Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

How the brain functions excludes the idea of free will. As pointed out, the brain does not work on the principle of will, architecture, memory/experience and input being its principle elements and drivers.

Saying ''Only the person (and his brain) can be said to have free will'' is simply saying or stating a person has free will. A statement that fails to account for how the brain actually works and how the brain actually produces response.

Compatibilism merely asserts ''the freedom to act is free will.'' Which is done at the expense of ignoring the nature of brain, mind and behaviour.

Why Compatibilism Is Mistaken.
''There are some major difficulties in compatibilism, which I think damage it irreparably.

Take Hobbes’ claim, largely accepted by Hume, that freedom is to act at will while coercion is to be compelled to act by others. This does not give us a sure reason to choose this ‘freedom’.

''Hobbes famously said that man was as free as an unimpeded river. A river that flows down a hill necessarily follows a channel, but it is also at liberty to flow within the channel. The voluntary actions of people are similar. They are free because their actions follow from their will; but the actions are also necessary because they spring from chains of causes and effects which could in principle be traced back to the first mover of the universe, generally called God. So on this view, to be at liberty is merely to not be physically restrained rather than to be uncaused. For Hobbes, to be free is to act as we will, and to be un-free is to be coerced by others.''

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

It is very far from clear that you would automatically choose to be free. Much would depend on the nature of the coercion. If you did not know what your fundamental desires were going to be, you might well decide to hedge your bets and back the field. It might be far better to be coerced by others (perhaps most people are good) than to be free to pursue un-chosen but possibly dubious desires. A free-floating ethically-minded spirit that feared an imminent endowment of psychopathic desires would certainly wish for an alert constabulary and swift incarceration: this spirit would wish to be coerced............''

''It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded.''

Compatibilism is not a middle position. Compatibilism asserts that (1) all our actions are caused events and that (2) the meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate action is the act of deliberation that precedes it. That act of deliberation is a choosing operation. The choosing operation inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is what we have chosen to do. So, we usually choose our specific intent and then carry out that intention (our will) with specific actions, motivated and directed by that intent.

All uses of the terms "free" or "freedom" are only meaningful when they reference, implicitly or explicitly, some meaningful constraint. For example, we can set a bird free from its cage (the meaningful constraint). However, we cannot set the bird free from reliable cause and effect. Without reliable causation, flapping his wings would be literally ineffective. In fact, the bird's freedom to fly away requires reliable causation. The notion of freedom from causation is an oxymoron, a self-contradicting logical impossibility. So, it is about time that we simply discarded that notion.

So, what is the meaningful constraint that the "free" in free will references? It is those things which prevent someone from deciding for themselves what they will do: Coercion and other Undue (extraordinary) influences. Causation does not impair our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. Reliable causation enables us to perform the choosing operation.

The only reason anyone thinks they must be free of causation is that the hard determinist has depicted causation as a boogeyman, an agent that controls their lives and eliminates all of their freedom. This boogeyman sends the theist running to the supernatural and sends the atheist seeking escape through quantum indeterminism.

But reliable causal mechanisms are the very source of all of our freedoms. And we employ the notion of cause and effect to understand how things work and to exercise control over events. We use causation, causation does not use us.

Also, thanks for the lovely quotes. It's always interesting to see how other people have worked out these issues for themselves.

Correct, that is what compatibilism asserts.

An assertion that does not account for the problems, where simply applying and asserting the label ''free will'' does not prove the proposition.

Basically, that ''every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature (causal determinism) does not equate or equal free will.

So asserting 'free will' where it does not necessarily apply is false.

That every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature required neither free will or volition.

The brain as an inseparable part of a causal world works not on the basis of will or free will, but the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Human Will as an aspect of a determined system where all things progress according to the 'way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law,' is not free.

''If brain states are completely determined by earlier physical facts and regular connections, so are mental states. Accordingly, so goes the argument, determinism also applies to mental states. Mental phenomena are, according to this view, determined entirely by facts of the past and, given this past, cannot be any different from what they actually are. This means that it is not up to agents to determine what their mental phenomena are. A person’s will is determined by the past, and not by the agent himself. Therefore, there is no free will and, to the extent that responsibility is based on free will, there is no responsibility either.''

'The case is either that, a), acts are determined through the determination of the will, and then there is no free will, or that, b), the will which underlies acts originates in an arbitrary way, and then there is no free will either, or that, c), if arbitrary will is identified with free will, that kind of free will cannot be a basis for personal responsibility.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

How the brain functions excludes the idea of free will. As pointed out, the brain does not work on the principle of will, architecture, memory/experience and input being its principle elements and drivers.

Saying ''Only the person (and his brain) can be said to have free will'' is simply saying or stating a person has free will. A statement that fails to account for how the brain actually works and how the brain actually produces response.

Compatibilism merely asserts ''the freedom to act is free will.'' Which is done at the expense of ignoring the nature of brain, mind and behaviour.

Why Compatibilism Is Mistaken.
''There are some major difficulties in compatibilism, which I think damage it irreparably.

Take Hobbes’ claim, largely accepted by Hume, that freedom is to act at will while coercion is to be compelled to act by others. This does not give us a sure reason to choose this ‘freedom’.

''Hobbes famously said that man was as free as an unimpeded river. A river that flows down a hill necessarily follows a channel, but it is also at liberty to flow within the channel. The voluntary actions of people are similar. They are free because their actions follow from their will; but the actions are also necessary because they spring from chains of causes and effects which could in principle be traced back to the first mover of the universe, generally called God. So on this view, to be at liberty is merely to not be physically restrained rather than to be uncaused. For Hobbes, to be free is to act as we will, and to be un-free is to be coerced by others.''

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

It is very far from clear that you would automatically choose to be free. Much would depend on the nature of the coercion. If you did not know what your fundamental desires were going to be, you might well decide to hedge your bets and back the field. It might be far better to be coerced by others (perhaps most people are good) than to be free to pursue un-chosen but possibly dubious desires. A free-floating ethically-minded spirit that feared an imminent endowment of psychopathic desires would certainly wish for an alert constabulary and swift incarceration: this spirit would wish to be coerced............''

''It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded.''

Compatibilism is not a middle position. Compatibilism asserts that (1) all our actions are caused events and that (2) the meaningful and relevant cause of a deliberate action is the act of deliberation that precedes it. That act of deliberation is a choosing operation. The choosing operation inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is what we have chosen to do. So, we usually choose our specific intent and then carry out that intention (our will) with specific actions, motivated and directed by that intent.

All uses of the terms "free" or "freedom" are only meaningful when they reference, implicitly or explicitly, some meaningful constraint. For example, we can set a bird free from its cage (the meaningful constraint). However, we cannot set the bird free from reliable cause and effect. Without reliable causation, flapping his wings would be literally ineffective. In fact, the bird's freedom to fly away requires reliable causation. The notion of freedom from causation is an oxymoron, a self-contradicting logical impossibility. So, it is about time that we simply discarded that notion.

So, what is the meaningful constraint that the "free" in free will references? It is those things which prevent someone from deciding for themselves what they will do: Coercion and other Undue (extraordinary) influences. Causation does not impair our ability to choose for ourselves what we will do. Reliable causation enables us to perform the choosing operation.

The only reason anyone thinks they must be free of causation is that the hard determinist has depicted causation as a boogeyman, an agent that controls their lives and eliminates all of their freedom. This boogeyman sends the theist running to the supernatural and sends the atheist seeking escape through quantum indeterminism.

But reliable causal mechanisms are the very source of all of our freedoms. And we employ the notion of cause and effect to understand how things work and to exercise control over events. We use causation, causation does not use us.

Also, thanks for the lovely quotes. It's always interesting to see how other people have worked out these issues for themselves.

Correct, that is what compatibilism asserts.

An assertion that does not account for the problems, where simply applying and asserting the label ''free will'' does not prove the proposition.

Basically, that ''every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature (causal determinism) does not equate or equal free will.

So asserting 'free will' where it does not necessarily apply is false.

That every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature required neither free will or volition.

The brain as an inseparable part of a causal world works not on the basis of will or free will, but the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Human Will as an aspect of a determined system where all things progress according to the 'way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law,' is not free.

''If brain states are completely determined by earlier physical facts and regular connections, so are mental states. Accordingly, so goes the argument, determinism also applies to mental states. Mental phenomena are, according to this view, determined entirely by facts of the past and, given this past, cannot be any different from what they actually are. This means that it is not up to agents to determine what their mental phenomena are. A person’s will is determined by the past, and not by the agent himself. Therefore, there is no free will and, to the extent that responsibility is based on free will, there is no responsibility either.''

'The case is either that, a), acts are determined through the determination of the will, and then there is no free will, or that, b), the will which underlies acts originates in an arbitrary way, and then there is no free will either, or that, c), if arbitrary will is identified with free will, that kind of free will cannot be a basis for personal responsibility.''

There is no "equating" of determinism and free will. They are about two entirely different subjects.

The opposite of determinism (the effect of a given cause is reliable and theoretically predictable) is indeterminism (the effect of a given cause is unreliable and thus unpredictable). Free will is not the opposite of determinism.

The opposite of free will (a freely chosen "I will") is a coerced or unduly influenced choice. Determinism is not the opposite of free will.

All events occur within the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability. Within this context we will find the context of human behavior, and the physical, biological, and rational causal mechanisms. All three of which we will assume, for the sake of determinism, are perfectly reliable within their own domain, such that we may further assume that every event is always the reliable result of some specific combination of physical, biological, and/or rational causes.

Within the context of the rational causal mechanism, the mechanism that operates by modeling reality, imagining possibilities, estimating the outcomes of different options, and choosing what the organism will do next, we find all human concepts. These include the concepts of possibilities and freedom and causation.

When we say that the rational causal mechanism is reliable, we do not mean free from error. The mechanism runs upon a physical infrastructure, and errors can be introduce through physical forces (for example, someone hits us on the head with a baseball bat). Errors can also occur due to biological causes, such as failures in neurological functions. And, errors can be introduced by incorrect thinking. However, the rational causal mechanism is still reliable causation in that all errors will be reliably caused. If we are in the habit of making a logical error or the information we're using is incomplete (always the case) or false, then those errors in our conclusions will be reliably caused.

So, all of the events that ever happen are reliably caused, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads. And all events are "deterministic", including the events involved in deciding what we will do.

Because of this, we can conclude that choosing is a deterministic operation, and choosing for ourselves what we will do (free will) is deterministic.

So, free will is a deterministic event. And, a coerced choice, the opposite of free will, is also a deterministic event. But then, every event, without distinction, is equally deterministic and necessarily will happen.

And that's the problem. Universal causal necessity makes no distinctions at all between any two events. But we need to make meaningful and relevant distinctions in order to survive. So, while universal causal necessity is a logical fact, it is not a meaningful or relevant fact. There are no practical human scenarios where it is appropriate to bring up the fact of universal causal necessity. All of the utility of the notion of reliable cause and effect comes from knowing the specific causes of specific effects. For example, knowing that a virus causes covid-19 and knowing that our immune system can be primed to fight that virus by vaccination, gives us control over the illness caused by the virus.

The notion of free will makes a meaningful distinction. It distinguishes deliberate actions from accidental actions, or coerced actions, or insane actions, allowing us to apply the most appropriate corrective measures when those actions have bad results.

All of these actions and events are causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. But that is not a meaningful or relevant fact. The intelligent mind simply acknowledges it and then ignores it.

 

[DBT]

Correct, that is what compatibilism asserts.

An assertion that does not account for the problems, where simply applying and asserting the label ''free will'' does not prove the proposition.

Basically, that ''every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature (causal determinism) does not equate or equal free will.

So asserting 'free will' where it does not necessarily apply is false.

That every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature required neither free will or volition.

The brain as an inseparable part of a causal world works not on the basis of will or free will, but the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Human Will as an aspect of a determined system where all things progress according to the 'way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law,' is not free.

''If brain states are completely determined by earlier physical facts and regular connections, so are mental states. Accordingly, so goes the argument, determinism also applies to mental states. Mental phenomena are, according to this view, determined entirely by facts of the past and, given this past, cannot be any different from what they actually are. This means that it is not up to agents to determine what their mental phenomena are. A person’s will is determined by the past, and not by the agent himself. Therefore, there is no free will and, to the extent that responsibility is based on free will, there is no responsibility either.''

'The case is either that, a), acts are determined through the determination of the will, and then there is no free will, or that, b), the will which underlies acts originates in an arbitrary way, and then there is no free will either, or that, c), if arbitrary will is identified with free will, that kind of free will cannot be a basis for personal responsibility.''

There is no "equating" of determinism and free will. They are about two entirely different subjects.

Given the Compatibilist claim that free will is compatible with determinism, the two clearly are related.

According to Compatibilists, will has freedom, commonly called ''free will.''

This is asserted despite the brain being no different to the motions and activities of rivers, clouds, waterfalls, rain, planets in orbit, galaxies that spin, etc, etc, including the universe at large in terms of determinism....its architecture and activity unfolding according to the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Yet the human brain is deemed by the Compatibilist to be an exception to the rule ; that the human brain has free will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Correct, that is what compatibilism asserts.

An assertion that does not account for the problems, where simply applying and asserting the label ''free will'' does not prove the proposition.

Basically, that ''every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature (causal determinism) does not equate or equal free will.

So asserting 'free will' where it does not necessarily apply is false.

That every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature required neither free will or volition.

The brain as an inseparable part of a causal world works not on the basis of will or free will, but the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Human Will as an aspect of a determined system where all things progress according to the 'way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law,' is not free.

''If brain states are completely determined by earlier physical facts and regular connections, so are mental states. Accordingly, so goes the argument, determinism also applies to mental states. Mental phenomena are, according to this view, determined entirely by facts of the past and, given this past, cannot be any different from what they actually are. This means that it is not up to agents to determine what their mental phenomena are. A person’s will is determined by the past, and not by the agent himself. Therefore, there is no free will and, to the extent that responsibility is based on free will, there is no responsibility either.''

'The case is either that, a), acts are determined through the determination of the will, and then there is no free will, or that, b), the will which underlies acts originates in an arbitrary way, and then there is no free will either, or that, c), if arbitrary will is identified with free will, that kind of free will cannot be a basis for personal responsibility.''

There is no "equating" of determinism and free will. They are about two entirely different subjects.

Given the Compatibilist claim that free will is compatible with determinism, the two clearly are related.

According to Compatibilists, will has freedom, commonly called ''free will.''

This is asserted despite the brain being no different to the motions and activities of rivers, clouds, waterfalls, rain, planets in orbit, galaxies that spin, etc, etc, including the universe at large in terms of determinism....its architecture and activity unfolding according to the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Yet the human brain is deemed by the Compatibilist to be an exception to the rule ; that the human brain has free will.

No exceptions. The brain functions deterministically. But it behaves differently than a river, just like a car behaves differently than a microwave oven. Matter behaves differently according to how it is organized (that "architecture" you mentioned).

For example:
1. Inanimate objects behave "passively" in response to physical forces. Place a bowling ball on a slope and it will always roll down hill, its behavior governed by the force of gravity.
2. Living organisms behave "purposefully" in that they are biologically driven to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a squirrel on that same slope and he may go uphill, down, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. While he is still affected by gravity, he is not governed by it. He is governed more by his biological need for food and a mate.
3. Intelligent species can behave "deliberately", by reason and calculation. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, they are not governed by them. They can decide when, where, and what they will eat. They can imagine alternative ways to satisfy their needs. And they can choose how they will go about satisfying them. This is where free will shows up in the universe.

So, there are three different causal mechanisms, physical, biological, and rational. Each made possible by a different architecture, like different machines constructed to perform according to different rules for different purposes.

Free will is not some mystical quality of the will. Free will is a deterministic empirical event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive or undue. Only specific causes, such as a guy holding a gun to our head, are coercive. Reliable causation itself is quite ordinary, and is always expected to be the case.

There are some freedoms that are impossible, like "freedom from causation" or "freedom from oneself" or "freedom from reality". Because they are impossible, it would be an error to suggest that any use of the terms "free" or "freedom" imply anyone of them. Because they cannot, they do not.

So, what can the "free" in "free will" mean? It means our choice was free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. That is all that is required when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It makes no claims to being uncaused. It requires nothing supernatural. It simply works.

 

[DBT]

Given the Compatibilist claim that free will is compatible with determinism, the two clearly are related.

According to Compatibilists, will has freedom, commonly called ''free will.''

This is asserted despite the brain being no different to the motions and activities of rivers, clouds, waterfalls, rain, planets in orbit, galaxies that spin, etc, etc, including the universe at large in terms of determinism....its architecture and activity unfolding according to the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Yet the human brain is deemed by the Compatibilist to be an exception to the rule ; that the human brain has free will.

No exceptions. The brain functions deterministically. But it behaves differently than a river, just like a car behaves differently than a microwave oven. Matter behaves differently according to how it is organized (that "architecture" you mentioned).

For example:
1. Inanimate objects behave "passively" in response to physical forces. Place a bowling ball on a slope and it will always roll down hill, its behavior governed by the force of gravity.
2. Living organisms behave "purposefully" in that they are biologically driven to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a squirrel on that same slope and he may go uphill, down, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. While he is still affected by gravity, he is not governed by it. He is governed more by his biological need for food and a mate.
3. Intelligent species can behave "deliberately", by reason and calculation. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, they are not governed by them. They can decide when, where, and what they will eat. They can imagine alternative ways to satisfy their needs. And they can choose how they will go about satisfying them. This is where free will shows up in the universe.

So, there are three different causal mechanisms, physical, biological, and rational. Each made possible by a different architecture, like different machines constructed to perform according to different rules for different purposes.

Free will is not some mystical quality of the will. Free will is a deterministic empirical event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive or undue. Only specific causes, such as a guy holding a gun to our head, are coercive. Reliable causation itself is quite ordinary, and is always expected to be the case.

There are some freedoms that are impossible, like "freedom from causation" or "freedom from oneself" or "freedom from reality". Because they are impossible, it would be an error to suggest that any use of the terms "free" or "freedom" imply anyone of them. Because they cannot, they do not.

So, what can the "free" in "free will" mean? It means our choice was free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. That is all that is required when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It makes no claims to being uncaused. It requires nothing supernatural. It simply works.

That a brain behaves differently to a river doesn't make its complex mechanisms and activity any less determined than a river, waterfall, planetary orbits, etc. All actions, however complex, are equally fixed as a matter of time t conditions and progression of event as a matter of natural law within a determined World.

Complexity does not free the brain from determinism. However complex the system, all events within a determined world unfold according to the conditions at time t and the way things go thereafter, fixed as a matter of natural law.''

There are no loopholes. We can't have it both ways.

We can't be in a determined world, yet have regulative control. Our actions cannot be determined, yet have the ability to have done otherwise.

Our will, being determined, doing precisely what is determined by the system (however complex) cannot be said to be free to do otherwise. Without the option to do otherwise....what is freedom? Asserting freedom does not establish it.

Within a determined world, our freedom is no more than that of anything else. Our determined actions, like falling rain, clouds scudding through the sky unimpeded, are performed freely. Which does not equate to free will. If we are claimed to have free will, then - we being inseparable from the universe/matter/energy - so has the universe and everything in it.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Given the Compatibilist claim that free will is compatible with determinism, the two clearly are related.

According to Compatibilists, will has freedom, commonly called ''free will.''

This is asserted despite the brain being no different to the motions and activities of rivers, clouds, waterfalls, rain, planets in orbit, galaxies that spin, etc, etc, including the universe at large in terms of determinism....its architecture and activity unfolding according to the ''way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

Yet the human brain is deemed by the Compatibilist to be an exception to the rule ; that the human brain has free will.

No exceptions. The brain functions deterministically. But it behaves differently than a river, just like a car behaves differently than a microwave oven. Matter behaves differently according to how it is organized (that "architecture" you mentioned).

For example:
1. Inanimate objects behave "passively" in response to physical forces. Place a bowling ball on a slope and it will always roll down hill, its behavior governed by the force of gravity.
2. Living organisms behave "purposefully" in that they are biologically driven to survive, thrive and reproduce. Place a squirrel on that same slope and he may go uphill, down, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. While he is still affected by gravity, he is not governed by it. He is governed more by his biological need for food and a mate.
3. Intelligent species can behave "deliberately", by reason and calculation. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, they are not governed by them. They can decide when, where, and what they will eat. They can imagine alternative ways to satisfy their needs. And they can choose how they will go about satisfying them. This is where free will shows up in the universe.

So, there are three different causal mechanisms, physical, biological, and rational. Each made possible by a different architecture, like different machines constructed to perform according to different rules for different purposes.

Free will is not some mystical quality of the will. Free will is a deterministic empirical event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive or undue. Only specific causes, such as a guy holding a gun to our head, are coercive. Reliable causation itself is quite ordinary, and is always expected to be the case.

There are some freedoms that are impossible, like "freedom from causation" or "freedom from oneself" or "freedom from reality". Because they are impossible, it would be an error to suggest that any use of the terms "free" or "freedom" imply anyone of them. Because they cannot, they do not.

So, what can the "free" in "free will" mean? It means our choice was free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. That is all that is required when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It makes no claims to being uncaused. It requires nothing supernatural. It simply works.

That a brain behaves differently to a river doesn't make its complex mechanisms and activity any less determined than a river, waterfall, planetary orbits, etc. All actions, however complex, are equally fixed as a matter of time t conditions and progression of event as a matter of natural law within a determined World.

Complexity does not free the brain from determinism. However complex the system, all events within a determined world unfold according to the conditions at time t and the way things go thereafter, fixed as a matter of natural law.''

There are no loopholes. We can't have it both ways.

We can't be in a determined world, yet have regulative control. Our actions cannot be determined, yet have the ability to have done otherwise.

Our will, being determined, doing precisely what is determined by the system (however complex) cannot be said to be free to do otherwise. Without the option to do otherwise....what is freedom? Asserting freedom does not establish it.

Within a determined world, our freedom is no more than that of anything else. Our determined actions, like falling rain, clouds scudding through the sky unimpeded, are performed freely. Which does not equate to free will. If we are claimed to have free will, then - we being inseparable from the universe/matter/energy - so has the universe and everything in it.

As you say, there are no loopholes. Every event, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. There is not such thing as "freedom from causal necessity".

But there most certainly is "freedom from coercion and undue influence". And that is all that operational free will claims to be free of.

Whether you choose for yourself what you will do (a freely chosen "I will"), or whether someone forces you to do something you don't want (coercion), the event will be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Causal necessity makes no meaningful distinction between any two events. Causal necessity makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity (it's always everywhere).

Complexity does not change anything. But function does. The brain makes choices which affect behavior. The river has no brain, so it makes no choices. Choosing what we will do controls what we do. If I choose to have the banana I will peel and eat the banana and throw away the banana peel. If I choose to eat the apple, I will bite into the apple, and when I'm done I'll throw away the core. If I choose to have MacDonald's I'll drive to the window, place my order, and pay for it, take my Quarter Pounder with Cheese home, and eat it. Choosing what I will do controls what I do.

So, what about the ability to do otherwise? The hard determinist makes a semantic error when he claims "you could not have done otherwise". Whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, it will always be the case that there will be at least two distinct things that we "can" do. For example, there are bananas and apples in the fruit bowl, and I'm feeling hungry. But I can't satisfy that hunger until I choose whether to eat a banana or whether to eat an apple.

"I can choose to eat a banana" is true, because there are bananas in the bowl. "I can choose to eat an apple" is true because there are apples as well. But I don't want to eat both, because dinner is only a couple hours later. At the beginning of any choosing operation there will be at least two "I can's", two real possibilities. After I make my choice I will still have two items. One is the thing that "I will" do. The other is the thing that "I could have done, but didn't do".

So, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, I will always end up with exactly one thing that I will do, and at least one other thing that I could have done.

At the end of a choosing operation, "I could have done otherwise" will always be a true statement, because the "could have" is simply the past tense of one of the "I can's". It is only "I would have done otherwise" that will always be false due to causal necessity.

People generally object to the notion that "I could have done otherwise" is false, because they saw the two "I can's" right before their eyes at the beginning of the choosing operation. At least one of them will become an "I could have" at the end.

But, how would they react to the statement that "I would have done otherwise" is false? Well, if they had good reasons for their choice, then why "would" they have chosen differently? This makes sense. It creates no cognitive dissonance, because it conforms to the facts of what actually happened.

What we "can" do is very different from what we "will" do. The error happens when we conflate the two notions, destroying the distinction. Something that "will" happen will simply happen. Something that "can" happen may happen, but then again it may never happen.

Here's another example. You're driving down the road with your determinist friend. You notice a traffic light up ahead. Currently the light is red. Will the light remain red so that you will have to stop when you get there? Or, will the light turn green as you arrive, so that you can continue down the highway? You don't know the single thing that "will" happen. But you can imagine two different things that "can" happen. The light "could" remain red and the light "could" change to green as you arrive. Both are real possibilities.

So, in case the light remains red, you slow down. But, as it turns out, the light switches to green, so you pick up speed again and continue down the highway. Your determinist friend asks, "Why did you slow down back there?" You answer, "The light could have remained red". Your friend retorts, "No, the light never could have remained red. It was always causally necessary that it would turn green. Remaining red was an impossibility. ... So, why did you slow down?"

You answer, "But it COULD have remained red!" Because it was one of the two things that could have happened. It "would" not happen, but it "could" have happened.

 

[DBT]

That a brain behaves differently to a river doesn't make its complex mechanisms and activity any less determined than a river, waterfall, planetary orbits, etc. All actions, however complex, are equally fixed as a matter of time t conditions and progression of event as a matter of natural law within a determined World.

Complexity does not free the brain from determinism. However complex the system, all events within a determined world unfold according to the conditions at time t and the way things go thereafter, fixed as a matter of natural law.''

There are no loopholes. We can't have it both ways.

We can't be in a determined world, yet have regulative control. Our actions cannot be determined, yet have the ability to have done otherwise.

Our will, being determined, doing precisely what is determined by the system (however complex) cannot be said to be free to do otherwise. Without the option to do otherwise....what is freedom? Asserting freedom does not establish it.

Within a determined world, our freedom is no more than that of anything else. Our determined actions, like falling rain, clouds scudding through the sky unimpeded, are performed freely. Which does not equate to free will. If we are claimed to have free will, then - we being inseparable from the universe/matter/energy - so has the universe and everything in it.

As you say, there are no loopholes. Every event, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. There is not such thing as "freedom from causal necessity".

But there most certainly is "freedom from coercion and undue influence". And that is all that operational free will claims to be free of.

Whether you choose for yourself what you will do (a freely chosen "I will"), or whether someone forces you to do something you don't want (coercion), the event will be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Causal necessity makes no meaningful distinction between any two events. Causal necessity makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity (it's always everywhere).

Complexity does not change anything. But function does. The brain makes choices which affect behavior. The river has no brain, so it makes no choices. Choosing what we will do controls what we do. If I choose to have the banana I will peel and eat the banana and throw away the banana peel. If I choose to eat the apple, I will bite into the apple, and when I'm done I'll throw away the core. If I choose to have MacDonald's I'll drive to the window, place my order, and pay for it, take my Quarter Pounder with Cheese home, and eat it. Choosing what I will do controls what I do.

So, what about the ability to do otherwise? The hard determinist makes a semantic error when he claims "you could not have done otherwise". Whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, it will always be the case that there will be at least two distinct things that we "can" do. For example, there are bananas and apples in the fruit bowl, and I'm feeling hungry. But I can't satisfy that hunger until I choose whether to eat a banana or whether to eat an apple.

"I can choose to eat a banana" is true, because there are bananas in the bowl. "I can choose to eat an apple" is true because there are apples as well. But I don't want to eat both, because dinner is only a couple hours later. At the beginning of any choosing operation there will be at least two "I can's", two real possibilities. After I make my choice I will still have two items. One is the thing that "I will" do. The other is the thing that "I could have done, but didn't do".

So, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, I will always end up with exactly one thing that I will do, and at least one other thing that I could have done.

At the end of a choosing operation, "I could have done otherwise" will always be a true statement, because the "could have" is simply the past tense of one of the "I can's". It is only "I would have done otherwise" that will always be false due to causal necessity.

People generally object to the notion that "I could have done otherwise" is false, because they saw the two "I can's" right before their eyes at the beginning of the choosing operation. At least one of them will become an "I could have" at the end.

But, how would they react to the statement that "I would have done otherwise" is false? Well, if they had good reasons for their choice, then why "would" they have chosen differently? This makes sense. It creates no cognitive dissonance, because it conforms to the facts of what actually happened.

What we "can" do is very different from what we "will" do. The error happens when we conflate the two notions, destroying the distinction. Something that "will" happen will simply happen. Something that "can" happen may happen, but then again it may never happen.

Here's another example. You're driving down the road with your determinist friend. You notice a traffic light up ahead. Currently the light is red. Will the light remain red so that you will have to stop when you get there? Or, will the light turn green as you arrive, so that you can continue down the highway? You don't know the single thing that "will" happen. But you can imagine two different things that "can" happen. The light "could" remain red and the light "could" change to green as you arrive. Both are real possibilities.

So, in case the light remains red, you slow down. But, as it turns out, the light switches to green, so you pick up speed again and continue down the highway. Your determinist friend asks, "Why did you slow down back there?" You answer, "The light could have remained red". Your friend retorts, "No, the light never could have remained red. It was always causally necessary that it would turn green. Remaining red was an impossibility. ... So, why did you slow down?"

You answer, "But it COULD have remained red!" Because it was one of the two things that could have happened. It "would" not happen, but it "could" have happened.

There is "freedom from coercion and undue influence" in a relative, but not in the absolute sense. The brain as an information processor responds according to architecture, memory and input regardless the presence or absence of external pressure. Pressure or constraint - a gun at your head - is just another input: options presented, cost to benefit weighed - its better to lose money than lose your life....here, take my wallet, I don't want any trouble.

Decision making is not free will. The state of the system, options presented, information in, response output.....

 

[Marvin Edwards]

That a brain behaves differently to a river doesn't make its complex mechanisms and activity any less determined than a river, waterfall, planetary orbits, etc. All actions, however complex, are equally fixed as a matter of time t conditions and progression of event as a matter of natural law within a determined World.

Complexity does not free the brain from determinism. However complex the system, all events within a determined world unfold according to the conditions at time t and the way things go thereafter, fixed as a matter of natural law.''

There are no loopholes. We can't have it both ways.

We can't be in a determined world, yet have regulative control. Our actions cannot be determined, yet have the ability to have done otherwise.

Our will, being determined, doing precisely what is determined by the system (however complex) cannot be said to be free to do otherwise. Without the option to do otherwise....what is freedom? Asserting freedom does not establish it.

Within a determined world, our freedom is no more than that of anything else. Our determined actions, like falling rain, clouds scudding through the sky unimpeded, are performed freely. Which does not equate to free will. If we are claimed to have free will, then - we being inseparable from the universe/matter/energy - so has the universe and everything in it.

As you say, there are no loopholes. Every event, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now, is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. There is not such thing as "freedom from causal necessity".

But there most certainly is "freedom from coercion and undue influence". And that is all that operational free will claims to be free of.

Whether you choose for yourself what you will do (a freely chosen "I will"), or whether someone forces you to do something you don't want (coercion), the event will be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity. Causal necessity makes no meaningful distinction between any two events. Causal necessity makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity (it's always everywhere).

Complexity does not change anything. But function does. The brain makes choices which affect behavior. The river has no brain, so it makes no choices. Choosing what we will do controls what we do. If I choose to have the banana I will peel and eat the banana and throw away the banana peel. If I choose to eat the apple, I will bite into the apple, and when I'm done I'll throw away the core. If I choose to have MacDonald's I'll drive to the window, place my order, and pay for it, take my Quarter Pounder with Cheese home, and eat it. Choosing what I will do controls what I do.

So, what about the ability to do otherwise? The hard determinist makes a semantic error when he claims "you could not have done otherwise". Whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, it will always be the case that there will be at least two distinct things that we "can" do. For example, there are bananas and apples in the fruit bowl, and I'm feeling hungry. But I can't satisfy that hunger until I choose whether to eat a banana or whether to eat an apple.

"I can choose to eat a banana" is true, because there are bananas in the bowl. "I can choose to eat an apple" is true because there are apples as well. But I don't want to eat both, because dinner is only a couple hours later. At the beginning of any choosing operation there will be at least two "I can's", two real possibilities. After I make my choice I will still have two items. One is the thing that "I will" do. The other is the thing that "I could have done, but didn't do".

So, whenever a choosing operation shows up in the causal chain, I will always end up with exactly one thing that I will do, and at least one other thing that I could have done.

At the end of a choosing operation, "I could have done otherwise" will always be a true statement, because the "could have" is simply the past tense of one of the "I can's". It is only "I would have done otherwise" that will always be false due to causal necessity.

People generally object to the notion that "I could have done otherwise" is false, because they saw the two "I can's" right before their eyes at the beginning of the choosing operation. At least one of them will become an "I could have" at the end.

But, how would they react to the statement that "I would have done otherwise" is false? Well, if they had good reasons for their choice, then why "would" they have chosen differently? This makes sense. It creates no cognitive dissonance, because it conforms to the facts of what actually happened.

What we "can" do is very different from what we "will" do. The error happens when we conflate the two notions, destroying the distinction. Something that "will" happen will simply happen. Something that "can" happen may happen, but then again it may never happen.

Here's another example. You're driving down the road with your determinist friend. You notice a traffic light up ahead. Currently the light is red. Will the light remain red so that you will have to stop when you get there? Or, will the light turn green as you arrive, so that you can continue down the highway? You don't know the single thing that "will" happen. But you can imagine two different things that "can" happen. The light "could" remain red and the light "could" change to green as you arrive. Both are real possibilities.

So, in case the light remains red, you slow down. But, as it turns out, the light switches to green, so you pick up speed again and continue down the highway. Your determinist friend asks, "Why did you slow down back there?" You answer, "The light could have remained red". Your friend retorts, "No, the light never could have remained red. It was always causally necessary that it would turn green. Remaining red was an impossibility. ... So, why did you slow down?"

You answer, "But it COULD have remained red!" Because it was one of the two things that could have happened. It "would" not happen, but it "could" have happened.

There is "freedom from coercion and undue influence" in a relative, but not in the absolute sense. The brain as an information processor responds according to architecture, memory and input regardless the presence or absence of external pressure. Pressure or constraint - a gun at your head - is just another input: options presented, cost to benefit weighed - its better to lose money than lose your life....here, take my wallet, I don't want any trouble.

Decision making is not free will. The state of the system, options presented, information in, response output.....

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. This is the definition of free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

ALL events are causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity. Free will is a deterministic event, just like every other event. That is how the paradox is resolved.

The lyrics refer to a Buddhist saying originally formulated by Qingyuan Weixin, later translated by D.T. Suzuki in his Essays in Zen Buddhism, one of the first books to popularize Buddhism in Europe and the US. Qingyuan writes

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]

First there is free will. Then there is not free will. Then there is free will.

 

[Copernicus]

Great thread and defense of compatibilism, Marvin. I'm largely in agreement with the positions you've been taking on this subject, although I have problems with Libet's interpretation of his results. Basically, I think of human beings as automatons that run on autopilot in real time. What gives us the illusion of free will is that we are constantly adjusting and tweaking the autopilot, as our model of reality changes. So the real decision to take an action occurs before the brain actually implements the behavior. That is, there is a time discrepancy between the adjustment of the autopilot and the behavior that it controls. You get the same effect in an automobile that has cruise control, if you keep tweaking the cruise control to slow down or speed up the car. The real decision to slow down or speed up appears to lag more than if you just directly controlled the gas pedal. Hence, you become aware of the speed up or slow down effect after it is actually commanded.

This entire debate over free will vs. determinism strikes me as a bit beside the point. The original issue had to do with how one could justify the existence of a god that had perfect knowledge of all future events but nevertheless judged its creations for choosing to disobey its commands, which it presumably knew in advance would be obeyed or disobeyed. God comes off as the clumsy carpenter who blames the hammer for hitting his thumb instead of the nail. So believers in this platonic ideal of a perfect being tied themselves up in knots trying to figure out how they could absolve God from a charge of idiocy or pure malevolence. Somehow, God had to be able to blame people for the choices they made.

Philosophers then abstracted away from the religious conundrum and tried to figure out how choices could be "free" in a deterministic universe, as if there were some incompatibility that existed when God wasn't an issue. So they end up debating endlessly over how choices can be non-random and non-determined, i.e. some kind of excluded middle option. The debate has always struck me as fueled by sophistry.

Most people seem to think that Scott Adams, creator of the "Dilbert" cartoon, first coined the expression "moist robot" to describe human beings. I think that that is an apt metaphor. We build lots of machines with sophisticated guidance systems that have rudimentary awareness of their surroundings and their own health. A modern airliner is an example of a very complex machine that monitors its own health, communicates it to ground stations and human pilots, and adjusts its behavior to correct potential problems. Of course, human pilots must necessarily be in control, but we keep building ever more autonomous vehicles that operate under uncertain conditions without human intervention. So the goal of robotics really is to build fully conscious machines that need no human intervention to survive. There is no principled reason to believe that we cannot artificially construct machines that are just as sentient as human beings. In fact, that is exactly what female bodies do, although they aren't really aware of how they do it.

 

[DBT]

There is "freedom from coercion and undue influence" in a relative, but not in the absolute sense. The brain as an information processor responds according to architecture, memory and input regardless the presence or absence of external pressure. Pressure or constraint - a gun at your head - is just another input: options presented, cost to benefit weighed - its better to lose money than lose your life....here, take my wallet, I don't want any trouble.

Decision making is not free will. The state of the system, options presented, information in, response output.....

Free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. This is the definition of free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

ALL events are causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in eternity. Free will is a deterministic event, just like every other event. That is how the paradox is resolved.

The lyrics refer to a Buddhist saying originally formulated by Qingyuan Weixin, later translated by D.T. Suzuki in his Essays in Zen Buddhism, one of the first books to popularize Buddhism in Europe and the US. Qingyuan writes

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]

First there is free will. Then there is not free will. Then there is free will.

Deciding for oneself is not done in isolation, within a determined system all decisions are inevitable consequences of events in the world at large. A decision implies a possible alternative, but for any given person in any given instance in time, there is no alternative, the response is fixed as a matter of law.

Without a realizable alternative, no decision was made, only the perception of a decision based on incomplete information.

Free will is an illusion based on an incomplete understanding of the underlying deterministic processes. Compatibilism ignores this and attempts to define free will into existence through semantics.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

Pereboom is arguing against what he calls "basic desert moral responsibility" (SEP - Basic Desert moral responsibility).

Similarly Galen Strawson rejects "ultimate moral responsibility" while accepting everyday moral responsibility (Discussed earlier on this forum)

I think you'll find most compatibilists reject basic desert/ultimate moral responsibility but accept everyday moral responsibility.

 

[WAB]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

Pereboom is arguing against what he calls "basic desert moral responsibility" (SEP - Basic Desert moral responsibility).

Similarly Galen Strawson rejects "ultimate moral responsibility" while accepting everyday moral responsibility (Discussed earlier on this forum)

I think you'll find most compatibilists reject basic desert/ultimate moral responsibility but accept everyday moral responsibility.

Show

/Bugs Bunny's (not God's! [Cliffs Notes' version] ) voice:

M'eeeeeeeeeeeaah...(chewing noises), woodha bin nice if Summ-body remembid to tell me dat Speaky and faaast was BOTE in dat tread, doc. Coodha saved DIS raabit a lot o time crawwwlin don DAT raabit hole! M'eeeeeeaaaah...(more chewing noises...cue Porky Pig...) M'eeeeeeea... - - -

Screeeeech!

