The kind of free will we have

[fast]

I see free will as the ability most people have, at least to some extent, to make independent choices, i.e. choices not coerced, limited or influenced by other people.

I think this is the notion of free will most people have.

If you disagree with this, please explain why.
EB

While it's true that we have free will2 the underlying question still remains as to whether we have free will1

I was talking about free will.

And I have no idea what free will2 is and what free will1 is.
EB

Okay, let me try it a different way.

The problem in need of philosophical scrutiny is the issue that came up shortly after determinism was first originally posited. The issue in question form is thus, "Is determinism or is determinism not compatible with something?" The term used for that something was "free will." Can there be free will in a world where determinism is true? Assuming determinism, is there room for free will? There were those that felt "if determinism is true, then there's no place for that something." We won't concern ourselves with the camp that denies determinism, for the issue requires the assumption. So, the reality of determinism remains steadfast in the equation. With determinism embedded as stationary and unremoved, can this something they call free will coexist in reality as we know it (that again, assumes determinism)?

In our endeavors to answer the question, we also sought to hone in on just what free will is. We cannot, well, ought not or should not redefine the problem away. Yes, with our sense of free will so well articulated, they are most certainly compatible, but the problem hasn't vanquished.

Free will is not an illusion. Tack that on the wall and cement it in to our terminology. Yes, when we make choices in absence of compulsion, they are choices of our own free will, and since it is no illusion, what then to make of the real problem? If by forces of nature within a fully deterministic universe that any event that occurs was set in stone, then every event that does occur must occur. How dark and hopeless! We can still hold people responsible for their actions made of their own free will since actions are among choices logically available to us, but if they are not in fact physically possible pursuant to the laws of nature, then Houston, we have a problem.

Imagine writing a computer script where options and choices are made. The players cannot tell that the options chosen were fated. There's no evidence! So, yes, the best answer is by far the answer given by the soft determinist, but it still sidesteps the underlying grip that keeps the issue alive.

 

[ruby sparks]

I was talking about free will.

And I have no idea what free will2 is and what free will1 is.
EB

Okay, let me try it a different way.

The problem in need of philosophical scrutiny is the issue that came up shortly after determinism was first originally posited. The issue in question form is thus, "Is determinism or is determinism not compatible with something?" The term used for that something was "free will." Can there be free will in a world where determinism is true? Assuming determinism, is there room for free will? There were those that felt "if determinism is true, then there's no place for that something." We won't concern ourselves with the camp that denies determinism, for the issue requires the assumption. So, the reality of determinism remains steadfast in the equation. With determinism embedded as stationary and unremoved, can this something they call free will coexist in reality as we know it (that again, assumes determinism)?

In our endeavors to answer the question, we also sought to hone in on just what free will is. We cannot, well, ought not or should not redefine the problem away. Yes, with our sense of free will so well articulated, they are most certainly compatible, but the problem hasn't vanquished.

Free will is not an illusion. Tack that on the wall and cement it in to our terminology. Yes, when we make choices in absence of compulsion, they are choices of our own free will, and since it is no illusion, what then to make of the real problem? If by forces of nature within a fully deterministic universe that any event that occurs was set in stone, then every event that does occur must occur. How dark and hopeless! We can still hold people responsible for their actions made of their own free will since actions are among choices logically available to us, but if they are not in fact physically possible pursuant to the laws of nature, then Houston, we have a problem.

Imagine writing a computer script where options and choices are made. The players cannot tell that the options chosen were fated. There's no evidence! So, yes, the best answer is by far the answer given by the soft determinist, but it still sidesteps the underlying grip that keeps the issue alive.

I like this post!





By the way, have you heard that god exists? Yeah. Define god as 'the universe' and god exists. Definitions make pwoblems go away.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I was talking about free will.

And I have no idea what free will2 is and what free will1 is.
EB

Okay, let me try it a different way.

