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I'm not convinced. I see very little in your posted argumentation that relates in any direct way to the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate from my perspective. Having said that, I have to admit that I find much of what you post quite impenetrable. This isn't intended as a criticism - it's...

I'm pretty sure we view compatibilist free will quite differently. Do you know of any philosophers who defend compatibilist free will in the same way you do? It might help me to understand your approach.

Yes, I know you do. We have very different notions of what is generally understood to be 'compatibilist free will'.

Compatibilist free will is a (subjective) property of some human actions. It's not an objective physical property that can be studied scientifically.

Yes, I'm aware. And I certainly wouldn't disagree.

Yes, I'm pretty sure we fundamentally disagree about the free will question. :)

He certainly doesn't understand compatibilism. His criticisms of compatibilism indisputably confirm this. For me, compatibilist freedom is quite simply freedom from specific morally relevant constraints/influences - the kinds of constraints/influences that we all take into account when...

This has always been my bone of contention with DBT (I've 'discussed' free will with DBT over many years ;) ). Although he never explicitly makes the claim, he does argue (and always has) as though he believes the sense of free will defended by compatibilists is in some way wrongheaded...

Apologies. Having reread your post I can see now that was what you must have intended. In my defense it was a longish and quite dense post and I made the mistake of skim-reading and that single sentence popped out at me. :oops:

This sounds very much like DBT's attitude to compatibilists. It implies, rather uncharitably, that compatibilists may not be entirely honest when they "claim" to be determinists. This is straightforwardly wrong. You, like DBT, start out with the assumption that any conception of 'free will'...

I think it needs pointing out that no compatibilist would argue any such thing. I'm concerned that your response here will only reinforce DBT's deeply held conviction that compatibilists don't genuinely accept determinism.

The following is taken from Marvin Edwards' thread, Compatibilism: What's that About? It might help a little more I think it explains quite well the kind of Dennettian compatibilism I subscribe to.

This might help: Daniel Dennett - What is Free Will?

An "Adequate determinism" that isn't fully adequate is not adequate determinism - it's simply indeterminism (random events). I agree with hard determinists that there's no free will (libertarian or otherwise) to be found in random events.

I don't think this is quite correct. Compatibilist free will only requires Adequate Determinism (reliable cause and effect). I don't think anyone seriously denies 'Adequate Determinism' as described in the provided link.

Where are you going with this? Are you suggesting that indeterminism justifies a belief in free will? Compatibilist free will (as exemplified by Marvin Edwards in his thread "Compatibilism: What's that About?") actually requires Adequate Determinism.

I think I know what you're trying to say but what you say here is going to confuse a lot of people (compatibilism is not simply determinism in the literal sense).

I'm devastated. I felt sure you'd be persuaded.

Glad you liked the article. However. I don't think think your interpretation of this paragraph is correct. I'm pretty certain the author (Adam Piovarchy) is not suggesting that we are anything more than "physical beings ruled by our environment".

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken