Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

 

[Jarhyn]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

 

[fromderinside]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

Some noctuid moths have a three neuron auditory system. They send and receive stridulating by posterior legs from an organ located on their posterior dorsal thorax segment. These stridulating signals are recognized as being the source of mating calls.

In 1973 I evacuated most protoplasm from this middle segment of a noctuid moth then hooked up an electrode to one of the fibers. I stimulated the electrode which induced stridulating, recorded nerve activity which the stridulating produced, and saved that information to a computer.

One can argue what I did was produce an execution policy to which the moth acted. The fact the target dead moth made such efforts is proof of the moth's free will then.

Of course, we might have some difficulty defending why one of the two clusters in the middle segment of the insect which has six neural clusters overall serves as home to that 'will'.

 

[Copernicus]

...

Your answer suggests to me that you did not understand a thing I said, because you aren't addressing anything I said, despite the fact that you quoted my post.

What you said was irrelevant to the issue. I repeated what is relevant.

I was complaining about the fact that you did not address what you repeated. By quoting my post, you implied that you would address its content, but you didn't. So why quote it?

Your reaction is first to mention neural networks, which perhaps you think supports your position without you having to explain its relevance.

I have explained the relevance of the role and function of neural networks in relation to freedom of will over and over.

Your remark strongly suggests that you did not understand a word I said, nor the articles I quoted from and cited.

I can only assume that it's because it doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.

No, you did not explain its relevance, and you obviously aren't bothering to specify any previous material--articles or posts--where you did explain it. This is just another example of failing to address the content of what I said about the discrepancy between what an individual knows (past and present) and what the individual imagines (future outcomes).

You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future.

You made no point. Imagination (being itself determined) doesn't allow the possibility of alternate action. Imagination cannot circumvent what has been determined to happen.

To say that there was ''a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual'' is to invoke Libertarian free will.

Wrong again. I reject libertarian free will completely, and I never claimed that imagination was free of causal determination. Subjective reality is experienced on a time scale. At any point on that scale, the individual sees the past as a collection of experiences and experiences the present while moving forward on the scale. What lies in the future is not yet experienced (i.e. irrealis--existing as an array of imagined outcomes). Free choice entails reacting to the outcome that the individual selects as most likely. This is completely within the scope of determinism. The individual does not know what action to take before calculating the likely outcome and action to address that outcome. No libertarian free will here, just physical brain activity caused by factors beyond the scope of the individual's subjective experience. Ignorance of the future is also a fully determined aspect of human cognition. That's why brains have evolved a capacity for imagination in the first place.

...The imagination of the individual is subject to exactly the same processes as everything else in terms of information processing and conscious mind. All forms of thought and action, including imagination, is determined by the state of the system in the instance of realizing an action - to reiterate - the only possible action in that instance in time.

But free choice does not exist when the action is realized, and I never claimed it did. It exists prior to that point in time, before the action is decided. The imagination is a kind of workspace for calculating future outcomes and reactions. You keep skipping ahead to the point in time where the decision has already been calculated and executed. Causation is fundamentally a relation between events that are sequentially determined. You need to understand that fundamental fact. You can't have a consequence without the antecedent that causes it. Pay attention to the timeline--past/present (realis) and future (irrealis). It's built right into the very structure of all human languages. Decisions are made as time moves forward.

Note that I have refuted your claim that there is a possibility of an alternative.

That makes no sense. I have made no claim that there is a possibility of an alternative. Just the opposite.

Quite correct, and that was a mistake in my wording. I have refuted your claim that there is NO possibility of alternative before the choice is made. There most certainly is in the mind of the individual before the choice is made. Sorry for the confusion, but what I said after that sentence would only have made sense if I had said "no possibility".

 

[DBT]

Here, Here!

Where, where?

Somewhere where you are not willing to look.

 

[DBT]

DBT, you write:

Again, nobody is arguing that ''causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us'' - that is Strawman. Nobody has said it, nobody argues that causal necessity is an entity.

But, in effect, that is exactly what you DO argue, even if inadvertently, when you then write:

The question is just whether freedom of will is compatible with determinism. And seeing the standard definition of determinism happens to be - Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - the answer is clearly no.

No. That is just the standard definition of determinism. It's a quote. The properties of matter/energy and interactions of objects; cause is effect and effect is cause within web of determined activity/actions. Nothing is acting upon the system.

 

[DBT]

...

Your answer suggests to me that you did not understand a thing I said, because you aren't addressing anything I said, despite the fact that you quoted my post.

What you said was irrelevant to the issue. I repeated what is relevant.

I was complaining about the fact that you did not address what you repeated. By quoting my post, you implied that you would address its content, but you didn't. So why quote it?

The subject has been thoroughly addressed. We are just repeating.

Your reaction is first to mention neural networks, which perhaps you think supports your position without you having to explain its relevance.

I have explained the relevance of the role and function of neural networks in relation to freedom of will over and over.

Your remark strongly suggests that you did not understand a word I said, nor the articles I quoted from and cited.

I can only assume that it's because it doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.

No, you did not explain its relevance, and you obviously aren't bothering to specify any previous material--articles or posts--where you did explain it. This is just another example of failing to address the content of what I said about the discrepancy between what an individual knows (past and present) and what the individual imagines (future outcomes).

Hasn't it been pointed out that the relevance of neural networks is that a neural network is the means by which an organism interacts with the world?

To reiterate;

Without the activity of neural networks, a brain, we have no conscious existence, we cannot think, feel or act.

The architecture of a brain determines how the organism, you, me, other animals, think, feel and respond.

How we think and respond and what we do is directly related to the issue of free will.

Compatibilism acknowledges that the brain is a deterministic system, that no alternate actions are possible in any given instance, but defines free will as acting in accordance to ones will.

Which, as pointed pointed out, fails because it ignores the means by which will and action is produced, constrained by the state of the system/inner necessity, no alternate action possible, therefore not freely willed.

Actions not being freely willed, determined will is not free will.

Determined will not being free will, free will is incompatible with determinism.

Goodbye free will.

You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future.

I don't zip past, I have limited time. I can only deal with so much on any occasion. I can't spend hours a day on this issue

Quite correct, and that was a mistake in my wording. I have refuted your claim that there is NO possibility of alternative before the choice is made. There most certainly is in the mind of the individual before the choice is made. Sorry for the confusion, but what I said after that sentence would only have made sense if I had said "no possibility".

