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Compatibilism: What's that About?

Marvin Edwards

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Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).

The only way that determinism and free will become contradictory is by bad definitions. For example, if we define "determinism" as "the absence of free will", or, if we define "free will" as "the absence of determinism", then obviously they would be incompatible. So, let's not do that.

Determinism asserts that every event is the reliable result of prior events. It derives this from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Our choices, for example, are reliably caused by our choosing operation. The choosing operation is a deterministic event that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is the thing that we have decided we will do. Our chosen intent then motivates and directs our subsequent actions.

Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will". The only issue here is what that choice is expected to be "free" of. Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence". The notion of "undue influence" includes things like a mental illness that distorts our view of reality with hallucinations or delusions, or impairs the ability of the brain to reason, or imposes an irresistible impulse. Undue influence would also include things like hypnosis, or the influence of those exercising some control over us, such as a parent/child, doctor/patient, commander/soldier. It can also include other forms of manipulation that are too subtle or too strong to resist. These are all influences that can be reasonably said to remove our control of our choices.

The operational definition of free will is used when assessing someone's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Note that free will is not "free from causal necessity". It is simply free from coercion and undue influence.

So, there is no contradiction between a choice being causally necessitated by past events, and the most meaningful and relevant of these past events being the person making the choice.

Therefore, determinism and free will are compatible notions.
 
I don't pay attention to the free will discussions. They seem like interminable exercises in talking past each other.

I may be a compatibilist, though I'd have to look it up to know for sure.

I'm a free willy; I experience free will all the time.

The world isn't perfectly deterministic. But what isn't determined may be random, which hardly helps us us defend free will.

But, if you say free will is an illusion, then I'll point out that the illusion is free will. If A equals B then B equals A. What we experience, that we call free will, is what we mean by free will. And, as a practical matter, everybody believes in free will. Nobody says, "Oh, it's okay that you mug me, because, philosophically speaking, you don't have a choice."
 
Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).
OK Wellington. Handle this cannonball of a conundrum. How can that be true for human beings who are only privy to past information for making present decisions?
 
Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).

The only way that determinism and free will become contradictory is by bad definitions. For example, if we define "determinism" as "the absence of free will", or, if we define "free will" as "the absence of determinism", then obviously they would be incompatible. So, let's not do that.

Determinism asserts that every event is the reliable result of prior events. It derives this from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Our choices, for example, are reliably caused by our choosing operation. The choosing operation is a deterministic event that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is the thing that we have decided we will do. Our chosen intent then motivates and directs our subsequent actions.

Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will". The only issue here is what that choice is expected to be "free" of. Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence". The notion of "undue influence" includes things like a mental illness that distorts our view of reality with hallucinations or delusions, or impairs the ability of the brain to reason, or imposes an irresistible impulse. Undue influence would also include things like hypnosis, or the influence of those exercising some control over us, such as a parent/child, doctor/patient, commander/soldier. It can also include other forms of manipulation that are too subtle or too strong to resist. These are all influences that can be reasonably said to remove our control of our choices.

The operational definition of free will is used when assessing someone's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Note that free will is not "free from causal necessity". It is simply free from coercion and undue influence.

So, there is no contradiction between a choice being causally necessitated by past events, and the most meaningful and relevant of these past events being the person making the choice.

Therefore, determinism and free will are compatible notions.

Any number of organisms/species have the neural processing power to think and act, yet are not considered to be moral agents. An information processor of sufficient capacity has the ability to make decisions based on given sets of criteria without consciousness or will.

Conscious Will has nothing to do with decision making or motor action.
 
Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).
OK Wellington. Handle this cannonball of a conundrum. How can that be true for human beings who are only privy to past information for making present decisions?

Choosing involves speculation. We have two options and all we know at the outset is the fact that we can choose A or we can choose B. So, we estimate the likely outcome of choosing A. Then we estimate the likely outcome of choosing B. We compare the two estimates and choose the best one.

We only have knowledge of the past, but we have an imagination that can estimate the likely result of each option.
 
