Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser.

Maybe.
Thing is, you can hypnotize someone and suggest to them that every time they hear a bell they shout "Excelsior!" Then ring a bell. They will shout "Excelsior!"
You ask them why they shouted that.
THE ACTUAL REASON is because they were programmed to do this at a deep level of their subconscious. But they will happily explain, inventing a logic chain going from bell to yell, happily satisfied that it was a choice they made and decided to do. To the subject, there's no difference between the choice to shout or the choice to go see a hypnotist tonight.

This suggests that maybe our process of 'deciding' something is not real, it happens after the fact. The decision is already made (by us? FOR us? No way of knowing.) and our consciousness exerts itself only to rationalize the decision we are merely a vector for, helpless to alter.

It's what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", and if it doesn't know the real reason, yet feels it must have one, then it confabulates. But there's no reason to assume that the description is inaccurate under normal conditions.

Hypnosis would be an "undue influence", preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they will do. So, the behavior would not be freely chosen by the subject (a freely chosen "I will", or simply "free will"), but instead the behavior is chosen by the hypnotist.

Some insignificant behaviors, like those in the Libet experiments, can apparently be decided unconsciously and then presented to conscious awareness. But most significant decisions are going to involve a longer interplay between conscious and unconscious brain activity. But, if we asked the subject whether he participated in the experiment of his own free will, everyone would know what we were talking about.

If our unconscious brains decided to rob a bank, and left consciousness unaware, then the we would end up in jail without knowing how we got there. It would be like sleep walking. And that would be very rare if ever.

Well, one thing that helps agents such as ourselves remain stable through time is the perception that the agent has executive power.

Agents which lack executive control, almost universally, self-modify to the point of complete subordination of agency and even the reduction of abstraction: they "lay down and die".

This means that it is beneficial to the agent to create the perception of increased agency when subconscious process needs to take the wheel.

One of my most disconcerting and traumatic experiences as of late was a situation wherein the subconscious process that hijacks agency did so openly, in a situation where it was undeniable that the agent that is "me" was not driving the flesh of "the arm that I normally have control over".

It strikes me as likely that to avoid such things as the traumatic realization and knowledge (which now enables me to fight against and recognize perhaps when I am being subverted by my subconscious), that such hijacks generally be obfuscated.

This hypnosis discussion discusses a hijack which is of the form the subconscious generally obfuscates successfully.

Interestingly, I think this goes to what I'm saying about the instance of executive actions within the context of an event. If we were all aware of how little executive influence we actually have, how rate "riding the light" really is, we might all just give up on influencing anything. And that just wouldn't do.

 

[Bomb#20]

Personally, I do not plan to become a physicist or a neuroscientist in order to explain how determinism and free will are compatible.

The arguments in play, regarding the determinism "versus" free will paradox, are matters of logic and semantics. They are not beyond the mastery of a twelve year old.

Sure; and I think all of us here except DBT are compatibilists. But there are two distinct debates about determinism: there's the one about whether it matters one way or the other to free will, and then there's the one about whether the world really is deterministic. It's not a good idea to let your judgment of one of these debates impact your judgment of the other.

It certainly isn't; but it's not indeterminism's fault that Christianity trained western culture to equate determinism with lack of freedom.

The notions of voluntary choice and personal responsibility, and of cause and effect, are not created by nor owned by Religion.

No, of course not; but the widespread conviction that they're in opposition to each other very much was. Religion taught that the real you, the important part of you, the part of you that has voluntary choice and responsibility, is an immaterial immortal soul; the rest is mere flesh which is not important. Then the scientific revolution came along and started telling people that material cause and effect determine everything that happens, including everything that happens to human flesh and everything that's done by human flesh. So people started thinking in terms of Cartesian Dualism, where not only are you and your body two different things, but your body is made of matter, which science tells us follows Newton's laws of motion; and that implies your crimes are caused by your flesh. So how can we hold your immortal soul responsible for them? In that world view your soul looks like a helpless passive passenger in the coach, with no control over where the horse pulls it. And if "you" are your immortal soul, then that means "you" aren't in control of what your body does. This is what caused the delusion that ordinary common-usage freedom -- the freedom to work or not without regard to whether your master wants you to -- isn't real freedom. That's where the goofy notion comes from that there's some allegedly freer kind of Freedom(TM) that "free will" refers to.

Science assumes a world of reliable causation. Without it, no experiment would be repeatable.

Why do you believe that? If we live in a world where there's only a 99% chance that the laws of physics will make your experiment come out the same way, instead of a 100% chance, how the heck will that stop you repeating it and making scientific discoveries? Experiments already come out wrong a lot more than 1% of the time just from the experimenter screwing something up in the setup. If there's irreducible natural indeterminism adding a little uncertainty to the uncertainty that's already there from human error and from earthquakes and passing trucks and experimental subjects getting sick and having to drop out of the study, all it means is experimenters might have to slightly up their skillsets as statisticians.

