Downward Causation: Useful or Misguided Idea?

[ruby sparks]

???

Do you really mean to deny that it's uncontroversial that the activity of the brain has a causal effect on its environment?

I'm sure we could always find a few people in institutions...

As far as I'm aware, all philosophers who consider it something we can't answer (yet) are not in institutions, and speaking as an amateur philosopher, I'm not in one either, so yes, I do deny it's uncontroversial.

Again, we're clear that the mind, understood as the activity of the brain, has causal powers, and we've been investigating this for a long time now.

You may be clear on that, but I'm not sure I am. I will say this, it's a fully on-topic issue, imo, so I don't mind you elaborating on your view on it (as being uncontroversial).

The problem we don't know how to solve is that of subjective experience (i.e. qualia + "bare consciousness").

No, imo, that would be a different thread topic. Something like 'what is consciousness?'

I don't mean to dodge the issue, but this OP has the advantage (in some ways) of focusing attention on something in particular, and I fear that if the thread devolves into 'what is consciousness', we will just get into a wider and deeper and apparently unresovleable quagmire (again) and I have been there many times.

Here I would acknowledge that a lot is being done and that might help at some point. Still, I think the situation is similar to the one Einstein got us out of. And, as far as I understand it, according to his own recollection of the events, he got to the solution of General Relativity through a thought experiment, rather than the kind of empirical science used for example by Max Planck to stumble in the dark on QM. To me, what Einstein did was typically coming up with an entirely new conception of the problem. And I believe that's what we need to achieve in the case of consciousness. Unfortunately, there's no methodology I know of the achieve that. Still, we should at least try it, rather than repeat ad nauseam that subjectivity is an illusion.

Maybe we should try it, but do we need to try it in a thread on downward causation?

Analogy (to go along with the ones I've already suggested): imagine a mysterious, invisible force keeps knocking you over. You can investigate the events without knowing what the force is. For example, if the force only operates when you have eaten a banana and peanut butter sandwich, that is a clue to what is happening, even if you don't know what the mysterious force is.

Or to put it another way, neuroscientists and psychologists already investigate this and related subjects without answering the 'what is consciousness' question first. They just get stuck in and see what comes out.

Perhaps focusing on the particular OP question might shed light on the latter.

I wouldn't say that subjectivity is an illusion, by the way. I might say that there are aspects of it or how it works that might be illusory. This in fact has already been demonstrated in various experiments.

I guess it all comes down to whether we agree that subjective experience (i.e. qualia + bare consciousness) and the mind as the activity of the brain, are two distinct problems. You seem unwilling to go that route. I can understand that. Entertaining two concepts rather than one is double the cost in terms of mental ressources.
EB

Again, it's not that I don't want to go down that route, it's just that I might not necessarily be all that keen to do it in this thread, even if I agree that it's related and that ideally we would solve those issues first, before addressing downward causation.


But of course I do not dictate the thread content. You might find that others are perfectly happy to tackle the other issue first. I'm trying to set it aside, for pragmatic reasons, assuming that's feasible.

 

[Speakpigeon]

An interesting and readable article (from a layman's pov) on Mental Causation:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/mental-c/

The writer uses the example of stubbing one's toe and suggests there are 4 different causal models. Above the horizontal grey bar represents mental events and below, physical events, so the arrangement already reinforces the possibly arbitrary notion that 'mental' is 'higher'. That said, one could, I suppose, imagine that the diagrams represent aerial views, in which case it would be as if we were looking down on a highway or street with 2 adjacent lanes. Worth noting that in that case it would be a one-way street, because of time's arrow. Or at least that is a limitation of the artificial simplicity of the models, because in reality I'd expect stuff to go 'back and forth' (feedback loops etc).

Anyhows, here are the suggested 4 models:

1. Parallelism (no causality across the divide in either direction):

2. Interactionism (causality across the divide in both directions):

3.Epiphenomenalism (causation from physical to mental only):

4. Reductionism (everything is physical, so no divide to cross):

I think I'm right in saying that the first 3 are essentially substance dualist, only the last is not (as I understand it, though I have a sneaking feeling it's not as clear cut as that).

