Jokes about prison rape on men? Not a fan.

[Angra Mainyu]

I understand your position as holding that moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor. In particular, this includes cases in which the truth of the assessments about M depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc. of the person whose behavior is being assessed.

This appears to be in line with my view (this is assuming what you say here is intended to represent what I agreed with B20 in post #300). I have no idea if it comports precisely with RS's view.

Yes, this is meant to represent the definition you offered in this thread, in light of your reply to B20 in post#300.

Now, I grant you that you have no idea whether it comports precisely with ruby sparks's view. However, you are in a position to determine based on what was said in this thread that it does not comport at all with ruby sparks's view. I can tell that because you need only an average reading comprehension ability to tell that, and you have more than that. Let me remind you, of some key parts of my exchange with ruby sparks on the subject:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...-men-Not-a-fan&p=830983&viewfull=1#post830983

It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.

Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?

https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...-men-Not-a-fan&p=831002&viewfull=1#post831002

It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.

Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?

I already explained in my reply to The AntiChris why the meaning is not the same. If that is the one you were using, then the meaning you have in mind and the meaning that The AntiChris have in mind are different - unless of course I misunderstood the meaning The AntiChris is using, in which case he can of course clarify.

Let me explain again: in the constructivist 'reflective equilibrium' view that she gives as an example of an anti-realist theory in which there is not mind-independent normativity (for some reason, she focuses on normativity not morality, but while that is important in general it is not so here for the purposes of this discussion; see her papers for more details), if I make the statement 'Ted Bundy ought not to have killed his victims', then the truth of my statement depends on Ted Bundy's evaluative attitudes ("in particular, on what those attitudes would be in reflective equilibrium", so not his actual attitudes but the ideal ones, on reflective equilibrium). It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.

On this constructivist view (there are more than one possible constructivist views), there is such thing as what the attitudes of a person would be in reflective equilibrium, and that is what determines what a person has reason to do, or equivalently - "equivalently" according to constructivism - what a person ought to do.

And next is ruby sparks's key reply:

It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.

Of course it doesn't depend on your evaluative attitudes or those of an observer. I never said it did!

All that it means is that it depends on someone's judgement (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, etc) about it.

I actually am finding it hard to believe you now don't understand this not unusual meaning.

Do you now see that ruby sparks's definition is not at all like yours?

On your definition, moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor. In particular, this includes metaethical theories in which the truth of moral assessments depends on the evaluative attitudes of the person whose behavior is being assessed. On the other hand, on ruby sparks definition, any metaethical theory according to which the truth of moral assessments does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor, but depends on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the person whose behavior is being evaluated, is a theory under which morality is mind-dependent, and so (on his definition) not objective.
​

The difference is crucial in this context, in particular on the subjects of moral disagreement, whether there is an objective fact of the matter in the usual sense of the terms, etc.

Given this, you are perfectly capable of determining if it comports precisely with your understanding of RS's view.

I am also perfectly capable of determining that it does not comport with ruby sparks's understanding of ruby sparks's view, even if he has not realized that on your view, moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor - and in particular, this includes metaethical theories in which the truth of the assessments about morality depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc. of the person whose behavior is being assessed.

And I'm still no wiser as to why you've been badgering me so relentlessly over this.

As I explained, I have several reasons to show repeatedly the differences between your definition (as stated and explained by you) and ruby sparks's definition (as stated and explained by them), such as:

1. Try to see whether I can get you and/or he to clarify what you/he mean/s so that it is possible to have a serious discussion.

2. Try to get ruby sparks to change the definition he proposes.
​

And if I can persuade you that the definitions differ significantly and you tell him that, then that also might help persuade him to change his definition, which I would consider progress.

ETA: Now I see that in a post after the one I was replying to, you explained one of the key differences to ruby sparks. Great! Let's see what he says.

