The kind of free will we have

[T.G.G. Moogly]

Strawson's argument is not idiotic evidenced simply by the fact that lots of people do not possess what you call free will. They possess will and exercise willpower, but their perceived judgement is impaired because their brains are what most of us would understand as not normal. But to many of them their brains are quite normal. And this happens in degrees. If you have ever known people with such conditions you would not call Strawson's argument idiotic.

It seems clear to me that your comment is prompted by emotion. I can understand that, but emotion doesn't make good arguments.

You're committing the same mistake here as ruby sparks earlier. You're trying to bring some empirical credibility to Strawson's argument on the basis of particular and well-documented cases of diminished responsibility. However, Strawson's argument is a universal argument. As such, it successfully applies to all beings in any causal universe. So, particular cases of diminished responsibility are just irrelevant to the validity of Strawson's argument, however well documented they are.

Look at it again and try to explain how it's not universal:

What do you think of Galen Strawson's refutation of responsibility, EB? In a nutshell, his argument is as follows:
1. We do what we do because of the way that we are.
2. In order to be responsible for what we do, we must be responsible for the way we are.
3. To be responsible for the way we are, we must have contributed to bringing it about in some relevant way.
4. But any contribution we might have made to the way we are must have been the result of the way we were when we made the contribution (from 1).
5. Thus it is impossible to be responsible for the way that we are.
6. Thus it is impossible to be responsible for what we do.

Your point is also irrelevant to my claim that Strawson's argument is idiotic, and for the same reason. I just said the argument is valid. So, how come it's also idiotic? Because it applies to a notion of responsibility that very nearly nobody has. So the argument is successful in denying the existence of a kind of responsibility nearly nobody thinks they have and just ignores the kind of responsibility most people think they have. How idiotic is that? I would say, it's very idiotic.

Have you ever known a bipolar individual who also had anosognosia? The energy and creativity levels displayed by some of these individuals are off the charts, not a bad condition to have if one is trying to simply survive. And no doubt our distant ancestors used this "abnormal" condition to do exactly that because it was precisely what the environment demanded. They lived hard and fast, and died relatively young.

But in today's environment these behaviors and conditions are not preferred, considered abnormal, some kind of disease, and are selected against. So how does this fit into your free will argument?

You'd have to explain to me how it doesn't.

Clearly the environment, including humans, gets to decide what is and is not free will according to your argument. In the case of bipolar individuals with anosognosia the environment has changed their free will, but nothing about their "free will" has changed.

Sorry, I don't understand.
EB

If I said to someone, "if you jump into water you will get wet," and they reply, "Sorry, I don't understand," there isn't much point in discussing further. The two individuals obviously do not share sufficient mutual experiences and interests to make a productive go at a discussion.

 

[Speakpigeon]

If I said to someone, "if you jump into water you will get wet," and they reply, "Sorry, I don't understand," there isn't much point in discussing further. The two individuals obviously do not share sufficient mutual experiences and interests to make a productive go at a discussion.

At least there's no doubt you can make it so.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

As I see it, there are two basic flavors of responsibility as most people understand it: (1) intentionally causing something to happen, and (2) being accountable for the results of your choices. Strawson applies to both. The act of causing something to happen is not sufficient for responsibility if that act was itself caused by something I didn't cause to happen. So, not being the cause of any of my acts, I cannot be held accountable for their results.

I can be imprisoned or fined for my acts, but not because I deserve to be, rather because the consequences of being imprisoned/fined are desirable compared to the alternatives. Just because I am not responsible for a string of robberies I committed doesn't mean society would want the robberies to continue, so it's perfectly rational to remove me from society to prevent more robberies, without ever holding me accountable for them. It would be the same thing as removing the ammunition from a gun to prevent a murder, which in no way implies that the ammunition would be held morally responsible for the murder.

EB, you keep saying Strawson's argument does not apply to the ordinary notion of responsibility and I keep giving examples where it does. What do you think is the difference between how most people think of responsibility and the way Strawson's argument uses it? Could you give an example of a case of responsibility being assigned that would not be vulnerable to the argument?