Any number of organisms/species have the neural processing power to think and act, yet are not considered to be moral agents. An information processor of sufficient capacity has the ability to make decisions based on given sets of criteria without consciousness or will.

Conscious Will has nothing to do with decision making or motor action.

Morality is species specific. What is good for the lion is bad for the antelope. So, all intelligent species are moral agents within the context of the morality of their own species.

Our species has sophisticated vocal abilities. From a very young age, we have often been asked, "Why did you do that?". This potential need to explain ourselves, both to ourselves and to others, plays a role in significant decisions. For example, if your unconscious brain decided to rob a bank, both your conscious and unconscious brain would go to jail. So, any significant decision making (other than reflexes or habits or learned skills) will usually involve conscious awareness.

Consider the subjects in Libet's experiments. Before they could carry out the experiment, they had to volunteer to participate (of their own free will), then the experimenters had to explain the apparatus to the subject and explain what the subject was expected to do. All of this setup involved conscious participation by the subject. It was only after this conscious preparation that the experiment, to squeeze his fist at random intervals, or to push a button, or some other minimally conscious action, could take place.
 
Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).

The only way that determinism and free will become contradictory is by bad definitions. For example, if we define "determinism" as "the absence of free will", or, if we define "free will" as "the absence of determinism", then obviously they would be incompatible. So, let's not do that.

Determinism asserts that every event is the reliable result of prior events. It derives this from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Our choices, for example, are reliably caused by our choosing operation. The choosing operation is a deterministic event that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is the thing that we have decided we will do. Our chosen intent then motivates and directs our subsequent actions.

Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will". The only issue here is what that choice is expected to be "free" of. Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while "free of coercion and undue influence". The notion of "undue influence" includes things like a mental illness that distorts our view of reality with hallucinations or delusions, or impairs the ability of the brain to reason, or imposes an irresistible impulse. Undue influence would also include things like hypnosis, or the influence of those exercising some control over us, such as a parent/child, doctor/patient, commander/soldier. It can also include other forms of manipulation that are too subtle or too strong to resist. These are all influences that can be reasonably said to remove our control of our choices.

The operational definition of free will is used when assessing someone's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Note that free will is not "free from causal necessity". It is simply free from coercion and undue influence.

So, there is no contradiction between a choice being causally necessitated by past events, and the most meaningful and relevant of these past events being the person making the choice.

Therefore, determinism and free will are compatible notions.
This is along the lines of what I've been trying to express for a few years now. Think I'm going to save this post to refer back to later.

Thank you.
 
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Any number of organisms/species have the neural processing power to think and act, yet are not considered to be moral agents. An information processor of sufficient capacity has the ability to make decisions based on given sets of criteria without consciousness or will.

Conscious Will has nothing to do with decision making or motor action.

Morality is species specific. What is good for the lion is bad for the antelope. So, all intelligent species are moral agents within the context of the morality of their own species.

Our species has sophisticated vocal abilities. From a very young age, we have often been asked, "Why did you do that?". This potential need to explain ourselves, both to ourselves and to others, plays a role in significant decisions. For example, if your unconscious brain decided to rob a bank, both your conscious and unconscious brain would go to jail. So, any significant decision making (other than reflexes or habits or learned skills) will usually involve conscious awareness.

Consider the subjects in Libet's experiments. Before they could carry out the experiment, they had to volunteer to participate (of their own free will), then the experimenters had to explain the apparatus to the subject and explain what the subject was expected to do. All of this setup involved conscious participation by the subject. It was only after this conscious preparation that the experiment, to squeeze his fist at random intervals, or to push a button, or some other minimally conscious action, could take place.

Morality is a human concept formulated and enabled by a brain of sufficient information processing ability.

Which is not a matter of Will, be it conscious or unconscious. To call decision making "will" is a fallacy. Decisions are made by neural networks, not Will.

Will, not being the actual agent of decision making - which is the function of neural networks - is not free to make decisions. It is not Will that makes decisions.
 
Morality is a human concept formulated and enabled by a brain of sufficient information processing ability.

Which is not a matter of Will, be it conscious or unconscious. To call decision making "will" is a fallacy. Decisions are made by neural networks, not Will.

