Angra Mainyu
Veteran Member
Yes, this is meant to represent the definition you offered in this thread, in light of your reply to B20 in post#300.The AntiChris said:This appears to be in line with my view (this is assuming what you say here is intended to represent what I agreed with B20 in post #300). I have no idea if it comports precisely with RS's view.Angra Mainyu said:I understand your position as holding that moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor. In particular, this includes cases in which the truth of the assessments about M depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc. of the person whose behavior is being assessed.
Now, I grant you that you have no idea whether it comports precisely with ruby sparks's view. However, you are in a position to determine based on what was said in this thread that it does not comport at all with ruby sparks's view. I can tell that because you need only an average reading comprehension ability to tell that, and you have more than that. Let me remind you, of some key parts of my exchange with ruby sparks on the subject:
https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...-men-Not-a-fan&p=830983&viewfull=1#post830983
It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.
Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?
https://talkfreethought.org/showthr...-men-Not-a-fan&p=831002&viewfull=1#post831002
Angra Mainyu said:It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.
Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?
I already explained in my reply to The AntiChris why the meaning is not the same. If that is the one you were using, then the meaning you have in mind and the meaning that The AntiChris have in mind are different - unless of course I misunderstood the meaning The AntiChris is using, in which case he can of course clarify.
Let me explain again: in the constructivist 'reflective equilibrium' view that she gives as an example of an anti-realist theory in which there is not mind-independent normativity (for some reason, she focuses on normativity not morality, but while that is important in general it is not so here for the purposes of this discussion; see her papers for more details), if I make the statement 'Ted Bundy ought not to have killed his victims', then the truth of my statement depends on Ted Bundy's evaluative attitudes ("in particular, on what those attitudes would be in reflective equilibrium", so not his actual attitudes but the ideal ones, on reflective equilibrium). It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.
On this constructivist view (there are more than one possible constructivist views), there is such thing as what the attitudes of a person would be in reflective equilibrium, and that is what determines what a person has reason to do, or equivalently - "equivalently" according to constructivism - what a person ought to do.
And next is ruby sparks's key reply:
It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.
Of course it doesn't depend on your evaluative attitudes or those of an observer. I never said it did!
All that it means is that it depends on someone's judgement (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, etc) about it.
I actually am finding it hard to believe you now don't understand this not unusual meaning.
Do you now see that ruby sparks's definition is not at all like yours?
On your definition, moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor. In particular, this includes metaethical theories in which the truth of moral assessments depends on the evaluative attitudes of the person whose behavior is being assessed. On the other hand, on ruby sparks definition, any metaethical theory according to which the truth of moral assessments does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor, but depends on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the person whose behavior is being evaluated, is a theory under which morality is mind-dependent, and so (on his definition) not objective.
The difference is crucial in this context, in particular on the subjects of moral disagreement, whether there is an objective fact of the matter in the usual sense of the terms, etc.
I am also perfectly capable of determining that it does not comport with ruby sparks's understanding of ruby sparks's view, even if he has not realized that on your view, moral assessments are mind-independent if whether a moral assessment is true does not depend on the feelings, evaluative attitudes, etc., of the agent(s) making said assessments, in her capacity as assessor - and in particular, this includes metaethical theories in which the truth of the assessments about morality depend on the evaluative attitudes, feelings, etc. of the person whose behavior is being assessed.The AntiChris said:Given this, you are perfectly capable of determining if it comports precisely with your understanding of RS's view.
As I explained, I have several reasons to show repeatedly the differences between your definition (as stated and explained by you) and ruby sparks's definition (as stated and explained by them), such as:The AntiChris said:And I'm still no wiser as to why you've been badgering me so relentlessly over this.
1. Try to see whether I can get you and/or he to clarify what you/he mean/s so that it is possible to have a serious discussion.
2. Try to get ruby sparks to change the definition he proposes.
And if I can persuade you that the definitions differ significantly and you tell him that, then that also might help persuade him to change his definition, which I would consider progress.
ETA: Now I see that in a post after the one I was replying to, you explained one of the key differences to ruby sparks. Great! Let's see what he says.