Note: I am not asking for an example of someone ascribing responsibility incorrectly--that would just prove Strawson is right, and whoever is holding somebody responsible would just be wrong (and if they are just following the law, as in your earlier example of a judge, then it would simply be that the law does not reflect what is actually true; nothing very interesting about that, happens all the time).

 

[Speakpigeon]

As I see it, there are two basic flavors of responsibility as most people understand it: (1) intentionally causing something to happen, and (2) being accountable for the results of your choices. Strawson applies to both. The act of causing something to happen is not sufficient for responsibility if that act was itself caused by something I didn't cause to happen. So, not being the cause of any of my acts, I cannot be held accountable for their results.

I can be imprisoned or fined for my acts, but not because I deserve to be, rather because the consequences of being imprisoned/fined are desirable compared to the alternatives. Just because I am not responsible for a string of robberies I committed doesn't mean society would want the robberies to continue, so it's perfectly rational to remove me from society to prevent more robberies, without ever holding me accountable for them. It would be the same thing as removing the ammunition from a gun to prevent a murder, which in no way implies that the ammunition would be held morally responsible for the murder.

EB, you keep saying Strawson's argument does not apply to the ordinary notion of responsibility and I keep giving examples where it does. What do you think is the difference between how most people think of responsibility and the way Strawson's argument uses it? Could you give an example of a case of responsibility being assigned that would not be vulnerable to the argument?

Note: I am not asking for an example of someone ascribing responsibility incorrectly--that would just prove Strawson is right, and whoever is holding somebody responsible would just be wrong (and if they are just following the law, as in your earlier example of a judge, then it would simply be that the law does not reflect what is actually true; nothing very interesting about that, happens all the time).

Our notion of responsibility potentially applies to pretty much everything we do in life. We need to assess every case before we can assign responsibility, but, very often, our assessment is reduced to very nearly a knee-jerk reaction. If you punch me in the face, I will punch you back immediately because I will see you as responsible for the pain I felt. Things get much more protracted in a criminal trial for example but the basic principle seems to remain the same. There's no question there of going back in time to find the ultimate cause of it as Strawson's argument asks us to do. We could do something very nearly like it, and science for example may be regarded as something approaching this, but, broadly, I think we operate under the law of proportionality. You punch me, I punch you. Fraudulent financial schemes and murders seem to justify that we should spend more time, personnel, and money to try and find those responsible. In doing so, we're indeed going back in time, but humans won't ever countenance your infinite regress argument proving nobody is ever responsible of anything. And there are probably good reasons for that. The idea of responsibility is not to find the ultimate true cause of our afflictions but what we could call "the effective cause". If you punch me in the face, there would be no point about me setting up a lengthy investigation to decide what to do. The most effective thing to do is just to punch you back in the face. Again, there's always some assessment to be made, but it will be proportionate. We're not going to go into greater expenses to find an elusive true cause than we've already suffered as a victim. Very often, we don't even do anything. The harm is so little that anything we would do to make sure it doesn't happen again would be too much. A neighbour negligently dropping cigarette's stubs in the stairwell, somebody staying in the way, being rude, whatever. Most of the time, you'll leave it to other people to do something if they want. Everything I see around me in life complies with this analysis. I don't even understand why I need to explain it given it's so bloody obvious.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

As I see it, there are two basic flavors of responsibility as most people understand it: (1) intentionally causing something to happen, and (2) being accountable for the results of your choices. Strawson applies to both. The act of causing something to happen is not sufficient for responsibility if that act was itself caused by something I didn't cause to happen. So, not being the cause of any of my acts, I cannot be held accountable for their results.

I can be imprisoned or fined for my acts, but not because I deserve to be, rather because the consequences of being imprisoned/fined are desirable compared to the alternatives. Just because I am not responsible for a string of robberies I committed doesn't mean society would want the robberies to continue, so it's perfectly rational to remove me from society to prevent more robberies, without ever holding me accountable for them. It would be the same thing as removing the ammunition from a gun to prevent a murder, which in no way implies that the ammunition would be held morally responsible for the murder.