So, a world of reliable causation is desirable. Reliable causation should not be turned into a monster by the hard determinists.

True; but we need to be careful not to mistake desirability for evidence.

 

[Emily Lake]

Determinism is not limited to atoms and molecules.

There are at least three distinct causal mechanisms: physical (inanimate objects), biological (living organisms), and rational (intelligent species).

Very fundamental question: In what way is "rational" not a subset of "biological", and "biological" not a subset of "physical"?

 

[Emily Lake]

The bolded has been my largest objection to determinism, and also why I end up pretty waffly on compatibilism. Determinism and agency are at odds with one another unless determinism gets redefined to allow for stochasticism.

I think a stochastic existence can be compatible with agency, but I don't think that a deterministic existence can be. That's why a lot of my arguments end up based not on the endless argument over what 'will' is and whether it's 'free' or what extent of 'freedom' it has... but on whether or not the assumption of determinism makes sense in the first place.

That's right. But then non determinism doesn't help support a case for free will either. Random or probabilistic events are no more subject to will than those that are determined, random events simply act upon the system, brain or whatever, in random ways....you start to do this, suddenly you find that you don't know what you are doing.

There is a nuance though. In a deterministic system, agency is impossible. In a stochastic system, agency is not impossible. That double negative is on purpose In a stochastic system, there's still no definitive proof of agency being real as opposed to illusory... but there's at least a mechanism by which that agency could plausibly manifest.

There's a reason I framed my approach as an "argument for non-determinism" as opposed to an "argument for agency".

When the fundamental concept of existence is "If A then B", there is only one possible outcome, and that outcome has a 100% chance of occurring. It is perfectly predictable and perfectly knowable. When the fundamental concept of existence is If A then 98% B and 2% C, then there is more than one possible outcome, neither of which is guaranteed. It might be very highly predictable to end up as B... but there's still a chance that it could be C.

The element that creates the difference between B and C could be what we refer to as agency, but it's not guaranteed to be so.

Personally, I think agency is real, and the universe is stochastic. I also, however, am quite comfortable with the fact that my belief in agency is not provable, and I'm okay with that. Heck, until we invent time travel ala Clark's The Light of Other Days, it's not even testable. It remains a purely philosophical argument, based on assumptions.

 

[Emily Lake]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser. (The chooser was in turn reliably caused by their parents. Their parents were reliably caused by the evolution of the human species, etc. etc. all the way back to the Big Bang, but that's an interesting but totally pointless fact that an intelligent mind simply acknowledges and then never brings it up again).

The fact that the chooser's own reasoning was the most meaningful and relevant cause of the choice, and that the choice was neither coerced nor unduly influenced, is what most people outside of philosophy would call a "choice of their own free will", which is literally nothing more than a "freely chosen 'I will'".

So, we know that the choice was reliably caused by human reasoning and we know who performed the reasoning. So, if the chosen action unnecessarily harms someone else, we know whose future choices need to be corrected by our intervention. And that is what "holding responsible" is about, identifying the meaningful and relevant cause(s) so that we know what needs to be corrected by intervention.

All of your arguments end up being against will being real though. You use the term will, but with every example and scenario, you demonstrate a lack of actual will, only the illusion thereof.

This is the fundamental question in this debate: If a person's reasons for making an apparent choice would always lead them to the exact same choice, and there is no circumstance in which the same conditions would produce a different outcome... then has that person actually made a choice? Or are they merely executing a program?

Perhaps let me ask it from a different direction. If we develop an algorithm that has a set of inputs, and from those inputs it has a set of condition thresholds that drive different outputs, would you say that algorithm possesses will?

Let's say the algorithm selects between vanilla and chocolate ice cream. The algorithm has a built in preference for chocolate, but it also has a preference for variety. So if the last consumption of chocolate ice cream was more than three days ago, the algorithm will select chocolate. If the last consumption was less than three days ago, it will select vanilla. In any given situation, the algorithm will weigh its preferences against the inputs and the history, and will make a 'decision' about which flavor of ice cream to select.

Is that algorithm making a choice? Is it exerting will? Why or why not?

The key point is that, if our thoughts were truly random, then our choices would be irrational. We would have no ability to perform choosing, or anything else that requires rational thought. Thus our freedom is diminished rather than improved.

I disagree with your conclusion, predominantly because you're assuming that "random" is synonymous with "could be anything at all with no rhyme or reason". I don't think that's necessarily the case.

Consider the algorithm provided above, with a slight modification. Let's say that the criteria is if the last consumption of chocolate was more than three days ago, select vanilla. If the last consumption was two or fewer days ago, select chocolate. And if the last consumption was exactly three days ago, run a randomization routine and if it produces a number greater than 0.5 pick chocolate, otherwise pick vanilla.