Parallelism seems the weakest, because without any direct connections between mental and physical events we'd have to ask what makes them coordinate? God? Some preset coordinating condition of the universe?

Interactionism. This one seems flawed too, because it implies that a mental route is necessary to get to a physical state, and it seems that there are just too many instances of non-conscious processing to make this likely (so I can get to stage e, the neural correlate for annoyance, without consciously knowing why, on many occasions). At the very least, this diagram might need another arrow between b and e, as an option. Note also that this is (I think) the only one of the 4 which has mental-to-physical causation. As such, my main issue with it is that it seems to involve telekinesis.

Epiphenomenalism. This might be my intuitive favourite of the 4. But there is the issue of how placebos work. At this point, I can't think of a better example than placebos to illustrate how the mental does (seem to) demonstrably affect the physical (because it appears you have to have a belief to make the placebo work).

Reductionism has its own problems, not least that it seems counterintuitive to say that thoughts are physical. In its favour, there is no 'weird' barrier to cross. Perhaps the idea that thoughts can't be physical is just a problem for our limited ability to think it so, or to grasp what 'physical' could include.

I always like it when philosophers try to focus on specific applications (such as here, stubbing a toe) because it starts to go at least in the general direction of empiricism and science, which imo can be brought to bear, as a method, even if we don't know exactly what we're dealing with, as has often been the case in science, routinely in fact. What I mean is, in theory, for example, one might be able to imagine hypothetical experiments to try to test the above 4 models, although I'm nor sure if toe-stubbing (being reactive) is necessarily the best process for testing. Dunno. I haven't thought out what sorts of experiments could be done. I just like it when philosophical investigations go in that direction.

That's just confusion. If you could identify exactly what the brain does whenever the subject feels the pain, you'll find that there's nothing mysterious as to causality, as suggested by Fig. 4. The brain just reacts to a signal.

The confusion is that pain and annoyance are terms that describe not mental activity but subjective experience, typically the problem we've no idea how to solve, although we certainly accept that what seems to happen in the physical world has consequences in terms of our qualia. Personally, I don't believe that our qualia or bare consciousness have any causal effect. I suspect causality is entirely irrelevant here. Causality is itself just an idea, essentially a quale. We have it because it's the mirror image of the concept of causality that our brain has to use to deal with the kind of physical environment it has. If you put a brain in a vat to provide a completely different environment for it, it would not develop the concept of causality because it would have no use for it. Causality is probably completely irrelevant to the issue of subjective experience. And possibly our brain can't explain qualia because qualia are not causally effective. And qualia themselves don't seem to have any computational powers, like the brain does. So, likely, we will always wonder and fail to find a solution.

Or we might just stumble in the dark on something.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Can I have box 5 please? The one in which they are all the same thing from two different perspectives (at least for pain)

How about if I offer you (on behalf of the author of that article but without her express permission) a box 4(a)? Deal or no deal?

 

[ruby sparks]

That's just confusion. If you could identify exactly what the brain does whenever the subject feels the pain, you'll find that there's nothing mysterious as to causality, as suggested by Fig. 4. The brain just reacts to a signal.

Ok but that would be the physical brain. That part, is, I agree, relatively uncontroversial. But we are doing mental causation.

The confusion is that pain and annoyance are terms that describe not mental activity but subjective experience, typically the problem we've no idea how to solve....

I agree we don't know the solution.

Out of curiosity, what in your opinion is the difference between 'mental activity' and 'subjective experience'? I would have thought they were much the same thing. Or by mental activity do you mean brain activity? If so, that's not a typical usage of the word mental in discussions about mental causation (usually mental refers to mind, I think). If you mean the same thing (or type of thing) in both cases then yes that makes the issue disappear, and is a bit like the diagram of model 4, above (Reductionism). But that would be a bold assertion, because you'd be on the brink of saying thoughts are physical. Which I'm not averse to.

...although we certainly accept that what seems to happen in the physical world has consequences in terms of our qualia.

Yes, that's physical-to-mental causation. Again, not as tricky as mental-to-physical (or for that matter mental-to-mental) causation.

Personally, I don't believe that our qualia or bare consciousness have any causal effect.

Do you mean that the mental has no causal effect, or just that 'bare' consciousness and quale have no causal effect?