EB, you keep saying Strawson's argument does not apply to the ordinary notion of responsibility and I keep giving examples where it does. What do you think is the difference between how most people think of responsibility and the way Strawson's argument uses it? Could you give an example of a case of responsibility being assigned that would not be vulnerable to the argument?

Note: I am not asking for an example of someone ascribing responsibility incorrectly--that would just prove Strawson is right, and whoever is holding somebody responsible would just be wrong (and if they are just following the law, as in your earlier example of a judge, then it would simply be that the law does not reflect what is actually true; nothing very interesting about that, happens all the time).

Our notion of responsibility potentially applies to pretty much everything we do in life. We need to assess every case before we can assign responsibility, but, very often, our assessment is reduced to very nearly a knee-jerk reaction. If you punch me in the face, I will punch you back immediately because I will see you as responsible for the pain I felt. Things get much more protracted in a criminal trial for example but the basic principle seems to remain the same. There's no question there of going back in time to find the ultimate cause of it as Strawson's argument asks us to do. We could do something very nearly like it, and science for example may be regarded as something approaching this, but, broadly, I think we operate under the law of proportionality. You punch me, I punch you. Fraudulent financial schemes and murders seem to justify that we should spend more time, personnel, and money to try and find those responsible. In doing so, we're indeed going back in time, but humans won't ever countenance your infinite regress argument proving nobody is ever responsible of anything. And there are probably good reasons for that. The idea of responsibility is not to find the ultimate true cause of our afflictions but what we could call "the effective cause". If you punch me in the face, there would be no point about me setting up a lengthy investigation to decide what to do. The most effective thing to do is just to punch you back in the face. Again, there's always some assessment to be made, but it will be proportionate. We're not going to go into greater expenses to find an elusive true cause than we've already suffered as a victim. Very often, we don't even do anything. The harm is so little that anything we would do to make sure it doesn't happen again would be too much. A neighbour negligently dropping cigarette's stubs in the stairwell, somebody staying in the way, being rude, whatever. Most of the time, you'll leave it to other people to do something if they want. Everything I see around me in life complies with this analysis. I don't even understand why I need to explain it given it's so bloody obvious.
EB

So, to recap:

-People tend to believe that they are adequately assigning responsibility when they trace an action to someone's intentional behavior. I agree.

-It would be difficult to convince most people that all intentional behavior is caused by factors beyond one's control. I agree.

-Assignment of responsibility happens against a backdrop of pragmatic concerns, like time and personnel. I agree.

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing. From what you have said here, it remains true that there is no difference between the definition of responsibility between Strawson's argument and everyday use. It is simply that everyday assignments of responsibility are sloppy and incomplete. When most people assign responsibility, they do not know that they are being sloppy and incomplete; they think that finding an intentional behavior that caused something to happen is a job well done. Absent any reason to doubt Strawson's reasoning or his definition of terms, it appears they are just flatly wrong. That isn't really news to me.

In other discussions, you have indicated that you are a radical skeptic about the existence of an external world. Let's submit that position to the same type of scrutiny you are employing here.

Well, your skepticism is idiotic! It's plain to see that people everywhere behave as if there is an external world! Nobody pays any attention to the distinction between subjective experience and an objectively extant universe! Most of the time, it's just a knee-jerk acceptance of whatever our senses present to us! There may be isolated cases where we investigate the reliability of perception, but these are the exception and not the rule! I don't understand why I have to explain something so obvious!

That's not how philosophy operates. You among all others should be aware that widespread acceptance of a metaphysical view has no bearing whatsoever on its truth.

 

[The AntiChris]

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing.

On what basis do you (and Strawson) conclude that most people are wrong? You appear to be demanding the kind of responsibility that does not, and can never, exist.

 

[PyramidHead]

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing.

On what basis do you (and Strawson) conclude that most people are wrong? You appear to be demanding the kind of responsibility that does not, and can never, exist.

