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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

It is necessary (but not sufficient) that the universe should EXIST, for me to pick Pepsi over Coke at time T. That is quite different from saying, It is necessary for me to pick Pepsi over Coke at time T, BECAUSE the universe exists. In addition to the modal fallacy, it is a form of the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Your 'constant conjunction' sets the terms, where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

It's the 'invariable' that implies necessity. Where event B invariably follows event A.

In a physical world where determinism holds sway, 'causal necessity' is for all practical purposes another way of saying 'constant conjunction'. where one event is invariably followed by another, A, then B then C....

Quote;
causal contradiction


This makes ml-TO causality something that must be the case for any given cause. For the free will debate, this has some important implications, one being that if every event has a cause, that the causal lines can only follow the specific path dictated by ml-TO causality. There can never be an “either/or” situation, at least without an event that does not have a cause (which would be just as problematic for free will).''
 

There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.'' It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves
 

There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.
 

So. how we are back to “laws“ that “govern” the universe? I thought that earlier you had agreed with me that such “laws” aren’t laws at all, because they are descriptive and not prescriptive. Perhaps I recall wrongly.

In any case, if you believe that there are ”laws” that “govern” the universe, that is the position of theism, with God the lawgiver.
 

So. how we are back to “laws“ that “govern” the universe? I thought that earlier you had agreed with me that such “laws” aren’t laws at all, because they are descriptive and not prescriptive. Perhaps I recall wrongly.

It's just a figure of speech; 'the laws of nature,' 'the laws of physics,' etc, which just refer to the attributes of the physical world, matter/energy, space/time, the behaviour of matter, motion, energy...

It doesn't mean that something or someone is imposing 'laws.'

We've been through this multiple times.

In any case, if you believe that there are ”laws” that “govern” the universe, that is the position of theism, with God the lawgiver.

It's 'self governing.' Gravity and mass may be said to 'govern' or 'determine' the orbits of planets around the sun as a way of describing observations of the motions of planets, mass, motion, gravity, etc.

You seize on the limitations of language and semantics as a means of defense.
 

There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

It has nothing to do with me. The compatibilist gives his definition of determinism as events determined by antecedents, with no realizable altenate actions in any given instance. Only one outcome possible

That is what your own endorsed definition of determinism entails; ''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood.

Constant conjunction permits no realizable alternatives to what is conjoined.

It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

Tht
I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.


There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

The modal fallacy is not mine. It is the compabilist who gives their definition of determinism.

''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood


Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

''Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

A definition that describes events as being fixed or determined by antecedents, which by definition entails the absence of alternate actions in any given instance.

If more than one possibility can happen at any given instance, it's not determinism as the compatibilist defines it to be.

You are the one engaging with modal fallacies.


It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

What exactly did I say? Quote what I said in the context in which I said it. I say that you are playing games.


I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

No, that's your game playing at work. I have explained your fallacy - the excluded middle - where the system must evolve to the point where there are creatures with the capacity to compose music, and not that the 'big bang composed jazz''

You should know by now how determinism is defined by compatibilists.


''The only essential element of determinism is that every event is reliably caused by prior events. This is logically derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.)

Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation")

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.



Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

No, just how determinism is defined and described by compatibilists, including yourself.

You are the one caught in a modal fallacy where you describe determinism as a system where each event is a matter of constant conjunction, which does not permit multiple possible actions in any given instance, yet deny the very terms of bot yours and the compatibilist definition of determinism.

You like to play it both ways, a modal fallacy, then point the finger at me.



And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.

Far from it. I am the one pointing out that that the agent is an inseparable part of the system and the process and that all of the agent's feelings, thoughts and actions are a part of the process. That, this being the case, the agent thinks and acts according to how the system evolves, without the possibility of alternate feeling thoughts or actions at any given point in time and the evolution of events. Where only one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized.

If any one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized, it's not determinism as compatibilists defined, not as you define or how it is generally defined.

To suggest that is the case, that any of a multiple of apparent options can be realized by an agent in any given instance is your modal fallacy, where you are not talking about determinism as it is defined, the object of your modal fallacy is invoking Libertarian free will on a debate on compatibilism.
 
God this is just depressing at this point watching someone well known (and well paid) for precise technical writing be lectured by someone in a kindergarten playground manner in terms of "no, I'm not the fallacious, you are the fallacious".

@DBT, at this point it is completely transparent that you do not know what you are talking about any more than a Flerf does. Please stop continuing to embarrass yourself.

The modal fallacy specifically says that "did" or "did not" does not violate "could" no matter which happened.