Will, not being the actual agent of decision making - which is the function of neural networks - is not free to make decisions. It is not Will that makes decisions.

Whenever we decide what we will do, our decision causally determines our will. Will I have the banana? Or, will I have the apple? I think I will have the banana. Having set our intent upon having the banana, that intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: I peel the banana, I eat the banana, I throw away the peel. That intent was set by my choice. So, you're right, it is not Will that makes decisions. It is Decisions that make will.

We cannot directly observe neural networks making decisions. We can watch the flow of blood throughout different areas of the brain during choosing by using a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). But we cannot physically see the thoughts that the brain is having. The only way to see the thoughts is through the patient's narration of what he is thinking. So, for now, we need to rely upon that report of the experience.

From that report, or from our own experience of thinking over a problem, we have a model of what the neural network is doing. And, it is making decisions. And those decisions are causally determining what we will do.
 
Morality is a human concept formulated and enabled by a brain of sufficient information processing ability.

Which is not a matter of Will, be it conscious or unconscious. To call decision making "will" is a fallacy. Decisions are made by neural networks, not Will.

Will, not being the actual agent of decision making - which is the function of neural networks - is not free to make decisions. It is not Will that makes decisions.

Whenever we decide what we will do, our decision causally determines our will. Will I have the banana? Or, will I have the apple? I think I will have the banana. Having set our intent upon having the banana, that intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: I peel the banana, I eat the banana, I throw away the peel. That intent was set by my choice. So, you're right, it is not Will that makes decisions. It is Decisions that make will.

We cannot directly observe neural networks making decisions. We can watch the flow of blood throughout different areas of the brain during choosing by using a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). But we cannot physically see the thoughts that the brain is having. The only way to see the thoughts is through the patient's narration of what he is thinking. So, for now, we need to rely upon that report of the experience.

From that report, or from our own experience of thinking over a problem, we have a model of what the neural network is doing. And, it is making decisions. And those decisions are causally determining what we will do.


According to research, decision making and response is the result of information input acting upon the brain, which processes that information and represents some of that processing activity in conscious form.

Our ability to think and reason being determined by the non-chosen condition of brain architecture.

The condition of the brain determining its output in terms of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours.

A person may be intelligent, yet lack empathy. Not through choice, but simply how their brain is wired.

A person may be intelligent, able to understand morality, understand right from wrong, yet behave in destructive ways because that is how their brain is wired;


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''
 
Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).
OK Wellington. Handle this cannonball of a conundrum. How can that be true for human beings who are only privy to past information for making present decisions?

Choosing involves speculation. We have two options and all we know at the outset is the fact that we can choose A or we can choose B. So, we estimate the likely outcome of choosing A. Then we estimate the likely outcome of choosing B. We compare the two estimates and choose the best one.

We only have knowledge of the past, but we have an imagination that can estimate the likely result of each option.

your argument doesn't get past the problem that what is processed by one has already been determined. Using your approach any speculation in any environment would be an example of free choice which it is obviously can not be because every environment is already determined in to which you speculate. No compatibility possible.

DBT's indentification of the development of a nervous system being determined makes obvious the being is determined if you want to quibble. The being is determined. The outcomes from the determined being in a determined environment already in place are also determined and accelerant to the being's demise.

In the human the state of Schrodinger's cat is also already known. That is obvious because what one is processing, experiencing, is already fixed and determined. You may make an erroneous judgement but your judgement will fall in to a known fixed world which forms the basis for your future experience and so forth.

In short you are too late to the game for your judgement to have possible determinate value. I believe that is a requirement for a choice to be freely made.

Another way to look at human behavior is to consider it as irrelevant noise. In fact My view is that what humans do actually increases the rate at which humans cease to exist. You're late, you're wrong most of the time, so eventually your actions will determine your death. I'm not prepared to call that free will.
 
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Morality is a human concept formulated and enabled by a brain of sufficient information processing ability.

Which is not a matter of Will, be it conscious or unconscious. To call decision making "will" is a fallacy. Decisions are made by neural networks, not Will.