The problem in need of philosophical scrutiny is the issue that came up shortly after determinism was first originally posited. The issue in question form is thus, "Is determinism or is determinism not compatible with something?" The term used for that something was "free will." Can there be free will in a world where determinism is true? Assuming determinism, is there room for free will? There were those that felt "if determinism is true, then there's no place for that something." We won't concern ourselves with the camp that denies determinism, for the issue requires the assumption. So, the reality of determinism remains steadfast in the equation. With determinism embedded as stationary and unremoved, can this something they call free will coexist in reality as we know it (that again, assumes determinism)?

In our endeavors to answer the question, we also sought to hone in on just what free will is. We cannot, well, ought not or should not redefine the problem away. Yes, with our sense of free will so well articulated, they are most certainly compatible, but the problem hasn't vanquished.

Free will is not an illusion. Tack that on the wall and cement it in to our terminology. Yes, when we make choices in absence of compulsion, they are choices of our own free will, and since it is no illusion, what then to make of the real problem? If by forces of nature within a fully deterministic universe that any event that occurs was set in stone, then every event that does occur must occur. How dark and hopeless! We can still hold people responsible for their actions made of their own free will since actions are among choices logically available to us, but if they are not in fact physically possible pursuant to the laws of nature, then Houston, we have a problem.

Imagine writing a computer script where options and choices are made. The players cannot tell that the options chosen were fated. There's no evidence! So, yes, the best answer is by far the answer given by the soft determinist, but it still sidesteps the underlying grip that keeps the issue alive.

The problem hasn't vanquished?

Uh, no, the problem hasn't vanished, that's true. The problem hasn't vanished for some. For me, there's no problem left.

I think you should very much like what I will now say: There are two apparently irreducible perspectives on the real world. One is the ontological perspective. The other is the epistemological perspective.

According to determinism, for a given situation, there's only one outcome. This is the ontological perspective.

I would agree that this perspective seems to be in conflict with our idea that we have free will. But no, it isn't. The ontological perspective is essentially a metaphysical view. That is, we don't know, and probably couldn't know, if it's true. We can believe it's true but we cannot prove absolutely that it's true. All we have is our epistemological perspective on the world, which we believe is based entirely on our perceptions. Even our ontological perspective is grounded on our epistemological perspective, which is why we can only believe rather than know it's true, and therefore why it is a metaphysical view.

The problem with our ontological perspective is that whenever we have to act, ontology is useless. Whenever we have to act, we go through our epistemological perspective. That's what we do. You do it. I do it. We all do it. Even our ontological perspective says we have to do that. This is because this perspective sees the flow of events as causally related, i.e. the present determines the future because the future is seen as the causal outcome of the present situation. We don't know whether that's true. We just usually accept it. We usually believe it's true. And we believe it's true because the idea of causality is really an extension of our sense of free will. Our everyday experience tells us that what we choose to do determines what happens. It seems to me that having that experience as a human being just cannot not lead us, everyone of us, to extrapolate this experience to the idea of causality being the operational force driving the flow of events in the natural world. Eventually, we all get there.

Yet, this remains a metaphysical view. Whatever we do, we still have to go through our epistemological view to act. That's probably just a consequence of what sort of beings we are. We don't know the world. We don't have any knowledge of the world. All we have is what we are. So we have various perception organs, our eyes, our ears etc. We have a memory. We have a mind. We have effector organs, our hands, our mouths, our sexual organs, etc. Whenever we act in the world, we go through a complex process whereby our brain produces actualised representations of our environment, of our body, and our mind selects and controls the main parameters of our action.

