Human Instinct and Free Will

[Treedbear]

Descartes meant the "I" to be the thinking thing so he thought of his thoughts has literally being him ("I").

Of course you remain free to think that your thoughts are not you, or all of you, but it's a misrepresentation of Descartes's view to interpret "think" in the Cogito as some activity that the "I" would have.
EB

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

If I have something then that something is not me, or at most it's only a part of me. And it certainly isn't if one is arguing for the existence of an essence of me, as is implied by many arguments for agency, free will, consciousness, etc. But this is more than a semantic argument. Things exist due to the relationships they have with other things. Therefore, however I might choose to describe myself, or any other thing, depends on either the explicit or the implied context. I find evidence for this in the scientific method, morality, esthetics, and linguistics.

Descartes meant the "I" to be the thinking thing so he thought of his thoughts has literally being him ("I").

Of course you remain free to think that your thoughts are not you, or all of you, but it's a misrepresentation of Descartes's view to interpret "think" in the Cogito as some activity that the "I" would have.
EB

I was under the impression that Descartes considered the "I" to be the "doing" thing, as in the doing of thinking, which seems to presage a kind of Existentialism. The doing (doing of anything will suffice, but only thinking is self evidently true) constitutes evidence of existence. But I agree that doing isn't having. My argument is that the having is more certain than the doing since I might not be certain where these thoughts come from. So I'm not supporting of Descartes or Sartre.

 

[DBT]

Probability is the freedom. Because of probability, there is freedom for probabilities greater than 0.

You need to explain that in relation to the decision making process.

Can you choose vanilla?

Only under severe compulsion.

 

[untermensche]

It is abandonment of serious discussion of the topic.

It is science if Hollywood was in charge of science.

Okay, turn off the boat's engine; I'll bite.

Do you not accept the multiverse as science? I know it's mostly theoretical, but it's still a possibility.

The multiverse is not science.

It is speculation.

Speculation sometimes leads to science but usually does not.

 

[untermensche]

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

You are none of those. You are the being who does such stuff. Try touching your skin or jamming your finger down your throat if you believe otherwise.

"I" am that which is aware of the throat. "I" am that which is aware of the sensations of touch.

And people do things that cause harm to their bodies all the time.

 

[untermensche]

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

If I have something then that something is not me, or at most it's only a part of me. And it certainly isn't if one is arguing for the existence of an essence of me, as is implied by many arguments for agency, free will, consciousness, etc. But this is more than a semantic argument. Things exist due to the relationships they have with other things. Therefore, however I might choose to describe myself, or any other thing, depends on either the explicit or the implied context. I find evidence for this in the scientific method, morality, esthetics, and linguistics.

When does the context change so that "you" are not that which is aware of thoughts?

And "you" are not that which labels these thoughts as "my" thoughts?

 

[fromderinside]

You are none of those. You are the being who does such stuff. Try touching your skin or jamming your finger down your throat if you believe otherwise.

"I" am that which is aware of the throat. "I" am that which is aware of the sensations of touch.

And people do things that cause harm to their bodies all the time.

Well when you figure out what I is ..... and my touch finger query was about what is "I".

Is there any evidence that the two "you"'s to which you refer are not different.

 

[ryan]

You need to explain that in relation to the decision making process.

From Wang's paper,

"In this introduction, we focus on two quantum principles as examples to show why quantum cognition is an appealing new theoretical direction for psychology: complementarity, which suggests that some psychological measures have to be made sequentially and that the context generated by the first measure can influence responses to the next one, producing measurement order effects, and superposition, which suggests that some psychological states cannot be defined with respect to definite values but, instead, that all possible values within the superposition have some potential for being expressed."

from http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/24/3/163.abstract

So from how I understand it, choices are in a superposition.

And the new working model of this explains how using QM.

 

[untermensche]

"I" am that which is aware of the throat. "I" am that which is aware of the sensations of touch.

And people do things that cause harm to their bodies all the time.

Well when you figure out what I is ..... and my touch finger query was about what is "I".

Is there any evidence that the two "you"'s to which you refer are not different.

And "I" answered.