The choices are still rational, and are still causes by past experiences and current input. The selection isn't irrational, it's simply not perfectly predictable. It's not like the algorithm is suddenly going to select diesel flavored ice cream instead. For all intents and purposes, that bounded randomization would align with "I just felt like it".

 

[DBT]

The words random and determined refer to conditions in the world: how the world works, how it's objects and events interact.

Compatibilism selects a slice of how the world works deterministically and declares this slice of determined behaviour to be an example of free will.

Free will is an event, just like any other event. And it is deterministic, just like any other event. The "free" in free will has nothing to do with "freedom from causal necessity". It simply means the choosing event was free from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Causal necessity is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is not meaningful because what I will inevitably do is exactly identical to me just being me, choosing what I choose, and doing what I do. And it is not a relevant constraint, because there's nothing we can do about it.

Basically, causal necessity is just a background constant that always appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. It literally makes no difference.

Behaviour that happens without coercion is an event, being an event generated by numerous factors, conscious will playing very little part, declaring it to be 'free will' is false labelling. We are able to act out of our own volition. Volition is not willed, volition is not free will.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determinism is not limited to atoms and molecules.

There are at least three distinct causal mechanisms: physical (inanimate objects), biological (living organisms), and rational (intelligent species).

Very fundamental question: In what way is "rational" not a subset of "biological", and "biological" not a subset of "physical"?

It would be correct to say that among all physical things, some are biological. And among all biological things, some are intelligent. But when we're talking about agency and control, the primary control of an intelligent species is the rational causal mechanism. The primary control of a non-intelligent biological organism is the biological drives. The primary control of an inanimate object is physical forces.

A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill. It's behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
A living organism, while still affected by gravity is not governed by it. Instead it is governed by biological drives to survive, thrive and reproduce.
An intelligent species, while still affected by gravity and biological drives, is not governed by them. Instead it is governed by the choices it makes as to when, where, and how it will satisfy biological drives, and whatever else it chooses to do.

Before living organisms there was no such thing as "purpose" in the universe. When living organisms showed up, purpose emerged in the physical universe. The purpose was to survive, thrive, and reproduce.

Before intelligent species there was no such thing as deliberate behavior (free will) in the physical universe.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser. (The chooser was in turn reliably caused by their parents. Their parents were reliably caused by the evolution of the human species, etc. etc. all the way back to the Big Bang, but that's an interesting but totally pointless fact that an intelligent mind simply acknowledges and then never brings it up again).

The fact that the chooser's own reasoning was the most meaningful and relevant cause of the choice, and that the choice was neither coerced nor unduly influenced, is what most people outside of philosophy would call a "choice of their own free will", which is literally nothing more than a "freely chosen 'I will'".

So, we know that the choice was reliably caused by human reasoning and we know who performed the reasoning. So, if the chosen action unnecessarily harms someone else, we know whose future choices need to be corrected by our intervention. And that is what "holding responsible" is about, identifying the meaningful and relevant cause(s) so that we know what needs to be corrected by intervention.

All of your arguments end up being against will being real though. You use the term will, but with every example and scenario, you demonstrate a lack of actual will, only the illusion thereof.

This is the fundamental question in this debate: If a person's reasons for making an apparent choice would always lead them to the exact same choice, and there is no circumstance in which the same conditions would produce a different outcome... then has that person actually made a choice? Or are they merely executing a program?

Perhaps let me ask it from a different direction. If we develop an algorithm that has a set of inputs, and from those inputs it has a set of condition thresholds that drive different outputs, would you say that algorithm possesses will?

Let's say the algorithm selects between vanilla and chocolate ice cream. The algorithm has a built in preference for chocolate, but it also has a preference for variety. So if the last consumption of chocolate ice cream was more than three days ago, the algorithm will select chocolate. If the last consumption was less than three days ago, it will select vanilla. In any given situation, the algorithm will weigh its preferences against the inputs and the history, and will make a 'decision' about which flavor of ice cream to select.

Is that algorithm making a choice? Is it exerting will? Why or why not?

The key point is that, if our thoughts were truly random, then our choices would be irrational. We would have no ability to perform choosing, or anything else that requires rational thought. Thus our freedom is diminished rather than improved.

I disagree with your conclusion, predominantly because you're assuming that "random" is synonymous with "could be anything at all with no rhyme or reason". I don't think that's necessarily the case.

Consider the algorithm provided above, with a slight modification. Let's say that the criteria is if the last consumption of chocolate was more than three days ago, select vanilla. If the last consumption was two or fewer days ago, select chocolate. And if the last consumption was exactly three days ago, run a randomization routine and if it produces a number greater than 0.5 pick chocolate, otherwise pick vanilla.

The choices are still rational, and are still causes by past experiences and current input. The selection isn't irrational, it's simply not perfectly predictable. It's not like the algorithm is suddenly going to select diesel flavored ice cream instead. For all intents and purposes, that bounded randomization would align with "I just felt like it".