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Great thread and defense of compatibilism, Marvin. I'm largely in agreement with the positions you've been taking on this subject, although I have problems with Libet's interpretation of his results. Basically, I think of human beings as automatons that run on autopilot in real time. What gives us the illusion of free will is that we are constantly adjusting and tweaking the autopilot, as our model of reality changes. So the real decision to take an action occurs before the brain actually implements the behavior. That is, there is a time discrepancy between the adjustment of the autopilot and the behavior that it controls. You get the same effect in an automobile that has cruise control, if you keep tweaking the cruise control to slow down or speed up the car. The real decision to slow down or speed up appears to lag more than if you just directly controlled the gas pedal. Hence, you become aware of the speed up or slow down effect after it is actually commanded.

This entire debate over free will vs. determinism strikes me as a bit beside the point. The original issue had to do with how one could justify the existence of a god that had perfect knowledge of all future events but nevertheless judged its creations for choosing to disobey its commands, which it presumably knew in advance would be obeyed or disobeyed. God comes off as the clumsy carpenter who blames the hammer for hitting his thumb instead of the nail. So believers in this platonic ideal of a perfect being tied themselves up in knots trying to figure out how they could absolve God from a charge of idiocy or pure malevolence. Somehow, God had to be able to blame people for the choices they made.

Philosophers then abstracted away from the religious conundrum and tried to figure out how choices could be "free" in a deterministic universe, as if there were some incompatibility that existed when God wasn't an issue. So they end up debating endlessly over how choices can be non-random and non-determined, i.e. some kind of excluded middle option. The debate has always struck me as fueled by sophistry.

Most people seem to think that Scott Adams, creator of the "Dilbert" cartoon, first coined the expression "moist robot" to describe human beings. I think that that is an apt metaphor. We build lots of machines with sophisticated guidance systems that have rudimentary awareness of their surroundings and their own health. A modern airliner is an example of a very complex machine that monitors its own health, communicates it to ground stations and human pilots, and adjusts its behavior to correct potential problems. Of course, human pilots must necessarily be in control, but we keep building ever more autonomous vehicles that operate under uncertain conditions without human intervention. So the goal of robotics really is to build fully conscious machines that need no human intervention to survive. There is no principled reason to believe that we cannot artificially construct machines that are just as sentient as human beings. In fact, that is exactly what female bodies do, although they aren't really aware of how they do it.

Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga also has a problem with Libet's interpretation:

"What difference does it make if brain activity goes on before we are consciously aware of something? Consciousness is its own abstraction on its own time scale and that time scale is current with respect to it. Thus, Libet’s thinking is not correct."
-- Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (p. 141). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

But I like to point out that Libet's subjects were conscious when asked to volunteer to participate in the study (volunteer = choose to do so of their own free will). They were also conscious when the researchers explained to them the apparatus and what they were expected to do with it, usually something simple and mechanical like squeezing their fist or pressing a button when they felt the urge.

Free will does not provide God with a "get-out-of-jail-free" card. If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he is also omni-responsible for everything that happens. After all, he could have created Heaven in the first place and put us all in it. On top of that, we have a Hell of eternal torture which cannot be justified. There is nothing we could do in a finite time on Earth that would justify even having our knuckles rapped for all eternity. Eventually, the accumulated punishment would far outweigh the crime. (There is a comment a little later that looks at the problem of what justice is all about).

We do come with a lot of built-in functionality, the hard-coded firmware of autonomic systems and reflexive behavior. But I don't care for the self-deprecation of calling us moist or meat robots, or automatons, or machines. A robot is a machine we build to help us carry out our will. We do not want to create a robot with a will of its own. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics, to keep their behavior in check.

 

[WAB]

Great thread and defense of compatibilism, Marvin. I'm largely in agreement with the positions you've been taking on this subject, although I have problems with Libet's interpretation of his results. Basically, I think of human beings as automatons that run on autopilot in real time. What gives us the illusion of free will is that we are constantly adjusting and tweaking the autopilot, as our model of reality changes. So the real decision to take an action occurs before the brain actually implements the behavior. That is, there is a time discrepancy between the adjustment of the autopilot and the behavior that it controls. You get the same effect in an automobile that has cruise control, if you keep tweaking the cruise control to slow down or speed up the car. The real decision to slow down or speed up appears to lag more than if you just directly controlled the gas pedal. Hence, you become aware of the speed up or slow down effect after it is actually commanded.

This entire debate over free will vs. determinism strikes me as a bit beside the point. The original issue had to do with how one could justify the existence of a god that had perfect knowledge of all future events but nevertheless judged its creations for choosing to disobey its commands, which it presumably knew in advance would be obeyed or disobeyed. God comes off as the clumsy carpenter who blames the hammer for hitting his thumb instead of the nail. So believers in this platonic ideal of a perfect being tied themselves up in knots trying to figure out how they could absolve God from a charge of idiocy or pure malevolence. Somehow, God had to be able to blame people for the choices they made.

Philosophers then abstracted away from the religious conundrum and tried to figure out how choices could be "free" in a deterministic universe, as if there were some incompatibility that existed when God wasn't an issue. So they end up debating endlessly over how choices can be non-random and non-determined, i.e. some kind of excluded middle option. The debate has always struck me as fueled by sophistry.

Most people seem to think that Scott Adams, creator of the "Dilbert" cartoon, first coined the expression "moist robot" to describe human beings. I think that that is an apt metaphor. We build lots of machines with sophisticated guidance systems that have rudimentary awareness of their surroundings and their own health. A modern airliner is an example of a very complex machine that monitors its own health, communicates it to ground stations and human pilots, and adjusts its behavior to correct potential problems. Of course, human pilots must necessarily be in control, but we keep building ever more autonomous vehicles that operate under uncertain conditions without human intervention. So the goal of robotics really is to build fully conscious machines that need no human intervention to survive. There is no principled reason to believe that we cannot artificially construct machines that are just as sentient as human beings. In fact, that is exactly what female bodies do, although they aren't really aware of how they do it.

Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga also has a problem with Libet's interpretation:

"What difference does it make if brain activity goes on before we are consciously aware of something? Consciousness is its own abstraction on its own time scale and that time scale is current with respect to it. Thus, Libet’s thinking is not correct."
-- Gazzaniga, Michael S.. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain (p. 141). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

But I like to point out that Libet's subjects were conscious when asked to volunteer to participate in the study (volunteer = choose to do so of their own free will). They were also conscious when the researchers explained to them the apparatus and what they were expected to do with it, usually something simple and mechanical like squeezing their fist or pressing a button when they felt the urge.