I suspect causality is entirely irrelevant here. Causality is itself just an idea, essentially a quale.

Do you mean mental causality is just a quale, a subjective experience, or that all causality is just that? I'm not sure I could agree with the latter (maybe the former, which seems to be close to epiphenomenalism, in which case I'd need to ask you, as I ask myself, how a placebo might be working). I'm ok with assuming that collisions between asteroids, for example, were happening before there were brains, so I'd doubt if causality is just an idea we thought up.

I hope it's clear to you that I'm not taking up an opposite stance to you and am enjoying discussing.

ETA: I goofed earlier, by saying I wasn't in an institution. I briefly forgot I was married. It happens quite a lot. Probably something to do with Stockholm Syndrome.

 

[DBT]

No evidence?

If there is no autonomy of your mind how do you come to conclusions?

Why do you trust conclusions you claim you don't even make?

You come to a conclusion because 'your' brain has acquired information, processed this information and represents this information in conscious form. Conscious form as an experience of 'you' thinking and acting consciously, something we call conscious mind. Which is inseparable from electrochemical brain activity.

Nice story from your imagination.

You can't prove a word of it.

Disrupting function randomly tells you nothing about normal function.

It just tells you a way to disrupt normal function.

You fail to understand the nature of the experiments, and consequently, their implications.

It is not a matter of 'disrupting normal function' but exposing the mechanisms by which the brain generates the perception of an action, and carrying out the action itself. Different regions, functions, signals sent and received, processed and presented in conscious form.


Abstract
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

 

[ruby sparks]

Abstract
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

Fascinating stuff.

Here's more, on the subject of 'mind reading':

Brain decoder can eavesdrop on your inner voice
https://www.newscientist.com/articl...an-eavesdrop-on-your-inner-voice#.VFebPvmsWSo

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fneng.2014.00014/full

In a nutshell, and although the techniques are fledgling, the idea is that if you are thinking in words (eg when reading silently to yourself) then your thoughts can be decoded by an algorithm that translates the pattern of brain activity. Similar techniques (again fledgling) can be used to decode mental 'pictures' too. Cool stuff:

‘Mind-reading’ software could record your dreams
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mind-reading-software-could-record-your-dreams

I understand, if I have it right, that you're essentially repeating to untermensche that mind is not independent of brain and is caused by brain activity, but I'm wondering, aside from that (because you don't need to try to convince me, or speakpigeon either I think, or possibly even anyone else apart from untermensche, about that) what your thoughts are specifically on mental-to-physical causation? Which is not something, I don't think, that either the papers you have posted in the thread (unless my memory fails me) or the ones I linked to in this post, are about.

 

[ruby sparks]

Can I have box 5 please? The one in which they are all the same thing from two different perspectives (at least for pain)

How about if I offer you (on behalf of the author of that article but without her express permission) a box 4(a)? Deal or no deal?

On second thoughts.....you can have a box 5....if you can come up with the diagram.

After that, I'll take bids for boxes 6 and 'upwards'.

 

[untermensche]

You fail to understand the nature of the experiments, and consequently, their implications.

No. The problem is I do understand.

There is no objective model for consciousness. There is no scientific understanding of even what it is.

Is it a vascular effect? A neural effect? An electrical effect? An unknown quantum effect? Some other category of unknown effects?

Nobody has a clue.

You stick a probe into a brain and introduce a foreign artificial current you cause a bunch of cells to fire mechanically.

You have not replicated brain activity. You have excited some abnormal activity that the brain tries to make sense of. It is not any part of it's normal functioning. It is a propagating short circuit that interrupts normal function momentarily.

And if some effect is experienced you have no idea what that means. Is the area an area of origination? A relay point? A necessary side connection?

Nothing is known because what the brain is doing to create consciousness is not known.

There is all kinds of activity in the brain.

''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

In other words. The brain creates an image for consciousness. And there are levels of consciousness that act upon it.

And there is a final decision maker that says whether the brake is pushed or not.

None of these studies understand what a thought is or could find one in a brain.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Nice story from your imagination.

You can't prove a word of it.

Disrupting function randomly tells you nothing about normal function.

It just tells you a way to disrupt normal function.

You fail to understand the nature of the experiments, and consequently, their implications.