Will, not being the actual agent of decision making - which is the function of neural networks - is not free to make decisions. It is not Will that makes decisions.

Whenever we decide what we will do, our decision causally determines our will. Will I have the banana? Or, will I have the apple? I think I will have the banana. Having set our intent upon having the banana, that intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions: I peel the banana, I eat the banana, I throw away the peel. That intent was set by my choice. So, you're right, it is not Will that makes decisions. It is Decisions that make will.

We cannot directly observe neural networks making decisions. We can watch the flow of blood throughout different areas of the brain during choosing by using a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). But we cannot physically see the thoughts that the brain is having. The only way to see the thoughts is through the patient's narration of what he is thinking. So, for now, we need to rely upon that report of the experience.

From that report, or from our own experience of thinking over a problem, we have a model of what the neural network is doing. And, it is making decisions. And those decisions are causally determining what we will do.


According to research, decision making and response is the result of information input acting upon the brain, which processes that information and represents some of that processing activity in conscious form.

Our ability to think and reason being determined by the non-chosen condition of brain architecture.

The condition of the brain determining its output in terms of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours.

A person may be intelligent, yet lack empathy. Not through choice, but simply how their brain is wired.

A person may be intelligent, able to understand morality, understand right from wrong, yet behave in destructive ways because that is how their brain is wired;


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''

Right. In criminal cases where mental illness is, in effect, controlling the behavior, it is the illness that is held responsible, and it is the illness that is subject to correction, through medical or psychiatric treatment. If the offender's behavior can be sufficiently corrected by treatment to prevent any serious harm to themselves or others, then they can return to normal life. But if it cannot be reasonably assured that they will not continue to harm others, then they need to be secured in a mental facility.

Significant mental illness, sufficient to remove a person's normal ability to control their behavior, is an undue influence. And those bad choices would be considered NOT of their own free will.

The point of the notion of free will is to make such distinctions.

No one gets to choose their original neural architecture. Free will never implies "freedom from oneself". It only implies freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. A mental illness that plays a significant role in causing bad behavior would be an undue influence.
 
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Choosing involves speculation. We have two options and all we know at the outset is the fact that we can choose A or we can choose B. So, we estimate the likely outcome of choosing A. Then we estimate the likely outcome of choosing B. We compare the two estimates and choose the best one.

We only have knowledge of the past, but we have an imagination that can estimate the likely result of each option.

your argument doesn't get past the problem that what is processed by one has already been determined. Using your approach any speculation in any environment would be an example of free choice which it is obviously can not be because every environment is already determined in to which you speculate. No compatibility possible.

DBT's indentification of the development of a nervous system being determined makes obvious the being is determined if you want to quibble. The being is determined. The outcomes from the determined being in a determined environment already in place are also determined and accelerant to the being's demise.

In the human the state of Schrodinger's cat is also already known. That is obvious because what one is processing, experiencing, is already fixed and determined. You may make an erroneous judgement but your judgement will fall in to a known fixed world which forms the basis for your future experience and so forth.

In short you are too late to the game for your judgement to have possible determinate value. I believe that is a requirement for a choice to be freely made.

Another way to look at human behavior is to consider it as irrelevant noise. In fact My view is that what humans do actually increases the rate at which humans cease to exist. You're late, you're wrong most of the time, so eventually your actions will determine your death. I'm not prepared to call that free will.

Ah! When you say that "your argument doesn't get past the problem that what is processed by one has already been determined", you're making the predetermination argument. You're suggesting that everything has already been determined before you even get there, leaving you with nothing to do. But that's not really the case. Our prior causes cannot leapfrog or bypass us and bring about our actions without our knowledge and consent. No event is fully caused until all of its prior causes have played themselves out. And the final responsible cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

Another expression of this argument is that we are not the "real" causes of our choices, because we have prior causes, and therefore those prior causes are the "real" causes. The problem with this argument is that all of our prior causes also have prior causes. So, if we are not real causes, then neither are they! The responsibility would shift off of us and all the way back to some imaginary "original" cause. But there is nothing we can do about that cause. So, this argument is fruitless.

