Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

How can you call choosing is a simple empirical operation?

The same way I know that a "cat" is a cat. I observe an animal wandering around, scratching and purring and leaping on things. I ask someone, "Hey, what the heck is that?". "That is a 'cat'!", they say. Now I know that when I see one of those animals that it is a "cat".

In the same fashion, I watch people in a restaurant browsing a menu, and then telling the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please". And I ask someone, "What are they doing?". Someone says, "They are choosing what they will order for dinner". "Oh, I say." Then, the next time I see people browsing a menu in a restaurant and placing their orders, I know that they are "choosing" for themselves what they will have for dinner.

Empiricism is really simple.

You made assumptions based on fictitious place, transaction, and outcome not even actually observed by you or me.

But I have observed it, because I have eaten in a restaurant. If my presumption that you have also eaten in a restaurant is incorrect, I apologize.*

*self testimony isn't evidence.

It's best seen as a hypothetical. Hypotheticals are a priori, empirical is your characterization, and inclusion is an invalid attempt of coercive confirmation.

A priori is what we get when we have agreed upon definitions of things like "cats" and "choosing". That thing is a "cat" (assuming I am pointing at a cat) is an a priori because that's what the name "cat" means. What they are doing is "choosing" is a priori because that event is what "choosing" means.

Here is an empirical example. Study it.

I'm sorry, but I don't accept homework assignments. If you already understand it, then feel free to explain it to me and be sure to explain how it relates to our discussion. If you do not understand it, then it's unfair of you to ask me to study it so that I can explain it to you. So, do your own homework, please.

... a priori reasoning (can be empirical proposition but not evidence) that this drug would reduce the risk of a heart attack by lowering blood pressure was invalidated by a posteriori empirical evidence.

Your lesson highlighted. Ta da.

Thanks for your Christmas wishes.

And a merry Ho ho ho to you Marvin Edwards and to you too Steve Bank

 

[DBT]

Why the concept of free will is incoherent;
''.....When we say we have a free will, what we’re saying is that our will is free of causality. To say we have a free will is to say that what we decide is free of a cause.

This simply isn't true.

Of course some people may use the term 'free will' in this nonsensical way but you must be aware that many (most?) do not.

Caused is not free. Determined is not free if free means regulative control (which it must). If you don't have conscious regulative control of what your brain is doing, your actions are being caused by information interactions beyond your control, you are not in charge, you are not free to select according to your will. Your actions are not free will actions.

Nonsensical is defining actions that must necessarily follow from a brain state output as an example of free will.

 

[DBT]

Why the concept of free will is incoherent;
''.....When we say we have a free will, what we’re saying is that our will is free of causality. To say we have a free will is to say that what we decide is free of a cause.

This simply isn't true.

Of course some people may use the term 'free will' in this nonsensical way but you must be aware that many (most?) do not.

The bit that DBT quotes here is of course a rebuttal of libertarian free will and not compatibilist free will (soft determinism). Since no one here is arguing for libertarian (contra-causal) free will, it has no relevance to the discussion.

The article is a rebuttal of the concept of free will. The compatibilist version of free will fails for the reasons given multiple times.

Basically:

''Compatibilism, sometimes called soft determinism, is a theological term that deals with the topics of free will and predestination. It seeks to show that God's exhaustive sovereignty is compatible with human freedom, or in other words, it claims that determinism and free will are compatible. Rather than limit the exercise of God's sovereignty in order to preserve man's freedom, compatibilists say that there must be a different way to define what freedom really means.''

In other words, redefining the meaning of freedom.


''Notice that a true compatibilist, who has gone on record saying that determinism is a fact of nature, must believe that the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of action, and forming an intention to act on the desire, are all determined. The causal chain leading a human to lift a finger is longer than the chain leading a squirrel to lift an acorn, but it is no less deterministic (he who says that it is less deterministic is not a compatibilist but a closet libertarian).''

''Still others, most notably David Hume and some prominent contemporary social psychologists, believe they can have it both ways: accept determinism while also postulating a type of non-libertarian, straight-jacketed “free” will that still enables moral judgment [I put the “free” in quotation marks because the semantics are drained from the word].



More;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.'

 

[DBT]

Why the concept of free will is incoherent;
''.....When we say we have a free will, what we’re saying is that our will is free of causality. To say we have a free will is to say that what we decide is free of a cause.

This simply isn't true.

Of course some people may use the term 'free will' in this nonsensical way but you must be aware that many (most?) do not.

The bit that DBT quotes here is of course a rebuttal of libertarian free will and not compatibilist free will (soft determinism). Since no one here is arguing for libertarian (contra-causal) free will, it has no relevance to the discussion.

I'm not convinced. My reading was that the authors were arguing, just as DBT does, against any and all uses of the term 'free will'. In his responses, DBT rarely if ever makes any distinction between libertarian and compatibilist free will (he routinely attempts to rebut compatibilist arguments with objections that only target libertarian free will).

Of course there is a distinction between Libertarian free will and Compatibilism, but nobody is arguing for the Libertarian version. I don't know if there are any Libertarians left, it's too silly.

 

[DBT]

Hard determinists believe that volunteers don't really exist. They are just deluded slaves to causal necessity who thought they were free to refuse service.

Who is a hard determinist? Are we not talking about compatibilism, which accepts determinism but claims that freedom of will is compatible with determinism?

Compatibilists don't claim that multiple options can be realized in any given instance.

There are always multiple options, in every second, across every moment in time. Marvin keeps playing with eggs or pancakes, and he simplifies things by creating posts where simple, often binary choices are available to people at most instances of most of the time. But the reality is that there are in fact a literally innumerable amount of choices, all the time.