It is not a matter of 'disrupting normal function' but exposing the mechanisms by which the brain generates the perception of an action, and carrying out the action itself. Different regions, functions, signals sent and received, processed and presented in conscious form.


Abstract
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

And if that ‘must’ on line one is wrong, and the example could be achieved in several other ways, for example as error correction or subsumptively ? Even if they were not starting off assuming that the only possibility they can imagine is the only possibility, the fact that they are measuring blood flow rather than neural function gives them a distressingly blunt tool for dealing with a system that stores and processes information superpositionally and as a mixture of type and token.

It doesn’t matter how cleverly you observe, start with a misunderstanding and ask the wrong questions and reality will deliver the wrong answers.

 

[Subsymbolic]

You fail to understand the nature of the experiments, and consequently, their implications.

No. The problem is I do understand.

There is no objective model for consciousness. There is no scientific understanding of even what it is.

Is it a vascular effect? A neural effect? An electrical effect? An unknown quantum effect? Some other category of unknown effects?

Nobody has a clue.

You stick a probe into a brain and introduce a foreign artificial current you cause a bunch of cells to fire mechanically.

You have not replicated brain activity. You have excited some abnormal activity that the brain tries to make sense of. It is not any part of it's normal functioning. It is a propagating short circuit that interrupts normal function momentarily.

And if some effect is experienced you have no idea what that means. Is the area an area of origination? A relay point? A necessary side connection?

Nothing is known because what the brain is doing to create consciousness is not known.

There is all kinds of activity in the brain.

''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

In other words. The brain creates an image for consciousness. And there are levels of consciousness that act upon it.

And there is a final decision maker that says whether the brake is pushed or not.

None of these studies understand what a thought is or could find one in a brain.

Wow. I never realised that’s how fmri works. A probe?

 

[untermensche]

Wow. I never realised that’s how fmri works. A probe?

I don't recall saying I was talking about fMRI. I was replying to an earlier discussion.

There are all kinds of activity going on in the brain.

fMRI looks at relative blood flow.

What do you think that means? Every part of the brain is continually getting blood and is active.

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's just confusion. If you could identify exactly what the brain does whenever the subject feels the pain, you'll find that there's nothing mysterious as to causality, as suggested by Fig. 4. The brain just reacts to a signal.

Ok but that would be the physical brain. That part, is, I agree, relatively uncontroversial. But we are doing mental causation.

We're talking not about the brain in itself but what the brain does. Presumably a dead brain won't do (pun). And I made clear I was talking of the mind as what the brain does. This is legitimate since most people are very familiar with the notion that a functional human body is necessary for a mind. We can't help but attribute minds to other people and we do this solely on the basis of our perception, looking at them, at what they do, and listening to them. Further, science has long been looking into the details of the relationship between brain activity and the mental activity as reported by the subject.

The confusion is that pain and annoyance are terms that describe not mental activity but subjective experience, typically the problem we've no idea how to solve....

I agree we don't know the solution.

Out of curiosity, what in your opinion is the difference between 'mental activity' and 'subjective experience'? I would have thought they were much the same thing. Or by mental activity do you mean brain activity? If so, that's not a typical usage of the word mental in discussions about mental causation (usually mental refers to mind, I think). If you mean the same thing (or type of thing) in both cases then yes that makes the issue disappear, and is a bit like the diagram of model 4, above (Reductionism). But that would be a bold assertion, because you'd be on the brink of saying thoughts are physical. Which I'm not averse to.

The mind is readily understood by most people as what is experienced through subjective experience as qualia. The qualia are the contents of subjective experience and are readily understood as the form the mind takes to subjective experience. They are the appearance of the mind to subjective experience.

There are obviously two perspectives on the mind. The subjective perspective, through subjective experience, and the objective perspective, broadly expressed by standard linguistic forms, objective behaviours and social processes, not least scientific ones.

...although we certainly accept that what seems to happen in the physical world has consequences in terms of our qualia.

Yes, that's physical-to-mental causation. Again, not as tricky as mental-to-physical (or for that matter mental-to-mental) causation.

It's more than that. It's the causation from the physical world to our subjective experience. However, this may be illusory.