It is not that I am demanding it; Strawson's argument shows that the type of responsibility demanded by ordinary people under regular circumstances is, contrary to what most believe, something that cannot and can never exist. There is no special definition of responsibility at play here. When people assign responsibility, they do so under the assumption that a chain of events were set in motion by somebody's intentional action. For example, if I accidentally knock over a stack of papers, less responsibility is assigned to me than if I intentionally did so. It is believed that the coincidental collision between my body and the papers in the first case is not something I should have to answer for, because it ultimately was not initiated by my will; it was an accident. Conversely, in the second case it is believed that my knocking over the papers was initiated by my will, and so I should be held accountable for it. What Strawson does is to show that there is no fundamental difference between the coincidental causes that led to the first case and the intentional causes that led to the second case. Neither were caused by the person who is being held responsible, or not, for the result of his behavior.

In the first case, it's easy to see that this is true. Nobody would say that a person caused himself to accidentally do something. Whatever combination of factors led to me losing my balance and knocking over the stack of papers (my trajectory at the time, my overall level of coordination, my attention span, my situational awareness) is not comprised of things I can consciously control. In the second case, it is implicitly claimed that intentional action is in a different category, that the buck stops there as far as blame and praise are concerned, but the reality of the situation is that ALL of my actions are simply outgrowths of however I am at the time they occur.

For me to have been walking in a different direction, with more coordination, attention, and awareness of my surroundings, I would have to be in a different state than the one I was in when I accidentally collided with the papers. Ordinarily, it is not expected that people have complete causal control over the state they are in relative to these variables. A certain baseline level is expected (such as not showing up to work plastered drunk), but beyond that, my lack of influence over every aspect of my current state is not something I can be blamed for. Yet, what is the actual cause of my intentional knocking over of the papers, other than some aspect of my current state? Causality is perfectly transitive, and if the commonplace notion of responsibility demands that we follow it backwards until we reach an event that was initiated by a choice that was not itself the inevitable result of a background condition beyond my control, there can be no difference between the accidental and intentional scenarios with respect to my responsibility.

This is not to say we should respond to both cases equally. Accidents happen, and if the right measures are taken, they can be minimized. Intentional actions may be more frequent, or follow a certain pattern. Nothing says we have to ignore these distinctions. But the person who intentionally chose to knock over the papers had no more control over the state that inexorably caused his intention than the person who accidentally knocked them over could control the details of his physiology that enabled the accident.

 

[The AntiChris]

It is not that I am demanding it; Strawson's argument shows that the type of responsibility demanded by ordinary people under regular circumstances is, contrary to what most believe, something that cannot and can never exist.

If I've got you right you're saying that Strawson's argument is based on what most people demand of responsibility. How does this square with the fact that most people don't apply Strawson's conditions when assigning responsibility (most people are wrong according to you)?

Wouldn't it make more sense to accept that what people mean by responsibility is best evidenced by what they do rather than by what they say they mean?

 

[Speakpigeon]

So, to recap:

-People tend to believe that they are adequately assigning responsibility when they trace an action to someone's intentional behavior. I agree.

-It would be difficult to convince most people that all intentional behavior is caused by factors beyond one's control. I agree.

-Assignment of responsibility happens against a backdrop of pragmatic concerns, like time and personnel. I agree.

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing. From what you have said here, it remains true that there is no difference between the definition of responsibility between Strawson's argument and everyday use. It is simply that everyday assignments of responsibility are sloppy and incomplete. When most people assign responsibility, they do not know that they are being sloppy and incomplete; they think that finding an intentional behavior that caused something to happen is a job well done. Absent any reason to doubt Strawson's reasoning or his definition of terms, it appears they are just flatly wrong. That isn't really news to me.

I think you're missing my point. As I see it, "responsibility" is just a name. It's the word people use to refer to something. And this something is an operational concept. It's an operational concept because it's been tested by humans since our inception as a species, and possibly even before that. You, following Strawson, you're just talking about something else, which is, as I see it, the scientific concept of causality. People do use it, mostly scientists, and to great effect, but my view is that it would be disastrous if humans suddenly had to magically switch from the notion of responsibility to that of causality in their management of interpersonal human relations. It just couldn't be done. And so, instead, people would have to stop calling people to account. I don't think that would be an improvement.