Sure, our ontological perspective says it's really our brain that does it, and most of us believe this is true. But the things we really know are those we experience through our epistemological perspective. It's rather telling that even when we use computers, we can only replicate this organisation. Our ontological perspective says we have computers, fundamentally deterministic computers. To use those computers, however, we have to go through the epistemological perspective. We write software programmes, programmes which contain explicit choice instructions: IF x = 2 THEN lightB2 = 16. This is straightforwardly mimicking what the human mind does. We think we know (we believe) it's really the computer, the hardware, that does everything. Even the software we think is really just an aspect of the hardware. Yet, we don't know how to use a computer if not through the epistemological perspective. So, we write programmes that contain IF-THEN instructions, which are absolutely essential to any programme, and work in effect much like the kind of mental choices we use for our every action in our everyday life.

If ever someone comes up with a way to stop using the epistemological perspective, to only go through the ontological perspective, then the notion of free will will disappear for this person. For now, the only person in this case I can think of would be God Himself he is does exist. Not us, because of what we are, or seem to be.

So, one way to see this, is to say that our ordinary notion of free will is an operational notion. We don't know how to not use it to make sense of our everyday experience of the world. The only free will which is really contradictory with our idea of a deterministic world is the metaphysical concept of free will, which is something different from our epistemological notion of free will, which is itself based on our sense of free will.

So, do you like that?
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Me? No, sorry. I like you, but not that.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Umph!

You can give me that, I will have tried.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

Number 4.a.: Able to make moral or rational decisions on one's own and therefore answerable for one's behavior.

It is the only one applicable in this context.



If that was anything like a conclusive argument, we would have judges throwing up their hands saying they can"t hold anybody responsible for their actions.

Do you see that happening at all?

Why would you expect judges to care about the logical arguments of a philosopher? Their job is to interpret and execute the law, as far as I know.

But if the person did not cause himself to be the way he was, he could not have caused himself to be the kind of person who made the decisions he made nor to be the kind of person who could be relied upon in a crisis. There would therefore be no obvious reason to ascribe praise to him for doing something good on the basis of his rationality, maturity, etc. or to chide him for doing something wrong, appealing to "he should have known better". The fact is that he did what he did, even in spite of knowing better, according to aspects of his nature ultimately beyond his intentional control.

You're merely re-hashing Strawson's argument. I already agreed it proved Strawson's concept of responsibility to be incoherent, wrong, useless.

But here, I am saying it also applies to definition 4.a. above; just because one is able to make moral/rational decisions does not imply that one is answerable for one's behavior. Strawson's argument shows that no one is answerable for their behavior, regardless of whether they are capable of rationality.

So, while Strawson's argument still allows us to select responsible parties in a consequence-oriented way, it does not permit any kind of personal judgement about whoever we deem responsible or not. Nobody is deserving of applause for doing something noble or being a natural leader; it's just the way they are.

I have yet to see any judge paying attention to Strawson's argument. If the judge deems the accused responsible, that's it.
EB

So? Are judges infallible? What a strange reply. I'm sure there was a time when many judges based their appraisal of someone's guilt on the color of their skin. Would you say that their verdicts were valid, even though they were based on a notion of guilt that didn't make any sense?

 

[ruby sparks]

I have yet to see any judge paying attention to Strawson's argument. If the judge deems the accused responsible, that's it.
EB

So? Are judges infallible? What a strange reply. I'm sure there was a time when many judges based their appraisal of someone's guilt on the color of their skin. Would you say that their verdicts were valid, even though they were based on a notion of guilt that didn't make any sense?

You have hit on the nub of my problem with Sp's approach, which I am going to call, the ''everything's pretty much fine as it is thank you very much" ideology.

 

[fast]

I was talking about free will.

And I have no idea what free will2 is and what free will1 is.
EB

Okay, let me try it a different way.

The problem in need of philosophical scrutiny is the issue that came up shortly after determinism was first originally posited. The issue in question form is thus, "Is determinism or is determinism not compatible with something?" The term used for that something was "free will." Can there be free will in a world where determinism is true? Assuming determinism, is there room for free will? There were those that felt "if determinism is true, then there's no place for that something." We won't concern ourselves with the camp that denies determinism, for the issue requires the assumption. So, the reality of determinism remains steadfast in the equation. With determinism embedded as stationary and unremoved, can this something they call free will coexist in reality as we know it (that again, assumes determinism)?