What seems indubitable is indeed causation from physical to mental, as well as mental to physical (I can move my arm). That's our basic understanding of life and we've always believed this. We're certainly all behaving accordingly. We couldn't understand how the mind works if we assumed it had no effect on the physical world.

However, causation from physical to subjective experience is no so clear and I believe myself it's probably illusory. The mechanism for illusion would be that we wrongly assume the effects of the physical on the mind to be effects on subjective experience.

Personally, I don't believe that our qualia or bare consciousness have any causal effect.

Do you mean that the mental has no causal effect, or just that 'bare' consciousness and quale have no causal effect?

I believe, I think uncontroversially, that the mind, as what the brain does, has a causal effect on the physical world.

I don't think qualia and bare consciousness have any effect. Or perhaps more accurately, that it wouldn't mean anything to talk of causal effects in this case.

I suspect causality is entirely irrelevant here. Causality is itself just an idea, essentially a quale.

Do you mean mental causality is just a quale, a subjective experience, or that all causality is just that? I'm not sure I could agree with the latter (maybe the former, which seems to be close to epiphenomenalism, in which case I'd need to ask you, as I ask myself, how a placebo might be working). I'm ok with assuming that collisions between asteroids, for example, were happening before there were brains, so I'd doubt if causality is just an idea we thought up.

I'm sure there's something corresponding to our notion of causality. But causality as we understand it is really just an idea, a representation. And therefore, the real something corresponding to our notion may not be anything like what we think of as causality. For example, our notion of causality assumes space and time, and maybe there are no such things as space and time.

No way to tell, obviously, at least for now.

I hope it's clear to you that I'm not taking up an opposite stance to you and am enjoying discussing.

ETA: I goofed earlier, by saying I wasn't in an institution. I briefly forgot I was married. It happens quite a lot. Probably something to do with Stockholm Syndrome.

Say hello to your warden on my behalf!

And don't argue when she says it's time to go to bed.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

In a nutshell, and although the techniques are fledgling, the idea is that if you are thinking in words (eg when reading silently to yourself) then your thoughts can be decoded by an algorithm that translates the pattern of brain activity.

I take it that rational really means linguistic, and so rational thinking will by definition always take a linguistic form.

So, basically, we could get to have rational interactions with mind-reading machines.

If that could be made safe.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

What seems indubitable is indeed causation from physical to mental, as well as mental to physical (I can move my arm). That's our basic understanding of life and we've always believed this. We're certainly all behaving accordingly. We couldn't understand how the mind works if we assumed it had no effect on the physical world.

However, causation from physical to subjective experience is no so clear and I believe myself it's probably illusory. The mechanism for illusion would be that we wrongly assume the effects of the physical on the mind to be effects on subjective experience.

Gosh. To me, and I had thought most philosophers and scientists, physical causality (including physical-to-mental, in the sense that thoughts supervene on brain activity) is the uncontroversial part of the more accepted models, and mental causation the controversial one, but you feel it's the opposite of that. I have not heard anyone say that before.

 

[ruby sparks]

I think the best guide to causality is time. Time, as far as we know only goes in one direction. This is a big help. If B happens, temporally after A, we don't have to understand what B is (eg if A is measurable brain activity and B is conscious thoughts) to be able to say, with some confidence, especially if B consistently follows A, that it is A causing B and not B causing A. This is why I say that in principle, we don't need to answer 'what is consciousness?' to explore 'which causes which?', the latter being a slightly different question (and the one in the OP).

Here's where science can come in. We, ourselves, can't accurately measure tiny time periods as well as science can, and (as seems to be the case) especially when we are dealing in microseconds. So, whilst it might feel like I move an arm after I have the conscious thought, science can, to some extent, have a go at checking if I have that temporal order of events right. And that is roughly speaking what investigations into readiness potentials try to do. Were it to be the case that for example RP's which are closely correlated to action consistently preceded conscious awareness of an intent to move (an arm), and I fully appreciate that what I will call Libet-type experiments are far from being conclusive, then we would have a basis for at least doubting that the causal process is actually B to A, even though it feels like it, and that B to A is merely an illusion brought about by the close association between B and A, and because we can't tell, subjectively, that A is in fact happening (possibly always) microseconds before we are aware of B.