As pointed out, there are multiple options, but only one realizable for you in any given moment in time. And given the nature of determinism, that option is necessitated by antecedents. It is not freely willed. Information acting upon the brain necessitates that action in that moment in time.

You can call it decision making (computers are able to select options based on sets of criteria) but decision making does not equate to free will for reasons that have been given multiple times.

Although there may only be one "realizable" option for a choice maker, the choice maker, being ignorant of which one that is, is still faced with multiple options. What you keep failing to understand is that the free selection is done in the choice maker's imagination. It is a calculation that determines an action. Imagination is different from physical reality, as there are actually multiple outcomes. There is only one realizable option, because that is determined by weighted priorities in the mind of the individual making the choice. Nothing about free will is free of actual causal necessity, only of imagined causal necessity.

The action of neural networks determines which option is taken. It is not a free will choice. That is what compatibilists ignore or dismiss.

The option that is taken doesn't allow an alternate possibility, without the possibility of an alternative, where is freedom of choice? nowhere to be found.

Where is free will? Nowhere to be found. The ideological illusion of free will is maintained by redefining the meaning of 'free' and elevating will to a higher status than it actually has.

 

[DBT]

'Choice' is not a matter of free will, but brain function and condition. Information condition equals output, thoughts generated actions taken.

You still don't get it. One does not preclude the other. Choosing is a brain function that is easily demonstrated by walking into a restaurant and observing people browsing the menu and placing their order.

Appearances do not explain the means. Which is not free will.

If you recall;
Volition
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal.

Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere.

Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual).

Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

Your example is inappropriate. Driving is a skill, like playing the piano. While developing a skill there is initially a lot of conscious attention involved at the outset. But after the skill is acquired, your attention is often elsewhere. People can drive to work without thinking about driving. They play the radio. They may even talk on the phone. People can drive with their minds elsewhere and be surprised at how far they've travelled. Your attention to driving only wakes up to handle something unpredictable.

As pointed out on previous occasions, conscious attention is being produced and maintained through an information feed beginning with sensory input of information which acts upon the system, which processes and recognizes patterns through memory function, which is then represented in conscious form and constantly 'refreshed' while conscious representation is active.

The whole brain at work. Consciousness plays its role as representation of the world and self in order to navigate and respond.

Response of course comes in many forms, reflexive, instinctual, learned or prefrontal cortex higher order processing, executive function, etc, whatever action is not only appropriate (if the brain is functioning normally), but determined by the state of the system.

So driving is not about choosing, and has nothing to do with free will, other than the fact that you did initially choose to go somewhere.

And this is typical of the selective use of neuroscience evidence in arguments about free will. Usually we get all the exceptional cases where a person's brain is injured in some way, and it is suggested to us that the brain injured is the same as the brain normal. But in this case you have given us the neuroscience of motor skills, assuming perhaps that choosing what we will order for dinner is using the same motor neurons used while driving.

Please. Let's stick to the relevant neuroscience and not presume that every example of not-choosing is evidence that choosing never happens. It's an invalid argument. This is the second time (at least) that you've posted that same material, and it is still irrelevant to this discussion.

I think the means by which actions are taken and performed is central to the question of free will.

Sorry to be brief, it's nearly Christmas dinner time. I was going to leave this till tomorrow but felt compelled to at least make a comment.

 

[Copernicus]

...
Although there may only be one "realizable" option for a choice maker, the choice maker, being ignorant of which one that is, is still faced with multiple options. What you keep failing to understand is that the free selection is done in the choice maker's imagination. It is a calculation that determines an action. Imagination is different from physical reality, as there are actually multiple outcomes. There is only one realizable option, because that is determined by weighted priorities in the mind of the individual making the choice. Nothing about free will is free of actual causal necessity, only of imagined causal necessity.

The action of neural networks determines which option is taken. It is not a free will choice. That is what compatibilists ignore or dismiss.

The option that is taken doesn't allow an alternate possibility, without the possibility of an alternative, where is freedom of choice? nowhere to be found.

Where is free will? Nowhere to be found. The ideological illusion of free will is maintained by redefining the meaning of 'free' and elevating will to a higher status than it actually has.

Your answer suggests to me that you did not understand a thing I said, because you aren't addressing anything I said, despite the fact that you quoted my post. Your reaction is first to mention neural networks, which perhaps you think supports your position without you having to explain its relevance. You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future. The former is taken as fact, and the latter is taken as imagined potential. In that imaginary potential, there are always many possible outcomes, and the problem facing the chooser is to pick one of them. That is not predictable before the individual actually calculates which one is the best of the alternatives. The actual choice arrived at may be predetermined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, but that is of no relevance to the person who must pick one of several alternatives. In the imagination of the individual. there is the possibility of an alternative. If you disagree with me, then address this argument. And forget about neural networks. They have no explanatory value here.

Note that I have refuted your claim that there is a possibility of an alternative. There is at first. Once the individual calculates the optimal outcome and executes an action, the possibility of an alternative disappears from the purview of imagination. As time moves forward, only then does the possibility of an alternative disappear, because it moves from the domain of imagination to the domain of experience.

 

[Jarhyn]

...
Although there may only be one "realizable" option for a choice maker, the choice maker, being ignorant of which one that is, is still faced with multiple options. What you keep failing to understand is that the free selection is done in the choice maker's imagination. It is a calculation that determines an action. Imagination is different from physical reality, as there are actually multiple outcomes. There is only one realizable option, because that is determined by weighted priorities in the mind of the individual making the choice. Nothing about free will is free of actual causal necessity, only of imagined causal necessity.

The action of neural networks determines which option is taken. It is not a free will choice. That is what compatibilists ignore or dismiss.

The option that is taken doesn't allow an alternate possibility, without the possibility of an alternative, where is freedom of choice? nowhere to be found.

Where is free will? Nowhere to be found. The ideological illusion of free will is maintained by redefining the meaning of 'free' and elevating will to a higher status than it actually has.

Your answer suggests to me that you did not understand a thing I said, because you aren't addressing anything I said, despite the fact that you quoted my post. Your reaction is first to mention neural networks, which perhaps you think supports your position without you having to explain its relevance. You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future. The former is taken as fact, and the latter is taken as imagined potential. In that imaginary potential, there are always many possible outcomes, and the problem facing the chooser is to pick one of them. That is not predictable before the individual actually calculates which one is the best of the alternatives. The actual choice arrived at may be predetermined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, but that is of no relevance to the person who must pick one of several alternatives. In the imagination of the individual. there is the possibility of an alternative. If you disagree with me, then address this argument. And forget about neural networks. They have no explanatory value here.

Note that I have refuted your claim that there is a possibility of an alternative. There is at first. Once the individual calculates the optimal outcome and executes an action, the possibility of an alternative disappears from the purview of imagination. As time moves forward, only then does the possibility of an alternative disappear, because it moves from the domain of imagination to the domain of experience.

Or in other words ...

...just because an observer can calculate the 'next step result' of a deterministic system 'the hard way' by running the whole simulation step on paper does not change that many things in that step will calculate in an isolated fashion from each other, or that individual processes are not making decisions.

I find this so stupid in that we have math to describe deterministic systems and "conditionals", decisions, are built right into that math!

"IF(x)": make a decision ON x.

We build massive machines where the concept of decision is such a basic assumption that people who spend their lives talking about determinism and who even spend their lives looking at it don't understand the implication this has on their other metaphysics.

Some people just can't make that connection into "the metaphysics of deterministic systems, of which our universe appears to mostly be."

 

[Marvin Edwards]

*self testimony isn't evidence.

But it isn't just me. Dictionaries give definitions of words in common use by everyone. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), a "cat" is "A well-known carnivorous quadruped ( Felis domesticus) which has long been domesticated, being kept to destroy mice, and as a house pet." So, everyone knows what a cat is.

In the same fashion, the OED defines the verb "choose" as "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference." So, everyone knows what choosing is.

... a priori reasoning (can be empirical proposition but not evidence) that this drug would reduce the risk of a heart attack by lowering blood pressure was invalidated by a posteriori empirical evidence.

Your lesson highlighted. Ta da.

Hmm. I understand that one's reasoning can be based on an a priori, but my understanding of "a priori" is that it is a principle that is already assumed to be true, like "two" in "two plus two equals four". Two is well-defined, the operation of addition is well defined, and four is also well defined. So, 2 + 2 = 4 is deduced to be true, a priori.

I think you're still suggesting that choosing doesn't actually happen empirically, based on the logical fact that the choice is inevitable.

However, your claim would be the example of a priori reasoning. And the restaurant would be the a posteriori empirical evidence that invalidates it.

Thanks for repeating the question. I didn't figure it out until his morning.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Basically:
''Compatibilism, sometimes called soft determinism, is a theological term that deals with the topics of free will and predestination. It seeks to show that God's exhaustive sovereignty is compatible with human freedom, or in other words, it claims that determinism and free will are compatible. Rather than limit the exercise of God's sovereignty in order to preserve man's freedom, compatibilists say that there must be a different way to define what freedom really means.''

[/QUOTE]

Holy sh**! You're dragging a theological encyclopedia's definition of compatibilism to this table??

Puhleeze, how rude.

Oh, and Merry Christmas! by the way.

''Notice that a true compatibilist, who has gone on record saying that determinism is a fact of nature, must believe that the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of action, and forming an intention to act on the desire, are all determined. The causal chain leading a human to lift a finger is longer than the chain leading a squirrel to lift an acorn, but it is no less deterministic (he who says that it is less deterministic is not a compatibilist but a closet libertarian).''

Yes. Every event is the reliable result of prior events, and is thus causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. This includes the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of an action, and forming an intention to act on that desire. And I presume perfectly reliable cause and effect, even at the quantum level.

The questions are:
"What does this fact of causal necessity of all events logically entail?" Pretty much nothing. It's just a background constant which is logically true within any world of reliable cause and effect.
"How does this fact of causal necessity affect our notion of freedom?" It has no affect whatsoever.
"Does this fact of causal necessity entail that we have no free will?" Nope. You would have to come up with a special definition of free will, such as "a choice we make that is free of causal necessity", in order for anyone to conclude that it conflicts with free will.

The only conflict between causal necessity and free will is created by the delusion that causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us against our will. This, of course, is superstitious nonsense. The delusion is fed by the suggestion that our prior causes are responsible for our actions, and we are not. The suggestion is false of course. The fact of prior causes does not contradict the fact of present causes. If such a contradiction was allowed, the whole causal chain would unravel, without any real causes to be found anywhere.

So, we are dumb if we are sucked into this paradox of delusions and figurative constructs. And of course, we've all been sucked into the paradox at one time or another.

''Still others, most notably David Hume and some prominent contemporary social psychologists, believe they can have it both ways: accept determinism while also postulating a type of non-libertarian, straight-jacketed “free” will that still enables moral judgment [I put the “free” in quotation marks because the semantics are drained from the word].

Of course we can have it both ways! That's the way it has always been. Everyone takes reliable cause and effect for granted, because we witness it every day, in everything we do. Everyone takes their freedom to choose for themselves for granted because they observe themselves and others doing exactly that every day.