In our endeavors to answer the question, we also sought to hone in on just what free will is. We cannot, well, ought not or should not redefine the problem away. Yes, with our sense of free will so well articulated, they are most certainly compatible, but the problem hasn't vanquished.

Free will is not an illusion. Tack that on the wall and cement it in to our terminology. Yes, when we make choices in absence of compulsion, they are choices of our own free will, and since it is no illusion, what then to make of the real problem? If by forces of nature within a fully deterministic universe that any event that occurs was set in stone, then every event that does occur must occur. How dark and hopeless! We can still hold people responsible for their actions made of their own free will since actions are among choices logically available to us, but if they are not in fact physically possible pursuant to the laws of nature, then Houston, we have a problem.

Imagine writing a computer script where options and choices are made. The players cannot tell that the options chosen were fated. There's no evidence! So, yes, the best answer is by far the answer given by the soft determinist, but it still sidesteps the underlying grip that keeps the issue alive.

The problem hasn't vanquished?

Uh, no, the problem hasn't vanished, that's true. The problem hasn't vanished for some. For me, there's no problem left.

I think you should very much like what I will now say: There are two apparently irreducible perspectives on the real world. One is the ontological perspective. The other is the epistemological perspective.

According to determinism, for a given situation, there's only one outcome. This is the ontological perspective.

I would agree that this perspective seems to be in conflict with our idea that we have free will. But no, it isn't. The ontological perspective is essentially a metaphysical view. That is, we don't know, and probably couldn't know, if it's true. We can believe it's true but we cannot prove absolutely that it's true. All we have is our epistemological perspective on the world, which we believe is based entirely on our perceptions. Even our ontological perspective is grounded on our epistemological perspective, which is why we can only believe rather than know it's true, and therefore why it is a metaphysical view.

The problem with our ontological perspective is that whenever we have to act, ontology is useless. Whenever we have to act, we go through our epistemological perspective. That's what we do. You do it. I do it. We all do it. Even our ontological perspective says we have to do that. This is because this perspective sees the flow of events as causally related, i.e. the present determines the future because the future is seen as the causal outcome of the present situation. We don't know whether that's true. We just usually accept it. We usually believe it's true. And we believe it's true because the idea of causality is really an extension of our sense of free will. Our everyday experience tells us that what we choose to do determines what happens. It seems to me that having that experience as a human being just cannot not lead us, everyone of us, to extrapolate this experience to the idea of causality being the operational force driving the flow of events in the natural world. Eventually, we all get there.

Yet, this remains a metaphysical view. Whatever we do, we still have to go through our epistemological view to act. That's probably just a consequence of what sort of beings we are. We don't know the world. We don't have any knowledge of the world. All we have is what we are. So we have various perception organs, our eyes, our ears etc. We have a memory. We have a mind. We have effector organs, our hands, our mouths, our sexual organs, etc. Whenever we act in the world, we go through a complex process whereby our brain produces actualised representations of our environment, of our body, and our mind selects and controls the main parameters of our action.

Sure, our ontological perspective says it's really our brain that does it, and most of us believe this is true. But the things we really know are those we experience through our epistemological perspective. It's rather telling that even when we use computers, we can only replicate this organisation. Our ontological perspective says we have computers, fundamentally deterministic computers. To use those computers, however, we have to go through the epistemological perspective. We write software programmes, programmes which contain explicit choice instructions: IF x = 2 THEN lightB2 = 16. This is straightforwardly mimicking what the human mind does. We think we know (we believe) it's really the computer, the hardware, that does everything. Even the software we think is really just an aspect of the hardware. Yet, we don't know how to use a computer if not through the epistemological perspective. So, we write programmes that contain IF-THEN instructions, which are absolutely essential to any programme, and work in effect much like the kind of mental choices we use for our every action in our everyday life.

