Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

There are plenty of common references to freedom that are not to the underlying nature of reality, a determined world.

Common references are the source of definitions. People outside of these discussions do not reference "a determined world" at all, because it has no meaning and no significance to any practical human matter. The notion of "a determined world" is a disease spread through false but believable suggestions that trap people in a paradox.

Common references are a source of definitions, but common references are not always an accurate representation of the physical processes they refer to. The 'moon is rising' represents what we see when we look at the evening sky - bu,t as we know, it's our planet that is rotating on its axis.

You can say ''I am thinking'' - yet conscious thought is being generated by neural network activity, information feed, etc, and not 'you thinking.'

You may say ''I am my brain'' and that is true to an extent, but more accurately, it is the brain that creates and generates conscious you when needed and puts you to sleep when not.

The truth is that all events are the natural result of prior events. This notion goes by the name "History".

As pointed out, George swings his golf club freely, the bird flies freely, you are free to watch TV or read a book, says absolutely nothing about the nature of the mechanisms and means of these freely performed actions.

Freedom is our ability to do things. If George can no longer swing his golf club freely, because he has a pulled muscle in his shoulder, the mechanism will be examined by an Orthopedist, who will recommend treatment. And all of George's golfing buddies will sympathize, and share their own stories of injuries on the golf course.

The nature of the mechanism is not some hidden philosophical secret. We just take them for granted until they stop working. Then we see a doctor, who knows all about the mechanism and how to restore its function, so that George is free once more to swing his golf club.

Yes, but the ability to act does not automatically equate to 'free will.' The ability to act is simply the ability to act. Any animal with a central nervous system can do it, snails, worms, rabbits, mice., whatever...each according to their genetic makeup and neural architecture, not their 'free will'

Their actions necessarily proceed from their neural activity. They can all act according to their will, but their will does not equate to free will.

Being subject to inner necessity, their will is not free.

Definition of freedom
1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action - Merrium Webster

The fact is that no actions are ever free of prior causes.
If the action is freely chosen, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is coerced, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is accidental, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is insane, then it will still be "causally" necessary.

To say that the action is causally determined blurs all meaningful distinctions. And, we humans become very dumb and incompetent when we fail to make meaningful distinctions. (The book, "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat", comes to mind).

Causal determination is the whole point of the debate and the question of whether free will can exist in a determined world.

It's not enough to point to actions that are freely performed (necessarily performed) on the basis of will and say that this is an example of free will when will itself is fixed by antecedents over which the agent, the brain, has absolutely no control.

The best you can claim is 'freedom of action.'

‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Schopenhauer

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you h

Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

Another false, but believable suggestion. The truth is that our cognitive states will themselves be the causes of other cognitive states. (It's that state at t and state at t+1 thing that causal necessity implies). And that is what we experience. One thing being the cause of the next thing. (For example, my breakfast is now ready, so I'll finish up and go eat it now).

It's not false. Present cognitive states are determined by past cognitive states, which in turn determine future cognitive states. The cognitive state in any given moment in time determines behavioral output in that moment in time, with no possible deviation in any given moment in time

What is done in each and every moment in time is the only possible action

It is the state of the brain that determines thought and action. The brain cannot choose its own makeup, architecture, information condition, etc, therefore cannot do otherwise.

Determinism, by definition, does not allow alternate actions.

If ''control'' implies the possibility of alternate action, the claim of control is false

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.

And this is the common you can't have free will because unless you can be "free from yourself" argument. Whose will would it be if you were free from yourself? Someone else's.

Condition determines action. We don't get to choose our condition.

 

[DBT]

2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world. Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

This is true only for libertarian (contra-causal) free will. It is not true for compatibilist free will as discussed in this forum.

Compatibilism is based on flawed premises. If the premises are flawed, the conclusion is rendered unsound. unimpeded actions based on necessitated processes/will does not equate to free will.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Which premise is flawed and what is the flaw?

I think we've been through this before.

From post #735

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated.

The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists.