In your dreams. You haven't refuted a thing. You have asserted the compatibilist line of 'I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to', or 'I could have wanted otherwise' - which is BS because what you thought or wanted prior to the action taken is just as determined as the action taken.

Whatever you thought prior to the action taken never had the possibility of being realized or altering the determined action.

 

[DBT]

Yes. Every event is the reliable result of prior events, and is thus causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. This includes the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of an action, and forming an intention to act on that desire. And I presume perfectly reliable cause and effect, even at the quantum level.

Reliable cause and effect in determinism is fixed cause and effect, being fixed does not equate to freedom. Just the opposite.

Nothing sticky about it.
a) Either you made the choice, or, someone or something else made the choice.
b) If you made the choice unconsciously, then it is still you making the choice. And the unconscious brain will inform the conscious brain in plenty of time to tell the waiter, "I'll have the steak dinner, please".
c) By causal necessity, it would be you, and no one else that would make that choice at that specific time and place.

But, perhaps it is still sticky for you. I hope you can see now how easily it sorts itself out.

Deterministic processes necessitate all actions. Given the nature of determinism, the determined actions of a brain produce determined outcomes, what you do is an inevitable consequence of the state of the system in the moment of response.

To say 'either you made the choice or someone else made the choice, seeks to circumvent the consequences of determinism.

It is determined activity, the world the brain, neural network actions that produce outcomes. the outcomes determine other actions, how others respond to the action produced by 'your' brain and on it rolls.

Sorry, but "I could have done otherwise" is hard coded into the rational causal mechanism. You cannot declare it to be "impossible" without breaking rationality itself.

Rational response does not equate to ''I could have done otherwise'' - by the given definition of determinism, the can be no 'could have,' only what is.

The survival benefits of intelligence comes from imagining alternate solutions to environmental challenges. Intelligence gives us the ability to deal with matters of uncertainty. And, lacking omniscience, we are often confronted with uncertainty.

Intelligence is not related to free will. Intelligence is enabled by information processing capacity/pattern recognition, enabling projection, predictions to be made, etc. None of it willed. Complexity does not equate to free will.

For example, its morning, and I wake up hungry. What will I have for breakfast? Well, what can I have for breakfast? I have eggs is the fridge. So, I am certain that I can fix eggs. But, I'm still uncertain as to whether I will fix eggs. What other options do I have? Hey, here's some pancake mix in the cupboard. So, I am also certain that I can fix pancakes. But I am still uncertain which one I will fix. Well, what did I have for breakfast yesterday? Hmm. Eggs. What about the day before yesterday? Eggs. And the day before that I also had eggs. So, just for a change, I will have pancakes this morning for breakfast. Could I have had eggs instead? Yes, of course I could.

As you should see by now, that fact that I would not have eggs does not logically imply that I could not have had eggs.

The given definition of determinist necessarily excludes alternate actions. Your indecision is a part of the process of realization. If the outcome is that you don't have eggs this morning, the outcome is the inevitable result of all that preceded it, your memory of previous breakfasts, feeling tired of eggs every day, etc.....conditions that brought you inevitably to pancakes for breakfast.

If pancakes this morning, there was never the possibility of eggs.

That is how determinism work. 'Would have' or 'might have' is an illusion. What is, is the reality.

What I "can" do constrains what I "will" do. I "will" never do something that I "cannot" do.
But what I "will" do never constrains what I "can" do. What I "can" do is only constrained by my imagination.

There is only what you do. The rest is brain activity that brings you to what you do, ie, what is. It is always 'what is' in the land of determinism.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Reliable cause and effect in determinism is fixed cause and effect, being fixed does not equate to freedom. Just the opposite.

Question 1: Then you have a small problem to solve:
a) Shall we remove the terms "free" and "freedom" from all our dictionaries?
OR
b) Shall we define freedom in a way that does not require "freedom from causal necessity"?

Deterministic processes necessitate all actions. Given the nature of determinism, the determined actions of a brain produce determined outcomes, what you do is an inevitable consequence of the state of the system in the moment of response.

Question 2: Yes, but how does that change anything? (You should probably answer Question 1 before tackling this one)

To say 'either you made the choice or someone else made the choice, seeks to circumvent the consequences of determinism.

Question 3: What are the consequences of determinism? (Hint: We already live in a deterministic world, so all the consequences should be obvious, just by looking around you).

It is determined activity, the world the brain, neural network actions that produce outcomes. the outcomes determine other actions, how others respond to the action produced by 'your' brain and on it rolls.

See your answer to Question 3.

Rational response does not equate to ''I could have done otherwise'' - by the given definition of determinism, the can be no 'could have,' only what is.

Question 4: Given that we already live in a deterministic world, what does the term "could have", as in "could have done otherwise" and "could have chosen otherwise" actually mean?

If you claim "could have" means nothing, then explain how you would replace it in this scenario:

You're driving down the road with your friend, a hard determinist, sitting in the passenger seat. You see a stoplight up ahead. Right now it is red, but you don't know how long it has been red. Will the light remain red or will it turn green as you arrive? You don't know. So, as you get closer you decide to slow down, just in case it remains red. But then the light changes to green just before you arrive, so you resume speed and continue down the road.

Your friend, the hard determinist, says to you, "Why did you slow down?". You tell him, "I wasn't sure whether the light would turn green. It could have remained red." Your friend corrects you, "No, the light could not have remained red. You see, in a determined system there is only one possibility, only one thing that can happen. So, the light could not have remained red!". And then he adds, "So, why did you slow down?". How do you answer the hard determinist?

Intelligence is not related to free will. Intelligence is enabled by information processing capacity/pattern recognition, enabling projection, predictions to be made, etc. None of it willed. Complexity does not equate to free will.

Hmm. Another sorting problem.
1. Complexity causally necessitated intelligence.
2. Intelligence includes imagination, evaluation, and choosing (among other things).
3. There is a distinction between the case where my intelligence performs the choosing and the case where the guy with a gun performs the choosing and forces me to do his will rather than my own.
4. The nature of this distinction is that in the former case I am free to decide for myself what I will do (free will) and in the other case I am coerced into doing what the guy with the gun orders me to do (unfree will).

