse.

Determinism posits that the collapse of the camel's back was inevitable at the precise time and location it occurred as a result of all antecedent activity from the beginning of time (Big Bang?) to the moment of collapse. To characterize the antecedent causes of activity as "adequate" within the paradigm of Determinism denigrates their inevitability.

I understand that you are trying to make a point to folks who refuse to understand, much less appreciate the paradigm, but that is no reason to cater to their ignorance, as it feeds into their contrary and unsupportable contentions.

I meant causal links, as in causal determinism;

''Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other.''

Which is fundamentally how compatibilists define determinism, yet some on this forum try to deny or circumvent the given terms.

That's all.

Since I reject that definition of causal determinism in toto, for reasons I have repeatedly explained, I am not trying to deny or circumvent anything.

That you reject it doesn't alter the terms and conditions of determinism as defined by compatibilists, which is not that different, at least in terms of not permitting alternate choices in any instance of decision making.

It makes no real difference.

A brief recap:

Necessity is solely a matter of logic and not physics.

The laws of nature are not laws at all.

Therefore the definition given above is fatally flawed

The terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilism define it to be describe how the world physically works, if it is deterministic.

If that is indeed flawed, as you say, compatibilism is flawed. Then compatibilism is flawed in terms of both its definition of determinism and free will.

Did you actually read the article the first paragraph from which you quoted?

Yes, I did. I have read the article several times.

 

[DBT]

@DBT has also claimed, if I have read him correctly, than any experiment with the same initial conditions will yield the same result, with the same antecedents entailing the same outcomes. Yet this is not so. See the linked article’s discussion of ceteris paribus.

I make no claims other than that, based on how compatibilists define determinism and how they define free will, compatibilism fails to make a case for the reality of freedom of will.

Whether the world is fully deterministic or has random events is irrelevant. Random events do not help because a random event cannot be chosen or controlled and determinism does not permit alternate actions.

It doesn't work either way, and of course compatibilists who use adequate determinism do not use random events in their definition of free will.

You can't have it both ways. Libertarian free will is not compatible with determinism, and determinism is not compatible with the idea of free will.

For instance;
''Libertarianism is vulnerable to what is called the “intelligibility” objection, which points out that people can have no more control over a purely random action than they have over an action that is deterministically inevitable; in neither case does free will enter the picture. Hence, if human actions are indeterministic, free will does not exist.''

 

[DBT]

If @DBT had bothered to read the article, the first paragraph from which he quoted, he would have observed that most of the rest of the article goes on to contest the definition of determinism given at the outset. This is very typical for articles at SEP and other places — supply a certain definition and then pick it apart.

The problem here is that DBT is not defending determinism, he is defending hard determinism — which rules out free will a priori by definition. But one must prove hard determinism at the conclusion of an argument, not establish it as a first premise. What we have here is one big fat exercise in question begging.

Maybe you should consider how compatibilists define determinism. That the given definition does not include the ability to choose any option at any given instance in time, which is precisely why compatibilists carefully define free will in terms that make it appear to be compatible with determinism as they define it to be.

That would be a start.

Whether the world is causally deterministic or not doesn't come into it.

Adequate determinism is probably as close as it gets, but that doesn't mean that anything is possible at any time.

If anything is possible at any time, the world is not deterministic.

Your position appears to be incoherent, part compatibilist, part libertarian despite these positions being incompatible.

 

[DBT]

If @DBT had bothered to read the article, the first paragraph from which he quoted, he would have observed that most of the rest of the article goes on to contest the definition of determinism given at the outset. This is very typical for articles at SEP and other places — supply a certain definition and then pick it apart.

The problem here is that DBT is not defending determinism, he is defending hard determinism — which rules out free will a priori by definition. But one must prove hard determinism at the conclusion of an argument, not establish it as a first premise. What we have here is one big fat exercise in question begging.

I mean, yeah, that's why I rejected that definition some ream's worth of pages ago.

We had exactly the discussion in that article, here, repeatedly.

I made all those observations that there is no suitable cause for the initial condition presented to force it to be just so.

Our perception that it is "just so" is much like the perception that a solipsist may have, lacking understanding of how or why they wouldn't and couldn't possibly directly feel the emotions of others: it is not factual or necessarily true that the initial condition itself was a matter of natural laws, and their disconnect is a product of actual disconnection, not a metaphysical absence or impossibility of the other.

Rather, natural law might very well be that different initial conditions happen in different spatial circumstances that we simply cannot access, like deaf, blind, insensate, mutes slaying next to one another on a floor and each thinking this is the only way things may be, the only thoughts that might be had, as a matter of natural law.

Ahem, the terms of the argument for compatibility are based on how compatibilists define determinism and how they define free will.

You do your best to try to circumvent the terms and set your own conditions. Conditions that have really nothing to do with compatibilism, determinism or the notion of free will.

A fantasy world where computers have mind, consciousness and free will....as you have claimed

 

[peacegirl]

compatibilism is the idea that free will and determinism can coexist, which is an internal contradiction. How can anyone square "could have done otherwise" with "could not have done otherwise" without it being totally contradictory?

If we could not have done otherwise (determinism), free will would be false because it states we could have done otherwise given the exact same conditions. It is the proof of determinism that makes free will false, as its opposite. The two, given the definitions used in this debate (not the compatibilist definition), one necessitates the falsity of the other.

If determinism is proven true, free will, by definition, is false. If you go by the definitions used in the free will/determinism debate, you will see that "could do otherwise" or "could not do otherwise" ARE mutually exclusive. You can disagree all you want, but these are the definitions that set these two worldviews apart in a mutually exclusive way.

. . . if determinism is true, we do not have true free will (i.e., the kind that would allow us to do otherwise); therefore, it doesn't even enter into the picture. That being said, we can use the phrase, "I did this of my own free will," to mean nothing external was putting constraints on my choice (like a gun to my head or threats of any kind). I chose it because I wanted to . . .

Riddle me this Peacegirl:

If the truth of Determinism means that no person is capable of doing anything other than that which they do, doesn't that me that fact is true before, during and after the activity occurs? If so, then how can a person possibly make a decision or choice between seeming alternatives that do not truly exist?

The use of the term "alternative" only means that we have the attribute of considering different potential outcomes based on what we will eventually decide upon. It does not mean we actually have an alternative, given that only one choice can be made at any given moment. I will need to repeat certain excerpts because it is not easy to grasp the first time around.

The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences; otherwise, there would be no choice in the matter at all, as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word ‘choice’ is very misleading, for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration, he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved. Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point, he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself, and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?”

Take the Coke and Pepsi example. If Determinism is true, then the fact that you will reach for a bottle of Pepsi is the only thing you can possibly do. That was a fact before the two bottles appeared before you, it was a fact as you were reaching for the Pepsi, and it is true looking backward to the moment you reached for the Pepsi. If that is the case, how can it be said that you made a decision or had a choice between Coke and Pepsi? It seems to me that you never had any decision or choice to make, because the potential to select Coke never truly existed. Rather, if you accept the truth of Determinism, the only thing you could possibly do is to reach for the Pepsi.

That is true., The only thing Steve could have accepted, at that moment, was the Pepsi, but to say that it was inevitable before the fact implies that "necessarily" he must choose the Pepsi before it was even chosen by him. That is problematic in that nothing is CAUSING him to choose the Pepsi other than his own desire, not some external force. This brings up the other side of this equation in that nothing can make a person do what they have made up their mind not to do. Nothing, not even determinism (the way it's incorrectly defined), can make a person do something against their will. Will is involved in any choice that is made to permit an action, but it is not a matter of "free" will.

No one is compelling a person to work at a job he doesn’t like or remain in a country against his will. He actually wants to do the very things he dislikes simply because the alternative is considered worse, and he must choose something to do among the various things in his environment or else commit suicide. Therefore, when any person says he was compelled to do what he did against his will, that he didn’t want to but had to — and innumerable of our expressions say this — he is obviously confused and unconsciously dishonest with himself and others because everything man does to another is done only because he wants to do it, done to be humorous, of his own free will, which only means that his preference gave him greater satisfaction at that moment of time, for one reason or another. But remember, this desire of one thing over another is a compulsion beyond control.