The only way these two empirical observations can be thought to conflict is by seduction into the fracking paradox, through false, but believable, suggestions. Thank you very kindly, philosophy.

More;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.'

First, there is not a dash of "true chance". Both random and chaotic events are problems of prediction rather than problems of unreliable causation. Every event is always reliably caused by prior events. However, we're only interested in the meaningful and relevant causes of events. The Big Bang is a convenient "prior point in time". But it would be sheer madness to attempt to arrest the Big Bang for robbing a bank, and just plain silly to say that the Big Bang decided in advance what I would have for breakfast this morning. There was nobody back then that had any clue that any of us would be born or what any of us would have for breakfast this morning.

There is no "master plan" that "fixes" all events in advance (that's another delusion). One thing happens, and that causes something else to happen, and so on, right up to the present and into the future. The farther back you go in time, as you trace the history of prior causes, the less meaningful and relevant, and the more incidental, each cause becomes. The Big Bang was an incidental cause of everything that followed, but certainly not the meaningful or relevant cause of anything happening now.

A meaningful cause efficiently explains why the event happened. A relevant cause is something we can actually do something about.

Second, whoever wrote the article is falsely equating desire with will. We have plenty of desires that we choose not to act on. The suggestion that desires control our behavior would justify rape, theft, murder, etc. So, let's keep things clear. Our deliberate will is a specific intention that we have decided to act upon. A desire is not sufficient in itself to cause any action.

Third, what's this business about claiming that humans are the only species with intelligence and free will? The ability to imagine alternatives, estimate their likely outcomes, experiment to confirm or refute our estimates, and choose what we will do, should be presumed to appear in some form in every intelligent species. (see Backyard Squirrel Maze 2.0)

And we do teach our dogs to make better behavior choices, just like we teach our children, but with fewer verbal cues. We can explain things to our kids that we cannot explain to our dogs.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The whole brain at work. Consciousness plays its role as representation of the world and self in order to navigate and respond...

... And one of things the whole brain works at is making choices. When making those choices, the brain may be subject to coercion and undue influence, or, the brain may be free of coercion and undue influence. There is no getting around these specific empirical details with generalizations about how the brain works as an information processing machine.

I think the means by which actions are taken and performed is central to the question of free will.

Only the means by which choices are made are relevant to the question of free will. Habits and skills only involving choosing at the point where we choose to put in the effort of developing the habit or skill. Existing habits or skills run automatically without the overhead of choosing. Habits and skills are not relevant to the topic of free will (at least not until you have a desire to break the habit, then choosing is essential).

 

[Jarhyn]

... The whole brain at work. Consciousness plays its role as representation of the world and self in order to navigate and respond...

... And one of things the whole brain works at is making choices. When making those choices, the brain may be subject to coercion and undue influence, or, the brain may be free of coercion and undue influence. There is no getting around these specific empirical details with generalizations about how the brain works as an information processing machine.

I think the means by which actions are taken and performed is central to the question of free will.

Only the means by which choices are made are relevant to the question of free will. Habits and skills only involving choosing at the point where we choose to put in the effort of developing the habit or skill. Existing habits or skills run automatically without the overhead of choosing. Habits and skills are not relevant to the topic of free will (at least not until you have a desire to break the habit, then choosing is essential).

Habits and skills are relevant to the topic of free will. It just happens that the will free to make those choices is a subsidiary ally, a secondary system in the body.

It is, effectively daemon or "service" process that makes better choices in the moment once you have given it management and direction.

There are still choices made, by a will that is "free" within the contexts of it's larger goal, it just happens to be embedded in the same chunk of meat we are.

 

[fromderinside]

*self testimony isn't evidence.

But it isn't just me. Dictionaries give definitions of words in common use by everyone. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), a "cat" is "A well-known carnivorous quadruped ( Felis domesticus) which has long been domesticated, being kept to destroy mice, and as a house pet." So, everyone knows what a cat is.

In the same fashion, the OED defines the verb "choose" as "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference." So, everyone knows what choosing is.

... a priori reasoning (can be empirical proposition but not evidence) that this drug would reduce the risk of a heart attack by lowering blood pressure was invalidated by a posteriori empirical evidence.

Your lesson highlighted. Ta da.

Hmm. I understand that one's reasoning can be based on an a priori, but my understanding of "a priori" is that it is a principle that is already assumed to be true, like "two" in "two plus two equals four". Two is well-defined, the operation of addition is well defined, and four is also well defined. So, 2 + 2 = 4 is deduced to be true, a priori.

I think you're still suggesting that choosing doesn't actually happen empirically, based on the logical fact that the choice is inevitable.

However, your claim would be the example of a priori reasoning. And the restaurant would be the a posteriori empirical evidence that invalidates it.

Thanks for repeating the question. I didn't figure it out until his morning.

One may assume something is true without having a posteriori evidence demonstrating it. So it' must remain a presumption and not be considered evidence. One must complete the experiment. showing the presumption is justified by empirical evidence. Believing and saying are no more than hand waving and gossip.

You now make an a priori 'example' of a base mathematical operation that's already been a posteriori confirmed. That's called apples and oranges or eating another's cake.

Dictionaries are not scientific experiments. Just as we've been arguing about the meanings and use of words by philosophers, unless those words are tested empirically they cannot be presumed as authoritative. Dictionaries are is not to set down the truth of words but to set down preferred meanings of words. for everyday use.