Could describes a momentary physical state of a differential of potentials. A trebuchet "could" launch the rock "if the pin is pulled", because the lever arm is storing potential (gravitationally mediated) energy, and that energy is resting against the pin. It doesn't matter if the pin is not pulled, or if the energy is released in some other way; neither such event erases the momentary reality that the energy was resting against the pin.

The could-ness was encoded by the configuration of reality putting the release force against the pin.

As a result, contingent "if" mechanisms are immutable objects of reality, existing as concrete constructions of stuff. In fact, the laws as we understand them of reality say "something SHALL necessarily resolve this potential". The energy itself shall find an "if" eventually that reaches "then the differential will be released along the gradient such that the available energy gets discharged and entropy increases".

This is just an identification of the physical realities of how that MAY happen, not how it "shall".

Again, the modal fallacy is the declaration of saying "it didn't so it COULDN'T".

It always COULD have, "if the pin was pulled" because the force was resting on the pin.
 
God this is just depressing at this point watching someone well known (and well paid) for precise technical writing be lectured by someone in a kindergarten playground manner in terms of "no, I'm not the fallacious, you are the fallacious".

@DBT, at this point it is completely transparent that you do not know what you are talking about any more than a Flerf does. Please stop continuing to embarrass yourself.


cEYC1G6YexEHu.gif


That's a sad lament.


If you are depressed, it has nothing to do with me. You know nothing about me. It's a discussion forum and nobody is compelled to participate.

You should know by now that I argue for incompatibilism and I support what I say on the subject.

Simply, that it is the compatibilist who gives a definition of determinism, and it is the compatibilist that gives their definition of free will in relation to their definition of determinism, and that the compatibilist argument fails for all the reasons given time and time again, including multiple sources, quotes, citations, etc, etc, describing why compatibilism is not only flawed, but incoherent.

If you need to make it personal, you have lost.

Once again.

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?


There are none.

Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered down version of one or both of the two concepts.

As I understand it, Determinism (which I take to be Causal Determinism) posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing:

If Causal Determinism is true (i.e., accurately describes the state of the universe), then humans lack Free Will because the truth of Causal Determinism means that (a) humans lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, as human cognition is simply a form of activity that is governed by Causal Determinism, and (b) there are no such thing as true “options” or “alternatives” because there is one, and only one, activity that can ever occur at any given instant; and
If Free-Will exists in its pure form, then Causal Determinism is not true because the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.
As I understand Causal Determinism and Free Will, they are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As William James aptly observed:

Bruce Silverstein
B.A. in Philosophy

''Again, the modal fallacy is the declaration of saying "it didn't so it COULDN'T".


Determinism is not a matter of ''it didn't'' - that is your modal fallacy.

A clue on how determinism is defined and how, by definition, it works;

''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn

Does that ring any bells? No?
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

As has been explained to you a hundred times before or more, the modal fallacy does not discuss randomness. It's completely agnostic to the idea of randomness. It is rather about potential energy and what specific things contain it.

Lets look at the alternatives to which gate the cows are let out through in a pasture: there are five latches on five gates. The cows must go out through one of those gates because those are the only extant paths in which release CAN happen. Only one of those paths shall be used in the event in question, and it is not a matter of randomness which, but it is constrained by the fact that there are five gates. There are no other gates through which the cows can pass via the opening of a latch.

It is about the current configuration of the fence, and the fact that these are our only options. We can evaluate what would happen IF they were opened, which is not random but rather simulation that is agnostic to outer reality. It is further not random that only one such gate leads to the barn, and it is not random that I wish the cows to be in the barn and so it is not random that my choice ends up being to open that gate.

At no point there was there randomness, but it was down to MY desire as to which gate would open... So of the alternatives, I made a nonrandom choice.

You don't understand the concept of randomness well enough to comment here, nor of the modal fallacy.

Compatibilism in fact sees "randomness", that which is not determined by the course of events, to be pointedly destructive to freedom.

It's just that one of the things determined by the course of events is that our agency matters in that course, even if it had prior causes.

The rock deflects the river, adds a push to the water that hadn't existed upstream, even if something put that rock there. The force that put the rock there dissipated long ago, in favor of the force it mediates from the earth into the water. The rock is responsible to the ongoing mediation of that force.
 

There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

It has nothing to do with me. The compatibilist gives his definition of determinism as events determined by antecedents, with no realizable altenate actions in any given instance. Only one outcome possible

That is what your own endorsed definition of determinism entails; ''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood.

Constant conjunction permits no realizable alternatives to what is conjoined.

