The kind of free will we have

[Speakpigeon]

Courtrooms are places where guilt and blame are individualized and assigned, not determined.

I don't think courtrooms are places where freewill is routinely assessed. Occasionally quite possibly, not routinely. Free will is known from us primarily because we have a sense of free will, so from the inside so to speak, not from observing how others behave. We infer free will in others just like we infer pain and joy, which requires some kind of assessment on our part, which can itself be mistaken.

If one has sufficient resources it becomes obvious that free will for such a person is greater than for someone of lesser means.

You seem to mix up free will and other things like freedom, capabilities etc.

Does a person really have free will if they are forced to steal to support themselves and their families? Academically I think we agree that this person still possesses free will, but practically their choices are more limited than someone who controls greater resources.

And "practically" is not free will.

This deterministic side of compatibilism can be viewed as very broad in scope or arbitrarily restricted by immediate, local conditions. And the same for free will.

Claiming free will is one thing, but claiming freedom of choice, and therefore guilt, is really something else.

Courts will typically assess freedom of choice, not free will, except in extreme cases. That's the basis for assessing personal responsibility.

Freedom of choice
an individual's opportunity and autonomy to perform an action selected from at least two available options, unconstrained by external parties.

EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

If we want to gauge what conceptions of of free will are in everyday use, we can look at the (admittedly limited) studies done, and we can look at what is written and said both in everyday life and in the courts. In all of these, the picture is confused, with a heavy dash of libertarianism, evidently, but also some naive compatibilism and determinism.

We don't really need to do any of this. We can all decide for ourselves if we have free will or not. As far as I can tell, free will cannot be scientifically assessed, and thus cannot be assessed from the outside. My only justification for claiming that I have free will is to insist that it is for you to make your own assessment and not let yourself be browbeaten into assuming free will is illusory. Why would we need anything else?

One small thing, the fact that something can't, as far as we can reasonably tell, exist in the real world is no obstacle to people in everyday life commonly believing it does anyway, as appears to be the case for common/popular aspects/conceptions of free will, and gods.

That's your conceit. Free will has little to do with beliefs in gods.

If for one am quite sure I possess free will and I'm not in the least tempted to believe in any kind of god.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I have always had some difficulty with the concept of free will. It seems apparent and even necessary for me to remain sane to believe it exists, and yet all of the research I have seen on it points the other way. If my mind is merely chemicals and neurons firing as they are triggered by others and by outside stimuli and genetic programming, I don't see how "Free Will" can truly exist and perhaps we only have the perception of it. But that kind of erases the concept of self as I see it.

Free will as people usually think of it is really the autonomy of the person in their environment. Even computer-based systems much simpler than human beings possess some degree of autonomy. I would point at how we typically look at robots in fictions as already possessing enough free will to be seen as malevolent (think Hal). That's what we mean by "free will". That's all our sense of free will says. It's basic. It's operational. It's causally effective. Sure, what we want to do is essentially the result of what our neurons are busy doing, unbeknownst to us, but neurons are part and parcel of the person. The neurons in my head are my neurons, not anybody else's. So whatever I do voluntarily because of my neurons I do according to my own free will, not yours or anybody else's. Simple, causally effective, and pretty obvious. I would understand some scientist explaining how free will is produced by neurons. But anybody claiming free will doesn't exist is not making sense.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

I have always had some difficulty with the concept of free will. It seems apparent and even necessary for me to remain sane to believe it exists, and yet all of the research I have seen on it points the other way. If my mind is merely chemicals and neurons firing as they are triggered by others and by outside stimuli and genetic programming, I don't see how "Free Will" can truly exist and perhaps we only have the perception of it. But that kind of erases the concept of self as I see it.

Free will as people usually think of it is really the autonomy of the person in their environment. Even computer-based systems much simpler than human beings possess some degree of autonomy. I would point at how we typically look at robots in fictions as already possessing enough free will to be seen as malevolent (think Hal). That's what we mean by "free will". That's all our sense of free will says. It's basic. It's operational. It's causally effective. Sure, what we want to do is essentially the result of what our neurons are busy doing, unbeknownst to us, but neurons are part and parcel of the person. The neurons in my head are my neurons, not anybody else's. So whatever I do voluntarily because of my neurons I do according to my own free will, not yours or anybody else's. Simple, causally effective, and pretty obvious. I would understand some scientist explaining how free will is produced by neurons. But anybody claiming free will doesn't exist is not making sense.
EB

So would you agree with me that one can have free will, and yet "not have done otherwise"? Sartre and the Existentialists say that one is "condemned to be free". That existence comes before essence in the sense that we are defined by what we do. I disagree in that respect because I think we are defined by the relationships we have. But nevertheless, the self is ever changing and its essense is found in the continuity of one's existence.

 

[fast]

We can all decide for ourselves if we have free will or not. As far as I can tell, free will cannot be scientifically assessed, and thus cannot be assessed from the outside.

Say what? The cameras show the bank teller being pushed into the safe. She is scared and wants out. She is being held in there against her will. She doesn't have the freedom to do as she pleases, which is to leave the confines of the restraining locked safe.

The fact is an objective fact, not subject to personal interpretation.

 

[ruby sparks]

But I'm pretty certain that everybody praises and blames out of practical necessity.

That appears to be your 'consequentialist' framing in a slightly different form (which I didn't buy into first time around). Got anything to back it up?

I mean, if you are only saying, somewhat weakly (as in a weak form of argument), that sometimes praise or blame are awarded for practical purposes, then fine. I'd guess they are, sometimes.

Imo, that would not dislodge a conception of free will, of some sort, as the likely best candidate for main basis, either in the courts or in everyday life. It's what humans do. It's part and parcel of how we psychologically navigate, interact with and respond to the world, making distinctions between what we see as other free will agents, other agents and non-agents, such as the weather.

As far as I can see, a conception of free will is fundamental to our justice systems. Look up the wiki page on 'legal guilt' for example (or 'culpability', 'moral responsibility' or 'personal responsibility' for that matter) and near the start you typically read stuff like this:

"Philosophically, guilt in criminal law is a reflection of a functioning society and its ability to condemn individuals' actions. It rests fundamentally on a presumption of free will, in which individuals choose actions and are, therefore, subjected to external judgement of the rightness or wrongness of those actions."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilt_(law)

Now, you may ask, what sort of free will is being assumed, and you may want to say that it's compatibilist or practical free will (and if you do, I would like to go into more detail with you about that) but the underlying basis does not appear to be consequentialism.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I have always had some difficulty with the concept of free will. It seems apparent and even necessary for me to remain sane to believe it exists, and yet all of the research I have seen on it points the other way. If my mind is merely chemicals and neurons firing as they are triggered by others and by outside stimuli and genetic programming, I don't see how "Free Will" can truly exist and perhaps we only have the perception of it. But that kind of erases the concept of self as I see it.

Free will as people usually think of it is really the autonomy of the person in their environment. Even computer-based systems much simpler than human beings possess some degree of autonomy. I would point at how we typically look at robots in fictions as already possessing enough free will to be seen as malevolent (think Hal). That's what we mean by "free will". That's all our sense of free will says. It's basic. It's operational. It's causally effective. Sure, what we want to do is essentially the result of what our neurons are busy doing, unbeknownst to us, but neurons are part and parcel of the person. The neurons in my head are my neurons, not anybody else's. So whatever I do voluntarily because of my neurons I do according to my own free will, not yours or anybody else's. Simple, causally effective, and pretty obvious. I would understand some scientist explaining how free will is produced by neurons. But anybody claiming free will doesn't exist is not making sense.
EB

So would you agree with me that one can have free will, and yet "not have done otherwise"?

I'm agnostic as to whether we could have done otherwise than whatever we actually did. And I certainly wouldn't know how to prove or disprove this. But, I have free will irrespective of whether I could have done otherwise than what I did.

For most people, free will is a pragmatic notion. This is so because they're usually not aware of any highfalutin concept of free will. They know of free will because they have a sense of free will and this will be what they call "free will".

Sartre and the Existentialists say that one is "condemned to be free". That existence comes before essence in the sense that we are defined by what we do. I disagree in that respect because I think we are defined by the relationships we have.

Personally, I don't think we can say much about human beings that would be absolutely true. To do that, you'd have to fall back on our chemical composition and even that may be uncertain.

A lot of what people say seems to me to be relative to some particular set of circumstances. So, I would seem to agree more with Sartre.

Still, it's also clear to me that relationships with other humans is a crucial aspect of the lives of most human beings.

But nevertheless, the self is ever changing and its essense is found in the continuity of one's existence.

Which seems like something clever to say to fully agree with the Existentialists.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

We can all decide for ourselves if we have free will or not. As far as I can tell, free will cannot be scientifically assessed, and thus cannot be assessed from the outside.

Say what? The cameras show the bank teller being pushed into the safe. She is scared and wants out. She is being held in there against her will. She doesn't have the freedom to do as she pleases, which is to leave the confines of the restraining locked safe.

The fact is an objective fact, not subject to personal interpretation.

???

It's just you don't know that bitch! She is just playing the part. And a first class Thespian, too. You wouldn't know the difference.

Sorry, you misinterpreted what you saw. Not to worry, it happens to all of us.