Now, if the foregoing is true, it is similarly true that there is nothing your father's book can do to bring about world peace unless that is the one and only thing that is going to occur. I suppose that you could say that writing your father's book was the only thing he could have done, advocating the book is the only thing you can do, and the consequences of your father writing the book and you advocating the book will be the only thing they can be -- which either will be that world peace results or it does not. Beyond that, however, your repeated contention that Determinism is true, Free Will does not exist, and Compatibilism is wrong is, itself, incompatible with your simultaneous contention that Determinism is true and people have the ability to make decisions that involve selecting among alternatives.

You have misunderstood what is meant by "alternative." It only means the ability to contemplate options, which we do every day, all day. It does not mean we actually have a true choice when we are compelled to choose only what we consider the most preferable or what we believe is better for ourselves. We cannot move in any other direction other than what offers us the most satisfying choice, not the least, which is why it is an invariable law (NOTE: This is not prescriptive in the modal fallacy sense. The term "cause" is a problem with the present definition and not reflective of reality. It is leading to all kinds of misunderstandings, and why we will never be able to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought unless the correct definition of determinism is put forth.) You are also correct that everything my father did, he could not not have done, and the same with me, and you, and everyone else. That in itself does not mean he was wrong in his analysis.

 

[Jarhyn]

As many of us have pointed out, Bruce, trying to claim necessitation for no reason at all is still just as much an "argument from 'ungrounded necessity'".

You have not spoken to the article Pood posted, and thus failed to support your case.

Every time, regardless of whether you SAY "God", necessity has to come from somewhere, under some context of the strictly 'not necessary', or of some axiomatic assumption.

The problem here is that we can clearly identify that you have "added" an axiom of unbounded comprehension no matter where you attempt to hide it in the moment, and that will always give you the contradiction: the rod to stick in the spokes.

The rest of us have suitably shown that the language is impeccable and accurate and ironclad using compatibilist definitions. This means that the compatibilists are correct and proven.

So any difference in definitions that suddenly means that any additional to "logic" or "differences" that lead to incoherence either mean that compatibilism has a contradiction somewhere in its own definitions (which you would have found rather than calling our logic iron-clad), or that YOURS does. Seeing as you have already multiply stated that compatibilism is logically iron-clad, this places a strong obligation back on you to go on a quest to find which or both actually contains the logical error... And there MUST be one, given the disagreement on something that can only be ONE of "true" or "false".

We have found MANY logical errors, foremost the modal fallacy, and the demand that freedom itself requires nature to contradict itself at literally every moment, hiding in the Fatalist arguments, and the argument from God is so problematic that they would rather argue from bald necessity rather than staring a word that tips their hand because that bald "necessity" is still just the statement of a "comprehension" that lacked sufficient bounds or justification.

It comes down to the repeatedly begged question of what context the necessitation comes, which is clearly absent from the argument when someone doesn't say 'God'. This does not absolve an interlocutor from their obligation to put something behind necessity to avoid question-begging.

Again, I would recommend reading the article Pood linked on the subject. Long story short, "necessitation" as a stand-in for "God" is still just a stand-in for the same error.

 

[peacegirl]

Determinism is not coercive, yet the evolution of events within the system eliminate alternate actions in any given instance of decision making. Consequently, decisions are neither a matter of choice (no alternate action possible) or free will, but necessitation.

We went over this in the other thread. You’re claiming that all true statements about the world are necessarily true.

This morning, John has a choice between putting on a blue shirt and a red shirt. He puts on a blue shirt. So the statement, “John puts on a blue shirt” is true.

This morning, John thinks he has a choice between drawing a triangle with three sides and drawing a triangle with four sides. In fact, he has no choice. If he draws a triangle, it must have three sides.

“John puts on a blue shirt” is a contingent truth about the world — true at some possible worlds, false at others. It could have been otherwise. “Triangles have three sides” is a necessary truth about the world — true at all possible worlds. It could not and cannot be otherwise.