As far as I am aware, science is a long way from showing this conclusively to be the case, but it is at least grounds for further empirical investigation, and it might be hoped that as time goes by, accuracy can be greatly improved.

Nor do I assume it's correct, because on the other side of the coin, if I have the thought 'I will go to the beach tomorrow', that thought clearly precedes me going to the beach. That said, a physical-to-mental model could still explain such a thing without the need to say that the thought caused any behaviour (the thought could be an epiphenomenon with no causal power over a system that is chugging through a physical process nonetheless, much as it might do in a zombie or AI robot that doesn't experience mental epiphenomena). So in that case, ultimately the only reasons I go to the beach the next day, by at some point moving my arm to grab a car key, are, or should I say would be, exactly the same ones that precede any 'microsecond' action and would have happened anyway, thoughts in advance or not.

I'm not at all against the idea that the mental can causally affect the physical. I can think of ways in which it might. Placebo effect seems to be evidence for it, in fact. It's just that it seems like believing in telekinesis. How could that possibly be?

One answer I have read of, which sounds like it might make sense, is if the universe consists not of matter and/or energy, but information, with matter and energy only secondary manifestations of information. So then the question could be, "can information have a causal effect?" If nothing else, this seems easier to conceive of than mind having causal effect, because as with model 4 in the diagrams above (Reductionism) there is, I think no barrier to cross, or at least a more intuitively comprehensible (to me) barrier to cross, with information being the bridge.

I'm just rambling and thinking out loud.

Unfortunately sub, I can't explore your 'same thing from two perpectives' thing because I have trouble understanding it and especially how it might relate, specifically, to the OP question. I think that I have tried before to get my head around it and not succeeded. Maybe I should have another go. Could you link me to something maybe? It would be great, if possible, if it related to the OP question specifically.

 

[Speakpigeon]

physical causality (including physical-to-mental, in the sense that thoughts supervene on brain activity)

If thoughts somehow supervene on something physical like brain activity, then thoughts are not "caused" by this physical activity. Supervenience is an ontological relation. Causality isn't.

Supervenience
In philosophy, supervenience is an ontological relation that is used to describe cases where (roughly speaking) the upper-level properties of a system are determined by its lower level properties.

Determined, not caused.

Gosh. To me, and I had thought most philosophers and scientists, physical causality (including physical-to-mental, in the sense that thoughts supervene on brain activity) is the uncontroversial part of the more accepted models, and mental causation the controversial one, but you feel it's the opposite of that. I have not heard anyone say that before.

To be honest, I've long stopped caring much for what scientists and philosophers say they think. They don't do a very good job of it. I prefer to look at the real world around me and in particular at how people behave, speak, and interact with each other. And I can't possibly imagine anyone sane who could really come to believe that his mind has no causal power on the physical world around him.

People are routinely mixing up and being confused by the various levels of description we use. You do it, too. The OP is partially about that. If you assume, as you seem to be doing, that the mind cannot possibly be anything but physical, then why would there be a problem with the idea of causation from mind to something else physical?

Now, obviously, if you think instead that the mind is nothing but an abstraction, then, yes, no possible causation whatsoever. But in this case, could you explain what it is you are experiencing subjectively every one second of your life? An abstraction?

Me, I don't even know what it would mean to experience an abstraction. So, I guess, that leaves you with a lot of explaining to do, probably first to yourself.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Determined, not caused.

Sure, but what, effectively, is the difference, in any way that matters here? I am again wary of teeing off away from the OP into 'what is causality?' I know it's a valid question, as is, 'what is consciousness?' but I am keen to avoid unnecessary or should I say unuseful going around in circles but not getting anywhere with the OP, if you see what I mean. I hope it's not offensive to philosophers of the unapplied sort if I say that this seems like something they do (at least on discussion forums) too much.

Or to put it another way, use either of those words. I can't see a good reason to quibble over it.

To be honest, I've long stopped caring much for what scientists and philosophers say they think. They don't do a very good job of it. I prefer to look at the real world around me and in particular at how people behave, speak, and interact with each other. And I can't possibly imagine anyone sane who could really come to believe that his mind has no causal power on the physical world around him.

