ruby sparks
Contributor
You have a gift for not actually engaging with what is actually being said and not making any point in relation to it.
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The cosmological arrow of time points in the direction of the universe's expansion. It may be linked to the thermodynamic arrow, with the universe heading towards a heat death(Big Chill) as the amount of usable energy becomes negligible. Alternatively, it may be an artifact of our place in the universe's evolution (see the Anthropic bias), with this arrow reversing as gravity pulls everything back into a Big Crunch.If this arrow of time is related to the other arrows of time, then the future is by definition the direction towards which the universe becomes bigger. Thus, the universe expands—rather than shrinks—by definition.
The thermodynamic arrow of time and the second law of thermodynamics are thought to be a consequence of the initial conditions in the early universe.[8] Therefore, they ultimately result from the cosmological set-up.
I would argue that the definition of color as property of light makes more sense. Consider, for example, this optical illusion:I think that a major problem here is one of the earlier questions I tried to have clarified, "What is the definition of color that is being used?"
That is a very good point. How many threads here have we seen this request made as a prerequisite to having a shared discussion?
In some ways, is it not sightly unusual that we are being asked to accept numerous definitions? In a way, I think it is. At times in this thread, colour has been defined by those not accepting the implied OP definition (colour as a brain experience only) as existing in at least 4 ways in 4 different places (in light, in objects, in the optic nerve and in the brain).
To my mind, the models that have colour, in different forms, in all 4 places are, I think, guilty of stretching definitions too far and just being confused, imprecise and profligate.
However, imo, the model that has it only in/of objects and in/of brains (possibly the most naturally intuitive model for the average human) is arguably definitionally precise, because it is saying that objects have the real, objective, actual colour and that the brain experience is merely a secondary representation or psychological model of this. This is colour on a par with shape. It is also the distinction between 'red' and 'redness'. Red qualia are allowed, but only as mimics of 'true red'.
Even then, it might arguably be helpful and clarifying not to use the same term for what are very different phenomena with different properties.
But more fundamentally, and no matter how precise its two related but different definitions are, in my opinion it is simply wrong. I would quite strongly claim that objects are not in fact actually coloured at all. Imo, that is probably a mistake, and an illusion of perception (a form of mental projection), and the model that has objects as coloured is falling for it.
As for light, I'm not particularly convinced at all. Seems pretty unlikely, imo. Ditto the optic nerve.
Yes, because color only exists as a mental category. The light itself cares not what category it is sorted into by an observer. A wave with a wavelength of 556 nm will still be a wave with a wavelength of 556 whether some observer calls it (and perceives it) as "red" or just as generally"dark-colored" as in a bicolorate language/culture..... it will always be inaccruate to refer to a wavelength as "being a color"...
Inaccurate as to which colour, yes, point about categories taken, but inaccurate to say that light has/is a colour property (of some sort)?
ps this thread is a spin-off of a thread on moral realism, so as such my initial interest was in the philosophical issue of colour realism.
Yes, because color only exists as a mental category. The light itself cares not what category it is sorted into by an observer. A wave with a wavelength of 556 nm will still be a wave with a wavelength of 556 whether some observer calls it (and perceives it) as "red" or just as generally"dark-colored" as in a bicolorate language/culture.
nor does a chair care whether it is conceptualized by an observer as a chair a table a dog a book of manners.
BTW, what do you mean by "mental category"?
Yes, because color only exists as a mental category. The light itself cares not what category it is sorted into by an observer. A wave with a wavelength of 556 nm will still be a wave with a wavelength of 556 whether some observer calls it (and perceives it) as "red" or just as generally"dark-colored" as in a bicolorate language/culture.
nor does a chair care whether it is conceptualized by an observer as a chair a table a dog a book of manners.
BTW, what do you mean by "mental category"?
Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs".
We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
So you're finally getting it? Both physical properties and mental categories are "real" in some sense, but they are not synonyms and only overlap in certain contexts. "Color" is like "chair"; "light wavelength" is like "the physical form that the cat interacts with." The cat is not interacting with "a chair" at all, unless a human is observing them. The cat from its own perspective is just interacting with an object, likely quite undistinguished from the table sitting next to it, or the plate that is on the table, except for being smaller and not as tall. And to say "the category of color it will at some point be sorted into is an inherent property of certain surfaces" makes as much sense as "being a future wooden chair is an inherent natural property of certain trees".Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs".
But the cat does not make up the chair. The chair's form is objective and informs the cat's actions in relation to it as you affirm here:
We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
So, to continue with the analogy in regard to ruby's ever fungible stance itt, you wouldn't say that the form of the chair exists ONLY in the mind of the cat. The form of the chair is communicated to the cat's brain via the cat's sensory apparatus, thus it is BOTH true that the chair exists objectively AND that the cat "experiences" the chair subjectively.
But if there were never any objectively existing object as a chair to "inform" the cat's brain what it is, the cat's brain could/would never create a mental map of a chair. How could it and why would it? This is chair ex-nihilo.
So you're finally getting it?So, to continue with the analogy in regard to ruby's ever fungible stance itt, you wouldn't say that the form of the chair exists ONLY in the mind of the cat. The form of the chair is communicated to the cat's brain via the cat's sensory apparatus, thus it is BOTH true that the chair exists objectively AND that the cat "experiences" the chair subjectively.
But if there were never any objectively existing object as a chair to "inform" the cat's brain what it is, the cat's brain could/would never create a mental map of a chair. How could it and why would it? This is chair ex-nihilo.
"Color" is like "chair"; "light wavelength" is like "the physical form that the cat interacts with."
The cat from its own perspective is just interacting with an object
And to say "the category of color it will at some point be sorted into is an inherent property of certain surfaces" makes as much sense as "being a future wooden chair is an inherent natural property of certain trees".
You're very confused about the difference between "it is" and "we call".
You're very confused about the difference between "it is" and "we call".
You're very confused about the difference between "it is" and "we call".
Yes... That ties closely to my trying to get the explicit definition for 'color' that is being used. Then an explanation of how that definition applies to objects, wavelength of light, neurons firing, and our mental perception of the stimulus. So far, I have seen several very different definitions being used depending on what they are talking about.
Yes, because color only exists as a mental category. The light itself cares not what category it is sorted into by an observer. A wave with a wavelength of 556 nm will still be a wave with a wavelength of 556 whether some observer calls it (and perceives it) as "red" or just as generally"dark-colored" as in a bicolorate language/culture.
nor does a chair care whether it is conceptualized by an observer as a chair a table a dog a book of manners.
BTW, what do you mean by "mental category"?
Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs". We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs". We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
So how does "chair" differ from "red"
Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs". We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
So how does "chair" differ from "red"
Chair is a noun, red is an adjective.
They have different referents, definitions, and qualities. They are both placeholders for concepts, though, as indeed are all words. "We" are highly evolved nervous systems embedded in a physically bounded organism, and we fundamentally perceive the world through a screen of consciousness that our neurological apparatus creates for us.Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs". We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.
So how does "chair" differ from "red"
Chair is a noun, red is an adjective.
Isn't that an artifact of language? It could be just as well that "red" is a noun and "chair" is an adjective.
There are chimps that fashion tools and pass the skill onto the young by observation and mimic. No words.