This logic is completely flawed. Of course, John’s putting on a blue shirt was contingent on what he was using to make his decision. So what? Obviously it’s not a necessary truth like a three sided triangle is a necessary truth, but it was necessary that he choose the blue shirt because any other choice, in this comparison, was less preferable based on the pros and cons he was contemplating. This compelled him to choose the blue shift that morning, rendering the red shirt an impossibility because it would have been in the direction of [dis]satisfaction, something that cannot be done. We cannot move against our very nature, which compels us to choose what we believe is the best choice in our eyes, not what others judge to be the best choice in their eyes.

Hence, this morning, John had a choice about what shirt to put on, but not about how to construct a triangle.

Let D stand for “puts on a blue shirt.” It may indeed be true that given deterministic antecedents A, B, and C, D will always follow — John will always put on a blue shirt given the determined antecedents. The key word here is “will” — he will put on a blue shirt, not must.

Determinism does not say he must. You are still stuck using the old definition, which states we are caused by antecedent events, as if we are dominoes and are not participants in the decision-making process. The confusion with words is spectacularly inaccurate, so it's no wonder this discussion has gotten nowhere, even though this discovery can move the needle in the right direction.

The definition of determinism is the philosophical and ethical doctrine that man’s choices, decisions, and actions are decided by antecedent causes, inherited or environmental, acting upon his character. According to this definition, we are not given a choice because we are being caused to do what we do by a previous event or circumstance. But I know for a fact that nothing can make me do what I make up my mind not to do, as you just mentioned a moment ago. If I don’t want to do something, nothing, not environment, heredity, or anything else you care to throw in, can make me do it because over this I have absolute control. Since I can’t be made to do anything against my will, doesn’t this make my will free? And isn’t it a contradiction to say that man’s will is not free, yet nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to do?”

“How about that? He brought out something I never would have thought of.”

“All he said was that you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink, which is undeniable; however, though it is a mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to another what he makes up his mind not to do — this is an extremely crucial point — he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment of his existence to do everything he does. This reveals, as your friend just pointed out, that man has absolute control over the former but absolutely none over the latter because he must constantly move in the direction of greater satisfaction. It is true that nothing in the past can cause what occurs in the present, for all we ever have is the present; the past and future are only words that describe a deceptive relation. Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the opposite, that man was not caused or compelled; he did it of his own accord; he wanted to do it; he didn’t have to. The term ‘free will’ contains an assumption or fallacy, for it implies that if man is not caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not mathematical, conclusions. The expression ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted due to the general ignorance that prevailed, for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because they wanted to, this in no way indicates that their will is free. In fact, I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself, which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?”

Moreover, if John does D, he requires it to be the case that D is preceded by A, B, and C. If it were not, John would have no basis for his decision; and moreover, no way to know if what he decides will in fact take place. A world at the macro level without determinism would be one in which free will is impossible. Free will requires determinism at the macro level to be true, or approximately true.

You are basing your entire logic on a definition of determinism that isn’t accurate, but you refuse to listen because you are invested in your worldview. When we are talking about true laws of nature (which determinism is, although it's not prescriptive), there is no room for approximations at the macro level. It is either true or not true. There is no in-between.

Sapolsky goes on and on about how we are “biologically determined” and hence have no free will. He says we are products not just of our conscious mind but of our subconscious, our neurons firing, our upbringing, our genes, etc. All that’s true. So what? If his aim is directed against libertarian free will, his aim is true. But what he needs to happen is for the gestalt switch to go off and realize that all these things — our conscious and subconscious, our bodies, our neurons, our upbringing, our genes — ARE us! All those things, collectively, are making choices in a deterministic macro world, in which all of us are part of the deterministic stream. He seems to want, for there to be free will, a switch in the head that would countermand what we (conscious, subconscious, bodies, neurons, upbringing, genes) — decide. If we had such a switch, THAT would be a lack of free will — the switch would override our choices!

Being able to choose does not require a switch. We can choose, everyone knows that, but it does not define free will or the ability to choose otherwise, given our heredity and environment.