Real choice requires alternate possibilities, yet no alternate possibilities exist within a determined system. The action that proceeds from thought/information processing is a necessitated action, which being determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted.

The action must be necessarily carried out as determined.

P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a person's desires or wishes, which, being determined by the factors outlined above, were not an example of free will.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes;
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The conclusion, for reasons outlined above, does not follow from P1, P2, P3 or P4.

Sorry.

 

[The AntiChris]

You can say ''I am thinking'' - yet conscious thought is being generated by neural network activity, information feed, etc, and not 'you thinking.'

This is a real gem and explains a lot about how DBT 'thinks'.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

1. Indeterminism would destroy science which is demonstrably the most powerful tool man has developed ever.

Correct. The whole point of science is to discover the causes of events. For example, Covid-19 is caused by a specific virus. Knowing the cause enables us to exercise control over the virus by creating vaccinations.

2. Free will has no mechanism for existence in either a determined or undetermined world.

The mechanism of free will is choosing and choosing is a deterministic mechanism.

Cause and effect eliminated choice and lack of cause and effect negates motive.

Nope. That would be a delusion created by thinking figuratively rather than literally.

Choosing is an actual event that takes place in the real world. One cannot it doesn't happen when we can easily walk into a restaurant and see people browsing the menu and placing their orders. This activity is called "choosing". And it is just as real as "walking", "talking", or "chewing gum".

Formally, choosing is an operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is the thing we have decided we will do.

The practical effects of choosing is that it sets our intention upon a specific goal, the thing that we will do, and that intention motivates and directs our subsequent actions, such as telling the waiter, "I will have the lobster dinner, please".

Cause and effect never eliminates anything. Cause and effect describes how the actual objects and forces interact to bring about events. We happen to be one of those actual objects that reliably interact with other objects (such as the waiter in the restaurant) to bring about the event of having a lobster dinner on our table for us to enjoy. We are the meaningful and relevant cause. The lobster on the table is the practical effect.

Choosing is a deterministic operation in that our choice is reliably caused by who and what we are at the time of choosing. Who and what we are at that time is a reliable result of prior events, such as our genetic dispositions (nature) and our prior life experiences (nurture).

Now, the delusion I spoke of is the tendency to say to ourselves that, since our choice was the reliable result of prior causes, that it is AS IF those prior causes made the choice instead of us. That is a figurative statement. But, like all figurative statements, it is literally (actually, objectively, empirically) false. It was actually us, in that moment, performing the choosing operation that causally determined there would be a lobster rather than a steak on the dinner table.

The evidence that it was really us, and not our prior causes, is witnessed by the waiter who brings us the bill for the lobster dinner. He does not bring the bill to our prior causes. And that should clear our head as to what literally happened in the real world.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Which premise is flawed and what is the flaw?

I think we've been through this before.

Yes we have. But you have not yet demonstrated any flaw. For example:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated.

Given determinism, the action was necessarily produced by the mechanism of choosing. It was causally necessary/inevitable, from any prior point in eternity, that choosing would be the final responsible cause of the action. That is how determinism and causal necessity work.

The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists.

Actually, it is your own wording that was "designed to give the impression" that necessity eliminates choice. If choosing happens, then it necessarily happens! And we can objectively observe choosing happening in a restaurant as people browse the menu and place their orders. Thus choosing necessarily happens.

Real choice requires alternate possibilities, yet no alternate possibilities exist within a determined system.

The people in the restaurant are looking at a literal menu of alternate possibilities. Given determinism and causal necessity, that list of alternate possibilities was unavoidable, and necessarily must happen. And that means that each customer would necessarily have to choose one of those alternate possibilities (or go without dinner).

The action that proceeds from thought/information processing is a necessitated action, which being determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted.

And by "thought/information processing" I assume you are referring specifically to the choosing operation that each customer in the restaurant actually performed just before placing their order. And, as you suggest, they were "unimpeded" and "unrestricted" by anything that would prevent them from deciding for themselves what they would order for dinner. So, when each customer told the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please", it was a freely chosen "I will".