It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

Tht
I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.


There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

The modal fallacy is not mine. It is the compabilist who gives their definition of determinism.

''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood


Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

''Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

A definition that describes events as being fixed or determined by antecedents, which by definition entails the absence of alternate actions in any given instance.

If more than one possibility can happen at any given instance, it's not determinism as the compatibilist defines it to be.

You are the one engaging with modal fallacies.


It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

What exactly did I say? Quote what I said in the context in which I said it. I say that you are playing games.


I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

No, that's your game playing at work. I have explained your fallacy - the excluded middle - where the system must evolve to the point where there are creatures with the capacity to compose music, and not that the 'big bang composed jazz''

You should know by now how determinism is defined by compatibilists.


''The only essential element of determinism is that every event is reliably caused by prior events. This is logically derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.)

Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation")

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.



Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

No, just how determinism is defined and described by compatibilists, including yourself.

You are the one caught in a modal fallacy where you describe determinism as a system where each event is a matter of constant conjunction, which does not permit multiple possible actions in any given instance, yet deny the very terms of bot yours and the compatibilist definition of determinism.

You like to play it both ways, a modal fallacy, then point the finger at me.



And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.

Far from it. I am the one pointing out that that the agent is an inseparable part of the system and the process and that all of the agent's feelings, thoughts and actions are a part of the process. That, this being the case, the agent thinks and acts according to how the system evolves, without the possibility of alternate feeling thoughts or actions at any given point in time and the evolution of events. Where only one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized.

If any one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized, it's not determinism as compatibilists defined, not as you define or how it is generally defined.

To suggest that is the case, that any of a multiple of apparent options can be realized by an agent in any given instance is your modal fallacy, where you are not talking about determinism as it is defined, the object of your modal fallacy is invoking Libertarian free will on a debate on compatibilism.

Did you notice that David Hume (“constant conjunction” and Marvin Edwards (“causal necessity”) are both compatibilists? And yet, weirdly, you quote them in support of your position. You do this all the time, cherry-picking compatibilists to support incompatibilism, and it’s downright weird.

In any event, as I’ve already told you multiple times, and in fact told Marvin when he was posting here, I do not agree that there is any such thing as causal necessity. See? I put in bold for you, that it might sink in. And I’ve explained WHY I don’t think such a thing exists, so it is utterly doubly pointless for you to quote Marvin to me (since he is a compatibilist) and to wave around at me “causal necessity” since I deny that any such thing exists. So why do you waste your time and mine doing these things, again and again?

To repeat myself yet again, the only valid modal category is LOGICAL NECESSITY. Is it logically necessary that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T? No, it is not. Why is it not? Because I am able to mentally conceive, without bringing about a logical contradiction, that I pick Coke at time T instead of Pepsi. By contrast, I cannot, on pain of bringing about a logical contradiction, conceive a four-sided triangle, or a married bachelor. Is this finally clear to you?

This is, obviously, how we distinguish between contingently true, and necessarily true, propositions.

The rest of your most recent posts are just incoherent. You deny that you are claiming that the big bang composed the jazz improv piece. You invoke the excluded middle in your defense. But according to your own words, the excluded middle is “causally necessary” because of the big bang; hence it MUST follow, on your own logic, that the jazz improv piece was “causally necessary” because of the big bang, and hence one must conclude that you think the big bang wrote the jazz improv piece. Deny it all you want, but your own words show that this inanity is precisely what you mean.

You accuse ME, now, of committing a modal fallacy? How? Where? You don’t even know what the fallacy is, and have resisted all efforts to educate yourself via explanatory links I have given you. I have already explained this error you make again and again and I’m going to waste any more time with it.

The jazz composer, not the big bang or intermediate steps between the bang and the composer, composed the improv jazz piece. Yes, the events leading up to his composing the piece were deterministic, and these deterministic inputs informed him (his brain, which is him) HOW to proceed. This is because without determinism, free will is impossible.

The composer was deterministically presented with a set of options on how to proceed. He chose the options he thought best at the time. COULD he have chosen different options? Yes. WOULD he have chosen different options, if we could replay the history of the universe with the EXACT SAME history? No. Why would he? He chose to proceed as he did, BECAUSE the history of the world, was the way that it was.