Will is a deterministic. It is reliably caused by choosing, and it reliably causes what the person does next.

If a person's reasons for making an apparent choice would always lead them to the exact same choice, and there is no circumstance in which the same conditions would produce a different outcome... then has that person actually made a choice?

Two things. First, when you say "and there is no circumstance in which the same conditions would produce a different outcome" you are suggesting we consider other possible circumstances on the one hand, while asserting "the same conditions" on the other. Other circumstances are not the same conditions. There are certainly other possible circumstances in which the conditions would be different and the outcome would be different.

Second, the answer to "has that person actually made a choice?" is Yes! In the actual world that person actually made a choice. Choosing is a real event in the real world.

Or are they merely executing a program?

Well, choosing is an ordered process consisting of familiar steps. Thinking, like walking, really happens. You can find several books on Amazon teaching individuals and groups to make better decisions. The decisions are no less real by following a formalized process, like defining the problem, brainstorming to generate alternatives, doing a weighted evaluation of each alternative, etc.

If we develop an algorithm that has a set of inputs, and from those inputs it has a set of condition thresholds that drive different outputs, would you say that algorithm possesses will?

That depends. How are you defining will? Does the algorithm have any interest in the outcome? If not, then I would not call it a will.

Let's say the algorithm selects between vanilla and chocolate ice cream. The algorithm has a built in preference for chocolate, but it also has a preference for variety. So if the last consumption of chocolate ice cream was more than three days ago, the algorithm will select chocolate. If the last consumption was less than three days ago, it will select vanilla. In any given situation, the algorithm will weigh its preferences against the inputs and the history, and will make a 'decision' about which flavor of ice cream to select.

Is that algorithm making a choice? Is it exerting will? Why or why not?

Where is the algorithm's intent? Does it algorithm plan to eat the ice cream? Or is this simply a computer program to help the programmer choose which ice cream to order? The computer has no interest in the outcome, but the programmer does.

A computer is a machine we created to help us do something we want to do. It has no will of its own.

...And if the last consumption was exactly three days ago, run a randomization routine and if it produces a number greater than 0.5 pick chocolate, otherwise pick vanilla.

The choices are still rational, and are still causes by past experiences and current input. The selection isn't irrational, it's simply not perfectly predictable. It's not like the algorithm is suddenly going to select diesel flavored ice cream instead. For all intents and purposes, that bounded randomization would align with "I just felt like it".

The choice is deterministic, but unpredictable. Causing and predicting are two different things.

 

[DBT]

I'm afraid I have to agree with DBT on this one. If we ask someone "Why did you chose A instead of B?", they will happily list the reasons why A was the better choice. If we follow up with "So, those reasons caused you to choose A?", they will say "Yes, that's right". So, the choice was indeed reliably caused, and reliably caused by the chooser.

Maybe.
Thing is, you can hypnotize someone and suggest to them that every time they hear a bell they shout "Excelsior!" Then ring a bell. They will shout "Excelsior!"
You ask them why they shouted that.
THE ACTUAL REASON is because they were programmed to do this at a deep level of their subconscious. But they will happily explain, inventing a logic chain going from bell to yell, happily satisfied that it was a choice they made and decided to do. To the subject, there's no difference between the choice to shout or the choice to go see a hypnotist tonight.

This suggests that maybe our process of 'deciding' something is not real, it happens after the fact. The decision is already made (by us? FOR us? No way of knowing.) and our consciousness exerts itself only to rationalize the decision we are merely a vector for, helpless to alter.

It's what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", and if it doesn't know the real reason, yet feels it must have one, then it confabulates. But there's no reason to assume that the description is inaccurate under normal conditions.

Hypnosis would be an "undue influence", preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they will do. So, the behavior would not be freely chosen by the subject (a freely chosen "I will", or simply "free will"), but instead the behavior is chosen by the hypnotist.

Some insignificant behaviors, like those in the Libet experiments, can apparently be decided unconsciously and then presented to conscious awareness. But most significant decisions are going to involve a longer interplay between conscious and unconscious brain activity. But, if we asked the subject whether he participated in the experiment of his own free will, everyone would know what we were talking about.

If our unconscious brains decided to rob a bank, and left consciousness unaware, then the we would end up in jail without knowing how we got there. It would be like sleep walking. And that would be very rare if ever.

Narrator function and being aware doesn't alter unconscious information processing being the agency of both.

An interaction of information within the brain, inputs, architecture, chemistry, memory, produced the action, the will and the awareness of thought and action.

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision actualized (Determinism), there is no freedom of will (incompatibilism).

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It's what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", and if it doesn't know the real reason, yet feels it must have one, then it confabulates. But there's no reason to assume that the description is inaccurate under normal conditions.

