My question here is: Why do you not think that he is doing something equally questionable?
I did not see Jarhyn using the naturalistic fallacy.
Let me explain the problem again: you think what I'm doing is questionable because it allegedly derives moral assessments from non-moral information, at least in part. Is that not the case? What you seem to call the "naturalistic fallacy" (though the naturalistic fallacy, as I explained, is neither that nor a fallacy).
But then, how is Jarhyn not doing the same? Furthermore, how is not
everyone who ever makes a moral assessment not doing the same?
Imagine someone makes a moral assessment by logically deriving it from premises that are also (at least some of them) moral assessments. Then, where do they derive the premises from? From other moral premises? Then how about those ones? As they do not make infinitely many assessments, even if there were (which they are not realistically) deriving every other moral assessment from some starting point moral premises, they would have at the base of all of their moral assessments some moral assessments (the premises) that they did not derive from moral premises. Then, where did they come from?
Either from non-moral ones (then, what you call the "naturalistic fallacy"), or else they just made an intuitive moral assessment using their own moral sense. But then they are using information about what their moral sense says to make moral assessments. How is that not what you call the "naturalistic fallacy", if making moral assessments on the basis of what
my moral sense says, or on the basis of what the moral sense of
the vast majority of humans says is the "naturalistic fallacy"?
Do you see the problem?
If I reckon that exacting retribution on a rapist in order to punish him is just, using as evidence that my moral sense yields that verdict, then it's objectionable by your claims, allegedly due to the 'naturalistic fallacy'.
If I reckon that exacting retribution on a rapist in order to punish him is just, using as evidence that the moral sense of nearly all humans yields that verdict, then it's objectionable by your claims, allegedly due to the 'naturalistic fallacy'.
If I reckon that exacting retribution on a rapist in order to punish him is just, using as evidence that the moral sense of nearly all humans yields that verdict and my own moral sense yields that verdict, then it's objectionable by your claims, allegedly due to the 'naturalistic fallacy'.
But if Jarhyn reckons that something is morally wrong, or morally right, or good, or bad, or whatever moral assessment, either using as evidence that his moral sense says so, or just someone else says so, or just because something else that is also not a moral statement, then it's not objectionable?