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Free Will And Free Choice

... and that is why, Lumpenproletariat, observers in psychophysical studies are over trained to the task. Every means of eliminating 'consideration' is countered by making response to input primary. The process is described in  Detection theory which provides methodology for comparing human and animal observation with respect to a theoretical Ideal observer.

RE:
"We choose how we will respond to all the above."

What happened to 'one is conditioned' did someone purposely misplace it at the learning table?

IOW Nope!

It comes out that we deceive ourselves into the fiction that we 'decide'. Rationalization lies at the center of the fictions of consciousness, self, experience.
 
A mind that experiences but can't act is superfluous.

If the brain is doing all the acting it is wasting a lot of energy creating a lot of superfluous phenomena.

A person who says the experiencing mind can't act can't give you a reason for it's existence.
 
The brain is primarily there to process and integrate that which is received via external and internal sensors chemical communicators and organs.

That the brain exists depends on receiving this information. That the brain processes that information and selectively integrates and sends information to other bodily features is testimony to it's need for being. It does not signal that the processing brain commands reception nor determines action. That is determined by inputs received and consequent responses generated by beings which survive.
 
Why didn't you quote the part where she says there can't be any free will in our decisions. Or that determinism rules out any possibility of free will. Or that brain cell activity taking place a microsecond earlier cancels out the possibility of free will. That would be the part relevant to our topic.

I've been saying these things all along, over and over in many different ways. Are you reading or considering what I say, or are you too busy typing walls of text?

To me it looks like the latter....you go off for a day or two busily typing away, producing reams of text that ignores whatever does not suit.

So then you are agreeing that free will does exist, along with determinism, and that our decision-making is free even though there is brain cell activity making it happen. I.e., so that the brain-cell activity, the prefrontal cortex activity, etc. is consistent with free will and not contradictory to it. If that's what you meant, then I misinterpreted you.


Here's more information to misconstrue or ignore;

Pattern recognition:
''Neuroscientists have repeatedly pointed out that pattern recognition represents the key to understanding cognition in humans. Pattern recognition also forms the very basis by which we predict future events, i. e. we are literally forced to make assumptions concerning outcomes, and we do so by relying on sequences of events experienced in the past.

This seems to say that "free will" is disproved by the fact that we use our memory to predict the future, like predicting rain because we see rain clouds, which "forces" us to believe rain is coming, because we've seen rain as an outcome previously when we saw similar clouds. But this does not disprove free will, even if it's true that our prediction of rain drives us to make a decision. Even if our brain / mind is conditioned by the memories and the perceptions which drive us to make a prediction, and this influences our decision, that decision is still a free choice. Even if the decision happens in a flash before we are conscious of it, it's still a free choice as long as we're conscious of the decision by the time we do the action, or it's at least partly free even if less than in a case where the awareness has more time before the action happens.

And calling it "pattern recognition" or some other fancy term doesn't change the fact that it's a free will act if the consciousness happens before the act is taken. It doesn't matter that "pattern recognition" or some other process caused the decision-making. Even so it's still a free-will act if we're conscious of the act we're choosing at the time we perform the act.

In a case where all that memory and perception and response happens so fast that the consciousness isn't aware of it until AFTER we do the act, then it's not a "free will" act, but even so, this case doesn't negate free will in all our decisions where the conscious awareness happens BEFORE the act or response we make. Even if the act is triggered by something earlier, it's still a free will act if it happens AFTER the awareness takes place so that the act is observed by the consciousness when our body moves to do the act that was decided on.

There are some cases where we react so fast that it might go against our "better judgment" and we regret it immediately. You could claim in this case that our nervous system did it too quick for our "will" to make a choice, and immediately we might wish to retract the act when we realize what our nervous system did too quickly. And these cases are ambiguous, and we might be blamed, and so on, but that doesn't mean ALL our decisions and actions are of that kind, because usually we do have time to think and consider whether to act on the impulse. So it's "free will" in all those cases where we did in fact have a chance to think first and decide, whereas in other cases where it happened too quick, maybe the "will" was partly overruled by the impulse and it's a poor example of "free will" or not a "free will" act at all.

Just because this is the case for some of our acts -- the sudden impulsive ones -- does not negate the many other cases where we chose freely because our conscious awareness came early enough to have an input before the act took place. As long as the consciousness has this time space, so we can think and make a judgment first, then the act decided upon is a free choice, or is a free-will act. And just because there were MEMORIES or perceptions that entered into the decision does not negate the element of free will in the choosing. No matter how quick those memories/perceptions happened, as long as there was a time span long enough for the consciousness to enter before the act is taken, it's still a free-will act, regardless how much memory or perception influenced the decision.


Huettel et al. point out that their study identifies the role various regions of prefrontal cortex play in moment-to-moment processing of mental events in order to make predictions about future events. Thus implicit predictive models are formed which need to be continuously updated, the disruption of sequence would indicate that the PFC is engaged in a novelty response to pattern changes.

Whether you call it "prefrontal" or some other technical term, it doesn't change the fact that if the consciousness occurs during the processing PRIOR to the decision being acted upon, then it's a free choice. Yes, it's not free in those cases where the impulse-influence happens so fast that there is NO CONSCIOUSNESS before the act takes place. Or it's ambiguous in marginal cases where the consciousness happens too late.


As a third possible explanation, Ivry and Knight propose that activation of the prefrontal cortex may reflect the generation of hypotheses, since the formulation of an hypothesis is an essential feature of higher-level cognition.