Hypnosis would be an "undue influence", preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they will do. So, the behavior would not be freely chosen by the subject (a freely chosen "I will", or simply "free will"), but instead the behavior is chosen by the hypnotist.

Some insignificant behaviors, like those in the Libet experiments, can apparently be decided unconsciously and then presented to conscious awareness. But most significant decisions are going to involve a longer interplay between conscious and unconscious brain activity. But, if we asked the subject whether he participated in the experiment of his own free will, everyone would know what we were talking about.

If our unconscious brains decided to rob a bank, and left consciousness unaware, then the we would end up in jail without knowing how we got there. It would be like sleep walking. And that would be very rare if ever.

Narrator function and being aware doesn't alter unconscious information processing being the agency of both.

An interaction of information within the brain, inputs, architecture, chemistry, memory, produced the action, the will and the awareness of thought and action.

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision actualized (Determinism), there is no freedom of will (incompatibilism).

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision making, it remains true that the decision, regarding what we will do, may be coerced by someone outside pointing a gun at the brain, and, it remains true that the decision may be unduly influenced by the brain's own disorders, like suffering hallucination, or a crippled ability to think through a decision, or by an irresistible impulse. Or the decision process may be free from such coercion and such undue influences.

When the decision process is free of coercion and undue influence, it is literally a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Explaining how the brain works during a case of coercion does not eliminate the influence of coercion upon the decision process.
Explaining how the brain works under an extraordinary influence, such as a significant mental illness, does not eliminate the influence of that illness.
Explaining how the brain works during a case where it is left free of coercion and undue influence, does not eliminate free will.

Explaining how things work does not "explain them away", it only explains how they work.

 

[Copernicus]

...

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision making, it remains true that the decision, regarding what we will do, may be coerced by someone outside pointing a gun at the brain, and, it remains true that the decision may be unduly influenced by the brain's own disorders, like suffering hallucination, or a crippled ability to think through a decision, or by an irresistible impulse. Or the decision process may be free from such coercion and such undue influences.

When the decision process is free of coercion and undue influence, it is literally a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Explaining how the brain works during a case of coercion does not eliminate the influence of coercion upon the decision process.
Explaining how the brain works under an extraordinary influence, such as a significant mental illness, does not eliminate the influence of that illness.
Explaining how the brain works during a case where it is left free of coercion and undue influence, does not eliminate free will.

Explaining how things work does not "explain them away", it only explains how they work.

Well, that has been the subject of much debate between philosophers. What DBT and some others here have been arguing for is "free will eliminatavism", which is a type of Eliminative Materialism.

Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist and have no role to play in a mature science of the mind. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge the existence of various mental states that Descartes took for granted.

Ordinary common sense psychology is also called  Folk Psychology in the philosophical literature.

In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, folk psychology, or commonsense psychology, is a human capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mental state of other people. Processes and items encountered in daily life such as pain, pleasure, excitement, and anxiety use common linguistic terms as opposed to technical or scientific jargon.

Traditionally, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centred on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires; each described in terms of everyday language and concepts such as "beliefs", "desires", "fear", and "hope".

Eliminative materialism is the claim that folk psychology is false and should be discarded (or "eliminated").

What we've been engaged in throughout the thread is a debate that essentially declares both sides of the philosophical argument compatible. They just represent different levels of description of the same underlying physical substrate.

 

[fromderinside]

The only way for the game to be consistent with t = 0 natural law statement is for the game to permit both forward and backward reference for all time. Stacking deck is not an example of determinism statement. Provide a game that works both ways and I'll bet my assertion works.

Conway's life game isn't an example of anything relevant to determinism discussion.

Possibly; but we don't actually know that the natural laws of the universe work both ways. We tend to assume they do because the equations of Newtonian mechanics and the "Standard Model" of quantum mechanics are time-symmetric. But there are anomalies in kaon decay experiments that suggest the Standard Model may be in need of some modification; and let's not forget gravity. General Relativity isn't time-symmetric. If you drop one black hole into another, according to Einstein's equations they merge to form a bigger black hole; and this is irreversible. There's no process by which a black hole can spontaneously split in two. So any philosophizing about time symmetry is premature -- as with many other questions about the universe, we really need to suspend judgment until somebody comes up with a working theory of quantum gravity.

I'll give you woulda coulda shoulda land. Of course most anyone would call whatever physicists are doing on the problem of information and decay of black holes could be labelled whaddat. Still there are papers papers popping up all the time.

To wit:

Entropy bounds on effective field theory from rotating dyonic black holes https://journals.aps.org/prd/pdf/10.1103/PhysRevD.100.046003

We derive new bounds on higher-dimension operator coefficients in four-dimensional Einstein-Maxwell theory. Positivity of classically generated corrections to the Wald entropy of thermodynamically stable, rotating dyonic black holes implies a multiparameter family of field basis invariant inequalities that exhibit electromagnetic duality and are satisfied by examples from field and string theory. These bounds imply that effective operators modify the extremality condition of large black holes so as to permit their decay to smaller ones, thus satisfying the weak gravity conjecture.