The given definition of determinist necessarily excludes alternate actions. Your indecision is a part of the process of realization. If the outcome is that you don't have eggs this morning, the outcome is the inevitable result of all that preceded it, your memory of previous breakfasts, feeling tired of eggs every day, etc.....conditions that brought you inevitably to pancakes for breakfast.

If pancakes this morning, there was never the possibility of eggs.

See Question 4.

Oh, and here's the big one:

Question 5: Is it possible that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition of determinism is incorrect?

There is only what you do. The rest is brain activity that brings you to what you do, ie, what is. It is always 'what is' in the land of determinism.

Cool. Then we must assume that determinism is restricted from making any assertions as to "possibilities" or things that "can happen" but which "might not" happen. And, of course, determinism would also be restricted from making any assertions about "freedom" (including "free will"). That seems reasonable to me. What do you think?

 

[Jarhyn]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

Some noctuid moths have a three neuron auditory system. They send and receive stridulating by posterior legs from an organ located on their posterior dorsal thorax segment. These stridulating signals are recognized as being the source of mating calls.

In 1973 I evacuated most protoplasm from this middle segment of a noctuid moth then hooked up an electrode to one of the fibers. I stimulated the electrode which induced stridulating, recorded nerve activity which the stridulating produced, and saved that information to a computer.

One can argue what I did was produce an execution policy to which the moth acted. The fact the target dead moth made such efforts is proof of the moth's free will then.

Of course, we might have some difficulty defending why one of the two clusters in the middle segment of the insect which has six neural clusters overall serves as home to that 'will'.

It's not difficult for me at all: it contains a logical machine, a decision engine.

That the model is simple, facile and reactionary, even, does not change that fact.

The very idea of an execution policy is the idea of a "will", and one that you have mapped out! You know the shape of it's will and can constrain it at your pleasure. You can readily identify when the will is "free" and when it is not.

You can be as oppressive to the moth as you wish, in the same manner as I can see, before my cat does it, that there is "will" to attack a toy, and I may oppress that free will easily by taking the toy away just after the butt wiggling stops due to flaws in the model, the model that says inside the cat's imagination "if I leave now, suddenly, I shall be quick enough to catch it"

Who knows what is going on inside the moth's head! It may be something like "closer that feel good, do this (flap flap), closer that!".

You do understand the nature of how and why neural clusters embed logic, right? How two signals coming across weak connections create an "and", how two signals strongly connected would act as "or", how a refractory period creates a "not" or "xor" depending on the arrangement, and how between those you can get a "nand" and from there any behavior a transistor array can create?

When the mating cluster is active, it acts as seat of the will because it has more weighting over the motor system (and the behavior generates a refractory signal that depresses other systemic "wills" that also exist within the system, oppressing them).

 

[fromderinside]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

Some noctuid moths have a three neuron auditory system. They send and receive stridulating by posterior legs from an organ located on their posterior dorsal thorax segment. These stridulating signals are recognized as being the source of mating calls.

In 1973 I evacuated most protoplasm from this middle segment of a noctuid moth then hooked up an electrode to one of the fibers. I stimulated the electrode which induced stridulating, recorded nerve activity which the stridulating produced, and saved that information to a computer.

One can argue what I did was produce an execution policy to which the moth acted. The fact the target dead moth made such efforts is proof of the moth's free will then.

Of course, we might have some difficulty defending why one of the two clusters in the middle segment of the insect which has six neural clusters overall serves as home to that 'will'.

It's not difficult for me at all: it contains a logical machine, a decision engine.

That the model is simple, facile and reactionary, even, does not change that fact.

The very idea of an execution policy is the idea of a "will", and one that you have mapped out! You know the shape of it's will and can constrain it at your pleasure. You can readily identify when the will is "free" and when it is not.

You can be as oppressive to the moth as you wish, in the same manner as I can see, before my cat does it, that there is "will" to attack a toy, and I may oppress that free will easily by taking the toy away just after the butt wiggling stops due to flaws in the model, the model that says inside the cat's imagination "if I leave now, suddenly, I shall be quick enough to catch it"

Who knows what is going on inside the moth's head! It may be something like "closer that feel good, do this (flap flap), closer that!".

You do understand the nature of how and why neural clusters embed logic, right? How two signals coming across weak connections create an "and", how two signals strongly connected would act as "or", how a refractory period creates a "not" or "xor" depending on the arrangement, and how between those you can get a "nand" and from there any behavior a transistor array can create?

When the mating cluster is active, it acts as seat of the will because it has more weighting over the motor system (and the behavior generates a refractory signal that depresses other systemic "wills" that also exist within the system, oppressing them).

Still, they are only neural clusters not mind clusters. I've never recorded from a mind cluster. I have recorded from a "Barlow" face detector in a cat though.

Of course, there's no such thing.

Oooh. Computers. No mind, no volition, just logic assemblies. Never constructed a 'will' though.

Do you have a schematic for one, a proof it is a 'will'?

 

[Jarhyn]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

Some noctuid moths have a three neuron auditory system. They send and receive stridulating by posterior legs from an organ located on their posterior dorsal thorax segment. These stridulating signals are recognized as being the source of mating calls.

In 1973 I evacuated most protoplasm from this middle segment of a noctuid moth then hooked up an electrode to one of the fibers. I stimulated the electrode which induced stridulating, recorded nerve activity which the stridulating produced, and saved that information to a computer.

One can argue what I did was produce an execution policy to which the moth acted. The fact the target dead moth made such efforts is proof of the moth's free will then.

Of course, we might have some difficulty defending why one of the two clusters in the middle segment of the insect which has six neural clusters overall serves as home to that 'will'.

It's not difficult for me at all: it contains a logical machine, a decision engine.

That the model is simple, facile and reactionary, even, does not change that fact.

The very idea of an execution policy is the idea of a "will", and one that you have mapped out! You know the shape of it's will and can constrain it at your pleasure. You can readily identify when the will is "free" and when it is not.

You can be as oppressive to the moth as you wish, in the same manner as I can see, before my cat does it, that there is "will" to attack a toy, and I may oppress that free will easily by taking the toy away just after the butt wiggling stops due to flaws in the model, the model that says inside the cat's imagination "if I leave now, suddenly, I shall be quick enough to catch it"

Who knows what is going on inside the moth's head! It may be something like "closer that feel good, do this (flap flap), closer that!".

