According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[peacegirl]

BSilvEsq said:
If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

This is not easy. It would be like an equation that looks perfect but in order to prove it, they actually have to use it. The same holds true here. If the two-sided equation turns out to be right, short of a population that has instituted these principles, we will have to bite the bullet and transition to this new world to prove that he was, in fact, correct. It really isn't that hard to grasp once you understand why the desire to hurt others (with a first blow) will no longer be considered as a preferable option.

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

None of these observations discredit the macro world of human relations that are not chaotic at all. They are driven by human's natures need to self-preserve.

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

I hope so, too, because I'm exhausted from the attacks that have no validity at all.

 

[Jarhyn]

I should probably note a third purpose noise can be used for, in terms of validating the source of a message, however this is also an "adversarial" concept.

In such situations, the ability to create some noise according to a shared secret using the message itself itself to generate output that is the combination of the entropy of a shared secret and the message itself: hashes.

By playing the message itself through the shared secret's entropy, you get a signal that is MUCH more mathematically difficult to correctly "spoof" or "fake", as the ends have the secret, and the middleman does not.

Again, this is only a useful element on systems where the "messages in flight" are both in an "accessible space" where the encoding of the messages is known, and where the link layer between the systemic elements is injectable.

This Hashing nvolves throwing away information from the problem space in chaotic ways so as to make it not even contain all the information necessary to replicate the inputs: there is a relational rather than functional relationship between hashes to messages that produce the hash, creating a problem of undecidability that prevents understanding the "hashing algorithm" and "salt" from being reverse engineered through those myriad chaotic decisions points.

In literature on the subject, these are called "collisions", and can be a feature or a bug depending on the hashing strategy used: if you use an unsalted hash that doesn't make it "one time", you can replay a message with its hash, defeating the hardening of the system.

Again, while this comes up in maintaining the freedom of systems when an adversary has access to modify, add, or express similar messages on the line, that wasn't a requirement for observing "freedoms" and "wills", merely for "hardening them against attack".

 

[steve_bank]

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

As I said before it compatibilism down to a moral issue. Do people have responsibility for actions.

Under causal determinism the answer should be no. If every action including our brain cells are set then our individual behavior is set. We have no control.

That some my become drug addicts is predetermined. That some drug addicts may kick addiction is also predetermined.

1. Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism

Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016). What we see here is not a unified front in the face of the incompatibilist challenge(s). Instead, compatibilists have been careful to identify the precise elements of incompatibilists’ arguments that they take to be erroneous, and then build their respective theories of freedom and responsibility with that in mind.

To help better situate compatibilist theories, we will now consider in more detail the arguments that incompatibilists have advanced on behalf of their own theories, since it is these arguments that have shaped the contours of compatibilist theories. As we mentioned above, the truth of causal determinism apparently poses a problem for freedom and responsibility in at least two ways. First, it might entail that no one has the freedom to do otherwise, which is a kind of power or control over one’s actions that many have regarded as necessary for moral responsibility. Second, it might entail that no one is the ultimate causal source of his or her actions. That our actions originate in our free will and not in forces outside of us also seems like a plausible condition on morally responsible agency. We take each of these potential threats in turn.

Note it is causal determinism.

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism

According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

As is common in philosophies there is no singular compatibilism.

In the end it does come down to the practical workings of the universe. The universe does not work IAW our laws of science, laws of science are how we conceptualize reality as we see it.

Our ability to conceptualize is limited by o0ir brains. We may not be able to conceptualize how the inverse works.

Not hard to see. The brain of goldfish is not likely to imagine quantum mechanics. Our brains are more sophisticated but still limited.

I do not see any fundamental problem with compatibilism, in terms of physical reality. Based on what we do know I speculate that we can have free will with what we see as physical reality.

I can see curability as in a game of pool without there being a universal causal determinism.


The black and white dichotomy of causal determinism and free will excludes something in between.

In the 19th century time and space were seen in terms of absolute Newtonian physics. Aolng came relativity and quantum physics.

Free will meaning active personal agency and control over one;s actions and causal determinism are by definition mutually exclusive.

 

[peacegirl]

BSilvEsq said:

If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

PEACEGIRL: There doesn't have to be anything other than whatever is determined to occur. There just has to be a change in environment based on human progress. This has nothing to do with free will.

Many theories as to how world peace could be achieved have been proposed, yet war has once again taken its deadly toll in the 21st century. The dream of peace has remained an unattainable goal — until now. The following pages reveal a scientific discovery regarding a psychological law of man’s nature never before understood. This finding was hidden so successfully behind layers of dogma and misunderstanding that no one knew a deeper truth existed. Once this natural law becomes a permanent condition of the environment, it will allow mankind, for the very first time, to veer in a different direction — preventing the never-ending cycle of hurt and retaliation in human relations. Although this discovery originated from philosophical thought, it is factual, not theoretical, in nature.

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

This whole idea that nature could determine what our questions are, guiding our questions such that we would arrive at a false picture of nature, is based on the standard definition, so it doesn't really relate. Again, determinism does not take away the ability to act on our desires and wishes, or to interfere with an experiment, causing a false picture of nature. Moreover, quantum physics (which I know very little about) is insufficient to change determinism into the kind of free will that allows us to act otherwise on a macro level.

I will now refute two common mechanisms proposed by free will advocates to allow for free will. Firstly, the stochastic nature of quantum mechanics is often cited as a means by which the universe can be considered non-deterministic. This is true, at least for very small systems. However, it is actually unimportant whether or not quantum mechanical fluctuations result in any appreciable uncertainty in macroscopic systems. This is because the argument is based on the notion that a lack of determinism would prove the existence of free will. However, more accurately an agent being non-deterministic is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for free will. This mechanism merely introduces randomization into the decisions and will of the agent, this is not the same thing as freedom of will or choice. In fact, this randomization could potentially infringe upon their freedom of choice. To make this idea clearer, consider a game of roulette. Suppose that each number on the wheel is assigned to a different choice. The roulette wheel in spun and the agent makes the choice corresponding to the number the ball stops on. We could also play this game to determine the state of will of an agent, to the same effect. It is clear to our intuition that the choice and will of the agent are not free, though the outcome is unpredictable. This analogy could be criticized on the basis that it does not properly capture the nature of our non-deterministic decision-making. In particular, the spinning roulette wheel is independent of the agent, whereas the uncertainty of quantum mechanics directly involves the agent since it acts directly on their brain. Nevertheless, whether or not the random event directly involves the agent does not change the situation in any meaningful way. We could involve the agent directly in the random event by having them spin the roulette wheel, for instance. To our intuition it is clear that the outcome selected by the wheel would still be random and not represent free will.

An argument against free will: freedom of choice, but not of will

A central issue in the free will debate is confusion and disagreement about how the term is defined. The topic is clarified considerably when we distinguish freedom of choice from freedom of will. I...

www.sciencesnail.com

PEACEGIRL: This is an issue of epistemology, which deems that observation and reasoning are valid ways in the search for truth. Science does not always have to begin with a hypothesis but rather with observation and reasoning.

https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=8cab...bWV0aG9kcy1mb3ItZGlzY292ZXJpbmctdHJ1dGg&ntb=1

In epistemology, the relationship between knowledge and truth is complex and multifaceted. While some theories suggest that finding the truth may start with a hypothesis, others propose that knowledge can be justified through non-hypothesis-based reasoning. Theories such as verificationism and non-solipsistic justification argue that truth is determined by the verification of propositions and the reliability of beliefs, respectively.

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

PEACEGIRL: This is not true. He obviously is thinking in terms of a definition using a modal fallacy that we are zombies and have no ability to think because we are controlled by something outside of ourselves.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

PEACEGIRL: There may be no right or wrong when it comes to a universe that is totally deterministic, but that does not mean this precludes a way to change the conditions that lead to hurt in human relations.

This natural law, which reveals a fantastic mankind system, was hidden so successfully behind a camouflage of ostensible truths that it is no wonder the development of our present age was required to find it. By discovering this well-concealed law and demonstrating its power, a catalyst, so to speak, is introduced into human relations that compels a fantastic change in the direction our nature has been traveling, performing what will be called miracles, though they do not transcend the laws of nature. The same nature that permits the most heinous crimes and all the other evils of human relations is going to veer so sharply in a different direction that all nations on this planet, once the leaders and their subordinates understand the principles involved, will unite in such a way that no more wars will ever again be possible. If this is difficult to conceive, does it mean you have a desire to dismiss what I have to say as nonsense? If it does, then you have done what I tried to prevent, that is, jumped to a premature conclusion. And the reason must be that you judged such a permanent solution as impossible and therefore not deserving of further consideration, which is a normal reaction, if anything, when my claims are analyzed and compared to our present understanding of human nature. War seems to be an inescapable feature of the human condition that can only be subdued, not eradicated. But we must insert a question mark between the empirical fact that a feature is characteristic of human life as we know it and the empirical claim that this feature is a sociologicalnevitability.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted

PEACEGIRL: Sorry for any confusion in which posts were mine. I hope my answers will provide more clarity for you as time goes by. Trying to explain these principles in this type of format is challenging indeed. I hope I am able, at the very least, to pique your interest before throwing in the towel.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

As I said before it compatibilism down to a moral issue. Do people have responsibility for actions.

Under causal determinism the answer should be no. If every action including our brain cells are set then our individual behavior is set. We have no control.

That some my become drug addicts is predetermined. That some drug addicts may kick addiction is also predetermined.

1. Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism

Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016). What we see here is not a unified front in the face of the incompatibilist challenge(s). Instead, compatibilists have been careful to identify the precise elements of incompatibilists’ arguments that they take to be erroneous, and then build their respective theories of freedom and responsibility with that in mind.

To help better situate compatibilist theories, we will now consider in more detail the arguments that incompatibilists have advanced on behalf of their own theories, since it is these arguments that have shaped the contours of compatibilist theories. As we mentioned above, the truth of causal determinism apparently poses a problem for freedom and responsibility in at least two ways. First, it might entail that no one has the freedom to do otherwise, which is a kind of power or control over one’s actions that many have regarded as necessary for moral responsibility. Second, it might entail that no one is the ultimate causal source of his or her actions. That our actions originate in our free will and not in forces outside of us also seems like a plausible condition on morally responsible agency. We take each of these potential threats in turn.

Note it is causal determinism.

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism

According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

As is common in philosophies there is no singular compatibilism.

In the end it does come down to the practical workings of the universe. The universe does not work IAW our laws of science, laws of science are how we conceptualize reality as we see it.

Our ability to conceptualize is limited by o0ir brains. We may not be able to conceptualize how the inverse works.

Not hard to see. The brain of goldfish is not likely to imagine quantum mechanics. Our brains are more sophisticated but still limited.

I do not see any fundamental problem with compatibilism, in terms of physical reality. Based on what we do know I speculate that we can have free will with what we see as physical reality.

I can see curability as in a game of pool without there being a universal causal determinism.