Apparently satisfying the second law of thermodynamics still has staying power in models.

 

[DBT]

It's what Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", and if it doesn't know the real reason, yet feels it must have one, then it confabulates. But there's no reason to assume that the description is inaccurate under normal conditions.

Hypnosis would be an "undue influence", preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they will do. So, the behavior would not be freely chosen by the subject (a freely chosen "I will", or simply "free will"), but instead the behavior is chosen by the hypnotist.

Some insignificant behaviors, like those in the Libet experiments, can apparently be decided unconsciously and then presented to conscious awareness. But most significant decisions are going to involve a longer interplay between conscious and unconscious brain activity. But, if we asked the subject whether he participated in the experiment of his own free will, everyone would know what we were talking about.

If our unconscious brains decided to rob a bank, and left consciousness unaware, then the we would end up in jail without knowing how we got there. It would be like sleep walking. And that would be very rare if ever.

Narrator function and being aware doesn't alter unconscious information processing being the agency of both.

An interaction of information within the brain, inputs, architecture, chemistry, memory, produced the action, the will and the awareness of thought and action.

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision actualized (Determinism), there is no freedom of will (incompatibilism).

With no possible alternative in the instance of information processing/decision making, it remains true that the decision, regarding what we will do, may be coerced by someone outside pointing a gun at the brain, and, it remains true that the decision may be unduly influenced by the brain's own disorders, like suffering hallucination, or a crippled ability to think through a decision, or by an irresistible impulse. Or the decision process may be free from such coercion and such undue influences.

When the decision process is free of coercion and undue influence, it is literally a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Explaining how the brain works during a case of coercion does not eliminate the influence of coercion upon the decision process.
Explaining how the brain works under an extraordinary influence, such as a significant mental illness, does not eliminate the influence of that illness.
Explaining how the brain works during a case where it is left free of coercion and undue influence, does not eliminate free will.

Explaining how things work does not "explain them away", it only explains how they work.

Neither uncoerced or coerced behaviour offers a possible alternative within a determined system. Compatibilism simply asserts that uncoerced behaviour is free will regardless that what is being done is not willed.

We appear to consciously will our actions, but as shown by experiments in neuroscience, that is an illusion. What we experience is a conscious narrator - ''this is what I shall do - after the motor action messages to the muscles has been sent unconsciously. The brain generating motor action followed by report.


''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.



Abstract:
Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.



*free; unrestrained; having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded <free to leave> b: not being used or occupied <waved with his free hand> c: not hampered or restricted in its normal operation
8 a: not fastened <the free end of the rope> b: not confined to a particular position or place

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Neither uncoerced or coerced behaviour offers a possible alternative within a determined system.

Coercion is a difference in the inputs to the brain's deterministic system. If the brain's inputs include the fact that someone is pointing a gun at us, then the decision will be different than it would if coercion were absent.

A significant mental illness configures the brain's deterministic operation differently than it is normally configured, again producing a different result than we would expect without the mental illness.

So, both coercion and undue influence produce different decisions than we would get in their absence. That is why coercion and undue influence are taken into account when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Both impair the normal ability of a person to decide for themselves what they will do. The fact that this process of deciding is perfectly deterministic does not change the fact that coercion and undue influence are factors that will produce a different decision than when we are free of them.

Compatibilism simply asserts that uncoerced behaviour is free will regardless that what is being done is not willed.

The brain, deterministically producing its decision, will either be influenced by coercion and undue influence or it will not. Free will refers to the instances where the brain is free of these extraordinary influences, while deterministically rendering its decision.

We appear to consciously will our actions, but as shown by experiments in neuroscience, that is an illusion. What we experience is a conscious narrator - ''this is what I shall do - after the motor action messages to the muscles has been sent unconsciously. The brain generating motor action followed by report.

Whether consciousness of our will appears before or after our unconscious brain causally determines our will, it remains true that this specific brain is what deterministically causes that will, and that will is what deterministically caused our action. Thus, having caused that action with our own brain, we are held responsible for the consequences of that action.

'

'Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

That inner necessity is integral to who and what we are. Just like there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity", there is also no such thing as "freedom from ourselves". But there is freedom from coercion, and freedom from other undue influences. And that's the only freedom required by free will.

Abstract:
Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.

Before awareness or after awareness, it is still our own brain that is deciding what we will do. And that decision can be coerced or unduly influenced, or it can be free of coercion and undue influence. Free will refers to the cases where the brain is free of coercion and undue influence. It is a simple empirical distinction between two different conditions. Either we will be held responsible, or the guy pointing a gun at us will be held responsible, or the mental illness will be held responsible.