What we care about is the meaningful and relevant causes of events. A cause is meaningful if it efficiently explains why something happened. A cause is relevant if we can actually do something about it. So, in matters of behavior, the meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it. And we would want to address that in the person who actually performed the deliberation.

If we presume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect (and I do) then every event, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our head right now, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Basically, one thing reliably leads to another, through normal everyday cause and effect, from any prior point to now. Every event has a history of causation going back as far as anyone cares to imagine.

So what? This logical fact is neither a meaningful nor a relevant fact to any practical human issue. It's just a background constant that is always true of every event. It cannot help us to make any meaningful decisions, because it offers only one piece of information, "Que sera, sera, Whatever will be, will be". If we ask it, "Should I choose A or should I choose B?" Causal necessity responds, "I don't know, but I can tell you that, whatever you choose will have been causally necessary from any prior point in history". Thanks a lot. The logical fact of universal causal necessity/inevitability is useless. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.

I'm a bit concerned about your statements, "Another way to look at human behavior is to consider it as irrelevant noise. In fact My view is that what humans do actually increases the rate at which humans cease to exist. You're late, you're wrong most of the time, so eventually your actions will determine your death." That seems a bit cynical if not downright depressing.
 
Another way to look at human behavior is to consider it as irrelevant noise. In fact My view is that what humans do actually increases the rate at which humans cease to exist. You're late, you're wrong most of the time, so eventually your actions will determine your death. I'm not prepared to call that free will.

I think the question we need to be looking at is whether the term free will has any relevance at all. If determinism implies a lack of free will, then we're not looking to prove free will. What is actually relevant are the properties of living things and trying to define those properties. Do people feel free? Why not explore that instead of endlessly focusing on why determinism implies a lack of freedom?

IOW, the conversation on free will is dead if determinism is the long and short of it. But we're still left with the question of why we have billions of people who would very much describe themselves as free beings.

To me the answer there is essentially that we are that which is determining. Where those who deny free will have some sense that determinism is happening to us.

So yes, determinism is a thing, but why not move beyond that and explore what is there.
 
Another way to look at human behavior is to consider it as irrelevant noise. In fact My view is that what humans do actually increases the rate at which humans cease to exist. You're late, you're wrong most of the time, so eventually your actions will determine your death. I'm not prepared to call that free will.

I think the question we need to be looking at is whether the term free will has any relevance at all. If determinism implies a lack of free will, then we're not looking to prove free will. What is actually relevant are the properties of living things and trying to define those properties. Do people feel free? Why not explore that instead of endlessly focusing on why determinism implies a lack of freedom?

IOW, the conversation on free will is dead if determinism is the long and short of it. But we're still left with the question of why we have billions of people who would very much describe themselves as free beings.

To me the answer there is essentially that we are that which is determining. Where those who deny free will have some sense that determinism is happening to us.

So yes, determinism is a thing, but why not move beyond that and explore what is there.

I agree. The way that I moved beyond determinism was by going through it. It was like a black hole that you had to get through to get to the other side. Universal causal necessity/inevitability is a logical fact, but neither a meaningful nor a relevant fact. The notion of freedom itself logically implies a world of reliable cause and effect. Without reliable causation, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. So, freedom itself is deterministic.

There will certainly be one single inevitable future (after all, we have only one past to put it in), but how we get there is by imagining many possible futures and choosing the one we want. Ironically, within the domain of human influence, we get to choose which future is inevitable.

The determinist errs in viewing causation as a force that controls us against our will. Causation never causes anything, and determinism never determines anything. These two concepts are descriptive, not causative. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can cause events. The notion of causation is what we use to describe the interaction of these objects and forces as they bring about events.

We happen to be one of those objects that goes about in the world causing stuff to happen, and doing so in a way that satisfies needs that are uniquely located within us, and in no other objects in the universe. And we have brains that let us deliberately choose what we will cause to happen next.

We are both the result of reliable cause and effect and the original causes of new effects.
 