"hypothesis" sounds like consciousness. Can there be an "hypothesis" if no consciousness is happening? And "higher-level cognition" also sounds like consciousness. If consciousness is happening when the decision takes place, then it's a free choice, or a free-will decision or free-will act -- no matter what may be the CAUSE of the consciousness.


A monitoring of participants awareness during pattern recognition could provide a test of the PFC’s ability to formulate hypotheses concerning future outcomes.

There's nothing about free will which rules out the prefrontal cortex having this ability. It doesn't matter how automatic the awareness or the pattern recognition or hypothesis formulation is. If any of this happens prior to any consciousness of it, plus the resulting decision and act, then maybe it's not a free-will act. Such a case is not free will -- but even so, many other decisions and acts are free because there's consciousness of it before the act takes place.


Responsibility is related to a functional brain with the ability to make rational decisions. The ability to make rational decisions, therefore the assumption of responsibility, being commonly associated with the idea of 'free will' - which, considering the nature and mechanisms of decision making, it is not.

Yes it is free will as long as the consciousness occurs before the act selected by the decision-making. The act can happen AFTER the decision-making mechanism, and that time space might be long enough for the consciousness to be aware of what is decided, BEFORE the act commences. There is free will, and the subject is responsible, as long as the action decided happens AFTER the consciousness first knows of it.


Based on the standard definition of rationality, logical, reasoned....the weighing of a set factors, including the cost to benefit ratio of each of the available options; empathy allows you to understand how someone who may be effected by your choice would feel if you did this rather than that, the consequences of actions as opposed to gain or reward.

"rationality" and "weighing of factors" and "empathy" and "understand" are all something in the consciousness. All this can happen before the act decided upon takes place -- even if not in all cases, but at least in some -- and so all those are cases of free will and responsibility for the decision. While in some other cases maybe it all happens too quick, impulsively, without the free will doing the choice. So maybe some actions are not free will choices, but others are.


Stealing may offer instant reward but has the high risk of being caught and punished, the shame to oneself and family if caught, etc, hence the factor of deterrence in the Law of the Land. Some may act on their own ethical standards and seek to be fair toward others, Sociopaths may not care how others are affected by their actions but may be deterred by the thought of getting caught and punished, which effects their decisions.

Since consciousness is necessarily part of all this decision-making and happens before the act is done, this is about free will making choices, not about any claim that there is no free will.

Where is the research showing any facts to disprove free will? Just because there is processing and activity in the cortex and so on doesn't disprove that free will is happening.
 
So then you are agreeing that free will does exist, along with determinism, and that our decision-making is free even though there is brain cell activity making it happen. I.e., so that the brain-cell activity, the prefrontal cortex activity, etc. is consistent with free will and not contradictory to it. If that's what you meant, then I misinterpreted you.

Nope, it's your bias at work, interpreting whatever your opponent says in ways that suit your own needs. Taking what was said and imagining that is something entirely different. In other words, just another cheap shot.


This seems to say that "free will" is disproved by the fact that we use our memory to predict the future, like predicting rain because we see rain clouds, which "forces" us to believe rain is coming, because we've seen rain as an outcome previously when we saw similar clouds.


We as people do not use memory like we use tools. Instead, we, our personality, character, are constructs of memory function. The brain has memory function; recognition, declarative. autobiographical, episodic, semantic, short term, long term....which holds the information of who we are, where we are, and what we do.

Without brain memory function, we are not. We cease to exist as conscious entities. Where is your 'free will' in all this?
 
consciousness + decision / selection − coercion = free will (free choice)

I disagree with most of what you just posted. I intended to convey that free will and self are lies, misrepresentations, of [what] an individual actually perceives.

What you are successfully conveying is that it's difficult to explain or identify "self" and "free will" -- but you are not conveying that they are "lies" or "misrepresentations" of something. You don't know what an individual "actually perceives" any better than what you're calling the "lies" and "misrepresentations" of what is perceived.

The "free will" and "self" are what we actually perceive, but they are more difficult to explain and analyze -- it's not that they are "lies" and "misrepresentations" anymore than all the rest of what we experience in life. They are more complicated than the other perceived objects, but they are perceived objects, just as space and time and causality and happiness and freedom and love and hate etc. are perceived objects also difficult to analyze.


Illusion is exactly what I meant. A person continuously gathers information about the world trying to make sense of what it is she's sensing. What is actually happening is mostly different from her developing models in process.

But how much is "mostly different" and how much is accurately understood? In your judgment of "what is actually happening," you're assuming there is some accurate perception happening.

Yes, there's always more that we don't understand. But that doesn't make the part we do understand a "lie" or "misrepresentation." We do perceive things correctly in part, but there's always more which we missed, and there's usually some misperception along with the correct perception. That's true of all that we know -- we never KNOW it fully, 100%, accurate in every imaginable detail. So there's always the erroneous part -- but still there is the part that's correct, and our knowledge or understanding does increase as we keep investigating further.

If you don't believe this, then you're opposed to education and all other pretense of trying to gain more truth, so you discourage learning and teaching and want schools eliminated. And you don't waste your time posting in a message board saying things you pretend to believe are true.

All that's different about "free will" -- and "self" and "freedom" and "good" and "evil" and "justice" etc. -- is that these latter are more difficult to analyze than the less complicated truths or objects of reality. It's nonsensical to say they are "lies" or "misrepresentations" in some special sense. If you mean that everything imaginable is a "lie" and a "misrepresentation," then your own posts in this message board are lies and misrepresentations. So then why are you engaging in this lying and misrepresenting?