The action must be necessarily carried out as determined.

Exactly. It was determined that each customer would choose for themselves what they would have for dinner, from a menu of many possibilities. And they would do this choosing while free of coercion and undue influence. Thus, their choice was a freely chosen "I will have the steak" or a freely chosen "I will have the lobster" or ... you get the idea.

So, as to P1, you have failed to prove it false. "P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence" stands firm.

P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

But the menu was filled with possible alternate actions. So, you cannot truthfully claim that there were no possible alternate actions. It was possible to order the steak. It was possible to order the lobster. It was possible to order the chef salad. Given determinism, each person would only choose one of those items, but each person could have chosen any one of those items.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

Listing what we actually did not choose, like our genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, does not eliminate anything that we actually do choose, like what we will have for dinner.

Free will does not require that we be "free from ourselves" or "free from causation" or "free from nature" or "free from nurture". It simply requires that our choice is free from coercion and undue influence.

The question of free will is whether the choice is our own (our own goals, reasons, interests) versus a choice imposed upon us by someone or something else (their goals, reasons, interests).


P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a person's desires or wishes, which, being determined by the factors outlined above, were not an example of free will.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes;

But what I will do about those wants and desires is determined by my deliberate choices.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X."

So, you're saying that if we desire sex with a woman then we must act upon that desire without constraint? You are justifying rape. Please stop doing that.

"At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

And that confirms you are justifying rape. You are saying that we should act like animals, and not judge ourselves in moral terms. This is very disturbing DBT, and I think you should cease quoting that source over and over again.

In any case, you have not demonstrated any flaws in the premises of the compatibilist argument.
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

 

[Jarhyn]

So @fromderinside @DBT:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

Edit: or, how would you reword the above statement to fit your hard determinism?

Because there is a truth there, in that statement. Game theory was invented by humans for the sake of making better "choices". That is it's entire function in the ecosystem of math.

Do you think game theory is meaningless mental masturbation? Otherwise, what process do you think "improves" and how would you even use language to meaningfully discuss it without bringing choice into it as a concept?

My hard determinism?

No, the definition of determinism is the same for both sides.

The distinction lies between compatibility and incompatibility of 'free will'

I argue that the term is redundant. It doesn't represent cognition, decision making, the drivers of human behaviour, the nature and function of neural networks, inputs or outputs....that compatibilism rests upon a carefully selected and worded definition.

That's all.

I argue that it does not, and is not.

I posed a simple question to you:

Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?
Reword terms of you need to.

Compatibilism relies on a carefully selected and worded definition for the same reason that math relies on a carefully selected and worded definition of "set" and "identity" and "transitive".

Carefully worded and selected definitions when discussing topics on a level wherein mechanical function of ideas is possible was the entire point.

I repeat: Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

The correct answer is 'yes'. But a mistake is being made. 'Better' is a qualitative word, a subjective expression. I take the liberty here providing an example of providing a mostly subjective analysis of choice and decision in design.

Subjective And Objective Design Choices​

Subjective And Objective Design Choices - Vanseo Design

How can a series of objective design decisions lead to something subjective?

vanseodesign.com

makes what I've been trying to make clear obvious. Humans are subjective beings living in an objective world. All operationalists try to make this point, but, being subjective beings they mostly fail. Most spectacularly, Psychologists, behaviorists, in particular, failed miserably.

So me saying what you write is subjectively expressed or view is true, but not because you can't see the light. The field which you love is filled with subjective statements, even in definitions. That you defend your view is proof of your and my subjectivity. Even the founder of Operationalism acknowledges what he expresses is never completely objective. He failed, admits his condition as true, because he has justified it because he's a physicist.

I don't ask that every word be operationally defined. I ask that you admit what you write is a mostly subjective view.

You associating your view by linking Math with your list of essential words is a strong signal you are aware what you write is a subjective statement supporting mostly subjective terms of their objectivity.

"Better" is only subjective when there is missing information, and relates in this conversation to an objective reality in the form of goal oriented operations.