Yes, I have noticed this about you many times. It's what I do too, when I go about the everyday business of navigating the world. But I think that when it comes to philosophical questions, it's not enough because it's basically accepting things because of appearances. And I think you have in the past even gone so far as to say that believing that the sun revolves around the earth is fine, for everyday purposes, so I think I get where you're coming from. But to me it's a sort of giving up. Which again I fully understand, because there is the distinct possibility that answers to certain things may never be obtainable and are a waste of one's valuable time. Though I don't really believe that, I suppose. I always think there's more to find out and understand, and resigning ourselves to just accepting stuff because it seems to be this or that is not attractive enough. I say all that while agreeing with you in a way and up to a point, because I am now about to go and read a book and am going to be fairly happy to pragmatically take it that I am doing that at least in part because I have the mental experience of wanting to do it.

People are routinely mixing up and being confused by the various levels of description we use. You do it, too. The OP is partially about that. If you assume, as you seem to be doing, that the mind cannot possibly be anything but physical, then why would there be a problem with the idea of causation from mind to something else physical?

No, I'm not assuming that. Any time I say something, it's provisional. Is the mind physical? I don't know. I'm not wedded to model 4 (Reductionism) by any means, and (I hope) never suggested otherwise.

Now, obviously, if you think instead that the mind is nothing but an abstraction, then, yes, no possible causation whatsoever. But in this case, could you explain what it is you are experiencing subjectively every one second of your life? An abstraction?

Me, I don't even know what it would mean to experience an abstraction. So, I guess, that leaves you with a lot of explaining to do, probably first to yourself.
EB

The nearest way I could try to answer that is by positing epiphenomenalism (model 3). I'm not saying it's the definitive answer, or that it's correct, but under that model, what I experience mentally could be a lot like the whistle on the steam engine, which has no causal effect on the train. That may be an analogy that does not stretch to fully fit, but it's an analogy.

And if you are again about to ask me what the mental experience of whistle is, I must warn you that I may say I'm not interested in that, at this juncture. I'm only interested in whether the 'whistle' causally affects the 'train', or not.

 

[ruby sparks]

One answer I have read of, which sounds like it might make sense, is if the universe consists not of matter and/or energy, but information, with matter and energy only secondary manifestations of information. So then the question could be, "can information have a causal effect?" If nothing else, this seems easier to conceive of than mind having causal effect, because as with model 4 in the diagrams above (Reductionism) there is, I think no barrier to cross, or at least a more intuitively comprehensible (to me) barrier to cross, with information being the bridge.

To add to my own series of thoughtfarts......


If, for example, thoughts contain information (which to me sounds at least intuitively plausible) then, imagine some sort (yes I know I'm being vague) of 'information only' transfer to memory. After that, the information in the memory can have an easy-peasy causal effect.

This would be a sort of Reductionist model, but not a reduction to physical, a reduction to information, with no barriers to cross (because everything is, monistically, information) and every apparently different type of reality is just information manifest in different ways.

This does not explain why my brain's mental experience of information would 'feel like something' but I am hoping to set that question aside.

I know that's speculative, and I know I don't understand it as well as experts in Information Philosophy, cognitive scientists or others who spend their time working with information theories and applications, but is it flawed in any obvious way? Have I, for example, fudged a mental to physical crossing by sleight of hand?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Sure, but what, effectively, is the difference, in any way that matters here? I am again wary of teeing off away from the OP into 'what is causality?' I know it's a valid question, as is, 'what is consciousness?' but I am keen to avoid unnecessary or should I say unuseful going around in circles but not getting anywhere with the OP, if you see what I mean. I hope it's not offensive to philosophers of the unapplied sort if I say that this seems like something they do (at least on discussion forums) too much.

Or to put it another way, use either of those words. I can't see a good reason to quibble over it.

Well, it's kind of impossible for me to make any argument that could look convincing to you if you understand some crucial words like "causality" and "supervene" differently. People don't usually quibble for nothing.

To be honest, I've long stopped caring much for what scientists and philosophers say they think. They don't do a very good job of it. I prefer to look at the real world around me and in particular at how people behave, speak, and interact with each other. And I can't possibly imagine anyone sane who could really come to believe that his mind has no causal power on the physical world around him.