Determinism, biological or otherwise, does not threaten free will, it makes free will possible in the first place. What would a world look like, in which determinism thwarted free will? Like this: John moves to put on a blue shirt this morning, but Determinism stays his hand, guiding it to the red shirt instead, even as John protests that he would prefer blue. Anyone ever see that, or anything like it, ever happen?

No.

That is not determinism Pood. It is not prescriptive, remember? It does not force John’s preferences in a direction he himself does not prefer. That is the very thing that it cannot do: force a choice against John's will. But just because it cannot force John to choose the red shirt against his will, does not mean his free will is free. Your logic is failing you.

 

[Jarhyn]

Obviously it’s not a necessary truth like a three sided triangle is a necessary truth, but it was [a] necessary [truth] that he choose the blue shirt because

I have added expanded language to clarify that necessary does mean "a necessary truth" in this context...

There is only one meaning of 'a necessary truth' that I will accept the meaning as per "a three sided triangle is a necessary truth".

I will not accept any other sense of "necessary truth".

So either it is or it isn't and you are directly stating a contradiction here.

The only thing that can necessitate truth are assumed axioms in the presence of a brute fact that cannot rule out the unaccessed or even the "locally inaccessible" as "possible".

So you end up in the same place anyone else who asserts blind necessitation and "only THIS is 'possible'" does, wherein they eventually come to commit a modal fallacy.

He could have done otherwise even after he selected the shirt right until the day in which we are considering is at a close, and then he could do otherwise the next, and he always could so long as he has the energy to acquire another shirt and put it on, and the limbs and so on he would need to accomplish it all attached in a way capable of actually wearing the shirt.

The otherwise as he could do is located in the closet or store and a trip to and from it, and the possibility rests in the potential energy that it requires to do so.

The actuality and the possibility rests between his eardrums and the events of the day.

How much freedom he has comes down to how much he can justify a change of clothing and spending all that energy, and his choices both now and in the future of whether to value frivolous or perhaps ostentatious wardrobe changes.

You might say if he is not, that he is a responsible sort, or if he does, at least he can hopefully express good reasons for his actions? Then, if he has nowhere to be and nothing to do but select a new shirt, what is it to any of us if he does or not?

He could, but there are many things he won't do at any of these points in time.

He, at least "as a person in general" can do all these things because persons in general do all those things.

He just won't do most of them. He'll do the things he does, not because he must, even as "himself" because he does otherwise yesterday and tomorrow. He has proven that "he" as a phenomena through time DOES do otherwise before and after.

 

[peacegirl]

Obviously it’s not a necessary truth like a three sided triangle is a necessary truth, but it was [a] necessary [truth] that he choose the blue shirt because

I have added expanded language to clarify that necessary does mean "a necessary truth" in this context...

There is only one meaning of 'a necessary truth' that I will accept the meaning as per "a three sided triangle is a necessary truth".

I will not accept any other sense of "necessary truth".

Maybe the phrase "necessary truth" can be left out because it goes into the modal fallacy, which this proof does not contain.

So either it is or it isn't and you are directly stating a contradiction here.

I call it a natural law of man's nature. Please don't play word games.

Once this natural law becomes a permanent condition of the environment, it will allow mankind, for the very first time, to veer in a different direction — preventing the never-ending cycle of hurt and retaliation in human relations. Although this discovery originated from philosophical thought, it is factual, not theoretical, in nature.

The only thing that can necessitate truth are assumed axioms in the presence of a brute fact that cannot rule out the unaccessed or even the "locally inaccessible" as "possible".

So leave out the phrase "necessary truth." It isn't necessary.

So you end up in the same place anyone else who asserts blind necessitation and "only THIS is 'possible'" does, wherein they eventually come to commit a modal fallacy.

There really is no modal fallacy here. I don't think you even know what this author's definition is, so we are not talking about the same thing.

He could have done otherwise even after he selected the shirt right until the day in which we are considering is at a close, and then he could do otherwise the next, and he always could so long as he has the energy to acquire another shirt and put it on, and the limbs and so on he would need to accomplish it all attached in a way capable of actually wearing the shirt.

No one is debating this, Jaryn. Next is not the same timeframe as now. I am only referring to now, this very moment. Up to the moment of choice, he could change his mind. But after he makes his choice, IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE.