You do understand the nature of how and why neural clusters embed logic, right? How two signals coming across weak connections create an "and", how two signals strongly connected would act as "or", how a refractory period creates a "not" or "xor" depending on the arrangement, and how between those you can get a "nand" and from there any behavior a transistor array can create?

When the mating cluster is active, it acts as seat of the will because it has more weighting over the motor system (and the behavior generates a refractory signal that depresses other systemic "wills" that also exist within the system, oppressing them).

Still, they are only neural clusters not mind clusters. I've never recorded from a mind cluster. I have recorded from a "Barlow" face detector in a cat though.

Of course, there's no such thing.

Oooh. Computers. No mind, no volition, just logic assemblies. Never constructed a 'will' though.

Do you have a schematic for one, a proof it is a 'will'?

Wow, so, I bolded a section you really need to reevaluate.

These are very bold claims to make indeed when we are discussing the fundamental metaphysics of those things.

You have defined extant minds and decision making engines in general out of existence because you wish to ignore the reality of decision.

All through this thread I argue from the position that there is no fundamental distinction between decision engines and minds, and that bigger minds are made of subassemblies of smaller ones, all the way down to single transistors or neurons.

The reason you cannot see the difference between a neural cluster and a mind is because you resist learning the abstraction and the model in which that abstraction is useful.

 

[Copernicus]

...
No, you did not explain its relevance, and you obviously aren't bothering to specify any previous material--articles or posts--where you did explain it. This is just another example of failing to address the content of what I said about the discrepancy between what an individual knows (past and present) and what the individual imagines (future outcomes).

Hasn't it been pointed out that the relevance of neural networks is that a neural network is the means by which an organism interacts with the world?

You may have discussed the subject elsewhere, but you need to establish how it is relevant to my argument. I think I know where you are trying to go with this, but you are committing a fallacy of irrelevance known as a  genetic fallacy. That is, you are shifting focus from the substance of my argument to focus on the physical origin of mental processes without explaining how that origin does away with my claim that free will lies in the discrepancy between realis experience and irrealis imagination. Also, I don't think that you really understand the problem with using a computer analogy to explain how brains work, but that is a side issue. It only bothers me because I have worked professionally in the field of artificial intelligence, and this kind of overimplification is wrong on so many levels.

To reiterate;

Without the activity of neural networks, a brain, we have no conscious existence, we cannot think, feel or act.

The architecture of a brain determines how the organism, you, me, other animals, think, feel and respond.

How we think and respond and what we do is directly related to the issue of free will.

Compatibilism acknowledges that the brain is a deterministic system, that no alternate actions are possible in any given instance, but defines free will as acting in accordance to ones will.

None of that is in dispute, yet you never seem to tire of repeating it as if it were in dispute. Again, you could dispense with the overworked "neural network" metaphor, and your argument would still be an irrelevant genetic fallacy.

Which, as pointed pointed out, fails because it ignores the means by which will and action is produced, constrained by the state of the system/inner necessity, no alternate action possible, therefore not freely willed.

Here you ignore my point that we live in real time--moment by moment--and that is where the process of exercising free will takes place. Alternate actions are always possible in altered models of reality, and that is precisely what the future is to a mind--an imagined reality. You keep wanting to skip ahead to a point in time where the imaginary future has disappeared, but that is why compatibilism agrees with you that there is no ability to choose a past action once it is past. There is only the ability to change a future action not yet realized. We are temporal creatures ignorant of future outcomes, not immortal gods knowledgable of all future outcomes. Hence, your argument bears a striking similarity to theological ones about God and free will.

You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future.

I don't zip past, I have limited time. I can only deal with so much on any occasion. I can't spend hours a day on this issue

But we have all committed hours a week to this discussion, and that is probably why you keep repeating exactly the same genetic fallacy in replying to anything anyone says. Why bother to keep defining determinism in a way that everyone has already stipulated to? The argument is about why free will is compatible with determinism. Explain why free will cannot be conceived of as a choice made to select one alternative of possible alternative imaginary actions to address imaginary outcomes? Robots do something like that all the time, although they have a very limited sense of imagination. We are not robots, but our bodies are just as physical and just as much machines as robots are.

Quite correct, and that was a mistake in my wording. I have refuted your claim that there is NO possibility of alternative before the choice is made. There most certainly is in the mind of the individual before the choice is made. Sorry for the confusion, but what I said after that sentence would only have made sense if I had said "no possibility".

In your dreams. You haven't refuted a thing. You have asserted the compatibilist line of 'I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to', or 'I could have wanted otherwise' - which is BS because what you thought or wanted prior to the action taken is just as determined as the action taken.

Whatever you thought prior to the action taken never had the possibility of being realized or altering the determined action.

Look at the way you characterized my argument, which is a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. You have already placed your perspective at a point that is looking backward at a time in the past, and you are using the past (realis) tense to describe a decision that has already been made (because it was predetermined). I have defined free will at a point where the mind is calculating a number of future actions. At that point in time, the future action is not predetermined in the mind of the individual. It is only predetermined from the perspective of an outside observer. Hence, the action can be determined or not determined, depending on which perspective you take: realis or irrealis. That is exactly what compatibilism is about.

 

[fromderinside]

Brain generals are like any other general they act according to policy dictates.

Nope. I don't see free there anywhere.

Oh sure, The pronounce they've decided. That's their job puffing up and pronouncing. See those medals flashing up as they breathe in.

And it's here, here.

"Act according to policy dictates" is, you know, just a way of trying very hard to not say "make a decision" while saying that something is making a decision.

The decision, the acting according to policy dictates, that's the will. The part that makes it free is that it will carry trajectory towards the goal it drives to without interruption: that the "can" does become "will" within the bounds of qualifying as "did".

This creates a measurement of the freedom of will as relates to the quality of the decision.

Some noctuid moths have a three neuron auditory system. They send and receive stridulating by posterior legs from an organ located on their posterior dorsal thorax segment. These stridulating signals are recognized as being the source of mating calls.