One is defending one from revealing anything about her while one is also processing some stuff her body has produced to sustain and maintain a base level of alertness and comfort which is probably not now relevant.

"now"? You mean it was "relevant" earlier, but is not any longer? When did it cease to be relevant, and how do you know it was relevant earlier?

You are continuing to ignore the fact that the consciousness of what we do, and the decision-making, and will to act, are parts of an ongoing process happening over a time span, maybe several seconds, or maybe several minutes or even hours, and during this decision-making event there are many moments of consciousness and of selecting, and so some of the conscious awareness moments do happen earlier than some of the brain impulses causing the desires or urge to act, so that the consciousness does also serve as an input actively affecting the elements happening later, such as future brain impulses.

You keep falsely putting ALL the consciousness LATER than ALL the brain cell activity causing the urges, when in reality some of the conscious moments happen PRIOR to some of the brain cell activity -- i.e., the brain cell activity happening later.


Consequently she comes up with contingency models which may or may not conflict with her primary status models.

You are artificially distinguishing "contingency" models from "primary status" models. You've not explained this distinction, nor can you. It is your make-believe only. When the decisions or judgments or perceptions are made, they are real, not "lies" or delusions based on something "contingent" conflicting with the "primary" part. Rather, they can be difficult to explain totally, and we have to keep rechecking our knowledge or understanding to try to improve it.

When we make a judgment or decision, where consciousness plays a part in it, this could be partly something later (e.g., a conscious moment) acting on something still later (primary brain-cell impulses), which then alters the final action, and this is a free-will act, or choice. A "choice" or "decision" can be an ongoing process, spread over a time span, in which later factors enter into the final act, or the final option selected. (And this does not rule out also the more spontaneous "choices" happening in a flash with little or no time for reflection. But if consciousness is totally left out, playing no role, then it's not really a free-will act, but just a reflex impulse which cannot properly be called a "free choice" one makes.)


You capture a piece of my thesis with your statement about behavior not completely .... but you miss the main point. The main point is one is continuously evaluating what one has processed after the fact sometimes out of error sometimes out of intent.

"after the fact" -- translation: after the "decision" or "choice" has taken place.

Yes, but there's also evaluating that goes on BEFORE the "decision" or "choice" has taken place. That processing might continue on for several seconds or minutes, during which consciousness happens and evaluates the options. This makes the final "decision" or "choice" a free-will act, because it happens in conjunction with the conscious awareness, rather than totally PRIOR to consciousness. Just because some brain cell activity happens very early does not mean the later consciousness plays no role. That earlier nerve cell impulse is not the entire decision-making process as long as the final act is delayed for a time period, as it often is.

. . . conflicting with what her behavior was meant to suggest using prior presumptions.

What "was meant to suggest" originally may be less important than the later processing, including the consciousness, as long as this happens PRIOR to the final actual move or body activity chosen by the decision-making process, which continues on until the moment of resultant action.

The "decision" is not complete until the action decided upon takes place.


It is a fact that when the 'choice' was made the following conditions are most likely now inappropriate for what one had intended to do to be useful.

But the CHOICE is not completed until the action chosen is performed. Until that action decided upon actually happens, the choice is still in process, and whatever affects it, including consciousness, can alter the selection. And this final selection and action is just as "appropriate" and "useful" as you can ever expect a chosen act to be. It is wacko nonsense to say that nothing ever done was useful or appropriate if it required a few extra seconds of reflection before being carried out.


The point is evolutionarily we've developed systems for making multiple models for what we expect which are changed as we see how our latest behavior is received by our social group.

That change takes place does not mean our choices are "lies" or "misrepresentations" -- the adjusting and modifying something earlier is just as legitimate and authentic as the earlier spontaneous impulses. Actions decided upon in a process where consciousness has time to enter and affect the outcome (or action decided upon) are actions of free will, or actions we freely chose to do, and this freedom or choice is not a lie or misrepresentation of anything. It's just something difficult to analyze and explain scientifically, like much of life is difficult to analyze and explain.


It is impossible to remain consistent or accurate given the lag between what we think about the now past and changes by others to that since we executed particular behaviors.

But our thinking is not limited to only behaviors already past. When a decision to act takes place consciously BEFORE the behavior, then it becomes a free choice, because there is selection plus also the consciousness entering into the process. A conscious moment in that process can affect a later brain impulse also playing a part, as not ALL the brain cell activity happens prior. Some of the brain impulses are earlier, but some are later, and these later ones can be changed by the consciousness happening earlier (or in between the earliest and the later brain impulses) over an extended process of ongoing brain impulses intermixed with conscious moments.

Decision-making is not limited to the earliest brain-impulse flash to the exclusion of anything happening a second or more later.


Awareness of actual now is never possible in necessarily respondent beings.

Maybe, but neither do the responses happen immediately and simultaneously with the earliest brain impulses, but can be delayed over a time span, and within that time span the awareness can enter into the process and affect the final delayed response.


We project an awareness anticipating now which is never quite right.

Probably our awareness is never 100% accurate about anything. Everything is in flux, at some level, and no matter how much we pin down the objects perceived, the millions of changes happening inside them every microsecond are never fully accounted for. But this less-than-100% grasp of what's happening does not turn all our knowledge and understanding into a lie. The need is to keep improving the grasp or the understanding.


If one looks at social transactions one sees how inappropriate one's behaviors were when we executed them.