Free will does not provide God with a "get-out-of-jail-free" card. If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he is also omni-responsible for everything that happens. After all, he could have created Heaven in the first place and put us all in it. On top of that, we have a Hell of eternal torture which cannot be justified. There is nothing we could do in a finite time on Earth that would justify even having our knuckles rapped for all eternity. Eventually, the accumulated punishment would far outweigh the crime. (There is a comment a little later that looks at the problem of what justice is all about).

We do come with a lot of built-in functionality, the hard-coded firmware of autonomic systems and reflexive behavior. But I don't care for the self-deprecation of calling us moist or meat robots, or automatons, or machines. A robot is a machine we build to help us carry out our will. We do not want to create a robot with a will of its own. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics, to keep their behavior in check.

I agree for the most part, with what you have said so far with respect to free will and the compatibilist positions, Martin.

Out of curiosity, are you familiar with this? no doubt you are, as you mentioned on your blog that you've read Spinoza, whose thought *seems to* coincide more with SS than the now predominant model of the BB theory, insofar as I can wrap my noggin around any of it - even despite Bomb#20's simplification of things, for me leastways, I rekkin, upthread:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steady-state_model

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

I'm using a simpler resolution to the problem, the resolution that already exists and is currently practiced by most people who have not been infected with the philosophical paradox.

"Free will" is what we call the empirical event where a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

That's the operational definition of free will, the one that is actually used in practice when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It distinguishes deliberate choices, for one's own interests, from accidents, and from choices imposed upon us by someone (e.g., a guy pointing a gun at us) or something (e.g., a significant mental illness) else. This distinction guides how we go about correcting bad behavior. For example, if it is a deliberate choice by a sane adult to rob a bank to get some cash to spend, then we need to take steps to change how the offender thinks about these things in the future. If it is due to a significant mental illness or brain injury, then we need to apply medical and/or psychiatric treatment. In any case, we may need to secure the offender to protect the public, either in a correctional facility or a secure mental facility.

Determinism, universal causal necessity/inevitability, makes no difference to this process. Both the criminal's behavior and our own behavior in correcting the offender would be causally necessary from any prior point in eternity, just like all other events. Causal necessity/inevitability is basically a background constant found on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.

All four of Pereboom's arguments are based upon the mistaken assumption that determinism implies the absence of free will. It doesn't. Reliable causation is not something that anyone can or needs to be free of. Only certain specific causes compromise our free will. They can be grouped under the general category of "undue" or "extraordinary" influence. But reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue. It is what we all take for granted all the time.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Compatibilism based on ''the Right Stuff'' and the Pereboom rebuttal:

Character-based account: A decision can be said to be “free” if it is caused by, and not out of character for, a particular agent. This is the view traditionally associated with the likes of David Hume. It is probably too simplistic to be useful. Other compatibilist accounts offer more specific conditions.

Second-order desire account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a first-order desire (e.g. I want some chocolate) that is reflexively endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g. I want to want some chocolate). This is the account associated with Harry Frankfurt (and others).

Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).

Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.

As you can see, all of these accounts claim that a certain type of causal sequence has the “right stuff” for free will, irrespective of whether the decisions produced are fully determined by those causal sequences.


To put it more formally, Pereboom adopts the following argument against compatibilism:

(1) If one agent's decision is manipulated by another agent, then that first agent's action is not freely willed.

(2) There is no difference between a manipulation by another agent and causation by a causal factor external to the agent.

(3) On determinism, all of an agent's actions are determined (causally influenced) by at least some factors beyond that agent's control.

(4) Therefore, on determinism, no agent can be said to freely will their actions (or be morally responsible for them). (from 1, 2 and 3)

Pereboom is arguing against what he calls "basic desert moral responsibility" (SEP - Basic Desert moral responsibility).

Similarly Galen Strawson rejects "ultimate moral responsibility" while accepting everyday moral responsibility (Discussed earlier on this forum)

I think you'll find most compatibilists reject basic desert/ultimate moral responsibility but accept everyday moral responsibility.

If we examine this issue of justice a little further, the phrase "just deserts" should expand to what the offender "justly deserves" for his crime. So, what is that?

Well, what is "justice" about? We create a system of justice to protect everyone's rights, the rights that we've agreed to respect and protect for each other, especially by the laws we have created for ourselves through our elected legislatures.

So, the natural goal of a just penalty would include everyone affected. A just penalty would seek to (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) secure the offender to protect others from harm until his behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender and his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I agree for the most part, with what you have said so far with respect to free will and the compatibilist positions, Martin.

Out of curiosity, are you familiar with this? no doubt you are, as you mentioned on your blog that you've read Spinoza, whose thought *seems to* coincide more with SS than the now predominant model of the BB theory, insofar as I can wrap my noggin around any of it - even despite Bomb#20's simplification of things, for me leastways, I rekkin, upthread:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steady-state_model

I'm a fan of the Big Bounce theory. A Big Bang expands a condensed ball of matter into a universe. A Big Crunch collapses the universe again into a condensed ball of matter. Rinse and repeat, eternally.

 

[The AntiChris]

So, the natural goal of a just penalty would include everyone affected. A just penalty would seek to (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) secure the offender to protect others from harm until his behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender and his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).

Agreed.

 

[fromderinside]

Willing and middle earth have a lot in common. Not the least of which is irrelevance. First. Determinism isn't actually causal at all unless you have something that sets time t = 0 before things. As I understand it things are at time t = -1 as well. Will is a human construct searching for relevance because we believe in it so. We are individuals, separate and distinct entities for chissake. We were mindless chickens pecking at stuff until we began surviving. Now we're the height of life doing the work entropy was doing so poorly.

rat, tat, bumfp?

A person's will is their specific intent for the immediate ("I think I will have a banana now") or distant ("last will and testament") future. We usually choose what we will do. The choice is expressed as "I will X", where X is what we have decided to do. Once the will is set, that intention motivates and directs our subsequent actions (going to the fruit bowl, peeling and eating the banana, then disposing of the peel).

I think that's pretty much how our "will" works in empirical reality. The notion of "free will" has to do with the choosing operation itself. It is literally a freely chosen "I will".

What is it supposed to be free of? Cause and effect? No. If it were free of reliable causation we could never carry out our intent.

How about our own genetic dispositions and appetites? No. If it were free from us, then it would be someone else's will, not ours.

The choice only needs to be free of coercion and other forms of undue influence to be truly free will.

Late response to above hypothesis.

I guess if you are going to insist on free will you should wrap it in protective armor against any insinuation that it, as a derivative of physical things, isn't subject to physical constraints. The only problem with that is there is no justifiable rational for insisting mindful be real. To suggest it is responsive to cause and effect when even determined things aren't caused is the height of being disingenuous. Inventions all the way down the rabbit hole.