"I" am that which experiences the sensation of touch.

And to experience is by definition different from what is experienced.

Experience is two things.

That which experiences and that which it experiences.

I have said this truism many times.

 

[fromderinside]

Well when you figure out what I is ..... and my touch finger query was about what is "I".

Is there any evidence that the two "you"'s to which you refer are not different.

And "I" answered.

"I" am that which experiences the sensation of touch.

And to experience is by definition different from what is experienced.

Experience is two things.

That which experiences and that which it experiences.

I have said this truism many times.

Your answer falls short in pointing to what is "I" (a thing) and to whether that which sees sees is the same as that which describes what is seen. You claim both to be "I". For us physiological types that which sees is that which distinguishes a thing from other and that which describes interprets the nature of what is seen. One need the tegmentum to distinguish thing from other and one needs frontal cortex to command interpretation and the language cortex to articulate information on the nature of things. Even the latter can be two things. So I amend my cirtique: which of three things is I?

Raise your game.

 

[untermensche]

And "I" answered.

"I" am that which experiences the sensation of touch.

And to experience is by definition different from what is experienced.

Experience is two things.

That which experiences and that which it experiences.

I have said this truism many times.

Your answer falls short in pointing to what is "I" (a thing) and to whether that which sees sees is the same as that which describes what is seen. You claim both to be "I". For us physiological types that which sees is that which distinguishes a thing from other and that which describes interprets the nature of what is seen. One need the tegmentum to distinguish thing from other and one needs frontal cortex to command interpretation and the language cortex to articulate information on the nature of things. Even the latter can be two things. So I amend my cirtique: which of three things is I?

Raise your game.

You need an occipital lobe for vision.

I have described nothing about the physiology of vision.

There is no known physiology of consciousness.

And the "I" that is aware of things is also the "I" that directs the brain to describe to others what is seen.

 

[DBT]

You need to explain that in relation to the decision making process.

From Wang's paper,

"In this introduction, we focus on two quantum principles as examples to show why quantum cognition is an appealing new theoretical direction for psychology: complementarity, which suggests that some psychological measures have to be made sequentially and that the context generated by the first measure can influence responses to the next one, producing measurement order effects, and superposition, which suggests that some psychological states cannot be defined with respect to definite values but, instead, that all possible values within the superposition have some potential for being expressed."

from http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/24/3/163.abstract

So from how I understand it, choices are in a superposition.

And the new working model of this explains how using QM.

That doesn't actually describe the decision making process. Higher order structures and processing effect changes in structure, connectivity, etc, all the way down to the quantum building 'blocks'

You need whole and complete functional neural architecture in order to process information and generate behaviour.

Quantum effects alone won't work. Add chemical agency and the system and its output is altered...right down the its quantum 'superstructure'

Sever connectivity between synapses and coherent thought is diminished or destroyed, depending on the severity of connectivity breakdown.

You don't consciously choose quantum states even if it effects changes to system function.

There is no escaping the fact, that it is the state of the system in any given moment that's reflected in its output, conscious thoughts, feelings and actions.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Fortunately, I remain free not to think this has any relevance to how we construe free-will.
EB

It is abandonment of serious discussion of the topic.

It is science if Hollywood was in charge of science.

Yes.

It's quite irresponsible to go into wild imaginings on the basis of science findings that one barely understands. I think "childish" is the proper qualifier.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Descartes meant the "I" to be the thinking thing so he thought of his thoughts has literally being him ("I").

Of course you remain free to think that your thoughts are not you, or all of you, but it's a misrepresentation of Descartes's view to interpret "think" in the Cogito as some activity that the "I" would have.
EB

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

It's certainly an interesting question but I was talking about Descartes' views, not my own. The "I", he said, is the thinking thing. It's quite clear and specific.

You can in fact disconnect your question from Descartes' angle. He wasn't talking about whatever real subject there might be (although he might have disagreed with that if he could have thought about the issue, which I doubt). He was just talking about the thinking thing, something I'm sure we can all relate to whatever our respective metaphysics.