And also how appropriate they were. If you can detect the "inappropriate" part, this means you also see the "appropriate" part, which is also real. Just because something was less than 100% perfect does not mean it had no appropriateness whatever. That we can recognize past errors in actions means there's also a correct part, which was not an error and was not inappropriate.

It would be senseless babble to insist that everything we do in life and all choices have been inappropriate. If everything imaginable we do has to be inherently inappropriate, then a words like "appropriate" and "inappropriate" have no meaning.


We are a future oriented machine still operating in the past.

No -- at least not always. Our consciousness can affect an action not yet taken. The decision to act is not finished before the consciousness enters the process -- or not always finished. Some (or most) decisions to act continue on long enough for the consciousness to enter it prior to the act being decided. So that consciousness operates also in the future, impacting what happens later, even though it was prompted by something earlier.


No choice, physics.

There's both. Even if all choice is a result of physics, it's still a free choice if the action decided on happens after the moment(s) of consciousness.

No one is giving any reason why a choice is not still a free choice, or free will, even though it was caused by something earlier. All that's necessary for it to be free will is that the action decided on happens after there was some conscious activity during the process of deciding (and of course that the action was not determined by coercion or threat of punishment to the one deciding (making him/her worse off than s/he would be without the threatening one), in which case it becomes a suppression of free will).

You have to eventually get beyond the mere dogma that there can be no free will if there's causality. At some point you must finally give a REASON why this must be, or why a choice cannot be both free and yet also caused or determined by something prior. It's only when it's caused by an intended threat of harm toward the one deciding that it changes from a free to an unfree choice. Otherwise there's no reason to insist that an act cannot be free while at the same time being caused by something, e.g., something like the person's brain-cell activity.
 
The fact that some such brain cell activity happened a microsecond prior to the consciousness of it does not mean the "conscious will" did not also drive the decision-making or information processing.

There is nothing but subjective wild guesses about invisible internal events showing there is this microsecond difference.

It is not hard evidence.

But even if it's true that there is such a gap between the brain-cell activity and the resultant action chosen, or consciousness of it, this still does not eliminate free choice or free will.

Free will is ruled out in a case where the "decision" and action take place totally BEFORE any consciousness of it. E.g., a reflect impulse jerk motion without any conscious choice to make that motion. So that's not a free will decision, but most of our decision-making is not that kind, but does have consciousness happening before the decided action happens = free will.

So it isn't necessary to debunk research claiming to have identified brain sections which caused a motion even before a conscious choice took place. It is legitimate research maybe having some usefulness, but it still does not discredit the general understanding of free will and responsibility.
 
The fact that some such brain cell activity happened a microsecond prior to the consciousness of it does not mean the "conscious will" did not also drive the decision-making or information processing.

There is nothing but subjective wild guesses about invisible internal events showing there is this microsecond difference.

It is not hard evidence.

But even if it's true that there is such a gap between the brain-cell activity and the resultant action chosen, or consciousness of it, this still does not eliminate free choice or free will.

Free will is ruled out in a case where the "decision" and action take place totally BEFORE any consciousness of it. E.g., a reflect impulse jerk motion without any conscious choice to make that motion. So that's not a free will decision, but most of our decision-making is not that kind, but does have consciousness happening before the decided action happens = free will.

So it isn't necessary to debunk research claiming to have identified brain sections which caused a motion even before a conscious choice took place. It is legitimate research maybe having some usefulness, but it still does not discredit the general understanding of free will and responsibility.

There are two fundamental problems with these kinds of experiments.

First is the problem of subjective guessing about invisible events.

Second is the claim by experimenters to have knowledge about the contents and origin of any observed neural behavior.

https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~jfkihlstrom/PDFs/2010s/2017/KIhlstrom_Libet_2017.pdf
 
Talk about the dualist cooking rules, does twisting presumptions to suit one's viewpoint mean anything to you about whether it is argument or bullshit?

Well sir it's bullshit.

You need to justify whether action of decision to act are even related before you pronounce consciousness suffices as qualifier for t=0. From what I read consciousness is a web of 'evidences' contrived after the fact to justify what one has done.

Do you really think that a knee jerk can be purposeful?

The knee tendon contracts in response to a blow to it and the individual saw that taking place.

She consciously justifies the jerk as willed and reports that 'fact' to anyone who'll listen.

Of course she did,

or,

if one is looking at fMRI of brain activity one might judge otherwise.

Actually one doesn't need brain actions to determine whether one's reports of why he moved his leg below the knee. fMRI in the vicinity of the blood near the tendon would be adequate.

Do you really think I would be convinced by your claim of a subjective event as decisive evidence of anything?

I hope not.

Yeah I did what you did. So what? Consciousness from the perspective of the doer cannot ever be material evidence.
 
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If a person can use the word "I" rationally they know full well what an "I" is and what it can do.

The idea that the brain tricks the conscious mind about anything is not an idea supported in any way.
 
You have no case in any way you care to look at it. You are arguing from faith and semantics, a belief held without the support of evidence and common language usage, which does not take the underlying means of production into account, that decision making is not free will for all the given reasons that you ignore.

You've given no reasons to show that decision-making is not free will as long as consciousness also takes place along with the decision-making. Only when there is no consciousness in the process is it not free will. But sometimes (or usually) consciousness is also happening as part of the selecting process, which makes it free will, or free choice.

The conscious part is there too! Just repeating the unconscious element over and over does not cancel the conscious part which makes it free will. Nothing about free will has to require that ALL of the decision-making process is conscious and with no unconscious part. Unconscious nerve impulses can play an essential role also, but when the consciousness gets added to this, then free will takes place, even if it's not until a second or two after the subconscious nerve impulses.