According to research, decision making and response is the result of information input acting upon the brain, which processes that information and represents some of that processing activity in conscious form.

Our ability to think and reason being determined by the non-chosen condition of brain architecture.

The condition of the brain determining its output in terms of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours.

A person may be intelligent, yet lack empathy. Not through choice, but simply how their brain is wired.

A person may be intelligent, able to understand morality, understand right from wrong, yet behave in destructive ways because that is how their brain is wired;


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''

Right. In criminal cases where mental illness is, in effect, controlling the behavior, it is the illness that is held responsible, and it is the illness that is subject to correction, through medical or psychiatric treatment. If the offender's behavior can be sufficiently corrected by treatment to prevent any serious harm to themselves or others, then they can return to normal life. But if it cannot be reasonably assured that they will not continue to harm others, then they need to be secured in a mental facility.

Significant mental illness, sufficient to remove a person's normal ability to control their behavior, is an undue influence. And those bad choices would be considered NOT of their own free will.

The point of the notion of free will is to make such distinctions.

No one gets to choose their original neural architecture. Free will never implies "freedom from oneself". It only implies freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. A mental illness that plays a significant role in causing bad behavior would be an undue influence.


It matters not whether its mental illness or the brain is functioning normally, producing rational thought and behaviour: it is the state of the brain/system in any given instance of response that determines its response.

Being of 'sound mind' is no more a choice thn it is to be a Sociopath. The state of the system does not equal free will.

To label rational response, non coerced decisions, etc, as examples of free will does not take the nature of the system into account, it just applies and asserts the label.
 
According to research, decision making and response is the result of information input acting upon the brain, which processes that information and represents some of that processing activity in conscious form.

Our ability to think and reason being determined by the non-chosen condition of brain architecture.

The condition of the brain determining its output in terms of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours.

A person may be intelligent, yet lack empathy. Not through choice, but simply how their brain is wired.

A person may be intelligent, able to understand morality, understand right from wrong, yet behave in destructive ways because that is how their brain is wired;


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

Prefrontal Cortex damage:
'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''

Right. In criminal cases where mental illness is, in effect, controlling the behavior, it is the illness that is held responsible, and it is the illness that is subject to correction, through medical or psychiatric treatment. If the offender's behavior can be sufficiently corrected by treatment to prevent any serious harm to themselves or others, then they can return to normal life. But if it cannot be reasonably assured that they will not continue to harm others, then they need to be secured in a mental facility.

Significant mental illness, sufficient to remove a person's normal ability to control their behavior, is an undue influence. And those bad choices would be considered NOT of their own free will.

The point of the notion of free will is to make such distinctions.

No one gets to choose their original neural architecture. Free will never implies "freedom from oneself". It only implies freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence. A mental illness that plays a significant role in causing bad behavior would be an undue influence.


It matters not whether its mental illness or the brain is functioning normally, producing rational thought and behaviour: it is the state of the brain/system in any given instance of response that determines its response.

Being of 'sound mind' is no more a choice thn it is to be a Sociopath. The state of the system does not equal free will.

To label rational response, non coerced decisions, etc, as examples of free will does not take the nature of the system into account, it just applies and asserts the label.

Yes, it is the brain that is determining the response. When the brain is healthy enough to make decisions, and when the person is not subject to coercion or undue influence, then that is "operational" free will. Free will never requires that the brain be free from itself (that is an impossibility). It only requires that it be free from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

The nature of the brain's system is that it is a collaborative collection of specialized functions that work together to keep the body working, so that the living organism can survive, thrive, and reproduce. One of those functions is to organize sensory data into a model of reality that can be logically manipulated to provide mental capabilities like imagination, evaluation, and choosing.

The ability to imagine alternative ways to accomplish the organism's goals, to estimate the likely outcomes of each option, and to choose the one it calculates will have the best result, gives the species a survival advantage when facing a variety of environmental challenges.

And that's how free will works, by the brain choosing what the body will do next. Will I have an apple? Or, will I have a banana? My brain will figure that out. And what my brain chooses, I have chosen.
 
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