If ever someone comes up with a way to stop using the epistemological perspective, to only go through the ontological perspective, then the notion of free will will disappear for this person. For now, the only person in this case I can think of would be God Himself he is does exist. Not us, because of what we are, or seem to be.

So, one way to see this, is to say that our ordinary notion of free will is an operational notion. We don't know how to not use it to make sense of our everyday experience of the world. The only free will which is really contradictory with our idea of a deterministic world is the metaphysical concept of free will, which is something different from our epistemological notion of free will, which is itself based on our sense of free will.

So, do you like that?
EB

I just want to throw something at you.

- - - Updated - - -

 

[Speakpigeon]

Why would you expect judges to care about the logical arguments of a philosopher? Their job is to interpret and execute the law, as far as I know.

But here, I am saying it also applies to definition 4.a. above; just because one is able to make moral/rational decisions does not imply that one is answerable for one's behavior. Strawson's argument shows that no one is answerable for their behavior, regardless of whether they are capable of rationality.

So? Are judges infallible? What a strange reply. I'm sure there was a time when many judges based their appraisal of someone's guilt on the color of their skin. Would you say that their verdicts were valid, even though they were based on a notion of guilt that didn't make any sense?

It appears you don't understand my argument. So, I'll try to make it real easy but I won't be able to make it easier than that if you still don't get it.

So, here it goes. I believe most of us assume that people are usually responsible, i.e. that they are able to make moral or rational decisions by themselves and that they are therefore answerable for their behaviour. As everything in life, our assessment may well be wrong on occasions, or even possibly always, but we're still doing it. In the case for example of a criminal trial, a judge is given the task of deciding whether the accused is responsible of the crime. Given the seriousness of the potential sentences involved, we have to have a process to do it and that's usually the way it's done in democratic countries. Personally, I wouldn't know what else to suggest we did instead. So the judge, or possibly the jury, will decide whether the accused is to be held responsible and, hopefully, exactly to what extent.

The basis of this decision is empirical. The judge listens to the evidence available and to what the accused has to say and makes a decision as to responsibility. And that's it.

I don't see where Strawson's argument would apply. At most, you could try to convince the judge that nobody is really responsible for anything, see if this could work, but I doubt it.

And that's just an example. You could try to convince your country's political representatives to see if you could get them to pass a law saying in substance nobody is responsible for anything. I also doubt this would work.

I don't think anything to do with Strawson's argument would work because it's based on a notion of responsibility that just doesn't match what people think. I also believe that the dictionary definition I provided is broadly what people seem to think about responsibility.

Well, I guess I already said al that.

Sorry, I can't help.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

You have hit on the nub of my problem with Sp's approach, which I am going to call, the ''everything's pretty much fine as it is thank you very much" ideology.

No, I would agree there are many and very serious problems. But I also think that the only responsible thing to do here would be to look at these problems in details and try to improve how justice works in practice as well as on principle. If you have suggestions to that effect, I think you should definitely do something about it. But I'm pretty sure Strawson's argument won't ever convince enough people to effect change.

But, it's your call. You try it.

I will cheer from the sidelines...
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

No, I would agree there are many and very serious problems.

Atta boy.

But I also think that the only responsible thing to do here would be to look at these problems in details and try to improve how justice works in practice as well as on principle.

I don't think I've ever said anything to the contrary.

If you have suggestions to that effect, I think you should definitely do something about it. But I'm pretty sure Strawson's argument won't ever convince enough people to effect change.

But, it's your call. You try it.

I will cheer from the sidelines...
EB

As I tire of saying.......

(a) I don't have to try it, it's already slowly and gradually happening and has been for many years. Where or how far it goes in the future may depend on the maturing of the various sciences which are relevant.