You're free to think that "most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it", but the way they go about it is in my mind broadly in line with the way they go pretty much about everything in life, and since humans have arguably been really successful as a species on this planet, I think that, overall, they are doing a good job. And more to the point, improvement in any area requires an input from those who have the experience in that area.
EB

 

[fast]

According to determinism, for a given situation, there's only one outcome. This is the ontological perspective.

I'm a bit stumped on this. There's something making me want to argue against the idea that according to determinism and there being only one outcome, yet there is a sense in which I actually might agree.

To me, saying "according to determinism" should be limited to saying there is a cause. I don't mean to argue either way in regards to the "there's only one outcome part" but rather the whole thing, "according to determinism ... there's only one outcome."

This is where things become a bit more complex. What is (is, I say) according to determinism is in itself ambiguous. I'm referring to the various is's in philosophical usage. Even if it's true that according to determinism there's only one outcome, that wouldn't be a function of 'is' in the 'is' of identity. In other words, even if true, it's not true by definition. Thus, if it's true, it's a contingent truth, not a necessary truth.

This is important as it speaks about whether the first part "according to determinism" part is applicable. I think determinism has more to do with causation from a necessary perspective--even if what you say is contingently true.

Here's an analogy: a cat is a domesticated feline. That is close to a necessary truth. If a cat has four legs, true as that may be, it's true by contingency and not by necessity and therefore not necessarily true even though nevertheless true.

Now, if you speak of an event as being determined, the basis of my interpretation with be the necessary truths (not contingent truths) about determinism, and the thing that'll spring to mind has not to do with there being only one outcome but rather that the event had a cause.

Just because an event had a cause, that's not to say (and least not necessarily) that there's only one outcome--that in particular needs to be argued for. If it needs to be argued for, it's not a necessary truth. Necessary truths aren't merely true but instead must be true. So, according to determinism, every event has a cause is the underpinning truth that need no argument since it's true by definition. The there's only one outcome part is a claim that even if supported and even if demonstrated as true will not be hailed as a truth commensurate with necessity.

If I choose chocolate, that's a single outcome. If I choose vanilla, that's a single outcome. Each is only one outcome, but what separates the hard determinist from the soft determinist is that only one of those one outcomes was truly possible to begin with (hard determinist) whereas either of those one outcomes was possible (soft determinist).

Now, four people in a room, a HD, a SD, you, and I. You say, with determinism, there is only one outcome. The HD and SD might agree, but I still have qualms with accepting that as a necessary truth. If you say, with determinism, there is a cause, then the truth is a function of strict meaning and then any denial on my part becomes much more problematic. Let me ask you, when you say with determinism there is only one outcome, and I highly doubt you're a HD, do you really believe the only one outcome view stems from determinism itself or some other ontological reason?

 

[Speakpigeon]

I guess all I really have to do here is to quote what came right after the little bit you quoted:

According to determinism, for a given situation, there's only one outcome. This is the ontological perspective.

I would agree that this perspective seems to be in conflict with our idea that we have free will. But no, it isn't. The ontological perspective is essentially a metaphysical view. That is, we don't know, and probably couldn't know, if it's true. We can believe it's true but we cannot prove absolutely that it's true. All we have is our epistemological perspective on the world, which we believe is based entirely on our perceptions. Even our ontological perspective is grounded on our epistemological perspective, which is why we can only believe rather than know it's true, and therefore why it is a metaphysical view.

Whatever our ontological perspective says, it's a perspective, i.e. dependent on our epistemology.

I would certainly agree that the "only one outcome" bit would need some contextualisation. So, yes, we can, and do, conceive of brands of determinism where there would be multiple outcomes, actual outcomes, possibly a very large number of them, for any given situation. These outcomes would need to somehow ignore each other, they would need to be fully independent from each other, but why not. This view makes for a very, very heavy ontology, but why not.

So, the only one outcome bit may well be merely a contingent truth, although that would itself be dependent on the concept of determinism you favour.