In 1973 I evacuated most protoplasm from this middle segment of a noctuid moth then hooked up an electrode to one of the fibers. I stimulated the electrode which induced stridulating, recorded nerve activity which the stridulating produced, and saved that information to a computer.

One can argue what I did was produce an execution policy to which the moth acted. The fact the target dead moth made such efforts is proof of the moth's free will then.

Of course, we might have some difficulty defending why one of the two clusters in the middle segment of the insect which has six neural clusters overall serves as home to that 'will'.

It's not difficult for me at all: it contains a logical machine, a decision engine.

That the model is simple, facile and reactionary, even, does not change that fact.

The very idea of an execution policy is the idea of a "will", and one that you have mapped out! You know the shape of it's will and can constrain it at your pleasure. You can readily identify when the will is "free" and when it is not.

You can be as oppressive to the moth as you wish, in the same manner as I can see, before my cat does it, that there is "will" to attack a toy, and I may oppress that free will easily by taking the toy away just after the butt wiggling stops due to flaws in the model, the model that says inside the cat's imagination "if I leave now, suddenly, I shall be quick enough to catch it"

Who knows what is going on inside the moth's head! It may be something like "closer that feel good, do this (flap flap), closer that!".

You do understand the nature of how and why neural clusters embed logic, right? How two signals coming across weak connections create an "and", how two signals strongly connected would act as "or", how a refractory period creates a "not" or "xor" depending on the arrangement, and how between those you can get a "nand" and from there any behavior a transistor array can create?

When the mating cluster is active, it acts as seat of the will because it has more weighting over the motor system (and the behavior generates a refractory signal that depresses other systemic "wills" that also exist within the system, oppressing them).

Still, they are only neural clusters not mind clusters. I've never recorded from a mind cluster. I have recorded from a "Barlow" face detector in a cat though.

Of course, there's no such thing.

Oooh. Computers. No mind, no volition, just logic assemblies. Never constructed a 'will' though.

Do you have a schematic for one, a proof it is a 'will'?

Wow, so, I bolded a section you really need to reevaluate.

These are very bold claims to make indeed when we are discussing the fundamental metaphysics of those things.

You have defined extant minds and decision making engines in general out of existence because you wish to ignore the reality of decision.

All through this thread I argue from the position that there is no fundamental distinction between decision engines and minds, and that bigger minds are made of subassemblies of smaller ones, all the way down to single transistors or neurons.

The reason you cannot see the difference between a neural cluster and a mind is because you resist learning the abstraction and the model in which that abstraction is useful.

Without pointing from your view there is no empirical justification for mind or thinking.

I can designate empirically a logical cluster whether it be in the brain or in a computer. I cannot designate the mind because it is without an empirical basis beyond lay speculation and self-reference. I'm not aware of a scientific abstraction ladder that transitions from empirical to self-attributed outside of a bogus basis for psychoanalysis.

Attach all the science you want to that subject you still have only magic and mysticism holding it together. They aren't science so they don't qualify. After you say mind everything is just noise.

I'm pretty sure the only things scientific are those things that arise from scientific experiments extracted from presumptions as material operations involving aspects of brain extracted from musings about mind, id, etc.

When gets to material operations one abandons the fuzzy model for explicit neural activities which can be scientifically addressed. Believe me, the vacuous uber model will disappear as scientific evidence increases and new material formulations arise for grouping together the various material findings.

Do you really think the neural targets of visual and auditory stimuli define the scope of visual and auditory processes. Really?

Self-portraits of the brain: cognitive science, data visualization, and communicating brain structure and function https://cns.iu.edu/docs/publications/2015-goldstone-self-portraits.pdf

With several large-scale human brain projects currently underway and a range of neuroimaging techniques growing in availability to researchers, the amount and diversity of data relevant for understanding the human brain is increasing rapidly. A complete understanding of the brain must incorporate information about 3D neural location, activity, timing, and task. Data mining, high performance computing, and visualization can serve as tools that augment human intellect; however, the resulting visualizations must take into account human abilities and limitations to be effective tools for exploration and communication. In this feature review, we discuss key challenges and opportunities that arise when leveraging the sophisticated perceptual and conceptual processing of the human brain to help researchers understand brain structure, function, and behavior.

 

[DBT]

...
No, you did not explain its relevance, and you obviously aren't bothering to specify any previous material--articles or posts--where you did explain it. This is just another example of failing to address the content of what I said about the discrepancy between what an individual knows (past and present) and what the individual imagines (future outcomes).

Hasn't it been pointed out that the relevance of neural networks is that a neural network is the means by which an organism interacts with the world?

You may have discussed the subject elsewhere, but you need to establish how it is relevant to my argument. I think I know where you are trying to go with this, but you are committing a fallacy of irrelevance known as a  genetic fallacy. That is, you are shifting focus from the substance of my argument to focus on the physical origin of mental processes without explaining how that origin does away with my claim that free will lies in the discrepancy between realis experience and irrealis imagination. Also, I don't think that you really understand the problem with using a computer analogy to explain how brains work, but that is a side issue. It only bothers me because I have worked professionally in the field of artificial intelligence, and this kind of overimplification is wrong on so many levels.

If you work in the field of artificial intelligence, you should know that free will is not a factor. That processing information and selecting an option according to sets of criteria has nothing to do with free will.

That the capability of the system is a matter of hardware and software and information crunching. The actions that follow are not only not coerced or impeded; they are necessitated by the system. Again, nothing to do with free will.

In principle, the brain is no different; architecture, memory, sets of criteria and sensory inputs determine response, which are not only not coerced or impeded but necessitated by the state of the system.

Now, I have supported this with numerous quotes and references from neuroscience, analysis by experts in their field, so your objections and assertions have no merit.

For example;

How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will?

Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction. Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires.

There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control. Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex. For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs.

Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear. Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain. Is it necessary that there be anything else?

This can be a complete description of the process of movement selection, and even if there is something more -- like free will -- it would have to operate through such neuronal mechanisms.

The view that there is no such thing as free will as an inner causal agent has been advocated by a number of philosophers, scientists, and neurologists including Ryle, Adrian, Skinner and Fisher.(Fisher 1993)

To reiterate;

Without the activity of neural networks, a brain, we have no conscious existence, we cannot think, feel or act.