You've given no reason why this is not the case -- such as in the following you give no reason:
Abstract
''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making.
Free will doesn't mean there aren't any such mechanisms. Just because nerves play a role at some part of the process, including a second before consciousness, does not rule out free will. The free will becomes reality when the consciousness does happen, even if this happens at a later moment than the nerve impulses.

You are totally ignoring this and pretending that the entire decision-making event happens in the microsecond flash of nerve impulse happening earlier, before the consciousness. Which, if true, means that every act or decision anyone ever made required only a second to happen, and that no decision-making ever required more than this second, or microsecond. So you're babbling that no decision ever in history required more than about a second in order to happen. Never a minute, 5 or 10 minutes of deliberating to consider the alternatives. How can you say something so mindless? It took you longer than that to figure out your argument, which itself is a judgment, like a decision or choice you formulated over time.


Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness.

Yes, there is probably some of that pre-conscious element influencing our decisions. You can even argue that it's more important than we generally realize. But that doesn't mean there is no conscious part also happening, which takes place before the final decision is completed, or before the decided action takes place. That conscious part makes it a free-will choice.


Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will.

Yes, in those uncommon cases it might be said that the free-choice element is disrupted, or that this distorted "free will" element in us maybe should be overruled in favor of our earlier non-distorted "free will" prior to the disordering event. So this means there are some tough choices to be made in life, where one's brain is injured. But that's not our normal everyday experience of decision-making.


Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making.

No, it demonstrates no such thing. Those cases of brain damage are not the norm. In our common everyday experiences of decision-making there is no such disordering of the will, so such uncommon events have no impact on the legal system dealing with the normal cases of decision-making and judging responsibility for decisions/actions. It is irrelevant to one's responsibility for a criminal act or for signing a contract or performing one's proper obligations.


Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

Fine -- that doesn't mean there isn't any free will, or responsibility for one's decisions. A more humane system does not require free will to be abolished or banned or ruled out of order.


More;

''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance).

Yes, but it's possible to overrule the desire if the consciousness takes place before the decided action. The desire might be dictated in our system prior to the consciousness, but then the consciousness enters the process, after the initial impulse, and so it can trigger a reaction against that desire.


Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

Maybe and maybe not. If the action to be done is delayed, there's plenty of opportunity for constraint to happen. The idea that every action we do is spontaneous, a microsecond after the initial impulse, with no reflection whatever, is wackadoodle pseudoscience. Why are you promoting pseudoscience instead of sticking to reality? Decisions usually involve a few moments of reflection.


At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t;

Which "we"? Some of us do ascribe "free will" to animals also, if they show signs of wavering between alternatives. With a lower level of consciousness, they might be considered as having less free will than humans. And possibly for insects and less primitive life forms we speculate that they have no free will. That's a judgment call.

For higher mammals it's reasonable to ascribe at least a degree of free will to their "decisions" to go to the right or left, to chase after that prey animal, etc. A stalking predator definitely pauses in some cases to consider if it's worth the effort to chase down that rabbit or deer etc. Surely there is a "calculation" going on about the speed necessary, how long the chase will go, about the terrain favoring one or the other, on the element of surprise, about the wind currents. As the predator delays longer to decide and weigh the factors, it is essentially making a choice, similar to what humans do, or more like a "free will" choice rather than only a spontaneous burst of muscle action triggered by an initial nerve impulse flash.

The less reflection and consideration of the alternatives they face -> the less of the free-will element in their selection of actions to take. The lower degree there is of this doesn't mean there is no free will at all in their behavior. Probably there is some, but less than in humans.

Certainly there are cases where an ape looks different directions, listens, considers what's happening, and has an urge one way or the other, and makes a choice, based on different preferences.


and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.

In general perhaps, but only because of their much lower level of consciousness. We "teach" the higher animals some of the proper behaviors, even "punish" them, and this is not completely different than teaching proper behavior to humans, especially children.

There is a difference, because of the higher consciousness in humans, including higher potential to judge between "good" and "bad" consequences. And we can't rule out the possibility of other intelligent life forms in the universe who are equal or superior to humans, having higher consciousness and thus also free will and responsibility for their decisions.


Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.''

But only because of the much lower level of consciousness in those animals. The higher animals may have enough consciousness that they exercise some "free will" in their behavior, but not enough that they can be blamed or judged as "guilty" of crime when they misbehave.

But in a possible case of animals having an unusually higher level of consciousness, we might treat them more like humans. Even if there are no such cases now, maybe in 1000 or 10,000 years from now there will be.

None of this changes the fact that humans have free will, which is our consciousness added to our process of selecting from options so that we make decisions to act. This is a high level of consciousness which is mostly lacking in non-human animals. Or their level of consciousness is too low for them to be held responsible for their "decisions," and their "free will" choices happen at a more simple or primitive level.
 
Here's an example of what you are doing: "I want to go home, I want to go home, I want to go home ..." RU home yet? Nope. Hell freezing at the next bend in thought.

If that must follow this as a matter of natural law how can there be free anything? Put in all the interveners you can muster. Not going to free up that from this ever.
 
Which "we"? Some of us do ascribe "free will" to animals also, if they show signs of wavering between alternatives. With a lower level of consciousness, they might be considered as having less free will than humans. And possibly for insects and less primitive life forms we speculate that they have no free will. That's a judgment call.

As pointed out, simply pasting the label 'free will' onto the decision-making ability of a brain does not establish the proposition that decision making is in fact free will.