The otherwise as he could do is located in the closet or store and a trip to and from it, and the possibility rests in the potential energy that it requires to do so.

No, the otherwise is at that moment, not located in the closest or store and a trip to and from it. This has nothing to do with energy because it doesn't involve a trip to the store.

The actuality and the possibility rests between his eardrums and the events of the day.

You are talking about two different things. We are talking about the moment of choice. Was that choice free or not free? We are not talking about the movement after the choice was made. This feels like a strawman.

How much freedom he has comes down to how much he can justify a change of clothing and spending all that energy, and his choices both now and in the future of whether to value frivolous or perhaps ostentatious wardrobe changes.

No. Now you are changing the definition of free entirely, typical of compatibilists. Please stick to the program.

You might say if he is not, that he is a responsible sort, or if he does, at least he can hopefully express good reasons for his actions? Then, if he has nowhere to be and nothing to do but select a new shirt, what is it to any of us if he does or not?

You're right, what is it to any of us if he does or not, but this discussion goes much deeper than choosing what shirt to wear. This is about the prevention of war and crime, which can only occur when we know the truth about our nature, which lies behind the door marked: MAN'S WILL IS NOT FREE.

He could, but there are many things he won't do at any of these points in time.

He, at least "as a person in general" can do all these things because persons in general do all those things.

He just won't do most of them. He'll do the things he does, not because he must, even as "himself" because he does otherwise yesterday and tomorrow. He has proven that "he" as a phenomena through time DOES do otherwise before and after.

Doing otherwise tomorrow is not even under discussion. We all can do other than what we chose yesterday, not because we must, but because we want to. This is called learning from the past. This in no way conflicts with the definition of determinism that this author is demonstrating. Let me repeat: We cannot do otherwise yesterday (as you stated), because we have already done it. IOW, how can we do other than what we have already done?

 

[peacegirl]

@DBT has also claimed, if I have read him correctly, than any experiment with the same initial conditions will yield the same result, with the same antecedents entailing the same outcomes. Yet this is not so. See the linked article’s discussion of ceteris paribus.

Of course it is so. If all the initial conditions were exactly the same up to today, we would get the same outcome. This does not mean we can predict the future with complete accuracy. It also has nothing to do with ceteris paribus, or “all else being equal."

Ceteris paribus - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Jarhyn]

Was that choice free or not free?

"Free", or "not free" ends up always being relative to a given boundary, through which constraint is either absent or expressed.

Thus is always the nature of autonomy.

Most such boundaries end up being "defined" by the physical structure of the thing itself: you have a boundary to your neural network that is your skull, or your eyelids, or your ability to simply not react to what you hear.

So with respect to his skull, assuming someone is not telling him at gunpoint or pulling shirts away when he tries to select them -- so, not constraining him either through the leverage on his retinas of photons containing the image of a gun, and thus the leverage of that image against his brain in a way he cannot ignore if he cares at all about his remaining goals, or through the leverage on the shirt itself as the selection is denied and the energy expended is kept insufficient to get it in his hot little hand, or some other thing -- as long as he is not constrained in such a way, his choice will be "free" with respect to "the color of shirt between blue and whatever else".

Freeness is different from a freedom or an alternative or something you can do or however you want to phrase it, in that freeness is the degree to which you have freedoms unconstrained by external forces, forces doing things outside the boundary, most notably the boundary of your skull.

In this way people have freedoms, but having freedoms is hard: you have to do work to make or buy the shirts to have the options, you have to work to know how or where to acquire or make one, and you have to make sure nobody walks off with it and drags it out of your reach.

If you want to pick some other boundary, the answer may be different (such as to indicate the entirety of the "tableau"). The relationships I just discussed do not go away or disappear when that other relative view is taken, however; they remain just as valid and true about that moment and the previously identified context.

At any rate, I brought up the clear contradiction right at the start of your post because if I can't even get past the start of a post without having a contradiction brought up, I'm just going to assume the rest is hopeless.

 

[DBT]

As many of us have pointed out, Bruce, trying to claim necessitation for no reason at all is still just as much an "argument from 'ungrounded necessity'".