Yes, I have noticed this about you many times. It's what I do too, when I go about the everyday business of navigating the world. But I think that when it comes to philosophical questions, it's not enough because it's basically accepting things because of appearances. And I think you have in the past even gone so far as to say that believing that the sun revolves around the earth is fine, for everyday purposes, so I think I get where you're coming from. But to me it's a sort of giving up. Which again I fully understand, because there is the distinct possibility that answers to certain things may never be obtainable and are a waste of one's valuable time. Though I don't really believe that, I suppose. I always think there's more to find out and understand, and resigning ourselves to just accepting stuff because it seems to be this or that is not attractive enough. I say all that while agreeing with you in a way and up to a point, because I am now about to go and read a book and am going to be fairly happy to pragmatically take it that I am doing that at least in part because I have the mental experience of wanting to do it.

What I meant as to the sun going round the earth is not that it doesn't matter or that the science of it is wrong. Only that what ordinary people, including me, say about the sun going round the earth has no metaphysical significance. It's not about the ontology of the universe, it's about our daily lives. So, my point was that at least some specialists make inappropriate comments on what they think people believe.

People are routinely mixing up and being confused by the various levels of description we use. You do it, too. The OP is partially about that. If you assume, as you seem to be doing, that the mind cannot possibly be anything but physical, then why would there be a problem with the idea of causation from mind to something else physical?

No, I'm not assuming that. Any time I say something, it's provisional. Is the mind physical? I don't know. I'm not wedded to model 4 (Reductionism) by any means, and (I hope) never suggested otherwise.

Now, obviously, if you think instead that the mind is nothing but an abstraction, then, yes, no possible causation whatsoever. But in this case, could you explain what it is you are experiencing subjectively every one second of your life? An abstraction?

Me, I don't even know what it would mean to experience an abstraction. So, I guess, that leaves you with a lot of explaining to do, probably first to yourself.
EB

The nearest way I could try to answer that is by positing epiphenomenalism (model 3). I'm not saying it's the definitive answer, or that it's correct, but under that model, what I experience mentally could be a lot like the whistle on the steam engine, which has no causal effect on the train. That may be an analogy that does not stretch to fully fit, but it's an analogy.

And if you are again about to ask me what the mental experience of whistle is, I must warn you that I may say I'm not interested in that, at this juncture. I'm only interested in whether the 'whistle' causally affects the 'train', or not.

That could fit as to qualia, but, again, 'epiphenomenalism', like 'supervene' and 'emergence', is just another word for 'not causal'. So, if you think of the mind as some kind of epiphenomenon supervening on, or emerging from, the physical brain, then not only there's no need to talk of causality, but it would be a contradiction. And this would go for the other way around, causality from the mind to the physical.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

One answer I have read of, which sounds like it might make sense, is if the universe consists not of matter and/or energy, but information, with matter and energy only secondary manifestations of information. So then the question could be, "can information have a causal effect?" If nothing else, this seems easier to conceive of than mind having causal effect, because as with model 4 in the diagrams above (Reductionism) there is, I think no barrier to cross, or at least a more intuitively comprehensible (to me) barrier to cross, with information being the bridge.

To add to my own series of thoughtfarts......


If, for example, thoughts contain information (which to me sounds at least intuitively plausible) then, imagine some sort (yes I know I'm being vague) of 'information only' transfer to memory. After that, the information in the memory can have an easy-peasy causal effect.

This would be a sort of Reductionist model, but not a reduction to physical, a reduction to information, with no barriers to cross (because everything is, monistically, information) and every apparently different type of reality is just information manifest in different ways.

This does not explain why my brain's mental experience of information would 'feel like something' but I am hoping to set that question aside.

I know that's speculative, and I know I don't understand it as well as experts in Information Philosophy, cognitive scientists or others who spend their time working with information theories and applications, but is it flawed in any obvious way? Have I, for example, fudged a mental to physical crossing by sleight of hand?

Science is really a sort of quantification of our observation of the physical world. We are free to assume that such a quantification could be carried out all the way to include in one consistent picture the whole world in all its details. If so, then the world could just as well be something equivalent to information.

The picture still leaves qualia and subjective experience unexplained. So, I guess that would be where the sleight of hand is.
EB