What you can be pretty sure is that she is not free to go as long as she's locked up in the safe. That in itself doesn't mean she didn't accept the situation. I guess the best you can do is make up your own mind and decide which is more likely to be true between she wants to get out or she is a very good actress. But that's different from knowing she's locked up against her own free will. Only she knows.
EB

 

[The AntiChris]

But I'm pretty certain that everybody praises and blames out of practical necessity.

That appears to be your 'consequentialist' framing in a slightly different form (which I didn't buy into first time around). Got anything to back it up?

Only common sense.

We praise and blame in order to influence behaviour. We want to encourage desired behaviour and discourage undesired behaviour.

To blame without any desire that the object of one's disapproval may in some way be influenced would be absurd.

Consequentialist and desert-based blame are not mutually exclusive. Some may actually believe (incoherently) that blame is in some way deserved but all will have a degree of expectation that their expression of disapproval might influence behaviour.

 

[PyramidHead]

Absolutely. You implicitly accepted this when you agreed with me that Strawson left open the possibility of pragmatic responsibility.

Whenever we praise or blame we're holding someone responsible. This type of responsibility exists in everyday use. It might not satisfy your requirements for 'actual' responsibility but to deny that it is real responsibility simply means you and the rest of us are talking about different things.

I take it by your statement that 'pragmatic responsibility' is praising or blaming people even though they deserve neither praise nor blame.

I don't subscribe to the sense of desert you (and Strawson) are alluding to.

Good! The problem is that most people do.

I understand the colloquial sense (non-metaphysical) of "deserve" in which it's commonly said that someone who's not responsible (i.e. didn't do it) didn't deserve to be blamed or when someone is perceived to be punished disproportionately (beyond what is strictly required for consequentialist purposes) that they didn't deserve their treatment.

Someone might be considered undeserving of blame because they didn't do it, but another big reason would be that they did it but weren't in control of their own behavior. Colloquial use admits many scenarios where this might excuse someone from responsibility, so it isn't a new concept. For instance, if I was caught on camera robbing a bank, I would be blamed for it, but if it was later found that I had been under hypnotic suggestion then I would be absolved from blame. Why do you think that is? Isn't it because, rationally, people conclude that I was not the cause of my own hypnotic suggestion, so I could not be held accountable for the behavior that resulted from it? Responsibility for my behavior correlates with the perceived degree to which I was a cause of it, and it is this fact that makes it vulnerable to the basic argument. It proves that the very same colloquial sense in which I would be absolved from responsibility if I was hypnotized into robbing the bank applies with exactly the same force to all of the factors that shape who I am at any given moment. Yet, we say that the person who robbed the bank under hypnosis does not deserve blame at all, not even for 'consequentialist purposes', although he would deserve it if he robbed the bank under normal circumstances. Why should the robber be the recipient of consequentialist negative incentives in the second case but not the first, if he was equally powerless over his behavior in both?

 

[ruby sparks]

We praise and blame in order to influence behaviour. We want to encourage desired behaviour and discourage undesired behaviour.

To blame without any desire that the object of one's disapproval may in some way be influenced would be absurd.

Consequentialist and desert-based blame are not mutually exclusive. Some may actually believe (incoherently) that blame is in some way deserved but all will have a degree of expectation that their expression of disapproval might influence behaviour.

Sure. The way I would put it perhaps is this, "sometimes, we praise and blame in order to influence behaviour, but even in those cases, there is most often an underlying assumption that the person whose behaviour we are trying to influence can choose to change".

Or if not, then we don't let them out and about again.

So I can agree with you that both can be in play, but not agree with you about which is likely the underlying basis.

And there are other times when emotions, rather than reasoning about consequences, shape our judgements. Studies appear to show that a stronger conception of free will leads to more retributive responses, especially when there is emotional affect, as there invariably is when we encounter what we feel is a moral wrong done by a human.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

Emotions are human currency numero uno. Anyone who thinks otherwise is not a very good observer of the human condition.

 

[The AntiChris]

Someone might be considered undeserving of blame because they didn't do it, but another big reason would be that they did it but weren't in control of their own behavior. Colloquial use admits many scenarios where this might excuse someone from responsibility, so it isn't a new concept. For instance, if I was caught on camera robbing a bank, I would be blamed for it, but if it was later found that I had been under hypnotic suggestion then I would be absolved from blame. Why do you think that is? Isn't it because, rationally, people conclude that I was not the cause of my own hypnotic suggestion, so I could not be held accountable for the behavior that resulted from it? Responsibility for my behavior correlates with the perceived degree to which I was a cause of it, and it is this fact that makes it vulnerable to the basic argument. It proves that the very same colloquial sense in which I would be absolved from responsibility if I was hypnotized into robbing the bank applies with exactly the same force to all of the factors that shape who I am at any given moment. Yet, we say that the person who robbed the bank under hypnosis does not deserve blame at all, not even for 'consequentialist purposes', although he would deserve it if he robbed the bank under normal circumstances. Why should the robber be the recipient of consequentialist negative incentives in the second case but not the first, if he was equally powerless over his behavior in both?

