Poll: Free will most people think they have

[Speakpigeon]

As I see it, the idea of free will, for most people, is the idea that you can choose what you're going to do next and that in turn will usually affect at least some things in your immediate environment. If there's a closed door in front of me, I can choose to leave it alone or I can choose to open it. My choice can thus affect the state of the door, i.e. whether it will remain closed or it will be now open.

This notion we have we can choose to do something is also quite simple. We, as human beings, have this ability whereby we can conceive in advance of various actions we could perform next and then elect to perform one of them.

We also have the impression that when we make it, our choice is essentially determined by us, that is, by the person we are at the moment we make this choice.

Now I don't see why this impression would be somehow erroneous or misleading. And I also don't know of any word or expression people would use instead of 'free will' to refer to this ability. We could talk of 'autonomy' and 'independence', for example, but mostly we don't and it should be noted that it would also be possible to argue just as well that we're not really independent and we're not really autonomous.

According to this interpretation, there's indeed no problem of free will. People have free will as described here and we all feel we do. And, more to the point, I fail to see how we could be wrong about that.

The idea that, having free will, we could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same, is rather ambiguous. I interpret it as follows. The "conditions" are the conditions of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. So interpreted, it is clear that what we choose to do does depend on us, our whole person, at the moment we make our choice and that there's no problem with that. Obviously, it's not something anyone is going to put to the test but there would be no need for that because it's obviously true.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

The idea that, having free will, we could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same, is rather ambiguous. I interpret it as follows. The "conditions" are the conditions of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. So interpreted, it is clear that what we choose to do does depend on us, our whole person, at the moment we make our choice and that there's no problem with that. Obviously, it's not something anyone is going to put to the test but there would be no need for that because it's obviously true.
EB

If you're saying here that in your view free will requires the hypothetical ability to act "otherwise all other conditions remaining the same" then it's not the kind of free will that makes any sense to me and I certainly don't think I have it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's no suggestion that it would be a necessary condition. Rather, we believe we could make a different choice in the same situation. Which is trivially true since our choice depends on us and all we would need to make a different choice would be to be ourselves in a different state at the moment we make the choice.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

There's no suggestion that it would be a necessary condition. Rather, we believe we could make a different choice in the same situation. Which is trivially true since our choice depends on us and all we would need to make a different choice would be to be ourselves in a different state at the moment we make the choice.
EB

I'm not sure I'm following you. By saying "all we would need to make a different choice would be to be ourselves in a different state at the moment we make the choice" you're not satisfying the "could have done otherwise" principle as I understand it.

If I'm any different then the conditions have changed.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's no suggestion that it would be a necessary condition. Rather, we believe we could make a different choice in the same situation. Which is trivially true since our choice depends on us and all we would need to make a different choice would be to be ourselves in a different state at the moment we make the choice.
EB

I'm not sure I'm following you. By saying "all we would need to make a different choice would be to be ourselves in a different state at the moment we make the choice" you're not satisfying the "could have done otherwise" principle as I understand it.

If I'm any different then the conditions have changed.

No, I interpret the conditions in this case to be that of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. Read again the bit of the OP you yourself quoted:

The idea that, having free will, we could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same, is rather ambiguous. I interpret it as follows. The "conditions" are the conditions of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. So interpreted, it is clear that what we choose to do does depend on us, our whole person, at the moment we make our choice and that there's no problem with that. Obviously, it's not something anyone is going to put to the test but there would be no need for that because it's obviously true.
EB

So, the conditions of the person exercising free will are not required to be the same in the two situations, and if these conditions are different we can conceive that a different choice would be made.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

No, I interpret the conditions in this case to be that of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. Read again the bit of the OP you yourself quoted:

The idea that, having free will, we could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same, is rather ambiguous. I interpret it as follows. The "conditions" are the conditions of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. So interpreted, it is clear that what we choose to do does depend on us, our whole person, at the moment we make our choice and that there's no problem with that. Obviously, it's not something anyone is going to put to the test but there would be no need for that because it's obviously true.
EB

So, the conditions of the person exercising free will are not required to be the same in the two situations, and if these conditions are different we can conceive that a different choice would be made.
EB

Sure, I have no problem agreeing that I could act differently if my mental/physical state was different, but that doesn't describe any of the senses of 'free will' that I'm aware of.