The reasons why the cognitive process of selecting options is not free will have been thoroughly explained.

To recap;

Movement] Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved. Conscious intention and motor awareness thus arise from increased parietal activity before movement execution.''

A parietal-premotor network for movement intention and motor awareness
''It is commonly assumed that we are conscious of our movements mainly because we can sense ourselves moving as ongoing peripheral information coming from our muscles and retina reaches the brain. Recent evidence, however, suggests that, contrary to common beliefs, conscious intention to move is independent of movement execution per se. We propose that during movement execution it is our initial intentions that we are mainly aware of. Furthermore, the experience of moving as a conscious act is associated with increased activity in a specific brain region: the posterior parietal cortex. We speculate that movement intention and awareness are generated and monitored in this region. We put forward a general framework of the cognitive and neural processes involved in movement intention and motor awareness.''
 
I doubt that those who believe in free will are going to consider or even read what is said. Once fixated on a belief, free will in this instance, the cognitive filter goes up and any and every alternative become invisible, . . .

Like being fixated on the belief that free will and causality are mutually exclusive, which is disproved by the free-will debunker's own logic, which offers nothing to show how free will must contradict causality. A strong case can be made for causality, or cause and effect, meaning that a phenomenon must have a cause, and it seems impossible to give an example of anything that is not caused by something else (even if the cause is not known), so we can always assume something must have caused it, whatever it is.

Yet why does that preclude free will, as the free-will debunker dogmatically insists without any reason? The free will makes choices, acting as a cause, while this free will itself might also be caused by something. That x is caused by something else does not mean somehow that the x doesn't exist.

So why is the free-will debunker blind to the alternative that the free will does exist and causes some things to happen and yet is itself also caused by something? Why does the anti-free-will crusader's cognitive filter go up and make this alternative invisible?

Nothing the free-will denier has to offer is disregarded by someone's cognitive filter. All the research cited to show that nerve impulses cause free will in no way undermines the normal understanding of free will as also a cause -- i.e., causing actions -- A causes B and then B causes C, etc. -- the normal pattern of everyday decision-making as people choose to do this or that, etc. It only shows that the free will making these choices is itself also caused. We can easily assume that something happens somewhere which determines the free will to be as it is, and also that this free will does its own influence on other objects to cause something to happen. This simple reality is what is made "invisible" by the anti-free-will fanatic's cognitive filter.

. . . and any and every alternative become invisible, thus disproving the very thing they believe in and argue for.

That's the free-will debunker, actually proving that free will does exist, by establishing that there are influences or causes which act on one's mind and consciousness and motor nerves, so as to establish the connection between the desire and the acts influenced by the desire, showing how something decided is put into action as a result of the decision-making process. Thus proving free will and refuting the free-will debunker's blind prejudice and dogmatic refusal to see any alternative.
 
I doubt that those who believe in free will are going to consider or even read what is said. Once fixated on a belief, free will in this instance, the cognitive filter goes up and any and every alternative become invisible, . . .

Like being fixated on the belief that free will and causality are mutually exclusive, which is disproved by the free-will debunker's own logic, which offers nothing to show how free will must contradict causality. A strong case can be made for causality, or cause and effect, meaning that a phenomenon must have a cause, and it seems impossible to give an example of anything that is not caused by something else (even if the cause is not known), so we can always assume something must have caused it, whatever it is.

Yet why does that preclude free will, as the free-will debunker dogmatically insists without any reason? The free will makes choices, acting as a cause, while this free will itself might also be caused by something. That x is caused by something else does not mean somehow that the x doesn't exist.

So why is the free-will debunker blind to the alternative that the free will does exist and causes some things to happen and yet is itself also caused by something? Why does the anti-free-will crusader's cognitive filter go up and make this alternative invisible?

Nothing the free-will denier has to offer is disregarded by someone's cognitive filter. All the research cited to show that nerve impulses cause free will in no way undermines the normal understanding of free will as also a cause -- i.e., causing actions -- A causes B and then B causes C, etc. -- the normal pattern of everyday decision-making as people choose to do this or that, etc. It only shows that the free will making these choices is itself also caused. We can easily assume that something happens somewhere which determines the free will to be as it is, and also that this free will does its own influence on other objects to cause something to happen. This simple reality is what is made "invisible" by the anti-free-will fanatic's cognitive filter.

. . . and any and every alternative become invisible, thus disproving the very thing they believe in and argue for.

That's the free-will debunker, actually proving that free will does exist, by establishing that there are influences or causes which act on one's mind and consciousness and motor nerves, so as to establish the connection between the desire and the acts influenced by the desire, showing how something decided is put into action as a result of the decision-making process. Thus proving free will and refuting the free-will debunker's blind prejudice and dogmatic refusal to see any alternative.


Will is not free for the given reasons. Your conscious will is nothing more than a prompt or urge to act once the real underlying work for that specific action is completed.

Consciousness is an ongoing activity being generated and fed information by underlying information processing activity.

That is the agency of decision making and why - being unconscious information processing by neural networks - decision making is not 'free will.'

Brain interpretor function:
''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb. The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving.

The left-hemisphere interpreter is not only a master of belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no matter what. Patients with “reduplicative paramnesia,” because of damage to the brain, believe that there are copies of people or places. In short, they will remember another time and mix it with the present. As a result, they will create seemingly ridiculous, but masterful, stories to uphold what they know to be true due to the erroneous messages their damaged brain is sending their intact interpreter. One such patient believed the New York hospital where she was being treated was actually her home in Maine. When her doctor asked how this could be her home if there were elevators in the hallway, she said, “Doctor, do you know how much it cost me to have those put in?” The interpreter will go to great lengths to make sure the inputs it receives are woven together to make sense—even when it must make great leaps to do so. Of course, these do not appear as“great leaps” to the patient, but rather as clear evidence from the world around him or her.''
 