The black and white dichotomy of causal determinism and free will excludes something in between.

In the 19th century time and space were seen in terms of absolute Newtonian physics. Aolng came relativity and quantum physics.

Free will meaning active personal agency and control over one;s actions and causal determinism are by definition mutually exclusive.

I agree 100% with everything in the post above.

Well stated!

 

[BSilvEsq]

An open question to all posters on this thread with whom I have locked horns from time-to-time:

Is it even conceivable to you that something might persuade you that the beliefs about which you have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which I (and some others) have been writing are correct?​

If the answer is "No" then what is the point in continuing the discussion?

For myself, I state without hesitation that it not only is conceivable to me that something might persuade me that the beliefs about which I have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which others have been writing are correct, but I sincerely hope to see that occur.

 

[Jarhyn]

And I will reiterate: this is all the fruit of having taken a few sessions of a course on cryptography some 10 years ago, along with a lifelong understanding and accounting of the roles of RNGs in software problems.

While most people will encounter "randomness" in software early simply because of its role in generating more "robust" adversarial activities (hardening the game itself against the player's efforts), most programmers won't be applying that to serious problems until "adversaries" enter the conversation. It's not really an issue in the "mind as a black box" view where those problems are "obscured" from view, or where the link layer of such a message is inaccessible, or where an adversary lacks the complexity necessary to reverse engineer, replicate, and 'game' the player.

I would condescend and ask whether this is really such a hard topic to understand, but the fact is that yes, it's a really hard topic to understand. Pretty much every protocol I have ever approached in any "early" attempt has issues where hashes are not used where they should be, or are not salted properly, or are left unencrypted. I have gotten up to SO many hijinks because of how people are ignorant of these things.

This doesn't prevent the existence of a will or freedoms from existing, but it does create a massive exploit in the autonomous segments that lack such "hardening". If I can just walk up to a traffic light and say "turn green" and it does every time immediately, all group turn based traffic breaks everywhere for everyone.

Compatibilism as I have presented it works, indicates responsibilities, and puts them into well ordered language that causes contradictions only when things are strictly untrue.

Libertarian and Fatalist formulations simply do not work as advertised.

I think I've adequately accounted for the lack of necessity of just-so "random" or "specific noise" events to account for anything important in the role of thought.

The ability to recognize something as the result of "just-so specific noise" actually defeats the purpose of the noise in the first place, with regards to adversarial activities: it lets you cancel the equation of the noise, so as to ignore attacks; and it allows you to XOR away the noise of an encryption to get the plaintext; and it allows you to identify the underlying truth of parts of the system, allowing you to actively game an opponent and play "mind games" rather than engaging in "simple play".

This is largely the context and activity of "hacking" or perhaps "Hijacking": the act of gaining control over a system (as opposed to just "applying clever solutions to problems"), such that someone can generate noise relative to some action of a system such that the noise imposes a sensible instruction.

One of the reasons I brought up the discussion of signal and noise is specifically that Libertarian Free Will proposes a "mind" mediated into the material world by some manner of "cosmic noise". And note, I'm not even calling it "randomness" because of it were random, there would be no means for it to "hijack" the meat with a signal.

But then if we have a signal and laws that formulate it and we can compose a machine that does that out of neurons rather than "cosmic whatever-it-is", and whenever we really zoom in on the "cosmic whatever-it-is" that seems to happen, it is completely devoid of anything signal-like... Then it seems that this simply would not be the case.

When dealing with "naive" interactions where the opponents are not playing "mind games" (or incapable of it), we can look and see the freedoms of the system, regardless of how those freedoms will later be constrained by the system's action to produce some singular result at a different time.

Without the statement of "necessity", everything works, contingent on the assumptions.

With the addition of this "necessity" something breaks.

I have posed that this "necessity" is just "the deity" hiding in the shadows.

As other posters have mentioned, the amount of activity imposed "apparently randomly" by quantum-scale "unpredictable" events, of "seeing over a horizon for the first time" is small but present. This means that not just on the large scale, but on the small scale, a system quiet and cold enough to detect such events happening would have a really good supply of "adversarially useful entropy", but it would not have a supply of "freedom with which to make decisions" except when that freedom is granted by "hardening" using said entropy with respect to an adversary.

Randomness and chaos and noise are how we keep secrets using a secret, though this is just a restatement in different terms that "'random' XOR 'anything' becomes 'different random' such that 'different random' XOR 'random' becomes 'anything'."

In some respects libertarians seem to be demanding "perfect adversarial unplayability" as a requirement for "freedom": the absence of any possibility of others controlling or constraining you via "mind games", in the presence of the ability to mind-game anything else.

Sadly, that doesn't exist. Reverse engineering the parts of the mind to find the recorded secrets, and such secrets must be recorded to be useful; even the most secure sort of encryption, the one-time pad, does not protect against a third party that has the pad.

What you get, instead, is not absolute autonomy to decide everything about everyone everywhere, or utter freedom of thought from mind games and manipulators. Instead, most things have some relative amount of autonomy, where it's hard or only "implausible" to game them rather than "impossible".

This puts reality into this "middle" space where you have as much freedom as you can keep others from taking, and you select among these freedoms for yourself.

But again, this is not how we found our freedoms, but how we protect them in the face of others who want to eat our dinners.

 

[bilby]

BSilvEsq said:
If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

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Finally, a post that makes a bit more sense than usual.

At least it's easier to ignore, when it looks like this:

 

[bilby]

An open question to all posters on this thread with whom I have locked horns from time-to-time:

Is it even conceivable to you that something might persuade you that the beliefs about which you have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which I (and some others) have been writing are correct?​

If the answer is "No" then what is the point in continuing the discussion?