 

[ruby sparks]

...moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor. In particular, this includes cases in which the truth of the [moral] assessments..... depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc. of the person whose behavior is being assessed

The first part (in blue) implies that the truth does not depend on evaluative attitudes (etc), but the second (in red) implies that the truth does depend on evaluative attitudes (etc).

In the first case, it's the evaluative attitudes (etc) of the assessor (not the actor) in the second case, it's the evaluative attitudes (etc) of the actor.

But it makes no difference.

But it does.

If evaluative attitudes (call them brain states) objectively exist, then objectively true/false statements can be made about them.

Here's B20's example: The claim that "It is morally acceptable to to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed" can be an objective claim because the patient isn't the assessor. The point being that if the assessor deems it morally acceptable because she does not want the patient to suffer then it's not objective. However if the assessor believes the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. it's morally acceptable regardless of anyone's concerns for the patient) then it's an objective claim and in my view untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist).

I don't quite follow, and B20's example confuses me, especially the last sentence. It's also possible B20 was not using the word 'objective' in the way I am.

Obviously, many objectively true/false statements can be made about morality ('moral judgements exist' is one) but not whether something is objectively morally right or wrong, using a definition of objective as 'not dependent on attitudes (etc)'.

As I see it, "It is morally acceptable to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed" can never actually be an objective judgement because it depends on attitudes (etc). The patient not being the assessor only means that is is the attitudes (etc) of the assessor we are talking about, but those are still attitudes (etc) which the judgement depends on. It also seems, fwiw, that the patient is deeming it morally acceptable too, which involves the patient's attitudes (etc). Unlike, for example, the cancer itself, there are no moral judgements that do not depend on attitudes (etc) as far as I can tell.

Or put it this way, someone else (a different assessor) might say "it is not morally acceptable to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed".

ETA: it might be said that we can't ever really know if anything is objectively true (beyond 'there is something', perhaps) even the existence of cancer, for example, or planet earth. That has to be a general caveat, I think. But going down that route would disqualify everyone's position on nearly everything, I think.

 

[ruby sparks]

No, it is a very uncommon meaning in ordinary English. It's not uncommon in philosophy, I grant you that, because there are several common meanings of 'objective' and 'mind-independent' in use in philosophy.

I don't know how you know how uncommon it is in ordinary English. If it is uncommon in everyday English, then fine, hooray for ordinary English, but I am still using it. And I consider yours a weaker version. If you disagree with that, then also fine.

"Weaker" in what sense?

Based on how I understand it, I would say it's a lower bar.

Point of order though. Have you yet offered the ordinary English version (of 'objective') you are using? I don't recall.

Also, a succinct definition of both 'morality' and 'moral fact' from you would be useful.

If you have previously offered any or all of the above then I must have missed it or forgotten, and would apologise.

 

[The AntiChris]

I don't quite follow, and B20's example confuses me.

No problem, it's not easy to explain.

As I see it, "It is morally acceptable to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed" can never be objective because it depends on attitudes (etc).

The objectivity we're attempting pin down is that of the claim "It is morally acceptable". The attitude of the patient has no bearing on the objectivity of this claim. The only role the patient's attitude plays in this is solely as the determining factor as to whether the assessor believes it is or is not a morally significant state of affairs.

For the claim to be objective it must be independent of the claimant's feelings/attitudes. To reword slightly what I said earlier, the point is that if the claimant (assessor) deems it morally acceptable out of concern for people like the patient, it's not objective. However if the assessor believes the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. mercy-killing the patient in this circumstance has the attitude-independent quality of 'moral acceptability') then it's an objective claim and a claim that is in my view is untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist).

Has this helped (at least to understand my position)?

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't quite follow, and B20's example confuses me.

No problem, it's not easy to explain.

As I see it, "It is morally acceptable to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed" can never be objective because it depends on attitudes (etc).

The objectivity we're attempting pin down is that of the claim "It is morally acceptable". The attitude of the patient has no bearing on the objectivity of this claim. The only role the patient's attitude plays in this is solely as the determining factor as to whether the assessor believes it is or is not a morally significant state of affairs.