Words used in experiments must be chosen carefully and adhere to the fundamental principles of science which are to communicate empirical findings related to existing evidence. Existing evidence is not proposals. Scientific (empirical) experiments are publicly demonstrated operations and functions intending to extend the known and adjudicated scientific record. Or one might say the scientific theory is an existing model of the world to be tested against any and all experimental evidence concerning variables codified in the theory.

What we are talking about in Determinism are the basic operating principles in the scientific method. You are doing the best you can to confuse the discussion thereby setting up a special place for consideration of human intelligence and function.

Don't take my opposition to free willy lightly. There isn't a magical place for human thought or behavior. If you take a moment and read Dirac you will understand there is no light, no wiggle room, between relativity and quantum. mechanics.

This psychologist accepts there is an appearance of free will by humans to humans. It is just a time rationalization between what man is aware of and what man does. We have developed a capability to verbalize some of what we are aware probably in order to get better at executing complex multistep cognitive tasks. I'm pretty sure the rise of human spiritualism is tied to these circumstances.

 

[DBT]

...
Although there may only be one "realizable" option for a choice maker, the choice maker, being ignorant of which one that is, is still faced with multiple options. What you keep failing to understand is that the free selection is done in the choice maker's imagination. It is a calculation that determines an action. Imagination is different from physical reality, as there are actually multiple outcomes. There is only one realizable option, because that is determined by weighted priorities in the mind of the individual making the choice. Nothing about free will is free of actual causal necessity, only of imagined causal necessity.

The action of neural networks determines which option is taken. It is not a free will choice. That is what compatibilists ignore or dismiss.

The option that is taken doesn't allow an alternate possibility, without the possibility of an alternative, where is freedom of choice? nowhere to be found.

Where is free will? Nowhere to be found. The ideological illusion of free will is maintained by redefining the meaning of 'free' and elevating will to a higher status than it actually has.

Your answer suggests to me that you did not understand a thing I said, because you aren't addressing anything I said, despite the fact that you quoted my post.

What you said was irrelevant to the issue. I repeated what is relevant.

Your reaction is first to mention neural networks, which perhaps you think supports your position without you having to explain its relevance.

I have explained the relevance of the role and function of neural networks in relation to freedom of will over and over.

Your remark strongly suggests that you did not understand a word I said, nor the articles I quoted from and cited.

I can only assume that it's because it doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.

You do. But your second sense is problematic, because I said that there was a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual. Since you zipped right past that point without attempting to rebut it, you then went on to behave as if you had somehow addressed or refuted it. My point, of course, is that people distinguish between the past/present and the future.

You made no point. Imagination (being itself determined) doesn't allow the possibility of alternate action. Imagination cannot circumvent what has been determined to happen.

To say that there was ''a possibility of choice in the imagination of the individual'' is to invoke Libertarian free will.

The former is taken as fact, and the latter is taken as imagined potential. In that imaginary potential, there are always many possible outcomes, and the problem facing the chooser is to pick one of them. That is not predictable before the individual actually calculates which one is the best of the alternatives. The actual choice arrived at may be predetermined from the perspective of an omniscient observer, but that is of no relevance to the person who must pick one of several alternatives. In the imagination of the individual. there is the possibility of an alternative. If you disagree with me, then address this argument. And forget about neural networks. They have no explanatory value here.

The imagination of the individual is subject to exactly the same processes as everything else in terms of information processing and conscious mind. All forms of thought and action, including imagination, is determined by the state of the system in the instance of realizing an action - to reiterate - the only possible action in that instance in time.

Imagination is an element of the process of cognition. A determinant.

Note that I have refuted your claim that there is a possibility of an alternative.

That makes no sense. I have made no claim that there is a possibility of an alternative. Just the opposite.

There is at first. Once the individual calculates the optimal outcome and executes an action, the possibility of an alternative disappears from the purview of imagination. As time moves forward, only then does the possibility of an alternative disappear, because it moves from the domain of imagination to the domain of experience.

Odd, it's like you are arguing with someone else entirely.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

*self testimony isn't evidence.

But it isn't just me. Dictionaries give definitions of words in common use by everyone. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), a "cat" is "A well-known carnivorous quadruped ( Felis domesticus) which has long been domesticated, being kept to destroy mice, and as a house pet." So, everyone knows what a cat is.

In the same fashion, the OED defines the verb "choose" as "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference." So, everyone knows what choosing is.

... a priori reasoning (can be empirical proposition but not evidence) that this drug would reduce the risk of a heart attack by lowering blood pressure was invalidated by a posteriori empirical evidence.

Your lesson highlighted. Ta da.

Hmm. I understand that one's reasoning can be based on an a priori, but my understanding of "a priori" is that it is a principle that is already assumed to be true, like "two" in "two plus two equals four". Two is well-defined, the operation of addition is well defined, and four is also well defined. So, 2 + 2 = 4 is deduced to be true, a priori.

I think you're still suggesting that choosing doesn't actually happen empirically, based on the logical fact that the choice is inevitable.

However, your claim would be the example of a priori reasoning. And the restaurant would be the a posteriori empirical evidence that invalidates it.

Thanks for repeating the question. I didn't figure it out until his morning.

One may assume something is true without having a posteriori evidence demonstrating it. So it' must remain a presumption and not be considered evidence. One must complete the experiment. showing the presumption is justified by empirical evidence. Believing and saying are no more than hand waving and gossip.

You now make an a priori 'example' of a base mathematical operation that's already been a posteriori confirmed. That's called apples and oranges or eating another's cake.

Dictionaries are not scientific experiments. Just as we've been arguing about the meanings and use of words by philosophers, unless those words are tested empirically they cannot be presumed as authoritative. Dictionaries are is not to set down the truth of words but to set down preferred meanings of words. for everyday use.