For myself, I state without hesitation that it not only is conceivable to me that something might persuade me that the beliefs about which I have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which others have been writing are correct, but I sincerely hope to see that occur.

Is it even conceivable to you that something might persuade you that the beliefs about which you have been writing are wrong​

Absolutely. Evidence always trumps belief; Any good evidence that my position is wrong will cause me to revise my positions.

and/or that the contrary beliefs about which I (and some others) have been writing are correct?​

There is no way to retrieve correctness for a claim that has been shown to entail a contradiction. Demonstrably false claims remain false forever - the only way to revise them is to show that the demonstration was faulty.

If you believe A, and I believe B, and the truth is C, and I have shown that A is false via evidence X, then if you show B to be false, I might change my opinion to C (or maybe to D, which is still false), but I am not going to start believing A.

For that, you would need to show that X is wrong/mistaken/unapplicable, not that B is false.

In summary, I might be wrong, and am open to that possibility, but I reject the false dichotomy that says if I am wrong, then you are right. We might both be wrong.

 

[peacegirl]

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

As I said before it compatibilism down to a moral issue. Do people have responsibility for actions.

Under causal determinism the answer should be no. If every action including our brain cells are set then our individual behavior is set. We have no control.

That some my become drug addicts is predetermined. That some drug addicts may kick addiction is also predetermined.

1. Free Will and the Problem of Causal Determinism

Compatibilism emerges as a response to a problem posed by causal determinism. But what problem is that? Well, suppose, as the thesis of causal determinism tells us, that everything that occurs is the inevitable result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past. If this is the case, then everything human agents do flows from the laws of nature and the way the world was in the distant past. But if what we do is simply the consequence of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past—then we cannot do anything other than what we ultimately do. Nor are we in any meaningful sense the ultimate causal source of our actions, since they have their causal origins in the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Determinism therefore seems to prevent human agents from having the freedom to do otherwise, and it also seems to prevent them from being the sources of their actions. If either of these is true, then it’s doubtful that human agents are free or responsible for their actions in any meaningful sense.

These lines of argument, which have been regimented in the work of Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1975, 1983), Wisdom (1934), Mele (1995), and Pereboom (1995, 2001), among many others, present a real problem for those who are inclined to think that we are free and responsible for our choices and actions and that the natural world might operate as a deterministic system (or if not completely deterministic, one in which an indeterminism is merely stochastic noise that is causally irrelevant at the level of human agency). How to respond to such arguments? On the one hand, incompatibilists accept (some version of at least one of) these arguments and so insist that our self-conception as free and responsible agents would be seriously misguided if causal determinism turns out to be true. Some incompatibilists argue for these conclusions indirectly—first by arguing that determinism precludes freedom or control and then second by arguing that such freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. Other incompatibilists argue directly that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016). What we see here is not a unified front in the face of the incompatibilist challenge(s). Instead, compatibilists have been careful to identify the precise elements of incompatibilists’ arguments that they take to be erroneous, and then build their respective theories of freedom and responsibility with that in mind.

To help better situate compatibilist theories, we will now consider in more detail the arguments that incompatibilists have advanced on behalf of their own theories, since it is these arguments that have shaped the contours of compatibilist theories. As we mentioned above, the truth of causal determinism apparently poses a problem for freedom and responsibility in at least two ways. First, it might entail that no one has the freedom to do otherwise, which is a kind of power or control over one’s actions that many have regarded as necessary for moral responsibility. Second, it might entail that no one is the ultimate causal source of his or her actions. That our actions originate in our free will and not in forces outside of us also seems like a plausible condition on morally responsible agency. We take each of these potential threats in turn.

Note it is causal determinism.

2.1 Freedom According to Classical Compatibilism

According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes offers an exemplary expression of classical compatibilism when he claims that a person’s freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). On this view, freedom involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists’ benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some external source to act contrary to one’s will.

As is common in philosophies there is no singular compatibilism.

In the end it does come down to the practical workings of the universe. The universe does not work IAW our laws of science, laws of science are how we conceptualize reality as we see it.

Our ability to conceptualize is limited by o0ir brains. We may not be able to conceptualize how the inverse works.

Not hard to see. The brain of goldfish is not likely to imagine quantum mechanics. Our brains are more sophisticated but still limited.

I do not see any fundamental problem with compatibilism, in terms of physical reality. Based on what we do know I speculate that we can have free will with what we see as physical reality.

I can see curability as in a game of pool without there being a universal causal determinism.


The black and white dichotomy of causal determinism and free will excludes something in between.

In the 19th century time and space were seen in terms of absolute Newtonian physics. Aolng came relativity and quantum physics.

Free will meaning active personal agency and control over one;s actions and causal determinism are by definition mutually exclusive.

I agree 100% with everything in the post above.

Well stated!

Compatibilists create their own definition (a semantic shift) to try to bridge the gap between determinism and free will by limiting those who would be considered morally responsible and those who wouldn't be. Someone with OCD, having an addiction, or being forced by having a gun to their head would get a free pass. Regardless of the definitions they use (making their type of free will worth having; and regardless of the different types of compatibilist theories out there), it all goes back to finding a way to keep moral responsibility intact. The conundrum for them is trying to avoid cognitive/dissonance because, in reality, there is no way these two worldviews can be made compatible without a serious contradiction in terms. What this author has done is to demonstrate how determinism can be reconciled with "doing of one's accord" but without contradiction, and by showing with this new understanding, how moral responsibility (doing that which hurts no one) increases tenfold.