For the claim to be objective it must be independent of the claimant's feelings/attitudes. To reword slightly what I said earlier, the point is that if the claimant (assessor) deems it morally acceptable out of concern for people like the patient, it's not objective. However if the assessor believes the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. mercy-killing the patient in this circumstance has the attitude-independent quality of 'moral acceptability') then it's an objective claim and a claim that is in my view is untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist).

Has this helped (at least to understand my position)?

Sorry, but no.

"For the claim to be objective it must be independent of the claimant's feelings/attitudes".

But it isn't that? There is no claim that is independent of feelings/attitudes (etc)? This is as true of the assessor as the patient.

The assessor believing in moral facts does not change that. Because beliefs are as subjective as attitudes are. In fact, a belief is often described as an attitude, a propositional attitude to be precise, which I would go along with and which makes sense, imo.

Previously, I have listed other things that 'feelings/attitudes (etc)' is meant to cover, such as judgements, intuitions, emotions, thoughts, etc. (I can't recall the whole list I made and it's probably incomplete). Beliefs are just another one of those, because belief is subjective.

 

[ruby sparks]

Propositional attitude
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude

"Linguistically, propositional attitudes are denoted by a verb (e.g. "believed") governing an embedded "that" clause, for example, 'Sally believed that she had won'."

So, rewriting B20's last sentence:

"However if the assessor's attitude is that the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. mercy-killing the patient in this circumstance has the attitude-independent quality of 'moral acceptability') then it's an objective claim and a claim that is in my view is untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist)".

Then that is not independent of attitudes (etc).

Nor is B20 saying he doesn't believe in moral facts.

Which I am surprised to be reminded of, because I had it in my head that he did, that it was just that they were extremely complicated. Just goes to show how often we misunderstand each other I guess. But yes, I do seem to remember him saying he was not taking a position on it, so he may also not believe that they don't exist either.

 

[The AntiChris]

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective (because they always express the speaker's belief)?

 

[ruby sparks]

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective (because they always express the speaker's belief)?

Yes.

Though I might say 'thoughts' rather than beliefs, since the former seems to be the better catch-all term. It might even, at a pinch, capture non-conscious thought processes too.

Cancer (we assume) objectively exists regardless of what anyone thinks about it. Moral judgements depend on (in fact are) subjective thoughts about something.

This is my basic objective/subjective distinction, and what I mean by mind-independent.

Note that if moral facts do exist regardless of what anyone thinks about them, then they would qualify as objectively existing, much like cancer.

But I personally do not think they do, at this point. That they depend heavily on thoughts about them is not, imo, supportive of the claim that they do, given the variety and complexity of human thoughts and the capriciousness of humans. But it must be said, it doesn't mean they don't, at least for humans (an important caveat imo, because things like cancer, for example, are not limited in that way).

In any case, we were, recently, only doing 'objective'.

 

[The AntiChris]

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective (because they always express the speaker's belief)?

Yes.

Really?

Cancer (we assume) objectively exists regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

I'm confused. Would the statement "Bill has cancer." be objective or subjective?

 

[ruby sparks]

Really?

Yes.

Would the statement "Bill has cancer." be objective or subjective?

In that case it's objectively true (assuming bill does have cancer) based on our reasonable assumption that cancer actually exists regardless of what we think about that.

Perhaps we could say it's an objective fact, subjectively stated. Bear in mind that it's the cancer we want to be objective about, not whether someone (a subject) says something about it. That's true of all 'X is a fact' statements.

I do not see a conflict with my usage of objective, which is "does not depend on thoughts" ("is mind-independent, ie is thought-independent"). To be fair, it has been expressed in a variety of ways in the last few pages, but it's always been essentially the same meaning, with thoughts now intended as a catch-all term for attitudes, feelings, opinions, emotions, etc. Now, this is not a cast-iron position. Some strong behaviourists might say 'there are only behaviours'. I don't know. Certainly that seems to be true of other species. Which raises interesting questions, as do non-conscious thought processes.