Your 'pointing out' has no merit. Necessitation is implied in the given definition of determinism, where the definition represents how the world works if it is deterministic.

It's there in your own definition; ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Determinism

As all events evolve as they must without deviation, there are no possible alternate actions. Consequently, determinism does not permit more than one realizable option in any given instance of decision making or action.

Without realizable alternate options, where lies the choice?

 

[peacegirl]

Was that choice free or not free?

"Free", or "not free" ends up always being relative to a given boundary, through which constraint is either absent or expressed.

Thus is always the nature of autonomy.

You are, once again, changing what the definition of "free will" means in this debate. We all know that there are limitations in what choices a person has, depending on many factors, but this does not mean his will is free in any sense of the word. He must choose, within those boundaries, what choice is better in his eyes. This is not a free choice or he could choose either/or. If he was given a choice, in the author's example, to die without feeling any pain, or dying by being held under water and suffering, the meaningful difference between these two choices would COMPEL him to choose the former. Autonomy, meaning independence of the will, is impossible if will is not free, but it could be used to mean without undue force or influence. Are you purposely being vague?

Imagine that you were taken prisoner in wartime for espionage and condemned to death but mercifully given a choice between two exits: A is the painless hemlock of Socrates, while B is death by having your head held under water. The letters A and B, representing small or large differences, are compared. The comparison is absolutely necessary to know which is preferable. The difference that is considered favorable, regardless of the reason, is the compulsion of greater satisfaction desire is forced to take, which makes one of them an impossible choice in this comparison simply because it gives less satisfaction under the circumstances. Consequently, since B is an impossible choice, man is not free to choose A. Is it humanly possible, provided no other conditions are introduced to affect your decision, to prefer exit B if A is offered as an alternative?

“Yes, if this meant that those I loved would not be harmed in any way.”

“Well, if this was your preference under these conditions, could you prefer the other alternative?”

“No, I couldn’t, but this is ridiculous because you really haven’t given me any choice.”

“You most certainly do have a choice, and if your will is free, you should be able to choose B just as well as A, or A just as well as B. In other words, if B is considered the greater evil in this comparison of alternatives, one is compelled, completely beyond control, to prefer A. It is impossible for B to be selected in this comparison (although it could be chosen over something still worse) as long as A is available as an alternative. Consequently, since B is an impossible choice, you are not free to choose A, for your preference is a natural compulsion of the direction of life over which you have absolutely no control. Let me explain this in another way. Once it is understood that life is compelled to move in the direction of satisfaction, and if two such alternatives were presented to you as in the example above, what choice would you possibly have but to accept the lesser of two evils? Since it is absolutely impossible to prefer something considered still worse in your opinion, regardless of what it is, are you not compelled, completely beyond your control in this set of circumstances, to prefer A? And since the definition of free will states that man can choose good over evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion since B was evil, as the worse alternative, and could not be selected in this comparison of possibilities?

The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences; otherwise, there would be no choice in the matter at all, as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word ‘choice’ is very misleading, for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration, he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved. Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point, he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself, and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all.

Most such boundaries end up being "defined" by the physical structure of the thing itself: you have a boundary to your neural network that is your skull, or your eyelids, or your ability to simply not react to what you hear.

Not reacting to what you hear does not grant you free will. It is a decision by you that could not have been otherwise at that moment, given those particular options.

So with respect to his skull, assuming someone is not telling him at gunpoint or pulling shirts away when he tries to select them -- so, not constraining him either through the leverage on his retinas of photons containing the image of a gun, and thus the leverage of that image against his brain in a way he cannot ignore if he cares at all about his remaining goals, or through the leverage on the shirt itself as the selection is denied and the energy expended is kept insufficient to get it in his hot little hand, or some other thing -- as long as he is not constrained in such a way, his choice will be "free" with respect to "the color of shirt between blue and whatever else".