First, we generally do not decide on our goals, or more appropriately we do not choose certain of our goals. I'll call these "objective needs". We need food, water, protection from environmental dangers, sleep, and self-actualization, among other things. We can make choices on how to accomplish these things, but they are objectively necessary parts of operating as a human being.

How to accomplish it in any moment may be complicated. Which pursuits are most likely to be successful are complicated. The strategy to accomplish those things are complicated. But they are not subjective. What you want you want, objectively.

You wish to eliminate choice with causal necessity? Really you just eliminate the very concept of subjectivity.

 

[Jarhyn]

The fact is, I objectively exist. I'm an object. The object that I am has a complex form which generated forces not unique to the implementation.

I feel a shelter force towards objects in the shelter field proportionate to my exposure. That this field is composed of other fields, and that it is fairly uniquely defined through the orientation and alignment of those other fields matters little to it's objective reality and it's effects on the object which in many ways names that force.

That a force is experienced by only one specific thing (and this is by no means a requirement), does not change it's objective reality.

That the logic is discussed fuzzily makes it no less real.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I repeat: Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

My impression is that game theory is a set of hypotheses and experiments exploring how people make decisions in specially constructed scenarios. I'm not sure that the goal of game theory is to help people make better choices. I suspect the information could also be used to help manipulate peoples choices.

Helping people to make better choices would be a separate enterprise. There are many books on Amazon about how individuals can make better personal decisions and how businesses can make better economic decisions.

There was a group in the Engineering department at UVa that studies group dynamics and tools that could be used to help groups of people identify problems, generate options through brainstorming, and choose the best option to pursue. I remember they had a large room, with large chairs for participants, to help people feel comfortable and confident while engaging with each other. There were white boards around the wall for sketching out ideas as well as computer support on a large terminal.

I took a Psych course in Group Dynamics in college and my older sister took a similar course in Sociology. She had lots of formal techniques that went by different names for group decision making.

Generally, when faced with a decisions, you want to collect the most complete information of the best quality about each option and identify any risks due to unknowns.

 

[Jarhyn]

I repeat: Is it possible for a human being to use game theory to make better choices?

My impression is that game theory is a set of hypotheses and experiments exploring how people make decisions in specially constructed scenarios. I'm not sure that the goal of game theory is to help people make better choices. I suspect the information could also be used to help manipulate peoples choices.

Helping people to make better choices would be a separate enterprise. There are many books on Amazon about how individuals can make better personal decisions and how businesses can make better economic decisions.

There was a group in the Engineering department at UVa that studies group dynamics and tools that could be used to help groups of people identify problems, generate options through brainstorming, and choose the best option to pursue. I remember they had a large room, with large chairs for participants, to help people feel comfortable and confident while engaging with each other. There were white boards around the wall for sketching out ideas as well as computer support on large terminal.

I took a Psych course in Group Dynamics in college and my older sister took a similar course in Sociology. She had lots of formal techniques for group decision making.

Generally, when faced with a decisions, you want to collect the most complete information of the best quality about each option and identify any risks due to unknowns.

It can be "just that", if you constrain your understanding artificially. The concepts apply, in fact, to all considerations of goal oriented thinking.

Everything, in essence, becomes a game.

All of existence becomes a game.

Life, living, being... That becomes a game.

It's really just a trick of figuring out how to generalize "goal" from "a specific goal" to "a generalized, abstract 'goal'".

I'll level with you, this is, as you might imagine from my "basic beliefs", what I have thrown my entire life behind understanding and trying to derive.

Thus far, it seems to be "mutually compatible self-actualization".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It can be "just that", if you constrain your understanding artificially. The concepts apply, in fact, to all considerations of goal oriented thinking.
Everything, in essence, becomes a game.
All of existence becomes a game.
Life, living, being... That becomes a game.
It's really just a trick of figuring out how to generalize "goal" from "a specific goal" to "a generalized, abstract 'goal'".
I'll level with you, this is, as you might imagine from my "basic beliefs", what I have thrown my entire life behind understanding and trying to derive.
Thus far, it seems to be "mutually compatible self-actualization".