 

[Speakpigeon]

No, I interpret the conditions in this case to be that of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. Read again the bit of the OP you yourself quoted:

The idea that, having free will, we could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same, is rather ambiguous. I interpret it as follows. The "conditions" are the conditions of the whole world outside the person exercising free will. So interpreted, it is clear that what we choose to do does depend on us, our whole person, at the moment we make our choice and that there's no problem with that. Obviously, it's not something anyone is going to put to the test but there would be no need for that because it's obviously true.
EB

So, the conditions of the person exercising free will are not required to be the same in the two situations, and if these conditions are different we can conceive that a different choice would be made.
EB

Sure, I have no problem agreeing that I could act differently if my mental/physical state was different, but that doesn't fall within any of the senses of 'free will' that I'm aware of.

This bit isn't a definition of free will, it's my interpretation of the idea that we could have done otherwise so as to make it compatible with determinism. As to whether my interpretation of free will itself tallies with some recognised sense of "free will", I think it does. My Collins dictionary (1991) gives free will first as "a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined", which is really what I'm talking about. And this definition is also compatible with my interpretation of the idea that we could have done otherwise in the same situation. That we would need to be ourselves in a different state to be at all able to have done otherwise has to be a late addendum since our belief that nature is deterministic is a recent invention relatively to our notion of free will, which human beings presumably always had.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

My Collins dictionary (1991) gives free will first as "a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined", which is really what I'm talking about.

I'm afraid I don't see how our ability to have acted differently if we were in a different mental/physical state demonstrates that we'd be making "choices that are not externally determined".

 

[Speakpigeon]

My Collins dictionary (1991) gives free will first as "a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined", which is really what I'm talking about.

I'm afraid I don't see how our ability to have acted differently if we were in a different mental/physical state demonstrates that we'd be making "choices that are not externally determined".

I think it does if the subject were in different states while the rest of the universe would be in the same state. Trivially, the different choice could only be explained by the difference in the subject.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

Trivially, the different choice could only be explained by the difference in the subject.
EB

Sure, but nothing here eliminates the possibility that both choices were still determined by external forces.

You wouldn't logically expect the same determining external forces to necessarily produce the same outcome if you change what those determining forces are acting upon.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Trivially, the different choice could only be explained by the difference in the subject.
EB

Sure, but nothing here eliminates the possibility that both choices were still determined by external forces.

You wouldn't logically expect the same determining external forces to necessarily produce the same outcome if you change what those determining forces are acting upon.

We would all identify the cause of a change in outcome to be whatever was changed in the initial conditions. In this case the changed conditions would be located inside the subject. So the cause for a change in outcome would be seen as located in the subject.

You're characterisation of the situation as external forces acting on the subject is misleading. We have in fact two distinct parts of the universe: the subject and its environment. How the situation evolves over time has to be the result of the interactions between these two parts. Presenting the situation as just external forces acting upon the subject is just wrong.
EB

 

[DBT]

Whatever is happening within the system, the organism, is largely unconscious. A literal web of unconscious states and conditions that contribute to options perceived (consciousness) and actions taken.

 

[The AntiChris]

Trivially, the different choice could only be explained by the difference in the subject.
EB

Sure, but nothing here eliminates the possibility that both choices were still determined by external forces.

You wouldn't logically expect the same determining external forces to necessarily produce the same outcome if you change what those determining forces are acting upon.

We would all identify the cause of a change in outcome to be whatever was changed in the initial conditions. In this case the changed conditions would be located inside the subject. So the cause for a change in outcome would be seen as located in the subject.

You're characterisation of the situation as external forces acting on the subject is misleading. We have in fact two distinct parts of the universe: the subject and its environment. How the situation evolves over time has to be the result of the interactions between these two parts. Presenting the situation as just external forces acting upon the subject is just wrong.
EB

I'm not following you. I still don't see how you have eliminated the possibility that your choices are not to some extent externally determined (which is what you need to do if you're attempting to satisfy your dictionary definition (post #7).

 

[Speakpigeon]

Whatever is happening within the system, the organism, is largely unconscious. A literal web of unconscious states and conditions that contribute to options perceived (consciousness) and actions taken.