Still, I'm not sure how one could maintain a cogent concept of deterministic cause in case of multiple outcomes. I guess our notion of cause would be reduced to that of an operational construct, an approximation, possibly a mirage. I'm not sure anyone would have any cogent concept of cause to articulate in case of a multiplicity of actual outcomes.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Still, I'm not sure how one could maintain a cogent concept of deterministic cause in case of multiple outcomes. I guess our notion of cause would be reduced to that of an operational construct, an approximation, possibly a mirage. I'm not sure anyone would have any cogent concept of cause to articulate in case of a multiplicity of actual outcomes.

I don't think determinism precludes indeterminacy, a starting point?

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't think determinism precludes indeterminacy, a starting point?

Any non-cogent idea could be used as a starting point for better and better explanations, i.e. the beginning of infinity.

Let's see if anyone articulate enough can continue your rash intuition.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

It is not that I am demanding it; Strawson's argument shows that the type of responsibility demanded by ordinary people under regular circumstances is, contrary to what most believe, something that cannot and can never exist.

If I've got you right you're saying that Strawson's argument is based on what most people demand of responsibility. How does this square with the fact that most people don't apply Strawson's conditions when assigning responsibility (most people are wrong according to you)?

Most people do apply those conditions when assigning responsibility, but they mistakenly believe that the regress of causes terminates at an intentional behavior on the part of the actor. To use EB's words, they assume that this constitutes an "effective cause", the unstated assumption being that there is something causally special about intentional actions that permits (or even necessitates) different treatment from incidental causes like the weather or the ambient lighting. In other words, moral responsibility is understood as a thread that extends backwards from whatever event is under scrutiny, through a virtually infinite series of causes that are deemed irrelevant because they were not initiated by the actor, until it reaches an origin point that was initiated by the actor. Strawson's argument proves that there can be no justification for treating intentional behavior as somehow different from the other irrelevant causes, because intentional behavior fails to be initiated by the actor in the same way the irrelevant causes fail: something beyond the actor's control is the actual cause of both.

Wouldn't it make more sense to accept that what people mean by responsibility is best evidenced by what they do rather than by what they say they mean?

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated. By definition, people assign responsibility in a way they believe is adequate and reasonable; this is not under dispute. If we just take their assignments at face value, then of course there is no problem at all, because nobody would continue to ascribe responsibility in a way they no longer believe makes sense (assuming there is no overriding reason to continue doing so). The question is whether what most people mean by responsibility is as accurate and reasonable as they think it is.

- - - Updated - - -

So, to recap:

-People tend to believe that they are adequately assigning responsibility when they trace an action to someone's intentional behavior. I agree.

-It would be difficult to convince most people that all intentional behavior is caused by factors beyond one's control. I agree.

-Assignment of responsibility happens against a backdrop of pragmatic concerns, like time and personnel. I agree.

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing. From what you have said here, it remains true that there is no difference between the definition of responsibility between Strawson's argument and everyday use. It is simply that everyday assignments of responsibility are sloppy and incomplete. When most people assign responsibility, they do not know that they are being sloppy and incomplete; they think that finding an intentional behavior that caused something to happen is a job well done. Absent any reason to doubt Strawson's reasoning or his definition of terms, it appears they are just flatly wrong. That isn't really news to me.

I think you're missing my point. As I see it, "responsibility" is just a name. It's the word people use to refer to something. And this something is an operational concept. It's an operational concept because it's been tested by humans since our inception as a species, and possibly even before that. You, following Strawson, you're just talking about something else, which is, as I see it, the scientific concept of causality. People do use it, mostly scientists, and to great effect, but my view is that it would be disastrous if humans suddenly had to magically switch from the notion of responsibility to that of causality in their management of interpersonal human relations. It just couldn't be done. And so, instead, people would have to stop calling people to account. I don't think that would be an improvement.

You're free to think that "most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it", but the way they go about it is in my mind broadly in line with the way they go pretty much about everything in life, and since humans have arguably been really successful as a species on this planet, I think that, overall, they are doing a good job. And more to the point, improvement in any area requires an input from those who have the experience in that area.
EB

In the end, you're just arguing from pragmatism. Why you don't make the same case for an external reality, but instead argue to the death that everyone else is wrong in their certainty about it, is beyond me.