First, there's an intuitive negative reaction to the notion that "everything is just a game".
But then again, one may avoid some stress by not taking things too seriously.

There is a general sense between all goal-directed activities that we want to "win" or be "successful" or "win or lose, play the best you can".

But it need not be a zero-sum game. Cooperation and even compromise may benefit everyone involved with no one suffering any losses.

So, when you suggest "mutually compatible self-actualization", are you thinking more of football or the PTA? (local parent-teacher association).

 

[Jarhyn]

It can be "just that", if you constrain your understanding artificially. The concepts apply, in fact, to all considerations of goal oriented thinking.
Everything, in essence, becomes a game.
All of existence becomes a game.
Life, living, being... That becomes a game.
It's really just a trick of figuring out how to generalize "goal" from "a specific goal" to "a generalized, abstract 'goal'".
I'll level with you, this is, as you might imagine from my "basic beliefs", what I have thrown my entire life behind understanding and trying to derive.
Thus far, it seems to be "mutually compatible self-actualization".

First, there's an intuitive negative reaction to the notion that "everything is just a game".
But then again, one may avoid some stress by not taking things too seriously.

There is a general sense between all goal-directed activities that we want to "win" or be "successful" or "win or lose, play the best you can".

But it need not be a zero-sum game. Cooperation and even compromise may benefit everyone involved with no one suffering any losses.

So, when you suggest "mutually compatible self-actualization", are you thinking more of football or the PTA? (local parent-teacher association).

All of it.

All intelligent activity is goal directed.

In fact the goal direction is what makes it "intelligent" in most respects of the word.

Nobody ever said it was zero sum. Edit: ok, some dummies probably would but they aren't here.

"Mutually compatible self-actualization".

Actually break it down: for the goal to be accepted as the general form "metagoal", the most abstract concept of "an acceptable goal" it automatically does assume there are unacceptable goals.

The trivial emotional proof, the thing we point to for this, is "my goal is to murder everyone else in the universe". This is not compatible with any other person having that goal. Or any goal. It assumes that the holders goals matter and nobody else's do. It's a clear example I like to bring up from time to time of "an unacceptable goal".

Assuming any goal is acceptable, not in the same class as that other one, this creates two very broad sets: unacceptable goals and acceptable goals. It's just a matter of figuring out where that line really lies.

As evidenced, I think it lives in the mutual compatibility of the goals held in the population: I can have the goal for example of having a mutual competition with my fellows. We all get together and decide that we want to compete, we get together, and we each compete. Then in the context of this mutual goal we get to suspend our awareness temporarily that "it is a game in mutual brotherhood" and the "play to self actualize as 'a winner', in the mutual accord of acceptance of not-that as risk".

There are certain times, like in the PTA that "mutually compatible" probably sways a lot more than "self actualization", though the goal is generally to support the actualization of new self vis-a-vis the children.

Always in this world, we seek to be ourselves, to build it up into something worth being and to be it completely. Sometimes that thing is not even "what we are currently" but "something similar, but clearly different". And that's OK too. We each seek to actualize that, and defend our power to do so.

It becomes generally acceptable only when that self doesn't put itself before others, bit rather to their left and right.

Always, the context of the competition is in mutual brotherhood, if we call this "sport". Else we call it 'warfare' and 'battle'.

I tend to take a dim view of those who exist in this world leveraging each other rather than working together.

 

[fromderinside]

Wow. OK guys. Anything you divine is somewhat ...

Can't do it.

What you determine isn't objective. Its' subjective, just because, well, you determined it.

Get it?

How easy was that? Very. I'm satisfied. If it flies with either one of you the wax securing the wings will melt. That's my subjective observation of the outcome of a fairytale.

As you can see, I don't think the use of certain words helps at all.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Wow. OK guys. Anything you divine is somewhat ...

Can't do it.

What you determine isn't objective. Its' subjective, just because, well, you determined it.

Get it?