That's irrelevant.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

We would all identify the cause of a change in outcome to be whatever was changed in the initial conditions. In this case the changed conditions would be located inside the subject. So the cause for a change in outcome would be seen as located in the subject.

You're characterisation of the situation as external forces acting on the subject is misleading. We have in fact two distinct parts of the universe: the subject and its environment. How the situation evolves over time has to be the result of the interactions between these two parts. Presenting the situation as just external forces acting upon the subject is just wrong.
EB

I'm not following you. I still don't see how you have eliminated the possibility that your choices are not to some extent externally determined (which is what you need to do if you're attempting to satisfy your dictionary definition (post #7).

In our current understanding of nature, and outside any catastrophic situations such as a fire, a blast of radiations etc., what's physically going on inside a human being within the short window of time of a decision is essentially independent from his environment as it is at that point in time. Obviously, we can travel back in time along the causality chain and quickly find external causes. These will indeed be external to the subject but only as he is at that point in the past, not at the time of the decision. At the time of the decision, in normal circumstances, the decision is all done essentially within the subject, and so independently of external forces.

And I'm not trying to eliminate possibilities. I'm just trying to articulate the best interpretation of free will I can think of. An interpretation that makes sense and that fits what most people say.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

of the decision, in normal circumstances, the decision is all done essentially within the subject, and so independently of external forces.

And I'm not trying to eliminate possibilities.

Ok. So you're not trying to satisfy the dictionary definition you provided? (If you were you'd need to demonstrate that you'd eliminated any possibility of external determination).

Edited to Add:

I think what you're saying is that if you were in a different mental state, all other things being the same, you could have chosen differently. This is essentially the compatibilist version of free will and one that I think many people would agree with. But this is not the 'could have chosen differently in the same circumstances' incompatibilist version of of free will.

 

[Speakpigeon]

of the decision, in normal circumstances, the decision is all done essentially within the subject, and so independently of external forces.

And I'm not trying to eliminate possibilities.

Ok. So you're not trying to satisfy the dictionary definition you provided?

My analysis of free will also shows how to interpret the Collins' definition for it to be true even in a deterministic universe.

(If you were you'd need to demonstrate that you'd eliminated any possibility of external determination).

This thread is a poll and it's asking whether you agree that my analysis of free will corresponds well enough to the notion of free will most people have.

And I don't pretend to be engaged in any scientific experiment to prove free will.

And it would be idiotic for me to pretend I could eliminate possibilities. For all I know, I can't exclude the idea that I may be a brain in a vat.

Edited to Add:

I think what you're saying is that if you were in a different mental state, all other things being the same, you could have chosen differently.

Having a different mental state would be sufficient but maybe it's not even necessary. If our brain works at all in a probabilistic way then different outcomes are possible for a given brain state.

This is essentially the compatibilist version of free will and one that I think many people would agree with.

That's all I was asking you. You can vote now.

But this is not the 'could have chosen differently in the same circumstances' incompatibilist version of of free will.

Except that the kind of free will I think most people feel they have would work fine in a deterministic universe.

I think it's just that the incompatibilist interpretation of free will is plain wrong.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

My analysis of free will also shows how to interpret the Collins' definition for it to be true even in a deterministic universe.

We'll have to agree to disagree. I suspect it depends on how one interprets 'free from external determination'. To me that implies incompatibility with determinism whereas a comptatibilist version would say 'free from morally relevant external determination' (e.g. free from coercion).

 

[Speakpigeon]

My analysis of free will also shows how to interpret the Collins' definition for it to be true even in a deterministic universe.

We'll have to agree to disagree. I suspect it depends on how one interprets 'free from external determination'. To me that implies incompatibility with determinism whereas a comptatibilist version would say 'free from morally relevant external determination' (e.g. free from coercion).

It depends on what notion of free will people have.
EB

 

[DBT]

Whatever is happening within the system, the organism, is largely unconscious. A literal web of unconscious states and conditions that contribute to options perceived (consciousness) and actions taken.

That's irrelevant.
EB

Wrong. It's relevant. If it wasn't, endless debates over the issue of free will would have been put to bed long ago. The issue of free will is ultimately an issue of the nature of brain and mind, not how people use the term.