Words used in experiments must be chosen carefully and adhere to the fundamental principles of science which are to communicate empirical findings related to existing evidence. Existing evidence is not proposals. Scientific (empirical) experiments are publicly demonstrated operations and functions intending to extend the known and adjudicated scientific record. Or one might say the scientific theory is an existing model of the world to be tested against any and all experimental evidence concerning variables codified in the theory.

What we are talking about in Determinism are the basic operating principles in the scientific method. You are doing the best you can to confuse the discussion thereby setting up a special place for consideration of human intelligence and function.

Don't take my opposition to free willy lightly. There isn't a magical place for human thought or behavior. If you take a moment and read Dirac you will understand there is no light, no wiggle room, between relativity and quantum. mechanics.

This psychologist accepts there is an appearance of free will by humans to humans. It is just a time rationalization between what man is aware of and what man does. We have developed a capability to verbalize some of what we are aware probably in order to get better at executing complex multistep cognitive tasks. I'm pretty sure the rise of human spiritualism is tied to these circumstances.

I'm not looking for wiggle room. In fact, the more pervasive causal necessity is, the less relevant it becomes. Back when I had the insight in the public library, there were sci-fi stories about travelling into and then through a black hole, and coming out on the other side somewhere new. Going from the familiar, through the turbulence, and back to the familiar again. I used to think of it as pushing into the blackhole of determinism and coming out on the other side where free will showed up again.

Many years later, I was reading some Zen and came across this story that showed up in one of Donovan's song lyrics, "First there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is". Wikipedia captures the Zen story like this:

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]

But my trip was not long or lengthy. It went like this:

After my father died, I spent time in the public library, browsing the philosophy section. I think I was reading something by Baruch Spinoza that introduced the issue of determinism as a threat to free will. I found this troublesome until I had this thought experiment (whether I read it in one of the books or just came up with it myself, I can’t recall).

The idea that my choices were inevitable bothered me, so I considered how I might escape what seemed like an external control. It struck me that all I needed to do was to wait till I had a decision to make, between A and B, and if I felt myself leaning heavily toward A, I would simply choose B instead. So easy! But then it occurred to me that my desire to thwart inevitability had caused B to become the inevitable choice, so I would have to switch back to A again, but then … it was an infinite loop!

No matter which I chose, inevitability would continue to switch to match my choice! Hmm. So, who was controlling the choice, me or inevitability?

Well, the concern that was driving my thought process was my own. Inevitability was not some entity driving this process for its own reasons. And I imagined that if inevitability were such an entity, it would be sitting there in the library laughing at me, because it made me go through these gyrations without doing anything at all, except for me thinking about it.

My choice may be a deterministic event, but it was an event where I was actually the one doing the choosing. And that is what free will is really about: is it me or is someone or something else making the decision. It was always really me.

And since the solution was so simple, I no longer gave it any thought. Then much later, just a few years ago, I ran into some on-line discussions about it, and I wondered why it was still a problem for everyone else, since I had seen through the paradox more than fifty years ago.

 

[DBT]

Marvin Edwards;
Holy sh**! You're dragging a theological encyclopedia's definition of compatibilism to this table??

Puhleeze, how rude.

It wasn't intended to be rude. The term ''Free Will'' has its roots in Christianity;

''The term "free will" (liberum arbitrium) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until the Enlightenment proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will,[10] so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.[11]'' - Wiki

Marvin Edwards
Yes. Every event is the reliable result of prior events, and is thus causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. This includes the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of an action, and forming an intention to act on that desire. And I presume perfectly reliable cause and effect, even at the quantum level.

Yes, and as always, the sticky point for compatibilism lies in agency and the defining freedom as acting in accordance with ones inclinations despite the fact that acting in accordance with one's inclinations is necessitated, not chosen....actions initiated before milliseconds prior to awareness.

The questions are:
"What does this fact of causal necessity of all events logically entail?" Pretty much nothing. It's just a background constant which is logically true within any world of reliable cause and effect.
"How does this fact of causal necessity affect our notion of freedom?" It has no affect whatsoever.
"Does this fact of causal necessity entail that we have no free will?" Nope. You would have to come up with a special definition of free will, such as "a choice we make that is free of causal necessity", in order for anyone to conclude that it conflicts with free will.

Cognition is more than 'just a background constant.' It's the very means by which we think and respond, what we think and the actions we take. The state of the system equates to the nature of the action.

Again, none of this is willed. It's an unconscious process right up to the moment of conscious report. Not being willed, it has nothing to do with free will.

''The results show that, first, W is not strongly linked to the time of movement onset, so whatever is going on in the brain at time W cannot be responsible for movement genesis.

1 Moreover, the brain event of W may even be later than we subjectively report. This should not be a complete surprise since humans “live in the past”—certainly perception of a real-world event has to be subsequent to its actual occurrence, since it takes time (albeit very little time) for the brain to process sensory information about the event. A recent experiment showed that it was possible to manipulate the conscious awareness of willing a movement by delivering a transcranial magnetic stimulus to the area of the brain just in front of the supplementary motor area after the movement had already occurred.3 This suggests that the brain events of W may occur even after the movement.

If free will does not generate movement, what does?

''Movement generation seems to come largely from the primary motor cortex, and its input comes primarily from premotor cortices, parts of the frontal lobe just in front of the primary motor cortex. The premotor cortices receive input from most of the brain, especially the sensory cortices (which process information from our senses), limbic cortices (the emotional part of the brain), and the prefrontal cortex (which handles many cognitive processes). If the inputs from various neurons “compete,” eventually one input wins, leading to a final behavior. For example, take the case of saccadic eye movements, quick target-directed eye movements. Adding even a small amount of electrical stimulation in different small brain areas can lead to a monkey's making eye movements in a different direction than might have been expected on the basis of simultaneous visual cues.4 In general, the more we know about the various influences on the motor cortex, the better we can predict what a person will do.''