(b) the question of 'what to do' is separate from and secondary to the question 'do we have free will' or even the question 'what sort of free will do we have' (for those who prefer to use the term free will in some way). We can agree that we perhaps should, for pragmatic reasons, still operate 'as if' we had this or that capacity, but personally I'm not going to also say 'I have it' unless someone can explain to me how that could possibly be correct.

As for suggestions....possibly less retributive punishment would do for now. We can leave anything more drastic until (or if or when) the picture is clearer.

 

[PyramidHead]

Why would you expect judges to care about the logical arguments of a philosopher? Their job is to interpret and execute the law, as far as I know.

But here, I am saying it also applies to definition 4.a. above; just because one is able to make moral/rational decisions does not imply that one is answerable for one's behavior. Strawson's argument shows that no one is answerable for their behavior, regardless of whether they are capable of rationality.

So? Are judges infallible? What a strange reply. I'm sure there was a time when many judges based their appraisal of someone's guilt on the color of their skin. Would you say that their verdicts were valid, even though they were based on a notion of guilt that didn't make any sense?

It appears you don't understand my argument. So, I'll try to make it real easy but I won't be able to make it easier than that if you still don't get it.

So, here it goes. I believe most of us assume that people are usually responsible, i.e. that they are able to make moral or rational decisions by themselves and that they are therefore answerable for their behaviour. As everything in life, our assessment may well be wrong on occasions, or even possibly always, but we're still doing it. In the case for example of a criminal trial, a judge is given the task of deciding whether the accused is responsible of the crime. Given the seriousness of the potential sentences involved, we have to have a process to do it and that's usually the way it's done in democratic countries. Personally, I wouldn't know what else to suggest we did instead. So the judge, or possibly the jury, will decide whether the accused is to be held responsible and, hopefully, exactly to what extent.

The basis of this decision is empirical. The judge listens to the evidence available and to what the accused has to say and makes a decision as to responsibility. And that's it.

I don't see where Strawson's argument would apply. At most, you could try to convince the judge that nobody is really responsible for anything, see if this could work, but I doubt it.

And that's just an example. You could try to convince your country's political representatives to see if you could get them to pass a law saying in substance nobody is responsible for anything. I also doubt this would work.

There is the issue of whether Strawson is correct that nobody is answerable for anything (which, if being answerable for something requires you to have brought it about yourself, he is correct), and there is the issue of whether the average person, judge or layman, is likely to be swayed by Strawson's argument. I would caution you not to conflate the two.

I don't think anything to do with Strawson's argument would work because it's based on a notion of responsibility that just doesn't match what people think.

Do people not think that to be held accountable for something, one must have caused it himself? I would say that's a fairly common precondition for assigning responsibility. If my input to whatever happened was never in my conscious control, what notion of responsibility would still blame me for it?

 

[Speakpigeon]

(a) I don't have to try it, it's already slowly and gradually happening and has been for many years. Where or how far it goes in the future may depend on the maturing of the various sciences which are relevant.

Whatever evolution there is has nothing to do with the idea that determinism makes human free will illusory.

(b) the question of 'what to do' is separate from and secondary to the question 'do we have free will' or even the question 'what sort of free will do we have' (for those who prefer to use the term free will in some way). We can agree that we perhaps should, for pragmatic reasons, still operate 'as if' we had this or that capacity, but personally I'm not going to also say 'I have it' unless someone can explain to me how that could possibly be correct.

No. The idea that determinism makes human free will illusory has zero political impact in whichever country you may want to look at.

Human relationships, at all levels, are predicated on the assumption that we all have free will and personal responsibility, until proven otherwise, and only in a few specific cases.

The justice system is just one example of that. You would find the same in all areas of the economy and private life.

As for suggestions....possibly less retributive punishment would do for now. We can leave anything more drastic until (or if or when) the picture is clearer.

I don't think sentences are wilfully retributive. Mostly, sentences are meant to "teach a lesson" and protect society. That's what the political power believes it needs.