As the philosopher I quoted upthread, and whom you cavalierly dismissed as “giving you a good laugh,” noted, when people like you and Jerry Coyne claim that we “could not have done otherwise,” that just collapses to the mundane “did not do otherwise”; and when you state that we “cannot do otherwise,” that just collapses to the mundane “will not do otherwise,” and this is the correct analysis, because to argue otherwise is a MODAL FALLACY, in which contingently true (could have been otherwise) states of affairs are mischaracterized as triangles or as bachelors.
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

Randomness doesn't come into it. You said there no randomness within a deterministic system, which also means no deviations of alternate actions. Where, if any number of things can happen in any given instance, it is not determinism as you define it.

The modal fallacy lies with those who define determinism in a way that permits alternate actions.

The modal fallacy is yours



As has been explained to you a hundred times before or more, the modal fallacy does not discuss randomness. It's completely agnostic to the idea of randomness. It is rather about potential energy and what specific things contain it.

You are the one who used the word random.

The point of determinism is that both cause and effect, where a cause is an effect and an effect is a cause, form a web of related events that do not permit multiple possibilities.

If you claim it can, you contradict the terms of your definition and the modal fallacy is yours.


Compatibilism in fact sees "randomness", that which is not determined by the course of events, to be pointedly destructive to freedom.

It's just that one of the things determined by the course of events is that our agency matters in that course, even if it had prior causes.

The rock deflects the river, adds a push to the water that hadn't existed upstream, even if something put that rock there. The force that put the rock there dissipated long ago, in favor of the force it mediates from the earth into the water. The rock is responsible to the ongoing mediation of that force.


That just shows that you are making up stuff as you go along. Nobody is arguing for random events as a means to free will.

Again; compatibilists define free will as deciding and acting without external force, pressure or undue coercion.

Nobody mentions randomness. Randomness doesn't help.

The compatibilist definition of free will fails for the reasons given too many times to count; basically inner processes that determine what is thought, decided and acted upon.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '


“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

Plus, not only was it determined that you in fact did not ''want otherwise'' - given the compatibilist definition of determinism - it cannot be otherwise
 

There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

It has nothing to do with me. The compatibilist gives his definition of determinism as events determined by antecedents, with no realizable altenate actions in any given instance. Only one outcome possible

That is what your own endorsed definition of determinism entails; ''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood.

Constant conjunction permits no realizable alternatives to what is conjoined.

It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

Tht
I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.


There is no modal category called “causal necessity,” only “logical necessity.”

I have addressed this time and time again.



Necessary causes vs sufficient causes

If someone says that A causes B:
  • If A is necessary for B (necessary cause) that means you will never have B if you don't have A. In other words, of one thing is a necessary cause of another, then that means that the outcome can never happen without the cause. However, sometimes the cause occurs without the outcome.

And there is no logical necessity that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T. End of hard determinism.

Sorry if that is inconvenient or upsetting.

You tend to overlook the distinction between necessary cause and sufficient cause, where ''necessary cause means that ''you will never have B if you don't have A.''

Apply that principle to your own definition of determinism, ''constant conjunction,'' where ''one event is invariably followed by the other''

I hope that helps.

Jebus Christ, we are not talking about necessary or sufficient CAUSES; we are talking about your (imaginary) necessary EFFECTS. The above completely fails to address my point about necessary v. contingent EFFECTS.

Nah, we are talking about determinism, as it is defined. That in relation to free will as compatibilists define it.... at least that is issue.

Your ''(imaginary) necessary EFFECTS'' rationale doesn't work because I made no mention of ''effects.''

Of course you did. You have repeatedly said that every causal effect is a NECESSARY effect. Modal fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, etc.

The modal fallacy is not mine. It is the compabilist who gives their definition of determinism.

''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: “Constant conjunction.” - Pood


Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

''Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.''

A definition that describes events as being fixed or determined by antecedents, which by definition entails the absence of alternate actions in any given instance.

If more than one possibility can happen at any given instance, it's not determinism as the compatibilist defines it to be.

You are the one engaging with modal fallacies.


It was not said by me, or even implied. You impose your interpretation without regard to what is said, meant or intended.

Now you are dropping your claim that it is NECESSARY that I pick Pepsi over Coke at time T? Because picking Pepsi is an EFFECT of prior CAUSES, no?

What exactly did I say? Quote what I said in the context in which I said it. I say that you are playing games.


I stick to the given terms and definitions. You try to circumvent them in order to find room for the notion of free will.

Determinism doesn't have 'effects' as such, it is by definition an unbroken web of events, where all events are entailed by initial conditions and how the world works, natural law. determining the evolution of the system.

Oh, so we are back to the Big Bang composing the improv jazz piece? I thought you rejected Jerry Coyne’s claim on that score (so to speak)?

No, that's your game playing at work. I have explained your fallacy - the excluded middle - where the system must evolve to the point where there are creatures with the capacity to compose music, and not that the 'big bang composed jazz''

You should know by now how determinism is defined by compatibilists.


''The only essential element of determinism is that every event is reliably caused by prior events. This is logically derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.)

Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation")

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.



Event B is not the effect of event A, event C the effect of event B, it is the natural progression events, the system evolving as it must. There is no contingency in determinism, the system evolves

So we are back to every effect is a necessary effect, the modal fallacy.

No, just how determinism is defined and described by compatibilists, including yourself.

You are the one caught in a modal fallacy where you describe determinism as a system where each event is a matter of constant conjunction, which does not permit multiple possible actions in any given instance, yet deny the very terms of bot yours and the compatibilist definition of determinism.

You like to play it both ways, a modal fallacy, then point the finger at me.



And back to ignoring, so it would seem, that the agent is part of the deterministic process, and so DETERMINES the outcome of a choice in which multiple options are presented by prior antecedent events — an option for choice that rocks rolling down a hill lack, but I guess you think we are rocks rolling down hills, and are back to the thesis that the big bang gave the initial push.

Far from it. I am the one pointing out that that the agent is an inseparable part of the system and the process and that all of the agent's feelings, thoughts and actions are a part of the process. That, this being the case, the agent thinks and acts according to how the system evolves, without the possibility of alternate feeling thoughts or actions at any given point in time and the evolution of events. Where only one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized.

If any one of a multiple of apparent options can be realized, it's not determinism as compatibilists defined, not as you define or how it is generally defined.

To suggest that is the case, that any of a multiple of apparent options can be realized by an agent in any given instance is your modal fallacy, where you are not talking about determinism as it is defined, the object of your modal fallacy is invoking Libertarian free will on a debate on compatibilism.

Did you notice that David Hume (“constant conjunction” and Marvin Edwards (“causal necessity”) are both compatibilists? And yet, weirdly, you quote them in support of your position. You do this all the time, cherry-picking compatibilists to support incompatibilism, and it’s downright weird.

Of course they are compatibilists. That doesn't mean that their definition of determinism is wrong. It's compatibilist definition of free will, not determinism that is flawed.

I'm not arguing over Marvin Edward's definition of determinism, or constant conjunction (which is correct), but the compatibilist definition of free will.



In any event, as I’ve already told you multiple times, and in fact told Marvin when he was posting here, I do not agree that there is any such thing as causal necessity. See? I put in bold for you, that it might sink in. And I’ve explained WHY I don’t think such a thing exists, so it is utterly doubly pointless for you to quote Marvin to me (since he is a compatibilist) and to wave around at me “causal necessity” since I deny that any such thing exists. So why do you waste your time and mine doing these things, again and again?

I have explained what is meant by causal necessity multiple times, where the all necessary elements of an event must be present and in play for the event to happen.

In order to strike a match, there must be matches, someone has to make them, matches must have the necessary chemicals on their tips, there must be a striking strip, someone to open the box, take out a match and strike it in order to ignite the match...where without these necessary elements in place, the event simple cannot happen.

To repeat myself yet again, the only valid modal category is LOGICAL NECESSITY. Is it logically necessary that I choose Pepsi over Coke at time T? No, it is not. Why is it not? Because I am able to mentally conceive, without bringing about a logical contradiction, that I pick Coke at time T instead of Pepsi. By contrast, I cannot, on pain of bringing about a logical contradiction, conceive a four-sided triangle, or a married bachelor. Is this finally clear to you?

We are talking about a physical deterministic world, how it works and how it evolves according to the given principles of determinism.

How do you think that applies to your thoughts, decisions and actions?


''Determinism means that what happens in the future is unambiguously determined by what happened in the past. Predictability means that you can figure out what will happen next based on what happened previously.

For example, suppose you swing a simple pendulum. Its movement is determined by the fact that it is constrained at one end, that it is acted upon by the force of gravity and air resistance. Its movement is also predictable- you can work out where the pendulum will be after it has been swinging for a given time.

If you then make the pendulum more complicated, by adding some other moveable parts to it, its movement is still determined by gravity, air resistance and the relative positions of its fixed points, but those influences will be too complicated for you to model mathematically, and you won't be able to predict exactly where the pendulum will be after a given time.''


I don't have the time or patience for the rest. It's just rehashing the same stuff
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

Randomness doesn't come into it. You said there no randomness within a deterministic system, which also means no deviations of alternate actions. Where, if any number of things can happen in any given instance, it is not determinism as you define it.

The modal fallacy lies with those who define determinism in a way that permits alternate actions.

The modal fallacy is yours

No, it isn’t. Please read the very first paragraph of this linked material. It will demonstrate to you, what you do all the time.

Oh, and in the above linked article, please read on, for a concrete discussion by Norman Swartz of how the modal fallacy works in practice when people like you argue against free will via the problem of future contingents, which has always effectively been your argument. I’ve linked you scholarly arguments before by Swartz, but you have shown no evidence of even having read them, much less attempted to take them on board.

And, once again, determinism does not permit, or prohibit, anything. It is a description, and not a prescription, of how the world goes. You even seemed to agree to this at one point, but here you are again lapsing into your same old discredited formulations.

To argue (falsely, as it turns out, but that’s OK) that Jarhyn and I are wrong is one thing; to now charge US with committing the fallacy that only YOU commit all the time, is gobsmackingly ridiculous. Of COURSE alternate options are possible, given that non-necessarily true propositions are contingently true propositions — i.e., they could have been false. That is what “contingent” means.
 
And. btw, I notice you like to sometimes waggle around the academic credentials of people whose quotes you cherry-pick, very often amusingly fail to notice that they are actually compatibilists. It’s a meaningless appeal to authority, but, since you like to do it, I’ll just note that Swartz has a PhD in philosophy and is a professor emeritus of philosophy at Simon Fraser University, a prestigious institution. So, there. Are we done comparing the academic dick sizes of people we quote? Fortunately, unlike you, I rarely quote others, preferring to make my own arguments instead.
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

Randomness doesn't come into it. You said there no randomness within a deterministic system, which also means no deviations of alternate actions. Where, if any number of things can happen in any given instance, it is not determinism as you define it.

The modal fallacy lies with those who define determinism in a way that permits alternate actions.

The modal fallacy is yours

No, it isn’t. Please read the very first paragraph of this linked material. It will demonstrate to you, what you do all the time.

Oh, and in the above linked article, please read on, for a concrete discussion by Norman Swartz of how the modal fallacy works in practice when people like you argue against free will via the problem of future contingents, which has always effectively been your argument. I’ve linked you scholarly arguments before by Swartz, but you have shown no evidence of even having read them, much less attempted to take them on board.

And, once again, determinism does not permit, or prohibit, anything. It is a description, and not a prescription, of how the world goes. You even seemed to agree to this at one point, but here you are again lapsing into your same old discredited formulations.

To argue (falsely, as it turns out, but that’s OK) that Jarhyn and I are wrong is one thing; to now charge US with committing the fallacy that only YOU commit all the time, is gobsmackingly ridiculous. Of COURSE alternate options are possible, given that non-necessarily true propositions are contingently true propositions — i.e., they could have been false. That is what “contingent” means.
I will note that this difference between "the contingency" and "the evaluation of contingency" is, perhaps in some way, a root of the concept of "duality" itself, because it is apparent in the observation that compiling into a program "if this, then that" is in fact the creation, the establishment of "a truth", which is itself a noun form, not a verb form (as would be "is true").

"If this then that" is a mechanism, a concrete object, matter and energy at rest but with a particular and identifiable fact about the shape of the stuff. The truth being identified here is not "if this then that", as such a statement is agnostic to truth or falseness. What is being said is "the stuff implements 'if this then that'", but generally leaving off the "the stuff implements" portion because while it is implicit, it is not always explicitly understood or necessary to make explicit.

The "if this then that", the contingent mechanism, is not an illusion but an object with a true statement about its nature.

The result of any given operation, any given access on the contingency, is determined by the preconditions, a different statement is being made of the event, namely "this, against if this then that, therefore that". It's a different thing being discussed in the truth of that statement.

The modal fallacy is the drawing of a false equivalence between "the structure of this thing is 'if this, then that'" and "this, against 'if this then that', therefore that."
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

Randomness doesn't come into it. You said there no randomness within a deterministic system, which also means no deviations of alternate actions. Where, if any number of things can happen in any given instance, it is not determinism as you define it.

The modal fallacy lies with those who define determinism in a way that permits alternate actions.

The modal fallacy is yours

No, it isn’t. Please read the very first paragraph of this linked material. It will demonstrate to you, what you do all the time.

Oh, and in the above linked article, please read on, for a concrete discussion by Norman Swartz of how the modal fallacy works in practice when people like you argue against free will via the problem of future contingents, which has always effectively been your argument. I’ve linked you scholarly arguments before by Swartz, but you have shown no evidence of even having read them, much less attempted to take them on board.