How easy was that? Very. I'm satisfied. If it flies with either one of you the wax securing the wings will melt. That's my subjective observation of the outcome of a fairytale.

As you can see, I don't think the use of certain words helps at all.

Actually, setting a measurable goal makes things literally objective. You have the objective, such as reaching the end of a marathon walk (or perhaps losing 10 pounds). And you can objectively measure how close you've come to your goal. And, because the goal is well-defined and the measurement is well-defined, all observers can objectively agree as to the result.

As you can see, I don't think the use of certain words helps at all.

I'm picking up a sense of nihilism in some of your comments. Keep in mind that "if everything is an illusion, then nothing is".

 

[fromderinside]

Wow. OK guys. Anything you divine is somewhat ...

Can't do it.

What you determine isn't objective. Its' subjective, just because, well, you determined it.

Get it?

How easy was that? Very. I'm satisfied. If it flies with either one of you the wax securing the wings will melt. That's my subjective observation of the outcome of a fairytale.

As you can see, I don't think the use of certain words helps at all.

Actually, setting a measurable goal makes things literally objective. You have the objective, such as reaching the end of a marathon walk (or perhaps losing 10 pounds). And you can objectively measure how close you've come to your goal. And, because the goal is well-defined and the measurement is well-defined, all observers can objectively agree as to the result.

As you can see, I don't think the use of certain words helps at all.

I'm picking up a sense of nihilism in some of your comments. Keep in mind that "if everything is an illusion, then nothing is".

This is what I mean by objective.

 Laws of thermodynamics

The laws of thermodynamics define a group of physical quantities, such as temperature, energy, and entropy, that characterize thermodynamic systems in thermodynamic equilibrium. The laws also use various parameters for thermodynamic processes, such as thermodynamic work and heat, and establish relationships between them. They state empirical facts that form a basis of precluding the possibility of certain phenomena, such as perpetual motion. In addition to their use in thermodynamics, they are important fundamental laws of physics in general, and are applicable in other natural sciences.

Traditionally, thermodynamics has recognized three fundamental laws, simply named by an ordinal identification, the first law, the second law, and the third law.[1][2][3] A more fundamental statement was later labelled as the zeroth law, after the first three laws had been established.

The zeroth law of thermodynamics defines thermal equilibrium and forms a basis for the definition of temperature: If two systems are each in thermal equilibrium with a third system, then they are in thermal equilibrium with each other.

The first law of thermodynamics states that, when energy passes into or out of a system (as work, heat, or matter), the system's internal energy changes in accord with the law of conservation of energy.

The second law of thermodynamics states that in a natural thermodynamic process, the sum of the entropies of the interacting thermodynamic systems never decreases. Another form of the statement is that heat does not spontaneously pass from a colder body to a warmer body.

The third law of thermodynamics states that a system's entropy approaches a constant value as the temperature approaches absolute zero. With the exception of non-crystalline solids (glasses) the entropy of a system at absolute zero is typically close to zero.[2]

Material goal setting is a distraction. There is very little in your post that suggests you have any understanding of what I mean by objective operational definition or linking observations through material parameters.

 

[DBT]

You can say ''I am thinking'' - yet conscious thought is being generated by neural network activity, information feed, etc, and not 'you thinking.'

This is a real gem and explains a lot about how DBT 'thinks'.

It's not about me. I have supplied more than enough information from neuroscience to support everything that I have said...given your remarks, it seems that none of it was read, considered or understood by you.

Again, the brain is the sole agent of information acquisition, processing, thought and motor response, which includes you as a conscious entity and all that you think and do, waking you up in the morning and putting you to sleep at night.

You really have no idea.

 

[DBT]

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Which premise is flawed and what is the flaw?

I think we've been through this before.

Yes we have. But you have not yet demonstrated any flaw. For example:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

What happens on a cellular level is not chosen. Cells process information and once readiness potential is achieved information, conscious experience is generated.

Compatibilists carefully word their terms in order to support their propositions and conclusion. Unconscious mechanisms processing information can hardly be called a free will choice.