 

[ruby sparks]

What is missing from your response is why the proper conclusion should be anything other than: most people are wrong about responsibility and how to assign it, which by the way is exactly what Strawson is arguing.

On what basis do you (and Strawson) conclude that most people are wrong? You appear to be demanding the kind of responsibility that does not, and can never, exist.

It is not that I am demanding it; Strawson's argument shows that the type of responsibility demanded by ordinary people under regular circumstances is, contrary to what most believe, something that cannot and can never exist.

If I've got you right you're saying that Strawson's argument is based on what most people demand of responsibility. How does this square with the fact that most people don't apply Strawson's conditions when assigning responsibility (most people are wrong according to you)?

Wouldn't it make more sense to accept that what people mean by responsibility is best evidenced by what they do rather than by what they say they mean?

Good to see you've ventured beyond picking DBT up on the flaw (which I agree is there) in his labelling/definitions.

And don't worry, I will not assume you are arguing for compatibilism, even if it seems that that is, actually, close to your current preferred position. Unless I am wrong? In any case, I won't be posting to try to prove you wrong, even if we disagree.

In a nutshell, I think I agree with everything PyramidHead has said in his last few posts, and feel that I could not have put it better myself.

I confess, all this 'what most people think' is not an approach I expected in a philosophy forum.

Personally I'd be fine with agreeing that the implications of a lack of free will might be (probably are) an inconvenient and counter-intuitive mindfuck, but to me that's not a good reason to deny the likelihood that it's true, especially when we're only jawboning on a forum. It might be a reason, from a pragmatic pov, to discuss what should/shouldn't or can/can't be done about it, but that's secondary to the question of principle.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Most people do apply those conditions when assigning responsibility, but they mistakenly believe that the regress of causes terminates at an intentional behavior on the part of the actor. To use EB's words, they assume that this constitutes an "effective cause", the unstated assumption being that there is something causally special about intentional actions that permits (or even necessitates) different treatment from incidental causes like the weather or the ambient lighting.

But there is something special about the way we see other human beings. To ignore this is to ignore we think we know how people work. This would be something as stupid to do as to dismiss our belief that we know how our car work, or how the administration works, or how shopping works. We think we know how people work and so we assign responsibility, and possibly use reward and punishment, as we see fit in the expectation that the offending behaviour will stop. Just think of dogs. They look at us and somehow understand they have their next meal provided for as long as they play along. Not bad. We do something very similar with other people, about all sorts of things but also, in particular, when assigning responsibility.

Wouldn't it make more sense to accept that what people mean by responsibility is best evidenced by what they do rather than by what they say they mean?

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated.

Sure, once you start reasoning like Strawson, why no continue and do it about just everything? Simplistic reasoning anyone?

The reality is that we do spend time, energy, manpower and money to question how to assign responsibility. This is a permanent conversation and activity that we have throughout society and every area of life can provide the incentive to engage in this conversation, and that's also true of criminal justice. And yet, very nearly nobody does it on the basis of Strawson's argument. Instead, they do it because they just feel like doing it. And usually, these are people who understand the particular issues of concern in each case and try to improve the way we do things in society. We very nearly all know that's the case. The question is not to apply Strawson and stop assigning responsibility but to improve the way we assign responsibility in a pragmatic way. I guess the main point is that you should try to remember we live in society and that you, too, live in society.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

Most people do apply those conditions when assigning responsibility, but they mistakenly believe that the regress of causes terminates at an intentional behavior on the part of the actor.

Isn't this rather begging the question?

You don't say why you think a mistake is being made but I guess (I don't want to misrepresent you) that you're assuming "most people" believe the "intentional behavior on the part of the actor" is isolated from deterministic causation (agent causality).

I'm not at all convinced by this assumption. All the determinists I know of, assign responsibility just like "most people". It could be that determinists and believers in agent causality apply different criteria when assigning responsibility but just happen to come to the same conclusion. But I doubt it.

Wouldn't it make more sense to accept that what people mean by responsibility is best evidenced by what they do rather than by what they say they mean?