But, 'Bill has cancer' is not like 'Bill is morally bad' (unless there is an objective fact that bill or anyone is morally bad, which I personally don't think there is).

 

[The AntiChris]

We appear to be talking past each other. You have said this:

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective (because they always express the speaker's belief)?

Yes.

and this:

Would the statement "Bill has cancer." be objective or subjective?

In that case it's objectively true

"Bill has cancer" is a statement which you previously agreed could never be objective, but which you now say is objective.

Perhaps we could say it's an objective fact, subjectively stated.

You could say that but it would be very confusing. If everything that is stated is 'subjective', then the word 'subjective' is redundant. Why not just say it is a stated objective fact?

I do not see a conflict with my usage of objective,

Apparently not.

So, 'Bill has cancer' is not like 'Bill is morally bad' (unless there is an objective fact that bill or anyone is morally bad, which I personally don't think there is).

This is pretty much exactly what I said in posts #359 and #365 both of which you rejected.

I don't think we're making any progress here so I'll leave it to you and Angra. Thanks for the chat.

 

[ruby sparks]

"Bill has cancer" is a statement which you previously agreed could never be objective, but which you now say is objective.

It is a subjective statement, yes, as all statements are. But whether Bill has cancer or not is not (we all assume) subjective. I do not understand why you feel that is confusing. It is just clarifying what the 'objective' pertains to. It is not the making of the statement. No statement can of itself be an objective phenomenon, though some can be about an objective phenomenon (the cancer, in that case). Debating whether the statement, as opposed to the thing it is about, is subjective or objective, is getting away from the topic of objective moral facts.

And so my definition of objective is still "independent of thoughts (etc)".

Or if you like, my definition of an objective fact (or truth) is "a fact (or truth) that is independent of thoughts etc (about it)". Similarly, my definition of objective existence is "existence that is independent of thoughts etc (about it)"

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Propositional attitude
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude

"Linguistically, propositional attitudes are denoted by a verb (e.g. "believed") governing an embedded "that" clause, for example, 'Sally believed that she had won'."

So, rewriting B20's last sentence:

"However if the assessor's attitude is that the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. mercy-killing the patient in this circumstance has the attitude-independent quality of 'moral acceptability') then it's an objective claim and a claim that is in my view is untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist)".

Then that is not independent of attitudes (etc).

Nor is B20 saying he doesn't believe in moral facts.

Which I am surprised to be reminded of, because I had it in my head that he did, that it was just that they were extremely complicated. Just goes to show how often we misunderstand each other I guess. But yes, I do seem to remember him saying he was not taking a position on it, so he may also not believe that they don't exist either.

Of course Bomb#20 believes there are moral facts. The AntiChris believes there are no moral facts. The sentence is not B20's.

 

[The AntiChris]

The sentence is not B20's.

In case there's any doubt, I never intended to suggest I was quoting B20, I was simply making use of his example ('the cancer patient').

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The sentence is not B20's.

In case there's any doubt, I never intended to suggest I was quoting B20, I was simply making use of his example ('the cancer patient').

There was no doubt on my part.

 

[ruby sparks]

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective ....?

It may be that I misunderstood your question. Apologies if I did. Genuine mistake on my part.

No, I was not saying that no statement can ever be objectively true. A statement can be objectively true if it expresses an objective fact.

 

[The AntiChris]

ruby sparks

Are you saying that no proposition/statement can ever be objective ....?

It may be that I misunderstood your question. Apologies if I did. Genuine mistake on my part.

No problem.

I assume it was a simple misreading. The question was straightforward and unambiguous.

 

[ruby sparks]

No problem.

I assume it was a simple misreading. The question was straightforward and unambiguous.

I think I got 'objective' and 'objectively true' confused.

I could add that I'm still not clear what was meant to be objective in (what I now realise was) your cancer patient 'argument', but we can leave that behind if you like. This topic goes in enough circles as it is, imo.