Every means of eliminating 'consideration' is countered by making response to input primary.

I can only speculate what that means.

But it sounds like: "making response to input primary" = making the first input/flash/impulse the ONLY input, in any selection process, and the first knee-jerk response to it the only factor from that point forward, and that all "consideration" of anything after that point is eliminated or deleted from playing any role in the decision-making to take place.

It sounds like a dogmatic insistence that nothing can have any role in causing a future act (by the one choosing) after the initial impulse as an all-time one-and-only causal factor or influence to drive the subsequent selection about to happen. It's a decree, like a Papal Bull, pronouncing that this one initial micro-microsecond input-flash-impulse is the ALL which vanquishes any other possible cause from having any part in a decision.

If that's what it means, it's arrogant pseudoscience for which there is no data based on any legitimate science.

But if it means something else, then it's probably not relevant to the question whether free will is reality or fiction.


The process is described in  Detection theory which provides methodology for comparing human and animal observation with respect to a theoretical Ideal observer.

The above link with the fancy calculus says nothing relevant to the question. Though I couldn't prove you wrong if you claim that the following proves that free will violates the principle of the expanding universe:

U=P_{{11}}\cdot U_{{11}}+P_{{21}}\cdot U_{{21}}+P_{{12}}\cdot U_{{12}}+P_{{22}}\cdot U_{{22}}

{\displaystyle U=P_{11}\cdot U_{11}+(1-P_{11})\cdot U_{21}+P_{12}\cdot U_{12}+(1-P_{12})\cdot U_{22}}U=P_{{11}}\cdot U_{{11}}+(1-P_{{11}})\cdot U_{{21}}+P_{{12}}\cdot U_{{12}}+(1-P_{{12}})\cdot U_{{22}}

{\displaystyle U=U_{21}+U_{22}+P_{11}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})-P_{12}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})}U=U_{{21}}+U_{{22}}+P_{{11}}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})-P_{{12}}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}})

Effectively, one may maximize the sum,

{\displaystyle U'=P_{11}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})-P_{12}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})}U'=P_{{11}}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})-P_{{12}}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}}),

and make the following substitutions:

{\displaystyle P_{11}=\pi _{1}\cdot \int _{R_{1}}p(y|H1)\,dy}P_{{11}}=\pi _{1}\cdot \int _{{R_{1}}}p(y|H1)\,dy

{\displaystyle P_{12}=\pi _{2}\cdot \int _{R_{1}}p(y|H2)\,dy}P_{{12}}=\pi _{2}\cdot \int _{{R_{1}}}p(y|H2)\,dy

where {\displaystyle \pi _{1}}\pi _{1} and {\displaystyle \pi _{2}}\pi _{2} are the a priori probabilities, {\displaystyle P(H1)}P(H1) and {\displaystyle P(H2)}P(H2), and {\displaystyle R_{1}}R_{1} is the region of observation events, y, that are responded to as though H1 is true.

{\displaystyle \Rightarrow U'=\int _{R_{1}}\left\{\pi _{1}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})\cdot p(y|H1)-\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})\cdot p(y|H2)\right\}\,dy}\Rightarrow U'=\int _{{R_{1}}}\left\{\pi _{1}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})\cdot p(y|H1)-\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}})\cdot p(y|H2)\right\}\,dy

{\displaystyle U'}U' and thus {\displaystyle U}U are maximized by extending {\displaystyle R_{1}}R_{1} over the region where

{\displaystyle \pi _{1}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})\cdot p(y|H1)-\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})\cdot p(y|H2)>0}\pi _{1}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})\cdot p(y|H1)-\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}})\cdot p(y|H2)>0

This is accomplished by deciding H2 in case

{\displaystyle \pi _{2}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})\cdot p(y|H2)\geq \pi _{1}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})\cdot p(y|H1)}\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}})\cdot p(y|H2)\geq \pi _{1}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})\cdot p(y|H1)

{\displaystyle \Rightarrow L(y)\equiv {\frac {p(y|H2)}{p(y|H1)}}\geq {\frac {\pi _{1}\cdot (U_{11}-U_{21})}{\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{22}-U_{12})}}\equiv \tau _{B}}\Rightarrow L(y)\equiv {\frac {p(y|H2)}{p(y|H1)}}\geq {\frac {\pi _{1}\cdot (U_{{11}}-U_{{21}})}{\pi _{2}\cdot (U_{{22}}-U_{{12}})}}\equiv \tau _{B}

No doubt you have verified all the above, substituting different coefficients and adjusting for heat and temperature and humidity factors?


RE:
"We choose how we will respond to all the above."
What happened to 'one is conditioned' did someone purposely misplace it at the learning table?
What's the difference between "conditioned" and "caused"? When "we choose" we might have been conditioned -- but so what? Free will does not deny that there is causality. Maybe the free will is caused. Even so, that doesn't mean it can't also be a cause. I.e., A causes B and B causes C.

Or, initial impulse(s) A causes free will B, and then free will B causes choice or action C.

So nothing "happened to 'one is conditioned'" -- it's alive and well.

IOW Nope!

It comes out that we deceive ourselves into the fiction that we 'decide'.