And, once again, determinism does not permit, or prohibit, anything. It is a description, and not a prescription, of how the world goes. You even seemed to agree to this at one point, but here you are again lapsing into your same old discredited formulations.

To argue (falsely, as it turns out, but that’s OK) that Jarhyn and I are wrong is one thing; to now charge US with committing the fallacy that only YOU commit all the time, is gobsmackingly ridiculous. Of COURSE alternate options are possible, given that non-necessarily true propositions are contingently true propositions — i.e., they could have been false. That is what “contingent” means.
I will note that this difference between "the contingency" and "the evaluation of contingency" is, perhaps in some way, a root of the concept of "duality" itself, because it is apparent in the observation that compiling into a program "if this, then that" is in fact the creation, the establishment of "a truth", which is itself a noun form, not a verb form (as would be "is true").

You keep dancing around the central elements of the issue.

Again, the issue here is the question of compatibility between free will and determinism, where the definitions of both determinism and free will are given by the compatibilist.

The failure of compatibilism is basically that its definition of free will is selective in that it ignores the inherent restriction the physical means and mechanisms of decision making (the brain as an information processor) has on the notion of freedom of will.

That even if there is no external force, coercion or undue influence placed on your thoughts and action, the underlying means of production - not being under the control or regulation of will - is an equal challenge to free will.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '' - Oxford.

That is basically why compatibilism fails to make a case, and you have no means to counter its failure except to perpetually dance around the point
 
''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.'' - Jarhyn
Randomness doesn't enter into it, and has nothing to say about the modal fallacy.

Randomness doesn't come into it. You said there no randomness within a deterministic system, which also means no deviations of alternate actions. Where, if any number of things can happen in any given instance, it is not determinism as you define it.

The modal fallacy lies with those who define determinism in a way that permits alternate actions.

The modal fallacy is yours

No, it isn’t. Please read the very first paragraph of this linked material. It will demonstrate to you, what you do all the time.

I know what a modal fallacy is.

So I point out again: it is not I who is defining determinism, but pointing to how it is generally defined (as quoted from several sources), and the compatibilist. Which includes yourself; constant conjunction.

I do not dispute the definition as given in multiple sources, I do not dispute constant conjunction, I do not dispute Marvin Edwards account or Jarhyns.

The sole point of contention is how the given definition of free will as expressed by compatibilists related to determinism as expressed by compatibilists.

A definition of free will that fails to establish the idea of freedom of will because it ignores the key elements of the given definition of determinism.

That the underlying deterministic processes is just as much a challenge for the notion of free will as 'manipulation by external agents.'

Now that is not my assertion, my doing or my modal fallacy.

The modal fallacy, or a category error (external factors are highlighted but unconscious internal processes are ignored) lies firmly at the feet of the compatibilist, who ignores these key points in their definition of free will in order to present an impression of compatibility where none exists.

The rest of your post is irrelevant because your assumptions about my position is flawed.

To reiterate; the debate is related to the compatibilist definition of free will in relation to the definition of determinism given by the compatibilist.

I merely point out that compatibilism fails because the given definition of free will ignores the key elements of determinism (and its implications) as given by the compatibilist.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '' - Oxford.

Where the non-chosen state and condition of a brain in any given moment in time determines how you think, what you think and what you do;

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''


''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.


”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.










https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_fallacy#:~:text=It is the fallacy of,the statement to be false.
 
ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person"
So, the biggest issue (and not the only) with this perspective is that it it says that the conditions that lead to the brain state are outside the person, even though once they have led to that state they no longer are outside the person. They have entered the house.

Only when those environmental conditions are still actually outside the skull are they actually outside at that point: only when it is the continued existence of the gun to the head that drives the decision are they outside!

Again, things can have been caused and still can themselves be causal, because past states are not current states and causes are not zero-sum.
something can be responsible for building me even just as I am with intent and whatever else, and once I am built I am responsible for my continued existence, as responding to the thing that built me does not alter my existence.

How is this so hard to grasp that having one's structure be determined by a course of events at some location does not mean that being some structure allows for that structure to be responsible on determining something else?
the underlying means of production - not being under the control or regulation of will - is an equal challenge to free will.
The underlying means of production is clearly under the control and regulation of a will, as defined as "an algorithm". Clearly an algorithm inside the "self" of some defined skull develops other algorithms that the skull executes, and physics allows that the part that executes that will to create other wills is the same part that executes the wills it creates.

You seem to not understand recursive processing, self-modifying processes, or automatic compilation as concepts.