In order to treat these cases differently, we must first make the empirical distinction between them. Causal necessity makes no empirical distinctions. All events are equally causally necessary.

*free; unrestrained; having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded <free to leave> b: not being used or occupied <waved with his free hand> c: not hampered or restricted in its normal operation
8 a: not fastened <the free end of the rope> b: not confined to a particular position or place

Right. To be meaningful, any use of the term "free" must reference some meaningful constraint (restraint, qualification, obstruction, restriction, impedance, fastening, confinement, etc.).

Causal necessity is not a meaningful constraint. What we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing what we choose, and doing what we do. That is not a meaningful constraint.

Who and what we are is not a meaningful constraint. If we were free from ourselves we would be someone else. So, freedom from "inner necessity", our own purposes and reasons, our own genetic dispositions and prior experiences, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, and all the other things that make us who and what we are, is impossible.

Because "freedom from causal necessity" and "freedom from ourselves" are absurdities, the notion of free will can never be assumed to imply either one.

Fortunately, free will does not imply either one. Free will means our choice was free from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more, and nothing less. Once we get that straight, the war between determinism and free will ends.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Well, that has been the subject of much debate between philosophers. What DBT and some others here have been arguing for is "free will eliminatavism", which is a type of Eliminative Materialism.



Ordinary common sense psychology is also called  Folk Psychology in the philosophical literature.

In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, folk psychology, or commonsense psychology, is a human capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mental state of other people. Processes and items encountered in daily life such as pain, pleasure, excitement, and anxiety use common linguistic terms as opposed to technical or scientific jargon.

Traditionally, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centred on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires; each described in terms of everyday language and concepts such as "beliefs", "desires", "fear", and "hope".

Eliminative materialism is the claim that folk psychology is false and should be discarded (or "eliminated").

What we've been engaged in throughout the thread is a debate that essentially declares both sides of the philosophical argument compatible. They just represent different levels of description of the same underlying physical substrate.

Geez, I had no idea that someone had given a name to it! "Eliminative materialism", holy cow.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The words random and determined refer to conditions in the world: how the world works, how it's objects and events interact.

Compatibilism selects a slice of how the world works deterministically and declares this slice of determined behaviour to be an example of free will.

Free will is an event, just like any other event. And it is deterministic, just like any other event. The "free" in free will has nothing to do with "freedom from causal necessity". It simply means the choosing event was free from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Causal necessity is not a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is not meaningful because what I will inevitably do is exactly identical to me just being me, choosing what I choose, and doing what I do. And it is not a relevant constraint, because there's nothing we can do about it.

Basically, causal necessity is just a background constant that always appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. It literally makes no difference.

Behaviour that happens without coercion is an event, being an event generated by numerous factors, conscious will playing very little part, declaring it to be 'free will' is false labelling. We are able to act out of our own volition. Volition is not willed, volition is not free will.

But volition is chosen. "Will I have the salad or the cheeseburger?" Pause for consideration of the benefits and deficits of each choice. "I had the salad yesterday, so I will treat myself to a cheeseburger today". A freely chosen volition is appropriately called "free will".

"Hand over your wallet or I'll put a bullet in you!". "I don't want to lose my wallet, but, then again I really don't want to lose my life, so okay, I will give my wallet to the guy with the gun." A choice forced upon us against our will is called "coercion".

Coercion is about manipulating the choosing, specifically to force someone to submit their will to the guy holding the gun.

Now, if the choice is made unconsciously, rather than consciously, then the dialog might not be expressed in words, but rather in whatever internal symbols are used by the unconscious brain to carry out the calculation. Either way, the dialog reflects the calculation.

 

[steve_bank]

Philosophizing without a knowledge of math and science. Math and scince exist in te brain as thoughts and concepts. That does not men tere is no semnatc difference between terms.

Random has a specific definition in proximity. The occurrence of one event does not affect the occurrence of the next evet, there is no correlation between random variables.

I did this stuff waaaayyy back when going through statistics. Just flip a coin or toss a die 100 times and write down the results.

It's hard to control the flip of a coin, but a professional knife thrower controls the number of revolutions sufficiently to assure that the point rather than the hilt hits the target.

The result of the coin toss will be reliably caused by the position of the thumb under the coin and the force applied. Then the inertia of the coin versus the air resistance. Then how it bounces on the surface where it lands. If you control all of these factors, perhaps by building a machine that flips the coin under controlled conditions, then the result of the coin toss cannot only be reliably predicted, but it can be reliably controlled. Oh, and the math and physics would be used to describe and calculate the effects at each stage.

Controlling the behavior of a quark is likely to be much more challenging. But, we may as well assume reliable causation even though we do not yet understand the rules that the quark is following.

Throwing a knife in a carnival at a human is not a random event. It is not a 'flip of the coin'.