 

[Bomb#20]

Here's B20's example: The claim that "It is morally acceptable to to mercy kill a cancer patient if the patient wants to be killed" can be an objective claim because the patient isn't the assessor. The point being that if the assessor deems it morally acceptable because she does not want the patient to suffer then it's not objective. However if the assessor believes the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. it's morally acceptable regardless of anyone's concerns for the patient) then it's an objective claim and in my view untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist).

Gaah! Why is this so bloody hard? (Man, a lot happens while I'm not following the thread. Having to work for a living sucks...)

I don't quite follow, and B20's example confuses me.

No problem, it's not easy to explain.

It should be easy -- I'm not saying anything abstruse here. You shouldn't kill people, for the most part. We have a right to life. But, like our other rights, we can waive that right. If I want you dead, that's not a good enough reason to kill you. If you want you dead, that's a much better reason. It's your life, not mine.

All I'm expressing here is ordinary common sense morality. It's shared so widely the TV industry takes it for granted their audience will see things that way. Did we all see the scene where Jon Snow murders an unarmed prisoner of war? Yay Jon! He's the number one hero of the series. Why is it okay for him to murder Mance Rayder? Well, it's because King Stannis was about to burn Rayder at the stake, and we take it as read that Rayder preferred to be shot through the heart rather than be burned to death.

The objectivity we're attempting pin down is that of the claim "It is morally acceptable". The attitude of the patient has no bearing on the objectivity of this claim. The only role the patient's attitude plays in this is solely as the determining factor as to whether the assessor believes it is or is not a morally significant state of affairs.

Yes and no. It has no bearing on the objectivity of the claim because it's in the semantics of moral claims to be objective; a subjective claim like "Killing him feels right to me" is an autobiography, not a moral claim. (Of course "The moon is made of cheese" is an objective claim too; some objective claims are objectively false.) But the patient's attitude plays a vital role as the determining factor as to whether the claim "It's okay to mercy-kill him" is true. (I get that you don't think it does since you don't believe in moral facts, but it looks like you're trying to explain my view to ruby sparks.)

For the claim to be objective it must be independent of the claimant's feelings/attitudes. To reword slightly what I said earlier, the point is that if the claimant (assessor) deems it morally acceptable out of concern for people like the patient, it's not objective. However if the assessor believes the acceptability is a 'moral fact' (i.e. mercy-killing the patient in this circumstance has the attitude-independent quality of 'moral acceptability') then it's an objective claim

That's not the distinction I was making. It's about truth-makers. If "I'm concerned for his suffering" is the truth-maker for "It's okay for you to kill him", that's subjective. If the truth-maker is "He's suffering and wants to be killed", that's objective. I can be concerned about his suffering and still make an objective judgment, as long as it isn't my concern that makes killing the guy okay.

(Actually, even if "He's suffering" were the truth-maker all by itself, that would be objective too. It's just that "He's suffering" isn't really a good enough reason to mercy-kill someone. We have to respect people's autonomy. If the patient is in constant pain but is determined to tough it out and live long enough to see his wife through her pregnancy and see his son born, it wouldn't be right for you to preempt that choice and mercy-kill him early. His life, not yours.)

The assessor believing it's a moral fact isn't relevant to whether it's objective -- anti-realists make objective moral claims all the time when they take off their meta-ethics hats and put on their ethics hats. To consciously make an utterance that one's antirealist meta-ethics alleges is what moral claims mean, such as "Killing him feels right to me" or "Yay, mercy-killing!", is to express an inarguable sentiment. But anti-realists argue first-order moral positions as much as the rest of us do.

and a claim that is in my view is untrue (I don't believe moral facts exist).

That sounds like you're accepting the objectivity of moral claims without accepting their truth, i.e., you're an error theorist. Is that correct?

 

[ruby sparks]

We have to respect people's autonomy.

I did not realise we were only doing modern moral standards.