The idea of retribution may be of interest only to the victims and part of the public opinion. If retribution was the idea, we would still allow hard labour (abolished in Britain only in 1948) and we would have the criminals tortured in front of an audience.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't think sentences are wilfully retributive. Mostly, sentences are meant to "teach a lesson" and protect society. That's what the political power believes it needs.

Possibly. But sterner attitudes to retribution are positively correlated to strength of belief in free will.

As to your general opinions, I see two things. First, you talk about stuff you haven't really delved into and second, you aren't all that interested in the details of things and are comfortable with appearances and the status quo. Imo, you are possibly the last person who should be starting a thread entitled, 'The kind of free will we have' because you don't really know what you're talking about on that topic. Also, this idea that afreewillism is an ideology. Please, catch yourself on.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There is the issue of whether Strawson is correct that nobody is answerable for anything (which, if being answerable for something requires you to have brought it about yourself, he is correct), and there is the issue of whether the average person, judge or layman, is likely to be swayed by Strawson's argument. I would caution you not to conflate the two.

I don't think anything to do with Strawson's argument would work because it's based on a notion of responsibility that just doesn't match what people think.

Do people not think that to be held accountable for something, one must have caused it himself? I would say that's a fairly common precondition for assigning responsibility. If my input to whatever happened was never in my conscious control, what notion of responsibility would still blame me for it?

The only question that matters here is whether someone is or isn't held responsible, where being responsible means something like being "able to make moral or rational decisions on one's own and therefore answerable for one's behaviour".

I also already agreed that Strawson's argument was very effective and definitely conclusive but also that it was utterly irrelevant because it is about a notion of responsibility that has nothing to do with the notion most people have.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

So.....we should tailor the way society works to.....the notions that most people have.....

I think I've heard it all now.

[/Cringe]

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't think sentences are wilfully retributive. Mostly, sentences are meant to "teach a lesson" and protect society. That's what the political power believes it needs.

Possibly. But sterner attitudes to retribution are positively correlated to strength of belief in free will.

I'm quite sure they are but not to the idea that determinism makes free will illusory. All cases where the accused is recognised as to some extent irresponsible take into account specific pathologies or conditions of life. Nothing like the idea that the notion of free will generally is illusory because of determinism.

As to your general opinions, I see two things. First, you talk about stuff you haven't really delved into and second, you aren't all that interested in the details of things and are comfortable with appearances and the status quo. Imo, you are possibly the last person who should be starting a thread entitled, 'The kind of free will we have' because you don't really know what you're talking about on that topic.

???

This is a forum. The idea is people confronting their arguments. Uh, preferably not ad hominem arguments.

Also, this idea that afreewillism is an ideology. Please, catch yourself on.

That's never been my point. First, I wouldn't use and never used the expression "afreewillism", which is indeed new to me.

Second, I clearly said that not all people who dismiss the notion of free will would be ideologues.

But I also believe that most people just don't think much about free will. They should be expected to have the ordinary notion of free will. Unless they be perverted by ideologues, such as can occur in religious communities and political organisations.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

So.....we should tailor the way society works to.....the notions that most people have.....

I think I've heard it all now.

[/Cringe]

I guess that's what most people would call democracy although it's true a few people don't like this idea very much.

Still, if you don't like the ideas most people have, you need to try and convince them they're wrong about it. It can work. It's been done before. We got rid of the death penalty in France and people are currently agitating to obtain a fairer deal for women. What you better not do is use irrelevant arguments like the idiotic one from Strawson.
EB

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

So.....we should tailor the way society works to.....the notions that most people have.....

I think I've heard it all now.

[/Cringe]

I guess that's what most people would call democracy although it's true a few people don't like this idea very much.