The subject's changed. It was never my intention to justify pragmatic concepts of moral responsibility (only to point out that this type of responsibility is not disproven by Strawson's argument).

You started out insisting that Strawson's argument "sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything.". I don't know if you still hold to this but in case you're in any doubt here's Strawson in an interview in March 2003:

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

It doesn't look to me as though Strawson shares your view that "The kind of responsibility that survives Strawson's argument is hardly responsibility at all".

I really don't care if you want to insist that everyday responsibility isn't, in your view, 'real' responsibility (I can't think of anything to say that you might find remotely persuasive) - I just don't think you can legitimately use Strawson's argument to justify your view.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I just don't think you can legitimately use Strawson's argument to justify your view.

Yes, exactly. He can use Strawson's argument, but no longer legitimately.

You just redeemed Strawson in mine eyes. Somewhat.

Not bad!
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

Well, look at that. I guess I might have taken him a bit too far after all.

 

[ruby sparks]

It was never my intention to justify pragmatic concepts of moral responsibility (only to point out that this type of responsibility is not disproven by Strawson's argument).

Yes, well, you know that I for one reckon that you like your hidey-hole and tend not to stray from an easy-to-the-point-of-being-bleedin'-obvious safe position to defend. You spent about a month on DBT on a position where you were obviously essentially correct about definitions. You should try deeper waters. Try something other than Consequentialism maybe.

Is there a compatibilist in the house willing to identify themselves?

I just want to stress the word “ultimate” before “moral responsibility.” Because there’s a clear, weaker, everyday sense of “morally responsible” in which you and I and millions of other people are thoroughly morally responsible people.

I really don't care if you want to insist that everyday responsibility isn't, in your view, 'real' responsibility (I can't think of anything to say that you might find remotely persuasive) - I just don't think you can legitimately use Strawson's argument to justify your view.

Count me at least still up for claiming that it is legitimate to say that 'everyday' responsibility isn't 'real' responsibility, until I hear what I consider to be a good case. I would be interested to know Strawson's argument for what he said there. It might be that I don't agree with him at that point. I don't buy Dennett and he says something similar. In his case, I think he's being inconsistent.

And I would love to hear your case. But I guess that's asking too much. But hey, before you give up because you can't think of anything to say that I might find remotely persuasive, do consider at least giving it a go.

 

[ruby sparks]

Here are Strawson's words in context. I must admit, it seems a bit of a departure from what he says both before and after (eg that it all comes down to luck). I wonder what he means by 'weaker' too.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...timate” before “moral responsibility.&f=false

 

[Speakpigeon]

Is there a compatibilist in the house willing to identify themselves?

Sorry, I know and care too little about compatibilism to identify myself as compatibilist.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Is there a compatibilist in the house willing to identify themselves?

Sorry, I know and care too little about compatibilism to identify myself as compatibilist.
EB

How do I know you're not another of those Compatibilists-in-hiding that appear to be common around these parts?

 

[Speakpigeon]

You do or you don't. How am I suppose to know which?

According to Wiki I've just looked up, Compatibilism defines "free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without arbitrary hindrance from other individuals or institutions". I'm broadly(1) OK with that definition and I suppose that makes myself a Compatibilist. Yet, this definition adds nothing to whatever I've said so far on this issue and I fail to see what could be new for you to argue about. It seems to me we disagree as to what we're talking about when we're talking about free will. I've exhibited dictionary definitions to support my position on this aspect, and apparently the usual understanding of what is free will is broadly the one from Wiki I've just quoted. The one you use to support your claim that free will doesn't exist seems to be that used by religious ideologues and a few philosophers. So, apparently, you would need the latter to come out of hiding and try to argue their view so you could smash them like bugs. No luck.

And here is my OP with my definition of free will, which seems broadly in line with the compatibilist view according to Wiki:

I see free will as the ability most people have, at least to some extent, to make independent choices, i.e. choices not coerced, limited or influenced by other people.

I think this is the notion of free will most people have.

So, my definition was there for you to criticise and you still haven't although we're already at 120 posts on this. Why should you now?
EB

Note 1. I think this definition is confusing free will with freedom to act according to your will but that makes no difference as to compatibility.