The only conflict between causal necessity and free will is created by the delusion that causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us against our will. This, of course, is superstitious nonsense. The delusion is fed by the suggestion that our prior causes are responsible for our actions, and we are not. The suggestion is false of course. The fact of prior causes does not contradict the fact of present causes. If such a contradiction was allowed, the whole causal chain would unravel, without any real causes to be found anywhere.

So, we are dumb if we are sucked into this paradox of delusions and figurative constructs. And of course, we've all been sucked into the paradox at one time or another.

Again, nobody is arguing that ''causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us'' - that is Strawman. Nobody has said it, nobody argues that causal necessity is an entity.

The question is just whether freedom of will is compatible with determinism. And seeing the standard definition of determinism happens to be - Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - the answer is clearly no.

The answer is no because the very definition of freedom is regulative control or the absence of necessity, coercion or constraint in choice or action.
Freedom;
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action

Yet the very means of thought and action is deterministically necessitated, all decisions are necessitated with an option to do otherwise being impossible.

Where then is free will to be found? It seems, only within a definition that seeks to redefine freedom in order to support the notion of 'free will'

'I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to', or 'I could have wanted otherwise' is impossible when determined actions inevitably follow from deterministically realized options, with will playing no part in regulation.

 

[fromderinside]

Here, Here!

 

[The AntiChris]

Here, Here!

Where, where?

 

[pood]

DBT, you write:

Again, nobody is arguing that ''causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us'' - that is Strawman. Nobody has said it, nobody argues that causal necessity is an entity.

But, in effect, that is exactly what you DO argue, even if inadvertently, when you then write:

The question is just whether freedom of will is compatible with determinism. And seeing the standard definition of determinism happens to be - Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - the answer is clearly no.

If the world is governed by, or under the sway of, determinism, then yes, you are reifying determinism as some kind of causal entity. What Marvin and I have repeatedly pointed out is that this sort of reification cannot be maintained because the world is NOT “governed by” natural law. Natural “laws” are not laws at all, because they are not prescriptive. They are descriptive. Natural law does not provide the truth grounds for what happens in the world. The truth-making relation is exactly the opposite: what happens in the world, provides the truth grounds for natural law.

Nevertheless, it may indeed, for other reasons, be the case that the future is just as fixed as the past — in Minkowski/Einstein’s block universe model for example. So what? Fixity is not the same as fatalism. If today it is true that yesterday I had eggs for breakfast, it does not follow that yesterday I HAD TO have eggs; I just did have eggs. I have pointed out again and again the modal fallacy that you repeatedly make.

Just so, if it is true today that tomorrow I will have eggs for breakfast, then tomorrow I will, but not must, have eggs. Whether I have eggs or not is, was, and always will be, a contingent fact of history — meaning it could have been, but was not, otherwise.

Yes, there is one history of the world, and it is fixed. Our free acts are among the factors that fix the history of the world and that are described by so-called natural law.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The term ''Free Will'' has its roots in Christianity;

''The term "free will" (liberum arbitrium) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until the Enlightenment proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will,[10] so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.[11]'' - Wiki

And yet, just above that paragraph you have this one:

History of free will​

The problem of free will has been identified in ancient Greek philosophical literature. The notion of compatibilist free will has been attributed to both Aristotle (fourth century BCE) and Epictetus (1st century CE); "it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them".[4][9] According to Susanne Bobzien, the notion of incompatibilist free will is perhaps first identified in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias (third century CE); "what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them".

Wikipedia actually has another, separate article called Free Will in Antiquity that lists even earlier contributors to the notions of determinism, compatibilism, and libertarian viewpoints.

Marvin Edwards
Yes. Every event is the reliable result of prior events, and is thus causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. This includes the events of experiencing a desire, foreseeing the consequences of an action, and forming an intention to act on that desire. And I presume perfectly reliable cause and effect, even at the quantum level.

Yes, and as always, the sticky point for compatibilism lies in agency and the defining freedom as acting in accordance with ones inclinations despite the fact that acting in accordance with one's inclinations is necessitated, not chosen....actions initiated before milliseconds prior to awareness.

Nothing sticky about it.
a) Either you made the choice, or, someone or something else made the choice.
b) If you made the choice unconsciously, then it is still you making the choice. And the unconscious brain will inform the conscious brain in plenty of time to tell the waiter, "I'll have the steak dinner, please".
c) By causal necessity, it would be you, and no one else that would make that choice at that specific time and place.

But, perhaps it is still sticky for you. I hope you can see now how easily it sorts itself out.

The questions are:
"What does this fact of causal necessity of all events logically entail?" Pretty much nothing. It's just a background constant which is logically true within any world of reliable cause and effect.
"How does this fact of causal necessity affect our notion of freedom?" It has no affect whatsoever.
"Does this fact of causal necessity entail that we have no free will?" Nope. You would have to come up with a special definition of free will, such as "a choice we make that is free of causal necessity", in order for anyone to conclude that it conflicts with free will.

Cognition is more than 'just a background constant.' It's the very means by which we think and respond, what we think and the actions we take. The state of the system equates to the nature of the action.

Cognition is a causal mechanism. Causal necessity is the background constant.

The cognitive process causes choices to be made and actions to be taken. Each of us comes into the world equipped with this causal mechanism, called the central nervous system. It enables us to be the causes events. And it gives us executive control, because we decide what happens next.