Still, if you don't like the ideas most people have, you need to try and convince them they're wrong about it. It can work. It's been done before. We got rid of the death penalty in France and people are currently agitating to obtain a fairer deal for women. What you better not do is use irrelevant arguments like the idiotic one from Strawson.
EB

Strawson's argument is not idiotic evidenced simply by the fact that lots of people do not possess what you call free will. They possess will and exercise willpower, but their perceived judgement is impaired because their brains are what most of us would understand as not normal. But to many of them their brains are quite normal. And this happens in degrees. If you have ever known people with such conditions you would not call Strawson's argument idiotic.

Have you ever known a bipolar individual who also had anosognosia? The energy and creativity levels displayed by some of these individuals are off the charts, not a bad condition to have if one is trying to simply survive. And no doubt our distant ancestors used this "abnormal" condition to do exactly that because it was precisely what the environment demanded. They lived hard and fast, and died relatively young.

But in today's environment these behaviors and conditions are not preferred, considered abnormal, some kind of disease, and are selected against. So how does this fit into your free will argument? Clearly the environment, including humans, gets to decide what is and is not free will according to your argument. In the case of bipolar individuals with anosognosia the environment has changed their free will, but nothing about their "free will" has changed.

 

[Speakpigeon]

So.....we should tailor the way society works to.....the notions that most people have.....

I think I've heard it all now.

[/Cringe]

I guess that's what most people would call democracy although it's true a few people don't like this idea very much.

Still, if you don't like the ideas most people have, you need to try and convince them they're wrong about it. It can work. It's been done before. We got rid of the death penalty in France and people are currently agitating to obtain a fairer deal for women. What you better not do is use irrelevant arguments like the idiotic one from Strawson.
EB

Strawson's argument is not idiotic evidenced simply by the fact that lots of people do not possess what you call free will. They possess will and exercise willpower, but their perceived judgement is impaired because their brains are what most of us would understand as not normal. But to many of them their brains are quite normal. And this happens in degrees. If you have ever known people with such conditions you would not call Strawson's argument idiotic.

It seems clear to me that your comment is prompted by emotion. I can understand that, but emotion doesn't make good arguments.

You're committing the same mistake here as ruby sparks earlier. You're trying to bring some empirical credibility to Strawson's argument on the basis of particular and well-documented cases of diminished responsibility. However, Strawson's argument is a universal argument. As such, it successfully applies to all beings in any causal universe. So, particular cases of diminished responsibility are just irrelevant to the validity of Strawson's argument, however well documented they are.

Look at it again and try to explain how it's not universal:

What do you think of Galen Strawson's refutation of responsibility, EB? In a nutshell, his argument is as follows:
1. We do what we do because of the way that we are.
2. In order to be responsible for what we do, we must be responsible for the way we are.
3. To be responsible for the way we are, we must have contributed to bringing it about in some relevant way.
4. But any contribution we might have made to the way we are must have been the result of the way we were when we made the contribution (from 1).
5. Thus it is impossible to be responsible for the way that we are.
6. Thus it is impossible to be responsible for what we do.

Your point is also irrelevant to my claim that Strawson's argument is idiotic, and for the same reason. I just said the argument is valid. So, how come it's also idiotic? Because it applies to a notion of responsibility that very nearly nobody has. So the argument is successful in denying the existence of a kind of responsibility nearly nobody thinks they have and just ignores the kind of responsibility most people think they have. How idiotic is that? I would say, it's very idiotic.

Have you ever known a bipolar individual who also had anosognosia? The energy and creativity levels displayed by some of these individuals are off the charts, not a bad condition to have if one is trying to simply survive. And no doubt our distant ancestors used this "abnormal" condition to do exactly that because it was precisely what the environment demanded. They lived hard and fast, and died relatively young.

But in today's environment these behaviors and conditions are not preferred, considered abnormal, some kind of disease, and are selected against. So how does this fit into your free will argument?

You'd have to explain to me how it doesn't.

Clearly the environment, including humans, gets to decide what is and is not free will according to your argument. In the case of bipolar individuals with anosognosia the environment has changed their free will, but nothing about their "free will" has changed.

Sorry, I don't understand.
EB