That being said, it's a real question. One can take qualia as conscious things in their own right (no consciousness as such), or as unconscious objects of consciousness. And then again you can see consciousness (or subjective experience) as the only subject, or merely as a property or activity of a hidden subject (bearing in mind that the subject in the latter case might be anything from God to sheer vacuum). I tend to prefer the latter but I don't see how we could settle the question.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

You are none of those. You are the being who does such stuff. Try touching your skin or jamming your finger down your throat if you believe otherwise.

Aren't you at least a little bit moved by the poetic value of a body denying itself?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The point of free will is the freedom to will it, not the freedom necessarily to actually do it.
EB

But thats just being able "to will", that is, being able to make choices. Thus there is no difference between having will and having "free will".

Er- yes there is a difference.

"Will" may exist but not necessarily as free will, as hardcore materialists could explain to you. "Free will" on the other hand, is tautologically construed as necessarily free, and therefore cannot exist as hardcore materialists could explain to you.
EB

 

[untermensche]

You are none of those. You are the being who does such stuff. Try touching your skin or jamming your finger down your throat if you believe otherwise.

Aren't you at least a little bit moved by the poetic value of a body denying itself?
EB

A body can't affirm or deny anything.

Only a mind can.

And if one uses their mind to conclude the mind is a body they are just lost.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Am I my thoughts or am I that which is aware of thoughts which I call "my thoughts"?

If I have something then that something is not me, or at most it's only a part of me. And it certainly isn't if one is arguing for the existence of an essence of me, as is implied by many arguments for agency, free will, consciousness, etc. But this is more than a semantic argument. Things exist due to the relationships they have with other things. Therefore, however I might choose to describe myself, or any other thing, depends on either the explicit or the implied context. I find evidence for this in the scientific method, morality, esthetics, and linguistics.

Descartes meant the "I" to be the thinking thing so he thought of his thoughts has literally being him ("I").

Of course you remain free to think that your thoughts are not you, or all of you, but it's a misrepresentation of Descartes's view to interpret "think" in the Cogito as some activity that the "I" would have.
EB

I was under the impression that Descartes considered the "I" to be the "doing" thing, as in the doing of thinking, which seems to presage a kind of Existentialism. The doing (doing of anything will suffice, but only thinking is self evidently true) constitutes evidence of existence. But I agree that doing isn't having. My argument is that the having is more certain than the doing since I might not be certain where these thoughts come from. So I'm not supporting of Descartes or Sartre.

Based on the formulation that the "I" is the thinking thing, I can only guess that Descartes made no distinctions between the "I" being the thoughts and the "I" doing the thoughts. Probably he would have said that one cannot tell them apart!

However, in the logic of systematic doubt, I think he would have had to argue that the "I" could doubt being anything else that the thoughts themselves. So, I'd go for being, not doing.

I don't think he went that far, though, so I guess there's a possible fudge there.
EB

 

[Juma]

But thats just being able "to will", that is, being able to make choices. Thus there is no difference between having will and having "free will".

Er- yes there is a difference.

"Will" may exist but not necessarily as free will, as hardcore materialists could explain to you. "Free will" on the other hand, is tautologically construed as necessarily free, and therefore cannot exist as hardcore materialists could explain to you.
EB

But that is not what how you used "free will" in your posts above. You used "free" as in "not externally coerced".

 

[Speakpigeon]

Aren't you at least a little bit moved by the poetic value of a body denying itself?
EB

A body can't affirm or deny anything.

Only a mind can.

And if one uses their mind to conclude the mind is a body they are just lost.

For all I know it might well be my body that does the thinking. I could not explain subjective experience from physical principles, obviously, but I can conceive that all that my mind is doing, it is doing it as an activity of my body (or more accurately, of the whole universe).
EB

 

[untermensche]

A body can't affirm or deny anything.

Only a mind can.

And if one uses their mind to conclude the mind is a body they are just lost.

For all I know it might well be my body that does the thinking. I could not explain subjective experience from physical principles, obviously, but I can conceive that all that my mind is doing, it is doing it as an activity of my body (or more accurately, of the whole universe).
EB

Is your bile your body?

Or is it something your body produces?