Before I show how it is possible to resolve the implications, it is necessary to repeat that I will proceed in a step-by-step manner. This dragon has been guarding an invisible key and door for many years, and this could never be made visible except for someone who saw these undeniable relations. If, therefore, you would like to learn that Man Does Not Stand Alone, as Morrison understood from his scientific observations, and that God, this Supreme Intelligence, is a mathematical reality of infinite wisdom, then what do you say we begin our voyage that will literally change the entire world. We are not interested in opinions and theories regardless of where they originate, just in the truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own free will (of our own desire because we want to) is done absolutely and positively not of our own free will. Remember, by proving that determinism, as the opposite of free will, is true, we also establish undeniable proof that free will is false.” So, without further ado, let us begin.

 

[BSilvEsq]

If, therefore, you would like to learn that Man Does Not Stand Alone, as Morrison understood from his scientific observations, and that God, this Supreme Intelligence, is a mathematical reality of infinite wisdom, then what do you say we begin our voyage that will literally change the entire world.

By removing the comma clauses and metaphorical introduction, I read the above quoted sentence to say that by reading the book the reader will learn that "God . . . is a mathematical reality." As open as I am not practically any possibility, including the possibility that God exists, I have an incredibly small window of willingness to consider the possibility that the existence of God can be proved, much less mathematically. Before I would be willing to devote my time to a book that makes such an ambitious claim, I would require a summary that provides sufficient detail to at least provide a glimpse of the basis for the claim and not simply a declaration that it is so.

 

[Jarhyn]

there is no explanation for how Free Will emerged ex nihilo

Ok, so, first, this supposes that "nihilo" exists, existed, and that it can exist or could have ever.

It assumes properties of "nothing" when "nothing" has no properties that we could hope to understand.

Your whinge about lacking knowledge of what caused the universe mirrors a common creationist trope in the argument from creation: "atheism doesn't explain how existence emerged ex nihilo, so it must be god".

You don't need to explain how or why a system comes to be to point to some element of it existing as it does, however.

The universe exists as a "brute" fact across whatever spaces it occupies, occupied, and will occupy, but "now" is never at the same place as "then" and "here" is never at the same place as "there", and that the structure of "nothing" may simply be unstable such that it breaks into things. That said, this implies "now" exists in many different locations.

If we want to answer pithy explanation, "it just fucking does". It looks like a "Goddidit" to me, though.

In the past I expected that in some probabilistic way, everything that can create the universe does create the universe whenever it creates the universe, where "the universe" just means "these laws on this field up to the horizon so far as has been revealed of some aperiodic patch. I admit it could be something like a Schrodinger's box entanglement state, wherein the structure becomes resolved into a more constrained wave/particle as the "observation" is forced to resolve. It could still be this way, even as a deterministic system.

But now, I expect it's like the future: Only one did (just as only one will happen wherever any instance of any relatively autonomous structure exists) but "which one" is just absolutely pointless to ask. We'll know if and when the simulation is "pierced" if it's a simulation, and if we are there to see it and talk about it.

We might be able to actually describe possible origins for our own universe: what events come to simulate it or something like it, but that still doesn't actually even resolve the problem for us. Maybe it tells us how to test for that specific origin, but probably not.

Occam's razor advises that it's always best to assume the simplest explanation: the one with fewest assumptions, the one with the fewest elements. For a whole closed simulation, it's the one where this just exists as it does where it does and that's just how it is and how it's gonna be, but not because it necessarily has to be.

...Then you test the snot out of that to see if there's more to it, and how you might come to observe that.

But the point is, looking there for answers is just pointless. Instead, it's up to us to understand the brute facts of our existence as it presents before us, without arguing from our ignorance as to "why", that such brute facts as are before us cannot exist.

 

[BSilvEsq]

there is no explanation for how Free Will emerged ex nihilo

Ok, so, first, this supposes that "nihilo" exists, existed, and that it can exist or could have ever.

It assumes properties of "nothing" when "nothing" has no properties that we could hope to understand.

Your whinge about lacking knowledge of what caused the universe mirrors a common creationist trope in the argument from creation: "atheism doesn't explain how existence emerged ex nihilo, so it must be god".

You don't need to explain how or why a system comes to be to point to some element of it existing as it does, however.

The universe exists as a "brute" fact across whatever spaces it occupies, occupied, and will occupy, but "now" is never at the same place as "then" and "here" is never at the same place as "there", and that the structure of "nothing" may simply be unstable such that it breaks into things. That said, this implies "now" exists in many different locations.

If we want to answer pithy explanation, "it just fucking does". It looks like a "Goddidit" to me, though.

In the past I expected that in some probabilistic way, everything that can create the universe does create the universe whenever it creates the universe, where "the universe" just means "these laws on this field up to the horizon so far as has been revealed of some aperiodic patch. I admit it could be something like a Schrodinger's box entanglement state, wherein the structure becomes resolved into a more constrained wave/particle as the "observation" is forced to resolve. It could still be this way, even as a deterministic system.

But now, I expect it's like the future: Only one did (just as only one will happen wherever any instance of any relatively autonomous structure exists) but "which one" is just absolutely pointless to ask. We'll know if and when the simulation is "pierced" if it's a simulation, and if we are there to see it and talk about it.

We might be able to actually describe possible origins for our own universe: what events come to simulate it or something like it, but that still doesn't actually even resolve the problem for us. Maybe it tells us how to test for that specific origin, but probably not.