You strike me eternally as what happens when a person who would have been a Flerf instead grows up or finds atheism. I've always wondered what the "I AM VERY SMART" of the professed skeptical crowd would be, amd I guess we have found it.

It honestly strikes me that arguments like "Water can't stick to a sphere" have corollaries in such statements as "systems that process wills cannot process a will to create a will or to alter/recompile the will to create wills or determine the outputs that later become its own preconditions."

It's just a ridiculously false statement that anyone with a basic understanding of how a process may alter the source code to the process, execute a build instruction to the shell to compile it, and place that process image in the NVM location of the original process, and then execute a "shutdown and schedule re-execution" instruction.

That is fairly trivially satisfying "a will being under the control and regulation of itself".

As to the "outputs to inputs" thing, software engineers tend to learn how to model that in their first couple years of education, namely in the transition from truth tables to state diagrams and state charts. "Bits" are actually a special case of trivial stateliness, and this allows systems to regulate future behavior through held information about past output states.

Again, the output of a process can actually result in the modification of the process itself, and you ought be able to recognize self-regulation is entirely possible from that fact.
 
ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person"
So, the biggest issue (and not the only) with this perspective is that it it says that the conditions that lead to the brain state are outside the person, even though once they have led to that state they no longer are outside the person. They have entered the house.

Only when those environmental conditions are still actually outside the skull are they actually outside at that point: only when it is the continued existence of the gun to the head that drives the decision are they outside!



For heaven's sake, surely you realize that your thoughts, feelings and actions are shaped by the events in the external world, and that you are an inseparable part of it?


Again, things can have been caused and still can themselves be causal, because past states are not current states and causes are not zero-sum.
something can be responsible for building me even just as I am with intent and whatever else, and once I am built I am responsible for my continued existence, as responding to the thing that built me does not alter my existence.

Again, you are in no way separate from the external world. You don't operate, think or act outside of it or its events. Everything you think and do is a part of the system as it evolves as it must according to the terms given by the compatibilist.

You keep trying to find a loophole where - according to the compatibilist definition of determinism - none exists.

Which is why the compatibilist relies on a carefully worded definition of free will which ignores key elements of determinism as the compatibilist defines it.

How is this so hard to grasp that having one's structure be determined by a course of events at some location does not mean that being some structure allows for that structure to be responsible on determining something else?
the underlying means of production - not being under the control or regulation of will - is an equal challenge to free will.
The underlying means of production is clearly under the control and regulation of a will, as defined as "an algorithm". Clearly an algorithm inside the "self" of some defined skull develops other algorithms that the skull executes, and physics allows that the part that executes that will to create other wills is the same part that executes the wills it creates.

You seem to not understand recursive processing, self-modifying processes, or automatic compilation as concepts.

You strike me eternally as what happens when a person who would have been a Flerf instead grows up or finds atheism. I've always wondered what the "I AM VERY SMART" of the professed skeptical crowd would be, amd I guess we have found it.

It honestly strikes me that arguments like "Water can't stick to a sphere" have corollaries in such statements as "systems that process wills cannot process a will to create a will or to alter/recompile the will to create wills or determine the outputs that later become its own preconditions."

It's just a ridiculously false statement that anyone with a basic understanding of how a process may alter the source code to the process, execute a build instruction to the shell to compile it, and place that process image in the NVM location of the original process, and then execute a "shutdown and schedule re-execution" instruction.

That is fairly trivially satisfying "a will being under the control and regulation of itself".

As to the "outputs to inputs" thing, software engineers tend to learn how to model that in their first couple years of education, namely in the transition from truth tables to state diagrams and state charts. "Bits" are actually a special case of trivial stateliness, and this allows systems to regulate future behavior through held information about past output states.

Again, the output of a process can actually result in the modification of the process itself, and you ought be able to recognize self-regulation is entirely possible from that fact.

Nah, you are wandering all over the place in a desperate attempt to justify the unjustifiable.

Try to focus;

1 - The compatibilist gives a definition of determinism, which describes the conditions and sets the terms of a deterministic system.

2 - The compatibilist gives a carefully crafted definition of free will in relation to determinism as they define it, claiming compatibility

3 - The compatibilist definition of free will ignores the key elements of determinism as they define it, ignoring unconscious causality, inner processes (inner necessity) that is just as much a threat to moral responsibility and free will as force, coercion or undue influence by external agents.

4 - Because compatibilism fails to take inner necessity into account, it fails to establish compatibility and fails as an argument.


Consequently, you have no case to argue, which of course doesn't appear to stop you from trying, regardless.
 
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