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated.

I don't think that follows at all. A large part of all formal systems of justice entail discussion and reasonable determination of responsibility (culpability). Introducing the concept of an infinite regress of responsibility doesn't help with assigning reasonable responsibility - it just makes no one responsible, ever.

 

[PyramidHead]

Isn't this rather begging the question?

You don't say why you think a mistake is being made but I guess (I don't want to misrepresent you) that you're assuming "most people" believe the "intentional behavior on the part of the actor" is isolated from deterministic causation (agent causality).

Not quite. Strawson's argument actually applies whether one is a determinist or not. Even if I freely chose to do something, without my choice being rigidly determined by the micro-state of the universe prior to my choice, it is still true that I chose what I chose in large part because of the way I am. I will let Strawson describe the argument in more detail:

This may seem contrived, but essentially the same argument can be
given in a more natural form. (1) It is undeniable that one is the way
one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience, and it is
undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in
any way responsible (morally or otherwise). (2) One cannot at any later
stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one
is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity
and previous experience. For, (3) both the particular way in which one
is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in
one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a
result of heredity and previous experience. And (4) any further changes
that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial
changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity
and previous experience. (5) This may not be the whole story, for it
may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity
and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors.
But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for
which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves
contribute in any way to one's being truly morally responsible for how
one is.

The claim, then, is not that people cannot change the way they are.
They can, in certain respects (which tend to be exaggerated by North
Americans and underestimated, perhaps, by Europeans). The claim is
only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a
way as to be or become truly or ultimately morally responsible for the
way they are, and hence for their actions.

[...]

I think that the Basic Argument is certainly valid in showing that we
cannot be morally responsible in the way that many suppose. And I
think that it is the natural light, not fear, that has convinced the students
I have taught that this is so. That is why it seems worthwhile to restate
the argument in a slightly different - simpler and looser - version, and
to ask again what is wrong with it.

Some may say that there is nothing wrong with it, but that it is
not very interesting, and not very central to the free will debate. I
doubt whether any non-philosopher or beginner in philosophy would
agree with this view. If one wants to think about free will and moral
responsibility, consideration of some version of the Basic Argument is an
overwhelmingly natural place to start. It certainly has to be considered
at some point in a full discussion of free will and moral responsibility,
even if the point it has to make is obvious. Belief in the kind of absolute
moral responsibility that it shows to be impossible has for a long time
been central to the Western religious, moral, and cultural tradition, even
if it is now slightly on the wane (a disputable view). It is a matter of
historical fact that concern about moral responsibility has been the main
motor - indeed the ratio essendi - of discussion of the issue of free
will. The only way in which one might hope to show (1) that the Basic
Argument was not central to the free will debate would be to show (2)
that the issue of moral responsibility was not central to the free will
debate. There are, obviously, ways of taking the word 'free' in which
(2) can be maintained. But (2) is clearly false none the less.

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated.

I don't think that follows at all. A large part of all formal systems of justice entail discussion and reasonable determination of responsibility (culpability). Introducing the concept of an infinite regress of responsibility doesn't help with assigning reasonable responsibility - it just makes no one responsible, ever.

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

 

[The AntiChris]

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated.

I don't think that follows at all. A large part of all formal systems of justice entail discussion and reasonable determination of responsibility (culpability). Introducing the concept of an infinite regress of responsibility doesn't help with assigning reasonable responsibility - it just makes no one responsible, ever.

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

I don't think Strawson is arguing against all notions of responsibility - his target is 'true' or 'ultimate' responsibility.

Strawson says "we cannot be morally responsible in the way that many suppose". This may be true but I'm not at all convinced that this is the way most people view moral responsibility.

Strawson's argument doesn't show that anyone is "wrong about responsibility and how to assign it" (the claim I originally took issue with). It simply shows that some people may not practice what they preach.

 

[ruby sparks]

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

Hits the nail cleanly on the head, imo.

The central question is about as settled as almost any philosophical question I can think of.

The rest, as a famous rabbi allegedly once said, is commentary.

Or fudge.

Or if you like, pragmatic compromise.