Why reduce your argument to whether a person understands his choices based on the health of his eyes to see the difference between red and blue? This is getting more and more ridiculous and I think you know it. Being unconstrained by these problems with his retina that would impede his ability to make a choice in no way gives him the free will to choose otherwise. This is the fundamental basis of this longstanding argument: whether or not a person could have chosen otherwise given the same exact same conditions, and it is impossible, for it would be a movement that is the antithesis to life itself.

To be free, according to the definition of free will, man would be able to prefer one of two alternatives, either the one he wants or the one he doesn’t want, which is an absolute impossibility because selecting what he doesn’t want when what he does want is available as an alternative is a motion in the direction of dissatisfaction. In other words, if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible.

Freeness is different from a freedom or an alternative or something you can do or however you want to phrase it, in that freeness is the degree to which you have freedoms unconstrained by external forces, forces doing things outside the boundary, most notably the boundary of your skull.

This is a fabricated definition by compatibilists who are trying desperately to fit this freedom in in order to hold onto the status quo, so that we can still blame and punish those who do wrong in our eyes. I get it, Jaryn, but the way compatibilists are going about it is obviously a contradiction. There is no way free will and determinism can be made to be compatible just by changing what they decide is free will. But the good news is this glaring flaw in their definition does not mean moral responsibility is lost. It actually increases, but you will have to give up your notion that by some magic trick (of definition) it is now possible to assign responsibility to some and not to others.

In this way people have freedoms, but having freedoms is hard: you have to do work to make or buy the shirts to have the options, you have to work to know how or where to acquire or make one, and you have to make sure nobody walks off with it and drags it out of your reach.

Again, this is a semantic shift if I ever saw one. This IS NOT the free will under discussion. Just because a person has access to buy the shirts or not does not give him freedom of the will or take it away.

If you want to pick some other boundary, the answer may be different (such as to indicate the entirety of the "tableau"). The relationships I just discussed do not go away or disappear when that other relative view is taken, however; they remain just as valid and true about that moment and the previously identified context.

At any rate, I brought up the clear contradiction right at the start of your post because if I can't even get past the start of a post without having a contradiction brought up, I'm just going to assume the rest is hopeless.

Sorry but it is YOU that is being contradictory, and now you're trying to shift the responsibility to others for what you think is their lack of understanding when it is yours alone.

 

[pood]

To me this discussion has devolved into a great big exercise in pounding sand,

I’ve stated my position endlessly and will summarize it one more time. Then others can squabble over it if they choose.

I am basically a Humean or neo-Humean compatibilist. Among other things this means that I reject the idea that the “laws” of nature are laws at all, or that they somehow “govern” the universe or our actions.

The “laws” are not prescriptions, they are descriptions. They are not, as mentioned in the article linked earlier, “pushy explainers.”

In addition, I reject the claim of “physical necessity” as unevidenced or superfluous. I recognize only logical necessity. Given a choice between Coke or Pepsi, it is obviously logically possible that I can choose either. It is also physically possible because I see no evidence for any modal category called “physical necessity.”

So when someone claims something like, “the laws of nature, in conjunction with antecedent events, entail all future outcomes,” I reject the premise of the first clause and I reject the conclusion.

That the past, present and future are all fixed I have no doubt. However, as I have repeatedly pointed out, fixity is not fatalism. We, by our free acts, do our bit to help fix the past, present, and future. Free will does not require us to have the ability to change past, present, or future — only the ability to help make things be as they were, are, and will be.

Finally, this “could” or “could not have done otherwise” discussion is a red herring. I have repeatedly stated my position, that given certain antecedents, I WILL do a certain thing; I just deny that I MUST, for that is a modal fallacy.

Besides, how do you know that I could not have done otherwise, given the exact same circumstances? You don’t — there is no test you can run to determine this. This is an entirely question-begging hard determinist assumption.

However, I am not an agent-causal libertarian because I do not believe that our actions are entirely severed from antecedents.

I strongly recommend Carrier’s essay that I linked, but have my doubts that anyone has read it. It seems some in this discussion are just intent on peddling their unevidenced bromides. For example, I have repeatedly asked @DBT how the Big Bang composes symphonies, writes novels, etc., for that is really the substance of his position. He claims he has answered the question, but as explained, his answers are always actually evasions.