Occam's razor advises that it's always best to assume the simplest explanation: the one with fewest assumptions, the one with the fewest elements. For a whole closed simulation, it's the one where this just exists as it does where it does and that's just how it is and how it's gonna be, but not because it necessarily has to be.

...Then you test the snot out of that to see if there's more to it, and how you might come to observe that.

But the point is, looking there for answers is just pointless. Instead, it's up to us to understand the brute facts of our existence as it presents before us, without arguing from our ignorance as to "why", that such brute facts as are before us cannot exist.

I truly appreciate the reply, and I also appreciate the prose. It is a story that hangs together.

In the end, however, it is just a story that is more probably a fairy tale than an accurate explanation.

 

[Jarhyn]

there is no explanation for how Free Will emerged ex nihilo

Ok, so, first, this supposes that "nihilo" exists, existed, and that it can exist or could have ever.

It assumes properties of "nothing" when "nothing" has no properties that we could hope to understand.

Your whinge about lacking knowledge of what caused the universe mirrors a common creationist trope in the argument from creation: "atheism doesn't explain how existence emerged ex nihilo, so it must be god".

You don't need to explain how or why a system comes to be to point to some element of it existing as it does, however.

The universe exists as a "brute" fact across whatever spaces it occupies, occupied, and will occupy, but "now" is never at the same place as "then" and "here" is never at the same place as "there", and that the structure of "nothing" may simply be unstable such that it breaks into things. That said, this implies "now" exists in many different locations.

If we want to answer pithy explanation, "it just fucking does". It looks like a "Goddidit" to me, though.

In the past I expected that in some probabilistic way, everything that can create the universe does create the universe whenever it creates the universe, where "the universe" just means "these laws on this field up to the horizon so far as has been revealed of some aperiodic patch. I admit it could be something like a Schrodinger's box entanglement state, wherein the structure becomes resolved into a more constrained wave/particle as the "observation" is forced to resolve. It could still be this way, even as a deterministic system.

But now, I expect it's like the future: Only one did (just as only one will happen wherever any instance of any relatively autonomous structure exists) but "which one" is just absolutely pointless to ask. We'll know if and when the simulation is "pierced" if it's a simulation, and if we are there to see it and talk about it.

We might be able to actually describe possible origins for our own universe: what events come to simulate it or something like it, but that still doesn't actually even resolve the problem for us. Maybe it tells us how to test for that specific origin, but probably not.

Occam's razor advises that it's always best to assume the simplest explanation: the one with fewest assumptions, the one with the fewest elements. For a whole closed simulation, it's the one where this just exists as it does where it does and that's just how it is and how it's gonna be, but not because it necessarily has to be.

...Then you test the snot out of that to see if there's more to it, and how you might come to observe that.

But the point is, looking there for answers is just pointless. Instead, it's up to us to understand the brute facts of our existence as it presents before us, without arguing from our ignorance as to "why", that such brute facts as are before us cannot exist.

I truly appreciate the reply, and I also appreciate the prose. It is a story that hangs together.

In the end, however, it is just a story that is more probably a fairy tale than an accurate explanation.

No, it just indicates that you pulled the need for an ex-nihilo explanation out your ass, and that brute facts stand on their own. If you want to actually offer a substantive response to the directly present reality of our autonomy,, I have invited you several times to educate yourself.

I have told you the subjects you would need to study, and all of the proofs and arguments and evidences for what I discussed, as might be applicable, are available in those disciplines as indicated.

It is not a fact anyone, neither you nor I not a creator god, can violate, in that we NEED an explanation beyond the brute reality of the thing.

As to the topic of "possibilities", and brute facts...

One thing I am currently engaged in, in a macrophysical scale system, is starting a game of Dwarf Fortress. This will be my first serious game started since the early steam releases.

Today I observed about 6 possible DF Universes before I settled on the one I picked. None of them existed in the same place and time, and more than one of them remains "possible" insofar as "possibly continued from initialization on".

After creating "worlds" until I got one with characteristics I wanted (namely a heavy aquifer under a "good" region capable of creating a defensive water barrier. This is important because now, according to the physics of the game, invaders can now dig, and aquifers are extremely difficult to dig through: they provide a controllable barrier from interference.

Another thing to note is that because this is a simulation that I can start and stop, time in it looks a little different: I can "save" the immediate state of the world, restore it to an earlier state, do something differently "at the same point in time in the system", by fudging an RNG output or forcing an outcome: this is a direct observation of possibilities, but notably none of these "possibilities" exist at the same point in time in "the contextual spacetime".

What is meant by this is that when we observe each permutation, we observe it before or after or to the left or right of them being executed separately from each other. Different locations in spacetime undergird each permutation of "possibilities"...

But by looking at one of them, we do see not merely what "could" happen "if the pRNG returns 0 instead of 1", we see what does happen where the pRNG returns this way.

As such, when you ask "what could happen in the next moment of this system", you get a Very Large number of answers, equivalent to the size of a particular permutation group deter.ined from the number of ways the next instruction can be formulated, times the number of addresses that instruction can access, times the number of values each address group accessed by each instruction can contain. It is difficult to express how large this number is, especially seeing as 64 bit address space is large, and x86 has variable-length instructions that may act on many addresses.

In a more limited sense, we can observe more limited permutation groups of possibilities in terms of "what can happen depending on whether r3 contains 0, 1, or 2", a permutation group of size three.

We can answer "what can the system do depending on X" with "what does the system do where [1, 2, 3]" and no one instance of the system needs to do what the others do for that to be true. It ends up being true "of the particle composed of all of them" existing not just at A place in time but as a timespan-volume, a hyper-volume, or as a "set": "this set contains one or more instance for which (statement) is true".