The architecture of a brain determines how the organism, you, me, other animals, think, feel and respond.

How we think and respond and what we do is directly related to the issue of free will.

Compatibilism acknowledges that the brain is a deterministic system, that no alternate actions are possible in any given instance, but defines free will as acting in accordance to ones will.

None of that is in dispute, yet you never seem to tire of repeating it as if it were in dispute. Again, you could dispense with the overworked "neural network" metaphor, and your argument would still be an irrelevant genetic fallacy.

It's the compatibilist definition being disputed by me and other incompatibilists, for the given reason. Reasons that you appear to dismiss without any apparent consideration.

Which, as pointed pointed out, fails because it ignores the means by which will and action is produced, constrained by the state of the system/inner necessity, no alternate action possible, therefore not freely willed.

Here you ignore my point that we live in real time--moment by moment--and that is where the process of exercising free will takes place. Alternate actions are always possible in altered models of reality, and that is precisely what the future is to a mind--an imagined reality. You keep wanting to skip ahead to a point in time where the imaginary future has disappeared, but that is why compatibilism agrees with you that there is no ability to choose a past action once it is past. There is only the ability to change a future action not yet realized. We are temporal creatures ignorant of future outcomes, not immortal gods knowledgable of all future outcomes. Hence, your argument bears a striking similarity to theological ones about God and free will.

You ignore that conditions in real time are determined by antecedent events. Conditions now are the result of conditions a moment ago, conditions now determine conditions in the next moment.

Consequently, there is no opportunity to ''exercise free'' - free will plays no part in a determined system.

It seems that you don't understand determinism at all. Not even the basics.

But we have all committed hours a week to this discussion, and that is probably why you keep repeating exactly the same genetic fallacy in replying to anything anyone says. Why bother to keep defining determinism in a way that everyone has already stipulated to? The argument is about why free will is compatible with determinism. Explain why free will cannot be conceived of as a choice made to select one alternative of possible alternative imaginary actions to address imaginary outcomes? Robots do something like that all the time, although they have a very limited sense of imagination. We are not robots, but our bodies are just as physical and just as much machines as robots are.

I have made no fallacy. I argue the standard incompatibilist argument and have supported everything that I say with quotes, links, studies and experiments from neuroscience on the nature of the brain, mind, decisionmaking and action initiation.

What you say above suggests that you have not understood a word of any of it. Not neuroscience, not incompatibilism, not brain function, nor determinism.

Sorry if that sounds harsh, but that is the impression I get when reading your response.

Look at the way you characterized my argument, which is a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. You have already placed your perspective at a point that is looking backward at a time in the past, and you are using the past (realis) tense to describe a decision that has already been made (because it was predetermined). I have defined free will at a point where the mind is calculating a number of future actions. At that point in time, the future action is not predetermined in the mind of the individual. It is only predetermined from the perspective of an outside observer. Hence, the action can be determined or not determined, depending on which perspective you take: realis or irrealis. That is exactly what compatibilism is about.

Your position is untenable. You only need look at what you said about ''exercising free will'' - ''that we live in real time--moment by moment--and that is where the process of exercising free will takes place. Alternate actions are always possible in altered models of reality, and that is precisely what the future is to a mind--an imagined reality'' to see that you do not appear to understand the nature of determinism.

I could quote the standard definition again, explain the principle, but I doubt that it would help.

 

[DBT]

Reliable cause and effect in determinism is fixed cause and effect, being fixed does not equate to freedom. Just the opposite.

Question 1: Then you have a small problem to solve:
a) Shall we remove the terms "free" and "freedom" from all our dictionaries?
OR
b) Shall we define freedom in a way that does not require "freedom from causal necessity"?

As we know, freedom may be used in reference to unimpeded or unrestrained actions; the ball flies through the air unimpeded, the dog has been freed from its chain, planets and moons orbit freely, etc, etc. But relative that relative unimpeded actions do not equate to freedom of will. The dog may be free from the chain, but it isn't free from the constraint of the yard. The planet freely orbits the sun, but it can't do anything else, it is not free to roam.

We can act in accordance to our 'will'' - which is determined by brain state - and the actions that follow are unimpeded, but you can't do anything else but what was determined by brain state.

You act according to inner necessity. Your constraints are determined by inner necessity. You can't do otherwise. Unimpeded action is not free will.

You're driving down the road with your friend, a hard determinist, sitting in the passenger seat. You see a stoplight up ahead. Right now it is red, but you don't know how long it has been red. Will the light remain red or will it turn green as you arrive? You don't know. So, as you get closer you decide to slow down, just in case it remains red. But then the light changes to green just before you arrive, so you resume speed and continue down the road.

Your friend, the hard determinist, says to you, "Why did you slow down?". You tell him, "I wasn't sure whether the light would turn green. It could have remained red." Your friend corrects you, "No, the light could not have remained red. You see, in a determined system there is only one possibility, only one thing that can happen. So, the light could not have remained red!". And then he adds, "So, why did you slow down?". How do you answer the hard determinist?

Information is being acquired via the senses as you approach the intersection, what you do is determined by your (brain) experience with traffic signals, your speed, distance from the traffic lights, an estimation of signal duration...all of which comes together to determine your actions, you stop or go based on these factors. After all, the brain is an information processor, evolved to respond to environmental conditions. After all, it doesn't take free will to acquire and process information and act rationally.

Hmm. Another sorting problem.

1. Complexity causally necessitated intelligence.
2. Intelligence includes imagination, evaluation, and choosing (among other things).
3. There is a distinction between the case where my intelligence performs the choosing and the case where the guy with a gun performs the choosing and forces me to do his will rather than my own.
4. The nature of this distinction is that in the former case I am free to decide for myself what I will do (free will) and in the other case I am coerced into doing what the guy with the gun orders me to do (unfree will).

The brain acquires and processes information and acts accordingly in both instances. In one instance you act according to your 'will,' but through inner necessity. The other, you are being forced to act against will.

The references relate to in external conditions, not how thought and action is produced.

Being free from external necessity doesn't free you from internal necessity;

''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein

Question 5: Is it possible that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition of determinism is incorrect?

Why would it be? It's the basic definition of determinism, which is why they included it.

Are you suggesting a better definition?

There is only what you do. The rest is brain activity that brings you to what you do, ie, what is. It is always 'what is' in the land of determinism.