No. When did that come out? We are not deceived. The initial impulse caused the free will, which in turn made the decision. Where is the deception? Showing that something caused something else does not mean everything we decide is a fiction or deception.


Rationalization lies at the center of the fictions of consciousness, self, experience.

Another Papal Bull based on blind impulse and prejudice, and on pseudoscience distorting research and data into jargon proving that the earth is flat.

You can't make pronouncements like these without relying on consciousness and experience.

You can't claim "it comes out that . . ." if there's no consciousness or experience.
 
We choose how we will respond to all the above.

The brain acquires information, processes that information and selects options based on sets of criteria, representing some of that activity in conscious form.

Yes, and then there is more information processing which begins AFTER the "activity in conscious form" happens. So the conscious activity then has an impact on the later brain activity, or adds further information to the brain, which then is influenced further. So the brain acquiring information is acted upon by earlier conscious activity.

Not ALL the conscious activity happens AFTER the brain's activity to acquire information. That act of acquiring information continues on and on, for seconds or even minutes later, so that some of it (or further information) is acquired by the brain AFTER the conscious activity has begun. Nothing prevents that earlier conscious activity from influencing the further brain activity of acquiring information.


Your thoughts are made conscious.

Yes, and that consciousness in turn stimulates still further brain activity. You keep ignoring this. You keep imagining that the consciousness can't ever influence new brain activity. How are you hung up on the platitude that no conscious impulse can ever have an influence on later brain activity?
 
The brain is primarily there to process and integrate that which is received via external and internal sensors chemical communicators and organs.

That the brain exists depends on receiving this information. That the brain processes that information and selectively integrates and sends information to other bodily features is testimony to its need for being. It does not signal that the processing brain commands reception nor determines action.

However you put it, the information received into the brain, into the consciousness, is used in some way to influence the decision-making, or to change the process of choosing among options. For many decisions that deciding process continues long enough to allow conscious moments to happen before the final decision or action, so that consciousness provides its own inputs into the deciding process and can change the outcome. Whether you say it "commands" or "determines" action, or describe it some other way, that brain, or that consciousness does enter into the deciding process because of this information it inputs to it which can change the outcome.


That is determined by inputs received and consequent responses generated by beings which survive.

OK, you can say it different ways. Those "consequent responses" are influenced by the consciousness in cases where the final response or choice takes long enough to happen and thus isn't completed until a time gap like a half second or 2 or 3 seconds or 2 or 3 minutes has passed. That's a free will choice, whereas in a case where the time gap is a microsecond it might be too short for the consciousness to have time to enter the deciding process.

A "free choice" is a decision in which the consciousness played a part by offering some information which could have an effect. When no such consciousness happens it's not a free choice.
 
...

Not ALL the conscious activity happens AFTER the brain's activity to acquire information. That act of acquiring information continues on and on, for seconds or even minutes later, so that some of it (or further information) is acquired by the brain AFTER the conscious activity has begun. Nothing prevents that earlier conscious activity from influencing the further brain activity of acquiring information.

...

Brain activity is both episodic and continuous, depending on what is processing and through whichever modality it occurs. Yeah, pretty inclusive and meaningless unless there is some context.

I'll provide two or three. But first I'm going to say using models for finding such factors is critical as are some conditions under which such study is performed.

Factors. Brain is evolving which was can be reflected in other comparable species with some caveats. There need be genetic and behavioral linkage among the several species where similarities of activity and function have been established. These are at the core of such study. We need to be satisfied there is analogous structure and function among the models and structures and behaviors.

Normally the above would be presumed but this is a special place where these basics need be explicitly specified.

In the present instance I'm going to compare structure and function among mammals ranging from rodents through to human progenitors such as possum, lemurs, prosimians, and apes, as well as man both sexes and many cohorts.

I'm going to concentrate on studies in which either I or a team in which I participated did work. And most of the work I describe is supportive of the basics of either learning or perception and is used to characterize the bases under which those behaviors arise within the NS.

I'm going to concentrate on neural and behavioral studies concerned with learning, perception, showing general behavior along ascending and descending neural tracts, primarily auditory and visual from just after receptor to primary cortical loci and some associative loci. These studies all had the objectives of determining parameters of sensation and learning activity.

In a study conducted following paradigms and protocols established by James Olds we examined multi-cellular electrical activity along ascending and descending auditory and visual tracts in attempts to determine either the engram or other defining locus of learning behavior within the sensory systems. In my particular study I chose to examine influences of sensory input on the acquisition of this behavior within the sensory tracts at several nuclei along both the visual and auditory sensory tracts and the accessory areas in lateral hypothalamus where chemical arousal and attentional sites and sources have been identified.

I went about these tasks by placing electrodes and cannula in the lateral hypothalamus in rats and at sensory waystations then recording data while having the rats learn choice and reverse choice In Olds proven methods. This data was acquired while performing a study on the effects of enkephalin and reinforcing action of electrical stimulation in the posterior lateral hypothalamus.

What we found were obvious after reflection on the structure of these systems.

Onset of activity corresponded with distance from receptor and change in receptor activity was also modulated with descending activity as the learning process proceeded. In the end the learning is seen as a continuous neural process using the entirety of ascending and descending processes. There is no engram or locus of learning. Rather, learning is achieved by the entire structure of the sensory systems.

As has since been found in the late nineties there are cells within sensory systems that respond both to direct stimulation and to response to such stimulation observed in others.

As for other sense stimulation influences most was seen in descending neural influences. These studies have been repeated in other species with similar results.
 
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