We do clearly, as I have been saying, have the power to observe possibilities at alternative locations and times from our perspective, but all at the same time and without concern to location from simulation time, but the idea that they really exist at the same time is illusory, revealed as a lie by looking behind the curtain and watching me simulate it differently a finite number of times over a long span of time.

This allows me the ability to predict perfect responses to all the things that happen. I can save-scum and cheat my way into observing all manner of "unlikely" events, to the point where one moment "the world" is DF-shaped, and the next it's suddenly Doom, wherein a complete memory state shift has occurred... But I can't decide what the "clean" system does, assuming the idea of a "clean" system has any meaning in the first place. At best, I can manipulate the state with varying degrees of obviousness in various ways, or make access on the metaphysically detached spaces through implementation.

Through implementation, we can "enforce" a brute fact of existence in such a simulation that way, such that a simulation suffers A Series of Unfortunate Events. In A way I am responsible for creating a horrible set of outcomes as much as everyone in the simulation is responsible for having natures that allow me to do so.

But this does not in any way influence the truth of what happens, wherever it happens, when it executes without me actually doing anything beyond getting it to the point where I can unpause. Indeed, this is part of why I discussed the actual observed role of noise in signal processing, and the effects of it: I can "attack" it in various ways, so as to impart instructions and cause things to happen but without such "attacks", all I can do is observe, at different times, the same deterministic outcome, even though we can directly produce alternatives elsewhere.

Admittedly, I do interfere with a "noise" shaped to alter the state in a way "almost libertarian". This is perhaps the intuition that our ancestors used when thinking about Gods as an approach to handle these ideas; whatever sources the signal that controls the body holds this sort of 'momentary responsibility' equal to the expression of that control, even if that thing happens to be a brain made of meat composed of "system stuff".

With human brains, all the mechanisms to make such decisions as I do in the game exists right here "in the greatest game I know of", without the need for an open line to an external brain capable of making such decisions.

Still, when I just create the universe with one massive momentary act of creative statement, when I literally "speak" the world into existence, things still end up existing with autonomy from me. It would be the easiest thing in the world to reach out and make dwarves start doing things, and to be fair, because it's part of the game that they all die horribly when you don't assert control over the freedoms of the system so as to make decisions as to what system tree branches you will view... But they do have autonomy, as a directly measurable independence in action from anything I happened to be doing at the time (seeing as I'm sitting on the couch just looking at them and typing on my phone).

In fact, as it stands, the dwarves have some remaining autonomy in how they go about their actions even when I play god, even if the "autonomy" is merely the determination of the specific behaviors "rolled" on with an RNG or their priorities levels or based on the dwarf's current needs. Again, just like the magical libertarian will composed of "randomness" or whatever, the developer replaced the sensible actions of a brain with a dice roller rather than make a more robust mind, when deciding what to do to meet their immediate needs.

Were the dwarves to have more complicated mechanisms for rendering decisions, these mechanisms in their configuration would form more interesting "responsibilities" that they would have. Maybe they would be able to adjust their own "gain" and "priorities" based on observation, learning, and choices to train themselves, but because programming that is hard and it's a game, the world outsources all the more advanced aspects of logistics and planning to the human player, even if the dwarves work through to fulfillment.

We don't need to ask "why these physics" to observe "check out these physics" or to ask "why is metaphysics like this" to observe "metaphysics be like this", and at the level we currently see physics, it's "one of these, possibly, or maybe something else, and we won't know until we know, assuming there is anything to know, which there might not be".

This is the only honest presentation; anything that assumes some specific thing more discounts the valid possibility of what else could be.

These are not really things that stand to be argued against, however. They are true from the axioms of math, and confirmed in brute observation, and they are true even about the domains where some uncertainty remains, no matter how that uncertainty is shown to be resolved, and every brute truth happens offset to the others in some way, individually.

In some respects this allows us to understand why the idea of alternatives is not contradictory, and why they never needed to be at the same place in containing spacetime to be at the same time and place in system time. This is just a restatement of what I was saying about how science and math tend to model things in ways where two things can't "really" be in the same place at the same time and also be different; rather it ends up being modeled as "the same time at different places", whenever it is observed, regardless of whether we consider "metaphysically detached spaces" or just "super-physically joined" ones.

This is consistent with the fact that only one future is ever experienced from any perspective, even if that future reveals many parallel present moments occurring in a container.

Again, this is not merely a story, this is all factually constructed from math and observation as necessary, using a direct example that actually has a god (however puny).

In this way we have an actual physical example where the language "it could happen any one of these ways" is equivalent to "the set of spacetime locations it does happen includes resolutions in each of these ways".

Still, it seems ridiculous that all such conversations get so hung up on this discussion that we can never advance the discussion on to what useful principles we can squeeze out of responsibility in terms of understanding when and if certain actions are justified and why and relative to what considerations.

Really, to get there, we require at least some buy-in that human action happens pursuant to "goals" and some measure of justification we invent for ourselves individually so as to impose our decisions on the world or to impose our forbearance on others' decisions. "Goals" are principally important in game theory and allow is a term we can start manipulating to hopefully find a more general sort of "ought" and "meta-goals" -- abstract goals pertaining to other goals -- such as the goal to be free from having your goals selected externally to some boundary.

One of the reasons it would be really useful if any of the people who claim to have thought about this in depth actually knew any of the jargon or terminology or examples that exist in the professional fields which these conversations are handled by.