Cool. Then we must assume that determinism is restricted from making any assertions as to "possibilities" or things that "can happen" but which "might not" happen. And, of course, determinism would also be restricted from making any assertions about "freedom" (including "free will"). That seems reasonable to me. What do you think?

We speak from our limited perspective of the world, its changing states and conditions. Our perception of 'possible outcomes' is a reflection of limited information. The world is too vast and complex for us to make anything approaching detailed predictions of future events, just projections of trends, which may or may not persist.

 

[Jarhyn]

Without pointing from your view there is no empirical justification for mind or thinking.

I think therefore I am.

It is the one thing that cannot be empirically doubted. If you think you do not exist even as you exist to think it, you are beyond help, trapped in a cage of your own nonsense, no matter how big that cage may be.

I can designate empirically a logical cluster whether it be in the brain or in a computer. I cannot designate the mind because it is without an empirical basis beyond lay speculation and self-reference.

That's because you lack the desire to develop or pick up any of the a languages that discuss abstractions on the level of "mind".

I have pointed to the process level of a computer to discuss "mind". I can create a world with things subdivided on the abstract level of a mind. I can show you the full shape of a mind, built from logical clusters. I can hold it up and point to it.

It requires speculation or self-reference beyond the recognition that "it is like something to be someone, it must be like something to be someone else. It is likely to be like something to be anything; it must be like something to be a rock." These are observations extended into generalities.

I'm pretty sure the only things scientific are those things that arise from scientific experiments extracted from presumptions as material operations involving aspects of brain extracted from musings about mind, id, etc.

Ah, so the only philosophy is now science?!? How presumptuous.

Science relies on logic and other elements of philosophy. Science is not the only part of metaphysics that is important.

I suppose if you cut out your eyes because you only trust your ears, you might not believe in the existence of light....

We have an actual phenomena, observe it every day, in our own existence. These things are not "subjective" in that every feeling, every thought, is caused somewhere in our heads by some neuron being either in a state or another.

I suppose if you walked up on a computer in action and looked at the behavior of the thing without looking at the actual interface, if you only had access to the current core state at any point in time, you would see the processor and the metal and say "it's just one processor grinding through an endless series of instructions; it's deterministic, and I see no "processes" here. It's just one instruction after another!

Never mind that there ARE distinct processes created as abstract groupings of instructions bundled together, you do not want to look at them. You look at "trees" and fail to see "forest"

When gets to material operations one abandons the fuzzy model for explicit neural activities which can be scientifically addressed.

So goal oriented thinking requires a goal. My goal is, in fact, to break down the requirements, expectations, and strategies that best serve goal oriented thinking, wherein the goal is mutually compatible self-actualization.

"Want" has a neural shape. I have want," I" am made of neurons occasionally impacted by messenger chemicals from other constructions, therefore "want" has a neural shape.

This is an empirical observation.

I am a mind. I use the term 'mind' to describe what I am as a functional system within a larger construction of stuff. I am made of neurons. Therefore a contained "mind" does have a describable shape, just not one you are very comfortable with addressing.

The observation, made in the most scientific way (direct observation), implies when neurons (and other logical assemblies) cluster together, and operate together, their construction is "a mind".

Kick and scream and hate it all you want but it's right there.

You want so badly for me to not use a word "mind" to refer to "a logical assembly".

Do you really think the neural targets of visual and auditory stimuli define the scope of visual and auditory processes. Really?

Yes. They do, if I understand your question right: the neuronal activity that accepts the output of the eyes, and then the neurons that accept that activity and so on ARE the visual auditory process. Unless you believe in things like "soul" beyond the concept of "abstract graph identity"

...

To use the analogy of programming, this is the difference between a system and process, and also the difference between a process and a task.

You seem to wish to claim none of it is "process", that all of it is only "system"

As long as isolation exists between subassemblies, subassemblies within their isolation form the shapes of process, defined by the isolation, in fact.

Isolation of information REQUIRES that distinct process a are given rise within any dynamic system which expressed that isolation.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Reliable cause and effect in determinism is fixed cause and effect, being fixed does not equate to freedom. Just the opposite.

Question 1: Then you have a small problem to solve:
a) Shall we remove the terms "free" and "freedom" from all our dictionaries?
OR
b) Shall we define freedom in a way that does not require "freedom from causal necessity"?

As we know, freedom may be used in reference to unimpeded or unrestrained actions;

Correct.

the ball flies through the air unimpeded, the dog has been freed from its chain, planets and moons orbit freely, etc, etc.

One of those things is not like the others. The ball, the planets, and the moons, do not experience constraint. The dog experiences his chain as a constraint. For the dog, freedom is a meaningful concept, because the chain prevents him from chasing the squirrel, something that he really wants to do.

But relative that relative unimpeded actions do not equate to freedom of will. The dog may be free from the chain, but it isn't free from the constraint of the yard.

The dog experiences the fence around the yard as a constraint, because the squirrel has escaped to the other side of the fence.

The planet freely orbits the sun, but it can't do anything else, it is not free to roam.

Fortunately, the planet has no desires to do anything, so being "free" of its orbit is meaningless to the planet. On the other hand, if the Earth were free of its orbit, it would be a very meaningful event for us, because the Earth would float out into space, where things would get very cold and we'd all die. So, again, a very good argument for why reliable causation is our friend, to keep our Earth orbiting the Sun.

We can act in accordance to our 'will'' - which is determined by brain state - and the actions that follow are unimpeded, but you can't do anything else but what was determined by brain state.

Why would I want to do anything else than what my brain state chooses to do? My brain states, deciding what I will do, and my being able to do it, is what my freedom is all about!

You act according to inner necessity. Your constraints are determined by inner necessity. You can't do otherwise. Unimpeded action is not free will.

Apparently some unimpeded actions are exactly what free will is about. One such unimpeded action is deciding for myself what I will do. And that unimpeded action is commonly called "free will", because it is literally me being free to decide for myself what I will do.

And if my "inner necessity" (my series of brain states) chooses to have pancakes for breakfast, even though I could have had eggs again, then why would I complain? That "inner necessity" happens to be me, deciding to have pancakes for a change.