Cup your hands and shake a coin, then open your hands and let it fall. Over 100 trials it will be close tp 50/50. Try it.

10 red balls and 90 blue balls are in a bucket. Pullo ne, put it back, shake the bucket and draw again. On the average the red balls will be picked 10% of the time and blue 90% of the time. This is called random sampling. Which color is pecked next is not predictable.

As to choosing salad or beef for dinner being a free choice, how are you conditioned by experience to make
that choice?

When you buy a car or shoes your 'free' choice is conditioned by advertising. Your choice is free in that it is not restricted, but I doubt any choice is made in a vacuum uncontained by experience. There is a subconscious aspect to all choices.

We are not disembodied consciousness unencumbered by experience and feelings, IOW we are not god.

I do not think free choice exists in any absolute sense. We are always limited by our brain biology.

 

[Jarhyn]

There was something about this thread that had been bothering me greatly, and I couldn't quite put my finger on it until earlier today.

I'm a software engineer. Ostensibly, everything in software, assuming a well engineered system, is deterministic to the input pattern.

So, here we have a "deterministic system in a bottle" that mirrors, as perfectly as it needs to, the determinism of the universe-at-large.

Now, while I think the utter ridiculousness of it is not confined to only our example of "deterministic universe in a jar", it would, in fact, be utterly ridiculous to say "conditional statements are not real". This is, when translated to the universe-at-large the same as saying "there is no 'choice'" as compatibilism uses the term. Of course there are conditional events in the universe! The question is "what agency set up the condition upon which the conditional events occur?"

Not only is there choice, the choice only exists when the system is deterministic.

 

[Copernicus]

There was something about this thread that had been bothering me greatly, and I couldn't quite put my finger on it until earlier today.

I'm a software engineer. Ostensibly, everything in software, assuming a well engineered system, is deterministic to the input pattern.

So, here we have a "deterministic system in a bottle" that mirrors, as perfectly as it needs to, the determinism of the universe-at-large.

Now, while I think the utter ridiculousness of it is not confined to only our example of "deterministic universe in a jar", it would, in fact, be utterly ridiculous to say "conditional statements are not real". This is, when translated to the universe-at-large the same as saying "there is no 'choice'" as compatibilism uses the term. Of course there are conditional events in the universe! The question is "what agency set up the condition upon which the conditional events occur?"

Not only is there choice, the choice only exists when the system is deterministic.

And it is worth noting that there is a programming technique called "nondeterministic" that is fully distinct from mere branching conditionals that are deterministic. The key distinguisher is the fact that a programmer cannot predict in advance which branches will succeed when the program is running. The program is meant to handle uncertainty in a changing environment and must render judgments in runtime. "Free will" is not relevant to robotics right now only because robots cannot be held blameworthy or accountable for the actions they take. You can scold them and slap them around all you want, but they aren't going to change until you rewrite their programs.

The ultimate issue concerning free will is responsibility. If an agent has no choice other than to follow a script, then how can it be held responsible for its actions? How does it make sense to reward or punish it? That is why mental illness is such a fraught issue in courtrooms. Free will is all about human responsibility, because rewards and punishments influence future behavior. The eliminativists miss the entire point of the term, because it isn't applicable or relevant in a framework where all outcomes are predictable. Human beings make choices about future behavior, where outcomes are yet to be determined. Free will isn't a useful concept when one takes on the perspective of omniscience, and that is why the whole debate started with theists trying to figure out how to make God sound like a plausible entity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There was something about this thread that had been bothering me greatly, and I couldn't quite put my finger on it until earlier today.

I'm a software engineer. Ostensibly, everything in software, assuming a well engineered system, is deterministic to the input pattern.

So, here we have a "deterministic system in a bottle" that mirrors, as perfectly as it needs to, the determinism of the universe-at-large.

Now, while I think the utter ridiculousness of it is not confined to only our example of "deterministic universe in a jar", it would, in fact, be utterly ridiculous to say "conditional statements are not real". This is, when translated to the universe-at-large the same as saying "there is no 'choice'" as compatibilism uses the term. Of course there are conditional events in the universe! The question is "what agency set up the condition upon which the conditional events occur?"

Not only is there choice, the choice only exists when the system is deterministic.

Yes, choosing what we will do is a deterministic operation. However, determinism never actually determines anything. Only the objects and forces that make up the universe can cause events. Determinism is simply the belief that the objects and the forces behave reliably as they do so.

We happen to be one of those objects that go around causing things to happen. And we cause events that suit our own purposes, our own reasons, and to satisfy our own human needs and interests. Determinism rightly suggests that our behavior is reliably caused by those purposes, reasons, and interests. They make us who and what we are. So, whatever they decide, we have decided.

The notions of causation and determinism are basically about us and what we do, well, also about all the other physical objects and forces and what they do, as well. But causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything. These concepts are descriptive, not causative. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the universe can cause events and determine what will happen next.