So far, I have covered some basic cryptography, foundational set theory, simulation theory, game theory, graph theory, systems theory, machine learning, psychology, signal processing, and some adjacent bits of integrated information theory.

I would encourage anyone with real interest in gaining useful insights about the world through these sorts of discussions to study those things and to practice at how to apply the principles you learn there.

 

[DBT]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.

I believe your statement gives away too much.

To begin, I believe we both agree that the predictability of given activity is immaterial to the question of whether the given activity could be otherwise than it is as a result of antecedent activity. While some folks argue that predictability follows from Determinism, others disagree. All Incompatibilists agree, however, that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses alternatives without regard to the ability of anyone to predict the determined activity.

Secondly, I have an issue with the words "if the links are strong enough." Antecedent activity that is closest in time and proximity to subsequent activity are simply the most obvious of the nearly infinite antecedent activity that coalesces to cause the activity in question. To credit the activity that is closest in time and proximity is akin to attributing the weight of a single straw to breaking a camel's back, when the fact is that every straw is a causal antecedent, as is the age of the camel, the activities of the camel that contributed to the strength of the camel's back, the strength of the force of gravity at the location in which the came is standing, and innumerable other antecedents that combine to cause the instant of camel back collapse.

Determinism posits that the collapse of the camel's back was inevitable at the precise time and location it occurred as a result of all antecedent activity from the beginning of time (Big Bang?) to the moment of collapse. To characterize the antecedent causes of activity as "adequate" within the paradigm of Determinism denigrates their inevitability.

I understand that you are trying to make a point to folks who refuse to understand, much less appreciate the paradigm, but that is no reason to cater to their ignorance, as it feeds into their contrary and unsupportable contentions.

I meant causal links, as in causal determinism;

''Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other.''

Which is fundamentally how compatibilists define determinism, yet some on this forum try to deny or circumvent the given terms.

That's all.

 

[peacegirl]

If, therefore, you would like to learn that Man Does Not Stand Alone, as Morrison understood from his scientific observations, and that God, this Supreme Intelligence, is a mathematical reality of infinite wisdom, then what do you say we begin our voyage that will literally change the entire world.

By removing the comma clauses and metaphorical introduction, I read the above quoted sentence to say that by reading the book the reader will learn that "God . . . is a mathematical reality." As open as I am not practically any possibility, including the possibility that God exists, I have an incredibly small window of willingness to consider the possibility that the existence of God can be proved, much less mathematically. Before I would be willing to devote my time to a book that makes such an ambitious claim, I would require a summary that provides sufficient detail to at least provide a glimpse of the basis for the claim and not simply a declaration that it is so.

I didn’t even start. I thought you would want to understand why man’s will is not free, at the very least, and why this matters. I already explained to you that I cannot summarize this book other than to say that behind the door marked “man’s will is not free”, there is a storehouse of untapped knowledge. God only means the laws that govern our world. I’m sorry you don’t like the lexicon but that does not change the veracity of his work. I also understand why you might be unwilling to hear more if you are a compatibilist or an agnostic in regard to whether or not we have free will. I will post what I believe is necessary for a clear understanding. If this falls outside of your small window of time, you are entitled to ignore my posts, but I have to do it my way.

 

[peacegirl]

I have knowledge that will prove “no human free will” exists. People who are angry about this proof, all I can say is “oh well.”

 

[peacegirl]

An open question to all posters on this thread with whom I have locked horns from time-to-time:

Is it even conceivable to you that something might persuade you that the beliefs about which you have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which I (and some others) have been writing are correct?​

If the answer is "No" then what is the point in continuing the discussion?

For myself, I state without hesitation that it not only is conceivable to me that something might persuade me that the beliefs about which I have been writing are wrong and/or that the contrary beliefs about which others have been writing are correct, but I sincerely hope to see that occur.

I hope so, too, but you being a lawyer will make it harder to swallow that we have no free will at all. I am not saying that you, as a lawyer, should not hold people responsible for behavior that is clearly their responsibility and has hurt others due to that behavior. I just want to make that very clear. I have a son who is an injury lawyer, so you know I'm not attacking the necessary profession as it now stands.

 

[steve_bank]

My views on politics, science, philosophy, and religion have changed with all the debates.

My views have changed from interacting with people in the real world.

That being said I am not likely to become religious.

One thing I am certain of by experience no matter how much knowledge and experience anyone has, nobody ever has all the answers all the time.

 

[steve_bank]

Universal peace and harmony?

We have genetic predispositions. We study chimps because we are genetically close. Non human seces can exhibit deception and theft..greed.

In the wild predator and prey live in a dynamic balance.

Pet dogs and cats gone fersl return to theirr natural behaviors. Females form groups for protection against makes. Males kill kittens to bring a female into heat.

Philosophy, religion, and culture are a thinn veneer over our instincts. When the vener cracks we see social breakdown. Riots and looting. right here in the USA.. I saw it here in Settle during the riots.

Our founders came up with a balance of power in government copied by the states.

As we are seeing today it is failing. Republicans in congress are afraid of crossing Trump. The MAGA crowd following the alpha male. Tribal.

When confronted by a perceived threat heart rate goes up. More oxygen. As it progresses adrenaline and other stress hormones enter the blood. Then comes the flight or fight decision.

It is automatic. The immune system revs up. Hormones over ride the logic and reason centers.

When facing death or serious harm you go into full rage. No logic or reason, kill or be killed.

That is us humans. It happens in every day life especially work. You perceive a personal threat or attack and stress hormones flow. Long term job stress leads to heart and other damage. The stress hormones like adrenaline are harsh.

It takes effort to deescalate.