Now, if I started to fix pancakes, and found that the box of pancake mix was empty, then I would complain. That would be a meaningful constraint upon my ability to do what I wanted.

So, let's summarize what just happened in terms of causal necessity:
1. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I woke up hungry.
2. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I checked to see what I could fix for breakfast.
3. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I found eggs in the fridge, so I actually could have fixed eggs.
4. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I found pancake mix in the cupboard, so I could also fix pancakes.
5. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I recalled having had eggs for the past three days.
6. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I chose to have pancakes for a change.
7. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I fixed and ate the pancakes.
8. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I would have two real options to choose from, pancakes and eggs.
9. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that No one else would be there to force me to eat the eggs.
10. It was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I would choose to eat the pancakes of my own free will.

Now, here is my point about causal necessity. Causal necessity changes nothing. Everything happens just the way it always does, through a series of events where one thing necessarily leads, naturally and reliably, to the next thing.

So, we can simply drop that leading phrase, "It was causally necessary...", without any loss of meaning.

Causal necessity has no meaningful implications to any human scenarios. All of the useful information is from knowing the specific causes of specific effects.

Oh, and, of course, it was causally necessary from any prior point in time that I would have two real options to choose from, pancakes and eggs. The fact that I would fix pancakes, is true. The fact that I could have fixed eggs, is equally true.

You're driving down the road with your friend, a hard determinist, sitting in the passenger seat. You see a stoplight up ahead. Right now it is red, but you don't know how long it has been red. Will the light remain red or will it turn green as you arrive? You don't know. So, as you get closer you decide to slow down, just in case it remains red. But then the light changes to green just before you arrive, so you resume speed and continue down the road.

Your friend, the hard determinist, says to you, "Why did you slow down?". You tell him, "I wasn't sure whether the light would turn green. It could have remained red." Your friend corrects you, "No, the light could not have remained red. You see, in a determined system there is only one possibility, only one thing that can happen. So, the light could not have remained red!". And then he adds, "So, why did you slow down?". How do you answer the hard determinist?

Information is being acquired via the senses as you approach the intersection, what you do is determined by your (brain) experience with traffic signals, your speed, distance from the traffic lights, an estimation of signal duration...all of which comes together to determine your actions, you stop or go based on these factors.

Or, to phrase that more concisely, you slowed down because your brain concluded that the light "could have" remained red.

After all, the brain is an information processor, evolved to respond to environmental conditions. After all, it doesn't take free will to acquire and process information and act rationally.

Another sorting problem. Here's the solution: Acquiring and processing information enables us to make rational choices. When we are allowed to make these choices for ourselves, it is called "free will". When a choice is imposed upon us against our will by someone or something else, then it is "not free will".

The brain acquires and processes information and acts accordingly in both instances. In one instance you act according to your 'will,' but through inner necessity. The other, you are being forced to act against will.

Yes. That is why we have the distinction between a freely chosen will and a coerced will. It is a significant distinction.

The references relate to in external conditions, not how thought and action is produced.

Of course. The brain is processing information about its internal and external environments and uses both when making decisions.

Being free from external necessity doesn't free you from internal necessity;

Why would you expect someone to be free from themselves? Wouldn't that literally make them someone else?

No, we don't need freedom from internal necessity. Free will itself is a form of "internal necessity", specifically by rational calculation, in which our options are weighed, according to our own beliefs and values, and the result of that evaluation necessitates our subsequent action.

Question 5: Is it possible that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition of determinism is incorrect?

Why would it be? It's the basic definition of determinism, which is why they included it. Are you suggesting a better definition?

Of course. The SEP definition you're using is this one:

“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” [5] (SEP)

I would suggest this definition of determinism instead:

Determinism is a belief in causal necessity, that all events are reliably caused by prior events, such that theoretically (though not practically), given sufficient knowledge of any past state and its events, we could predict with 100% accuracy, any future state and its events.

Note that I've omitted the witchcraft and superstition contained in the SEP's definition, specifically the "governing" and the "swaying". Determinism is not an active force. And the author of the SEP article on Causal Determinism, Carl Hoefer, points this out himself later in section 2.4 Laws of Nature:

"In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical." (italics mine)

We speak from our limited perspective of the world, its changing states and conditions. Our perception of 'possible outcomes' is a reflection of limited information. The world is too vast and complex for us to make anything approaching detailed predictions of future events, just projections of trends, which may or may not persist.

Exactly. When we cannot speak with certainty as to what "will" happen, we imagine what "can" happen, in order to deal more effectively with what actually "does" happen.

There are many "possible" futures, but only one "actual" future. There are many things that "can" happen, but only one thing that "will" happen.

Within the domain of human influence (things we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

 

[The AntiChris]

You're unlikely to get a clear and unambiguous response fromReliable cause and effect in determinism is fixed cause and effect, being fixed does not equate to freedom. Just the opposite.

Question 1: Then you have a small problem to solve:
a) Shall we remove the terms "free" and "freedom" from all our dictionaries?
OR
b) Shall we define freedom in a way that does not require "freedom from causal necessity"?

As we know, freedom may be used in reference to unimpeded or unrestrained actions; the ball flies through the air unimpeded, the dog has been freed from its chain, planets and moons orbit freely, etc, etc. But relative that relative unimpeded actions do not equate to freedom of will. The dog may be free from the chain, but it isn't free from the constraint of the yard. The planet freely orbits the sun, but it can't do anything else, it is not free to roam.

We can act in accordance to our 'will'' - which is determined by brain state - and the actions that follow are unimpeded, but you can't do anything else but what was determined by brain state.

You act according to inner necessity. Your constraints are determined by inner necessity. You can't do otherwise. Unimpeded action is not free will.

Marvin

You're unlikely to get a clear and unambiguous response from DBT on his insistence that "freedom" is incompatible with determinism - I've tried for years.

Here's a frustrating exchange I had with DBT 3 years ago.

 

[pood]

IMO, DBT has a quasi-religious belief in hard determinism, such that he conflates it with determinism. As I have explained, they are not the same. You cannot validly go from, “reliable cause and effect is observed at the macro scale in our universe,” to, “the reason I chose eggs for breakfast this morning is because of the big bang,“ which is essentially his argument, such as it is. With rare exceptions, people cannot be budged from religious or quasi-religious beliefs.