Again, none of this is willed. It's an unconscious process right up to the moment of conscious report. Not being willed, it has nothing to do with free will.

So what? Conscious or unconscious, choices are still our own choices.

''The results show that, first, W is not strongly linked to the time of movement onset, so whatever is going on in the brain at time W cannot be responsible for movement genesis.

1 Moreover, the brain event of W may even be later than we subjectively report. This should not be a complete surprise since humans “live in the past”—certainly perception of a real-world event has to be subsequent to its actual occurrence, since it takes time (albeit very little time) for the brain to process sensory information about the event. A recent experiment showed that it was possible to manipulate the conscious awareness of willing a movement by delivering a transcranial magnetic stimulus to the area of the brain just in front of the supplementary motor area after the movement had already occurred.3 This suggests that the brain events of W may occur even after the movement.

Yeah. We know all of that stuff. And it doesn't change anything. The conversion of sensory data into conscious awareness takes a wee bit of time (you know, turning the image right side up, and all that). And a normal brain can be manipulated by transcranial magnetic stimulus to give us inaccurate sensations.

Free will remains a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence. There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts this.

If free will does not generate movement, what does?

''Movement generation seems to come largely from the primary motor cortex, and its input comes primarily from premotor cortices, parts of the frontal lobe just in front of the primary motor cortex. The premotor cortices receive input from most of the brain, especially the sensory cortices (which process information from our senses), limbic cortices (the emotional part of the brain), and the prefrontal cortex (which handles many cognitive processes). If the inputs from various neurons “compete,” eventually one input wins, leading to a final behavior. For example, take the case of saccadic eye movements, quick target-directed eye movements. Adding even a small amount of electrical stimulation in different small brain areas can lead to a monkey's making eye movements in a different direction than might have been expected on the basis of simultaneous visual cues.4 In general, the more we know about the various influences on the motor cortex, the better we can predict what a person will do.''

You keep repeating this as if it had something to do with free will. I shouldn't blame you since you are quoting from authors who are looking for free will in the primary motor cortex, and equating "quick target-directed eye movements" with a person's choice as to whether he should rob a bank. This is foolishness.

Again, nobody is arguing that ''causal necessity is some kind of entity that exercises control over us'' - that is Strawman. Nobody has said it, nobody argues that causal necessity is an entity.

Well, let's see how long it takes before you do it again.

The question is just whether freedom of will is compatible with determinism. And seeing the standard definition of determinism happens to be - Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. - the answer is clearly no.

And there it is. Determinism is presented to us literally as a "governing" force that exercises some kind of "sway" over events.

The answer is no because the very definition of freedom is regulative control or the absence of necessity, coercion or constraint in choice or action.

Freedom is the ability to do something that we want to do. We are not free if we must do something out of necessity whether we want to or not. We are not free if we are coerced by someone with a gun to do something whether we want to or not. We are not free if we are constrained from doing what we want to do or constrained to do something that we do not want to do.

But, logically, if what we want to do is causally necessary, then causal necessity cannot be said to prevent us from doing what we want, having provided that want in the first place. Any constraint, upon doing what we want, would have to come from something else, like the guy holding the gun.

Yet the very means of thought and action is deterministically necessitated, all decisions are necessitated with an option to do otherwise being impossible.

Except that each option to do otherwise will, by causal necessity, appear to our mind via a real physical event within the brain's real processing as part of the rational causal mechanism, the real mechanics of thought.

Where then is free will to be found?

Right there. I just showed it to you again! It's in the mechanics of thought that enable you to construct your own argument.

It seems, only within a definition that seeks to redefine freedom in order to support the notion of 'free will'

Ah, but it is you that argues for a flawed, straw man definition of freedom. One that requires freedom from cause and effect, as if cause and effect were some kind of boogeyman that would steal our control and our freedom. There is no freedom without reliable cause and effect. So, the philosophical definition of free will, as "freedom from causal necessity", is an oxymoron, a paradox created by self-contradiction.

The correct notion is this: free will is when someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. That is the notion that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. This sort of free will is commonly understood and correctly applied by most people.

The notion of being "free from causal necessity" can never be used to excuse someone from responsibility, because if it excuses one act then it excuses all acts, because all actions are equally causally necessary.

'I would have done otherwise, if I had wanted to', or 'I could have wanted otherwise' is impossible when determined actions inevitably follow from deterministically realized options, with will playing no part in regulation.

Sorry, but "I could have done otherwise" is hard coded into the rational causal mechanism. You cannot declare it to be "impossible" without breaking rationality itself.

The survival benefits of intelligence comes from imagining alternate solutions to environmental challenges. Intelligence gives us the ability to deal with matters of uncertainty. And, lacking omniscience, we are often confronted with uncertainty.

For example, its morning, and I wake up hungry. What will I have for breakfast? Well, what can I have for breakfast? I have eggs is the fridge. So, I am certain that I can fix eggs. But, I'm still uncertain as to whether I will fix eggs. What other options do I have? Hey, here's some pancake mix in the cupboard. So, I am also certain that I can fix pancakes. But I am still uncertain which one I will fix. Well, what did I have for breakfast yesterday? Hmm. Eggs. What about the day before yesterday? Eggs. And the day before that I also had eggs. So, just for a change, I will have pancakes this morning for breakfast. Could I have had eggs instead? Yes, of course I could.

As you should see by now, that fact that I would not have eggs does not logically imply that I could not have had eggs.

What I "can" do constrains what I "will" do. I "will" never do something that I "cannot" do.
But what I "will" do never constrains what I "can" do. What I "can" do is only constrained by my imagination.