Given determinism, the outcome is determined. There goes any real choice. 'Someone chooses for themselves' is misleading.

Which makes P1 a flawed premise.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated.

Given determinism, the action was necessarily produced by the mechanism of choosing. It was causally necessary/inevitable, from any prior point in eternity, that choosing would be the final responsible cause of the action. That is how determinism and causal necessity work.

Sure, but still not a choice given the outcome is fixed. Which means no possibility of an alternate action.

Would the punters be happy placing their bets on a fixed race? In fact the horse that wins is the only possible result in any race, just that nobody has deliberately fixed the race and punters do not know which horse must necessarily win.

Nevertheless, no other outcome was possible.

What happens within the brain determines outcome. You can call it a persons choice, but rather than the work of a 'person' it is specifically the brain that processes information and determines output, itself being determined by input, architecture, chemistry, etc. None of it open to choice.

The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists.

Actually, it is your own wording that was "designed to give the impression" that necessity eliminates choice. If choosing happens, then it necessarily happens! And we can objectively observe choosing happening in a restaurant as people browse the menu and place their orders. Thus choosing necessarily happens.

Nope, what I said is in line with both the accepted definition of determinism - all actions are fixed - and how the brain functions as a parallel information processor.

To say a 'person decides' is true in the general sense of the organism as a whole, body/brain/mind, but does not take into account that the brain is the sole agent of thought and action. Not the arms, legs, torso, shoulders, eyes, nails...but the brain alone.

A 'person' may be alive, physically uninjured, but if the brain is not functioning, the person can do nothing.

Memory function loss alone means the destruction of conscious selfhood while the 'person' is alive.

Real choice requires alternate possibilities, yet no alternate possibilities exist within a determined system.

The people in the restaurant are looking at a literal menu of alternate possibilities. Given determinism and causal necessity, that list of alternate possibilities was unavoidable, and necessarily must happen. And that means that each customer would necessarily have to choose one of those alternate possibilities (or go without dinner).

Each customer has their own non chosen proclivities that determine outcome in relation to whatever is on the menu. The brain acquires information from the senses - you read the menu - the brain processes that information which in turn determines the only possible outcome (which means fixed) and the result is made conscious; you think you'll have Pepperoni Pizza and beer.

That is basically the unconscious means and conscious experience of thought and action.

A parietal-premotor network for movement intention and motor awareness
''It is commonly assumed that we are conscious of our movements mainly because we can sense ourselves moving as ongoing peripheral information coming from our muscles and retina reaches the brain. Recent evidence, however, suggests that, contrary to common beliefs, conscious intention to move is independent of movement execution per se. We propose that during movement execution it is our initial intentions that we are mainly aware of. Furthermore, the experience of moving as a conscious act is associated with increased activity in a specific brain region: the posterior parietal cortex. We speculate that movement intention and awareness are generated and monitored in this region. We put forward a general framework of the cognitive and neural processes involved in movement intention and motor awareness.''

The action that proceeds from thought/information processing is a necessitated action, which being determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted.

And by "thought/information processing" I assume you are referring specifically to the choosing operation that each customer in the restaurant actually performed just before placing their order. And, as you suggest, they were "unimpeded" and "unrestricted" by anything that would prevent them from deciding for themselves what they would order for dinner. So, when each customer told the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please", it was a freely chosen "I will".

If an action is determined, it cannot be impeded or blocked. It must proceed as determined. If its determined that a bird flies from point A to point B, the bird flies freely between point A and point B.

This freedom of action does not equate to freedom of will - inner necessity, etc.

Abstract
''There has been long controversy as to whether subjectively 'free' decisions are determined by brain activity ahead of time. We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.''

The action must be necessarily carried out as determined.

Exactly. It was determined that each customer would choose for themselves what they would have for dinner, from a menu of many possibilities. And they would do this choosing while free of coercion and undue influence. Thus, their choice was a freely chosen "I will have the steak" or a freely chosen "I will have the lobster" or ... you get the idea.

So, as to P1, you have failed to prove it false. "P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence" stands firm.

I have explained why P1 is flawed. You don't accept my explanation. Which, given your position as a compatibilist, is understandable.

That's all I have time for tonight, I'll leave it there.

 

[Jarhyn]

Material goals are part of material geometry. Part of that geometry in inside it is 'goal shaped' if we are going to be "eliminative" about anything with our materialism, we eliminate the concept of subjectivity.

It is in fact objective as the material objects that hold their own geometry. Because goals are highly variable, it becomes necessary to abstract them to get a general form.

You can't play "it's all material and causal" and then ignore that the material is an object and objectively has a geometry which generated force towards those goal structure satisfactions, even if that force is highly complicated and translates through neural networks.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

This is what I mean by objective.

 Laws of thermodynamics

The laws of thermodynamics define a group of physical quantities, such as temperature, energy, and entropy, that characterize thermodynamic systems in thermodynamic equilibrium. The laws also use various parameters for thermodynamic processes, such as thermodynamic work and heat, and establish relationships between them. They state empirical facts that form a basis of precluding the possibility of certain phenomena, such as perpetual motion. In addition to their use in thermodynamics, they are important fundamental laws of physics in general, and are applicable in other natural sciences.
...

Hmm. Looks like the laws of thermodynamics are clearly defined by measurable goals that make things literally objective. You have the objective, such as predicting the amount of energy expended reaching the end of a marathon walk (or perhaps losing 10 pounds). And you can objectively measure how close you've come to your goal, by measuring physical quantities such as temperature, energy, and entropy. And, because the goal is well-defined and the measurement is well-defined, all observers can objectively agree as to the result.

 

[pood]

DBT,

By “readiness potential,” I assume you are referring to the Libet experiments. They don’t show what you think they show. The fact that our brains do some evaluation and considering subconsciously is irrelevant. We are our brains! The experiments also showed that conscious awareness has a “veto power”over subconscious processing. This is clearly compatibilist free will. The Libet experiments only count against libertarian free will.

You speak of the brain doing “parallel processing.” I’ve already referred you to a detailed article arguing that the brain is not a computer, as you seem to think it is.

You once again speak of events being “fixed.” As I have explained, fixity is not fatalism. Your argument cannot just be that future events are fixed, because fixity is fully compatible with, well, compatibilism. Freely willed human acts help fix the future.

I await your discussion of how evolution selected for brains that remember, foresee, evaluate, process, and then choose. All of these functions are illusory according to you, except the processing part, and so I wonder why you think natural selection would favor illusions. On the contrary, illusions would not be conducive to fitness, and would be selected against.

 

[Jarhyn]

DBT,

By “readiness potential,” I assume you are referring to the Libet experiments. They don’t show what you think they show. The fact that our brains do some evaluation and considering subconsciously is irrelevant. We are our brains! The experiments also showed that conscious awareness has a “veto power”over subconscious processing. This is clearly compatibilist free will. The Libet experiments only count against libertarian free will.

You speak of the brain doing “parallel processing.” I’ve already referred you to a detailed article arguing that the brain is not a computer, as you seem to think it is.

You once again speak of events being “fixed.” As I have explained, fixity is not fatalism. Your argument cannot just be that future events are fixed, because fixity is fully compatible with, well, compatibilism. Freely willed human acts help fix the future.

I await your discussion of how evolution selected for brains that remember, foresee, evaluate, process, and then choose. All of these functions are illusory according to you, except the processing part, and so I wonder why you think natural selection would favor illusions. On the contrary, illusions would not be conducive to fitness, and would be selected against.

I think you are a little ready to dismiss the brain as a systemic information process, as this is all the likening to a computer does.

A computer can be a brain. A brain can be a computer.

What matters is that even in the event of parallel child processes, in physical parallel in neurons or physical parallel in sand, the parallel eventually conjuncts into a decision point and combinatory translation: the work all goes to a queue where it is serviced, in our case, by a single conscious agent process that manages the system.